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Universities are fascinating institutions. For almost 1,000 years, these corporations 
of teachers and scholars have been searching for knowledge and transmitting it. In 
carrying out this mission, universities are “things of unruly paradox”1 that operate as 
the birthplace and battlefield of ideas, constantly enlightening, challenging, solving, 
confounding, serving, criticizing, creating, reasoning, and frustrating both themselves 
and their stakeholders. And yet, focusing on my initial term above, universities 
are corporations too. In fact, universitas, the Latin root of the word, literally means 
“corporation” as in a company or guild.2 It’s odd, then, as institutions built on the 
very notion of knowing, that the people in and associated with universities know so 
little about them as corporations in the business-oriented sense of the word. That’s the 
charge I’m taking on in this book: to explain how the business of the university works, 
to provide a grounding in what people want to know and ought to know about how 
money really flows in and around these vital institutions.
Contemporary universities are part of a global higher education enterprise that 
has seen unprecedented expansion for decades, growing and succeeding, as the 
idiom says, like nobody’s business. The breadth and complexity of how universities 
are funded and operated make them, in a managerial and practical sense, utterly 
unlike any other business either. Nowhere are these observations truer than for 
universities in the US. During the twentieth century individual states invested in their 
higher education systems, sometimes more and sometimes less, while elite private 
universities continued to flourish. Simultaneously, the GI Bill, Pell Grant program 
and unprecedented research investments at the federal level propelled US higher 
education into a position of world leadership. These factors, along with the significant 
1  Ben Johnson, a past Chair of Emory University’s Board of Trustees, coined this redolent term when 
he said, “A great university is a thing of unruly paradox. It is a place of tranquil reflection and a 
testing place and indeed a battleground of outrageous ideas… It requires stability, yet is a catalyst for 
change. It teaches respect for boundaries, yet encourages pushing those boundaries. It is a place of 
self-conscious egalitarianism, yet a place of studied rank. It trains for the sacred, as well as the secular. 
It gleans from the past, to prepare for the future.” (Williams 2013)
2  The full Latin phrase describing an academic corporation is universitas magistrorum et scholarium, 
a “guild of masters and scholars” that had collective legal rights guaranteed by charter, was self-
regulating, and determined the qualifications of its members (Wikipedia 2019b).
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absence of unifying central control by a national ministry of education (unlike many 
other countries), produced a large, diverse system of universities and colleges and, 
importantly, an intensely competitive academic marketplace in which they function. 
US universities are constantly competing for students, for faculty, for facilities, and 
for the resources to support them and further fuel their success, and generally do 
so as nonprofits in a business environment like no other. And, US universities have 
graduated, like no other, tens of millions of people, redefining the middle class to 
such an extent that a college degree has replaced a high school diploma as the ticket 
to career success. Finally, add to all this our cultural embrace of universities, their 
simultaneously elitist and egalitarian aims, their parts in the concurrent pursuit of 
individualistic American dreams and civic Jeffersonian ideals, their uneasily parallel 
functions as engines of both social reproduction and of social change, their depictions 
in movies and novels as variously idyllic or sophomoric, the unique role of college 
sports, the considerable financial support by alumni and donors, and our obsession 
with ranking them. In both senses of the phrase then—of a lot happening and of being 
unlike any other—it’s no wonder that the responsibility of running a US university has 
grown like nobody’s business.
There are three broad aspects of running (i.e., administrating) a university: (1) 
supporting the academic mission through teaching and research programs involving 
primarily the faculty and students, as well as outreach/community engagement; (2) 
leading and managing the people, as in any enterprise, and including here the extensive 
specialized faculty and staff, administrators, and other employees of the institution; and 
(3) generating and managing the money that pays for it all, from revenue generation 
to expense allocation, including budgeting, accounting, finance and, increasingly, the 
nature of the business model. For the faculty, staff, students, alumni, and community 
members, of these three broad aspects, arguably none is associated with more mystery, 
confusion, myth or general lack of understanding than the third: money, and the 
business of the university, the corporation, that it represents.
A significant part of the university spends its time worrying about the first 
point, academics, especially those in the departments, schools, colleges, centers and 
institutes. Because the academic mission is the raison d’être of the university, how the 
academic part of the university works is generally well-understood by those who 
labor in it. Regarding the second point, people: although the faculty generally eschews 
issues of administration and management, non-academic employees are typically in 
the majority by a substantial margin—leading and managing people is something 
that many of them do every day. Furthermore, while there is always room for more 
to be written and learned about the practical science and elusive art of leading and 
managing people, especially in academia, there is nonetheless a significant literature 
already established on how to do so.
Yet the third point, money, is at best only partially understood by the vast majority 
of those who work on or with a campus. The sheer range and complexity of university 
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finances, when combined with the limited number of people on a campus with the 
expertise and institution-wide perspective to explain them means that, despite its vital 
role for the successful operation of the institution, this aspect of how a university works 
is poorly understood by many who need to know it better. Worse yet, there are serious 
misunderstandings and oversimplifications of university funding that are commonly 
held, both on campus and off, and which can lead to poorly-informed decisions and 
detrimental outcomes.
I’m not entirely sure why the ins and outs of university funding have ended up 
as such a mysterious topic, with connotations of secrets shared only by those in 
the know, but I hypothesize that it is the result of at least a few factors: university 
finances are inherently complicated; revenues have diversified faster than the general 
understanding thereof; and, administration has historically been a distraction from 
(and anathema to) academic pursuits. Taking each factor in turn, universities are 
complicated institutions and their finances reflect this fact.3 Ironically, public university 
budgets in all their detail are in fact public, but they are opaque to lay readers because 
of the necessary technical complexity required to appropriately reflect proper financial 
rules and institutional accounting practices. Next, university revenue has become far 
more diverse since the days of direct appropriations that covered most core costs. In 
public institutions, recent decades have seen a growth in fundraising that is starting 
to rival the privates, tuition is now a major revenue source, research funding is far 
larger from both government and private industry, and states have become minority 
shareholders in terms of the proportion of public university budgets that they fund. 
Tending to each source requires specialized expertise and experience beyond the realm 
of most university citizens. Furthermore, there is a longstanding social convention that 
faculty members don’t need or want to be distracted from their scholarly pursuits by 
the details of administration, which includes the realities of funding flows. Indeed, 
the role of administrator is often a derogatory stereotype, and faculty who take on 
administrative roles are half-jokingly said to have crossed over to “the dark side.” 
Likewise, some administrators can be tone deaf to faculty concerns. Much of that 
culture is understandable, if not constructive, and the blame for this state of affairs, 
as well as the responsibility to fix it, falls squarely on both sides. Still, an unfortunate 
side-effect of the oversimplified us-versus-them attitude is a naïve and sometimes 
misleading understanding of how the institution operates financially.
I can recall times as a junior faculty member when a senior colleague would opine 
that we were “paid to think” by society, sometimes with the added implication that 
teaching undergraduates was a necessary irritation. For most universities in the US, 
to the extent that such a self-absorbed view was ever even partially true, those days 
3  William McRaven, a decorated military commander who served as chancellor of the University 
of Texas system, described the position of university president as “the toughest job in the nation” 
(Thomason 2018) because of the multifaceted competing political and financial challenges of running 
such a complicated organization.
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are long gone.4 While the end of the era of more-or-less full public funding for US 
higher education is still bemoaned by many on campus, it doesn’t alter the fact that the 
halcyon days of public funding for higher education began to recede as long ago as the 
1970s and 1980s. This trend accelerated in the 1990s and became a stark reality with 
the Great Recession that arrived in late 2008. A business model based on increasing 
privatization and neoliberal precepts is simply the fact of life for a contemporary US 
campus, reflecting a substantial shift in higher education from a public good to a private 
good. While I personally don’t condone this shift, I am nonetheless a pragmatist: it is 
hard to argue against the reality that the success of a contemporary US university 
relies on it being able to function well in this economic environment.
Therefore, whether those of us in higher education like this situation or not,5 it is 
worth understanding how university funding works within institutions and across the 
higher education landscape. For example, at the microeconomic level, and as colleagues 
serving students and wanting to advance the university, it is essential that we better 
understand how and why we might increase funding for a program or initiative, or 
how we provide the necessary support services, or what the financial and academic 
trade-offs are among different approaches to delivering on the university’s academic 
mission. Further examples, at the macroeconomic level, include dealing with changes 
in college-going rates, federal funding, and the growth of online education. Perhaps 
because of the diversity of funding flows across a university, and how they intertwine to 
make these great institutions run, learning how it all works can be extremely valuable 
for many campus stakeholders. After all, as responsible members of the university 
community we should know how our institution works so that we can better enable 
the effective pursuit of knowledge and learning. This need has been made even more 
essential by the economic and financial effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on higher 
education.
This book is not a conventional text on higher education budgeting, finance 
or accounting, and I didn’t write it as a published scholarly expert on university 
funding—any expertise I have was learned on the job. There are some useful books out 
there that are by recognized scholars and/or are technical texts (Massy 2003; Weisbrod 
et al. 2008; Archibald and Feldman 2011; Kretovics 2011; Lombardi 2013; Serna and 
4  Clark Kerr, who was chancellor of UC Berkeley and then president of the University of California 
system during the boom years of the 1950s and 1960s, captured this tension with a metaphor (Moore 
et al. 2013), “The cherished view of some academics that higher education started out on the Acropolis 
of scholarship and was desecrated by descent into the Agora of materialistic pursuits led by ungodly 
commercial interests and scheming public officials and venal academic leaders is just not true for the 
university systems that have developed at least since 1200 A.D. If anything, higher education started 
in the Agora, the market place, at the bottom of the hill and ascended to the Acropolis on top of the 
hill… Mostly it has lived in tension, at one and the same time at the bottom of the hill, at the top of the 
hill, and on many paths in between.”
5  In a recent essay, Adam Daniel and Chad Wellmon (2018) argue that higher education’s insatiable 
appetite for acquiring more roles and complexity will be its undoing. They coin the term “omniversity” 
to replace Clark Kerr’s “multiversity” and contend that the university’s varied commitments are 
pulling it apart.
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Weiler 2016; Barr and McClellan 2018; D.O. Smith 2019). There are also some excellent 
recent volumes that are broader in scope and that touch on selected topics in this 
book (Bok 2013; Clotfelter 2017; Brint 2019; Geiger 2019). All of the above are valuable 
references for the eager reader. My aim with this book is slightly different: I would 
like it to serve the kind of reader who is interested in getting a grasp of the essentials 
of university funding in an approachable form, one that can engage a relative novice 
while also informing those readers with more background knowledge, and to do so 
comprehensively with a heavy emphasis on data and visuals. Thus, my intended 
audience is broad and includes administrators, faculty, staff and students on campus 
as well as alumni, parents, fans, community members, the media, board members, 
policy makers and others who deal with higher education. While it can certainly be 
read from start to finish, this book is designed so that the reader can “dip in” to a 
specific topic of interest in modular form. I have written the book I wish I’d had when 
I first had to discover how money flows in a university, i.e., as a non-expert faculty 
member who became an administrator and had to figure it out bit by bit. Since then, 
in countless budget presentations I’ve made as a central administrator, I have learned 
that most stakeholders in the university community are eager to learn how the money 
works to enable the successful functioning of the institution and their part thereof. 
As the questions flow in those talks, as they inevitably do, many in the audience are 
fascinated as the shrouds of mystery are removed, prompting even more queries and 
explanations. I’ve attempted to collect all those questions, asked from an everyday 
perspective and, in answering them, illuminate how the business of the university 
works and fits together.
In my experience, there is no more effective way to achieve this understanding than 
to use real-life facts and figures on university funding along with clear, even pithy, 
explanations. Better yet, if one starts with simple questions asked by many on campus, 
the resulting answers lead to more questions and greater engagement, developing 
precisely the clarity we desire. So, this book will “follow the money” or, more precisely, 
follow the data about how money flows in a university.6 While those flows are often 
complicated, and sometimes complex (there’s a difference), gaining an understanding 
of the basics of how money flows in a university is not hard. It just needs to be explained 
in everyday language with a minimum of financial and accounting jargon, exposing 
myth and misunderstanding with appropriate data analyses, and illustrating how 
things truly work with factful charts and graphics (Nyhan and Reifler 2019).
It’s easy for a financial topic to seem boring to a non-specialist, just as I have found 
that science can seem boring to non-scientists in my academic work. I remember a book 
from my kids’ childhood called The Big Book of Why (Perritano 2010) that presented 
6  The phrase “follow the money” was coined in the 1976 movie All the President’s Men to describe how 
to get to the bottom of financial dealings in the Watergate crisis. It has since been used widely in many 
contexts, sometimes without the negative connotation, as a verbal shorthand to understand how a 
process or organization really works. It’s used in that latter sense here.
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science nuggets in an appealing way to children, playing off intriguing (and sometimes 
impolite) questions and engaging graphics. A fine example of effective communication 
about business and economic issues to a non-specialist audience is Marketplace on 
public radio (Marketplace 2020)—it is engaging, literate and entertaining, and one 
of my favorite shows. As a comprehensive compendium for the non-expert there is 
no better model than Mark Bittman’s How to Cook Everything (Bittman 1998), another 
personal favorite. I’ve tried to incorporate a sense of those styles in this book to 
explain university funding to non-specialist readers. As a result, it is an introduction, 
a Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) list, a chartbook, a pictorial guide at times, a 
quick-start user’s handbook rather than a dense technical manual or, to use academic 
analogs, a summary akin to Cliffs Notes or a 101-level course on how the money works 
in a contemporary US university.
At one point the working title of this book was Seeing the Elephant, a reference to 
the ancient parable of the blind men, each touching a different part of an elephant 
and who, when each was asked to describe the animal he was touching, provided a 
completely different interpretation because he could only sense the part and not the 
whole. The person touching the trunk thought it might be a snake, the one touching 
a leg suggested a tree trunk, the one touching the tail supposed it was a rope, and so 
on. It’s an apt metaphor for the widespread poor or partial understanding of how 
contemporary US university funding works and how limited views from different 
stakeholders are projected onto the whole. As I learned when looking up the phrase, it 
also has a relevant second connotation that dates to Civil War times, meaning to have 
experienced action in combat, to have seen what lies over the hill, or to have overcome 
an adversity. In all senses I’ve certainly “seen the elephant” in my experiences as a 
faculty member and senior administrator—I hope to share some of those insights with 
you in this book.
Box 1.1. Early University Funding
The first independent universities not established by religious authorities emerged during 
medieval times in Europe (although the first full-fledged university-like institutions with 
religious affiliations were Taxila around 800 BCE and then Nalanda in 427 CE, both in 
what is now India, and Al-Quaraouiyine in 859 CE, in Morocco). The independence of 
the European universities was born in part from a desire for academic freedom, and the 
institutions were formed as corporations of scholars and students with an organizational 
structure and an elected leadership. The price of autonomy was a different funding 
model: tuition and fees. Initially the students contributed a donation in place of paying 
outright tuition because knowledge was considered to be given by God and therefore 
not able to be sold. Unsurprisingly, students did not always make their donations. No 
doubt the early bursar’s office, formal salaries, and the need for financial aid followed 
soon after!
1. Introduction  7
This development of independently funded institutions also marked the emergence 
of market forces in higher education because work conditions and the course of study 
had to meet expectations. Needing little or no specialized physical infrastructure, it was 
relatively easy for faculty or students to move to a different city and establish or join 
another competing institution (The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica 2016; University 
of Bologna 2018). For example, the University of Padua (est. 1222) was formed by a group 
that split off from the University of Bologna (est. 1088). Bologna is the oldest secular 
university and the Latin alma mater studiorum on its seal (Figure B1) means “nourishing 
mother of studies” (yes, the original alma mater), while Padua can boast Galileo Galilei 
as a former Chair of Mathematics (1592–1610) and both Nicolaus Copernicus and Elena 
Cornaro Piscopia, the first woman to receive a PhD, as alumni.
Figure B1.  Seals of the universities of Bologna (left) and Padua (right) including the year that 
each was established. Sources: University of Bologna, Image by Malinion (2016), 
Wikimedia, Public Domain, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d0/
Seal_of_the_University_of_Bologna.svg, and University of Padua, Image by OMT5500 
(2017), Wikimedia, Public Domain, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/it/5/53/
Logo_Universit%C3%A0_Padova.svg.
1.2 Structure
The business of the university can be thought of as having six major functional elements 
(Figure 1.1). The foundation of university funding is students, the community and 
broader society. Together they support the core threefold academic mission pillars 
of teaching, research and public service. University business is coordinated by the 
administration, and it is in turn overseen by external groups such as the state or trustees 
(that represent the foundational broader community). The hierarchy of service is 
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primarily to students and the broader community (the principal stakeholders served by 
the university) and then successively to the remaining layers, which can also influence 
each other. The hierarchy of management is the other way around, with universities 
chartered and presidents appointed by states and/or a board of regents/trustees. 
The organizational chart proceeds down through administration to employees in the 
academic functions. Money flows between and within these functional elements, often 
in complicated ways among the academic pillars, where individual employees and 
units often have overlapping responsibilities across all three academic mission areas.
Figure 1.1. Schematic of the six major functional elements of the university.
As we discuss the various parts that make up these major functional elements and 
how they work financially, you will see this overall structure represented throughout 
the book. The chapters don’t all correspond directly to the six-element structure 
because there is more detail to the functional organization in practice (skip ahead 
to Figure 5.1 if you’re interested) and I thus expand upon several areas with distinct 
funding characteristics. Following this introductory chapter, Chapters 2 and 3 focus on 
institutional revenues and expenditures and Chapter 4 covers public funding, with all 
three of these chapters connecting to the external elements at the top of Figure 1.1, as 
well as the foundational student and community elements at the base. The remaining 
chapters deal with internal components of the university, starting with Chapter 5 on 
the human resources of instructional and support staff. The next four chapters move 
on to the mission pillars: Chapter 6 focuses on academic affairs and Chapter 7 covers 
associated student affairs and support services, Chapter 8 covers research activities and 
Chapter 9 covers public service, including extension services. We shift to facilities and 
finance in Chapter 10, and then we consider the somewhat different funding models 
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and we circle back to community again in Chapter 13 to focus on fundraising. Chapter 
14 concludes the book by examining outcomes and considering the future.
1.3 Budgets don’t make decisions, people do
It’s not too early to point out something fundamental, something that is easy to forget 
when discussing university funding: at all times we must ensure that decisions are 
made first on the basis of academic and societal priorities. Budgets are unquestionably 
a vital component of decision-making and they can enable or constrain activity, 
sometimes dramatically, but it is a mistake to let budgets be the core driver of decisions. 
Even when there is not enough money (which is most of the time, see Bowen’s Law 
in Section 3.7) the decision is more that the proposed activity cannot be prioritized 
over other competing priorities given the available resources. We should never lose 
sight of human agency in making money-related decisions about the business of the 
university—competing priorities are assessed and assigned to deliver on the mission 
of the university (i.e., ultimately, even if an individual decision is a smaller one).
Expressed another way, in a nonprofit enterprise such as most universities, the 
“bottom line” on the balance sheet is not dollars (by definition, that is held to zero). 
Our threefold bottom line is comprised of students graduated, knowledge discovered, 
and impact on the community. Universities are social enterprises operating under 
business constraints while, in contrast, companies are business enterprises operating 
under social constraints. Companies exist to make a profit. Universities exist to make 
graduates, knowledge, and societal impact (see Box 3.2).
The pursuit of financial resources to support those social goods consumes a 
substantial amount of time and effort for many on campus. Money is, quite literally, 
the means by which we carry out the business of the university, albeit a tool that works 
for us and not the other way around.
1.4 Notes on data
As I mentioned earlier, I employ data extensively to illustrate and explain concepts 
throughout this book. Most of the data I present can be found in openly accessible 
reports, online data warehouses, and books. It is all regular stuff for those who 
specialize in higher education institutional finance and data analytics. However, while 
much of the information appears individually in those places, this wide range of data 
is rarely pulled together in one place to tell a comprehensive overall story such as I lay 
out in the coming chapters.
A quick pedantic note: data are plural. I’m trained as a scientist and I served as a 
journal editor, and therefore I am compelled to say, “data are” rather than “data is” 
or “these data” rather than “this data” and so on. Data are like staff, or the faculty, a 
collective noun. Technically, the singular of data is datum, but that is too fussy even for 
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me. I prefer data point, data element, etc., just as we would say staff member or faculty 
member (and not “a faculty” to refer to an individual person as I’ve sometimes heard 
in stifled horror!).
The largest and most comprehensive publicly accessible repository of higher 
education data is IPEDS, the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, run 
by the US Department of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics (US 
Department of Education 2020b), hereafter referenced as IPEDS (2020). It is a veritable 
trove of information where you can find many useful summaries as well as technical 
details just a few clicks into the data section. I have made extensive use of IPEDS’s 
financial and related data in this book. Where necessary for comparison, I have used 
the closest corresponding categories to allow for technical accounting differences 
applicable to public and private institutions, and known by their acronyms, GASB and 
FASB, respectively (US Department of Education 2018). I’ve augmented the IPEDS 
data with useful information from reports, academic papers, and statistical websites, 
and I cite specific data sources in each case.
Inflation adjustments were made using Consumer Price Index (CPI) data from 
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2018b) to convert financial trend data to constant 
dollars. As a technical detail, I utilized the standard CPI-Urban values for January to 
reflect the midpoint of each fiscal year.
There are literally thousands of colleges and universities in the US, each with its 
own set of data. In many analyses it is useful to draw on the overall average or a set 
of group averages as the clearest way to illustrate key patterns. Thus, I have selected 
a large cross-section of schools with varying characteristics that represent the range 
of institutions in the US, essentially all of the public and private nonprofit four-year 
institutions in the country. My selection criteria were as follows, using IPEDS (2020):
• US only
• Title IV participating (i.e., participating in federal financial aid programs)
• Control:
◦ Public, four-year or above
◦ Private nonprofit, four-year or above (i.e., excludes two-year and for-
profit institutions)
• Carnegie Classification 2015
◦ Doctoral Universities: Highest Research Activity (R1)
◦ Doctoral Universities: Higher Research Activity (R2)
◦ Doctoral Universities: Moderate Research Activity (R3)
◦ Master’s Colleges & Universities: Larger Programs (M1)
◦ Master’s Colleges & Universities: Medium Programs (M2)
◦ Master’s Colleges & Universities: Small Programs (M3)
1. Introduction  11
◦ Baccalaureate Colleges: Arts & Sciences Focus (BAS)(i.e., excludes 
professional schools or colleges with special focus)
• Has full-time first-time undergraduates (i.e., not graduate-only)
• Branch campuses reporting separate financial information
• Valid data for common variables and years analyzed
The resulting data set covers most universities and four-year colleges across the nation 
and includes 468 public and 706 private institutions, for a total of 1174 in the data set. 
The Carnegie Classification (Indiana University Center for Postsecondary Research 
2015) provides useful categories representing academic level, size and scope. I have 
collapsed the smaller Carnegie institution types into one group because their financial 
profiles are broadly similar, producing four categories: R1, R2, R3-M3 and BAS. I 
have selected only nonprofit institutions to keep the scope of the book consistent and 
because for-profit colleges, by definition, operate under a separate suite of financial 
and academic conditions. The set of selected institutions is summarized in Figure 
1.2 and mapped in Figure 1.3. A listing of the institutions in the data set appears in 
Appendix A. This set is used throughout the book where possible, in order to make 
comparisons consistent and easy to understand.
Figure 1.2. Number of public and private institutions in each Carnegie category of the data set used 
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Figure 1.3.  All 1174 universities and colleges in the data set, showing location, Carnegie Classification, 










2.1 How big is the university budget?
University budgets range from a few million dollars at small colleges to several billion 
dollars at the largest universities (Figure 2.1). Dealing with millions of dollars is 
unfamiliar to most people, let alone dealing with billions. Once we examine the details 
throughout the book you will be far better acquainted with what makes up these 
numbers and hopefully find them easier to grasp. Note that these revenue numbers 
are not the same as university endowments, which are more commonly reported in the 
media; we’ll cover those in Chapter 13.
Figure 2.1.  Average total institutional budget (FY2017 non-hospital revenues) for the universities 
and colleges in the data set, by Carnegie classification and control. Source: IPEDS (2020).
These budget numbers are simply the total of what it takes to run the business of the 
university in a given year. Technically, the amounts in Figure 2.1 are revenues (money 
coming in) and not expenditures (what was spent to cover costs), but because we are 
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dealing with nonprofits where we allocate essentially all income to expenditures, the 
two amounts are similar in practice unless the institution is in dire financial straits or 
receives windfall income. We’ll cover expenditures in Chapter 3.
For comparative consistency, Figure 2.1 excludes hospital revenues because some 
universities formally include a hospital in their reported budgets. Many universities 
with medical schools have affiliated hospitals run as independent corporations, even 
if the hospital name is university-related, and those hospital finances are reported 
independently. Either way, academic medical school finance and administration are 
distinct from those of a hospital, although they are often highly dependent thereon. 
We’ll examine hospitals, medical schools and health sciences in Chapter 11.
It’s clear from Figure 2.1 that the nation’s major research institutions can have truly 
large budgets that reflect their comprehensive scope as well as their sheer size. This 
holds true as we look across the categories to medium universities and to baccalaureate 
colleges, where the latter are focused on providing an educational environment that 
is purposely small, undergraduate-only, and liberal arts oriented. At this level of 
aggregation, the distinctions between public and private institutions are not especially 
remarkable, but as we get into more detail in later sections we’ll see some significant 
differences emerge.
Institutional size and budget are closely correlated, as plotted in Figure 2.2. Across 
types of institution, average budgets scale in an almost perfect linear relationship with 
the number of employees and scale almost as well in terms of student enrollment 
(especially if one considers public and private institutions separately). As a quick 
guide, if you don’t know the size of the budget for your own institution, you can 
approximate it by simple comparison to similarly sized institutions in these data. 
All institutions publish an annual financial statement or report, and you can always 
find the definitive number for your school in that document. Although the size of the 
institutional budget enables coarse comparisons such as those above, alone it doesn’t 
tell us much more than size itself. The interesting parts are what accounts for those 
revenues and the matching expenditures. The rest of the book covers all of that and 
more.
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Figure 2.2.  FY2017 total non-hospital revenues compared to total FTE employees (upper) and 
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Box 2.1. Universities in the Fortune 500?
How do the larger university enterprises compare to the size of companies, just for 
interest’s sake, given that they are different creatures? Fortune magazine publishes an 
annual listing of companies by revenue. The current threshold for number 500 is ~$5.4B 
and for number 1000 it is ~$1.8B (Fortune 2018). As a guide, recognizable names close 
to number 500 are Harley Davidson and Western Union, and close to number 1000 are 
Tribune Media and Vail Resorts. For FY2016 data, eight of the biggest public and private 
US R1 universities have total revenues (including hospitals) that would put them in the 
Fortune 500 (Figure B2). A further 41 R1 universities would be in the Fortune 1000. Using 
the chart-topper, Penn, its FY2016 total revenues were $9.5B, of which $5.3B were from 
its hospital. Just two of these eight, NYU and Johns Hopkins, do not include hospitals 
in their budgets, and if we exclude hospital revenues from the others, only these would 
squeak into the Fortune 500 at $5.6B and $5.5B respectively, with Stanford just missing the 
cut at $5.1B. Taking the comparison beyond revenues, the median number of employees 
for companies in positions 490–500 is 10,550 people, which is somewhat smaller than the 
median of 17,548 for these eight schools, likely because higher education and healthcare 
are relatively labor-intensive sectors.
Figure B2.  The eight US universities with the highest revenues in FY2016 that exceeded the Fortune 
500 threshold of $5.4B. Source: IPEDS (2020).
2.2 How big is the university by enrollment size and growth?
We acknowledged the obvious importance of student enrollments in the previous 
section on budget size, so let’s take a closer look. Enrollment is the most commonly 
cited measure of university size. As a metric, it is an excellent example of how variable 
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definitions are critically important (and infuriating to the uninitiated) because the 
truth is that there isn’t one correct answer to the question, “how many students 
are at your university?” The simplest metric would appear to be total headcount—
all individuals registered as students—but even that’s complicated. Consider the 
following non-exhaustive list that can influence the answer, in which I’ve included 
the IPEDS Fall enrollment definition in parentheses for context (US Department of 
Education 2019b):
• What if some students are doing two degrees at the same time, do we count 
them twice? (no);
• What about students just taking the odd class who are non-degree seeking? 
(yes);
• And those who are only auditing classes? (no);
• There are many part-time students, should we use full-time equivalent (FTE) 
numbers instead? (no);
• Do we include online students? (yes);
• Include students at the main campus only or include those at branch 
campuses and off-campus locations? (domestic = yes, international = no);
• What about those taking remedial courses or English as a Second Language 
before they take regular college courses? (yes);
• Undergraduates only or are graduate students included too? (yes, count all);
• Do we count professionals registered for continuing professional education 
classes? (no).
As you can see, there are dozens of permutations that each lead to a different number 
for the “how many students” question. Thus, the right answer is that it depends on 
how the number will be used. For example, in Figure 2.2 in the previous section, 
I used FTE enrollment because it arguably aligns better with resource-related 
amounts like revenue. If we were interested in student-faculty ratios then some 
version of headcount would be better. There are still further details (e.g., which day 
of the semester to use as the census day) but at this point you get the idea as to why 
official enrollment numbers can be simultaneously accurate and yet different for one 
institution at any given time.1
The IPEDS enrollment headcount definition is designed for consistency and 
comparison across many institutions, and it is the basic metric of institutional size, 
so let’s take a closer look. Figure 2.3 shows total Fall enrollment broken out for 
undergraduate and graduate students for two individual years that are three decades 
1  Similar challenges of multiple variable definitions apply to much of the financial data we’ll be looking 
at too. I’ll be sure to point out where definitions might make an important difference to how we 
interpret the data.
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apart, FY1987 and FY2017. The Carnegie classification is closely tied to size, and 
indeed we see a steady scaling by institution type from the large R1 schools to the 
small baccalaureates. Public institutions have higher average enrollments than private 
ones, category for category, and as it happens private schools have enrollments that 
are roughly the size of the next smaller category of public school (i.e., R1 privates are 
similar in size to R2 publics, and so on down).
Figure 2.3.  FY1987 and FY2017 total Fall enrollment (i.e., headcount, including part-time and full-
time) of undergraduate students and graduate and first professional (e.g., JD, MD) 
students, averaged by Carnegie classification and control. Source: IPEDS (2020).
Figure 2.3 also shows that the average number and proportion of graduate students 
differs between public and private universities, especially at R1 and R2 institutions, 
which the bulk of them attend. The majority of them are master’s and doctoral (PhD) 
students but this group also includes what are known as first professional doctor’s 
degrees such as those in law (JD), medicine (MD), pharmacy (PharmD), veterinary 
medicine (DVM) and a number of other fields. The percentage of graduate students 
is about 25% and 20% at R1 and R2 publics respectively, while it is over 50% and 
about 35% at R1 and R2 privates respectively. There are several dimensions to those 
differences related to revenue and funding for graduate students that we will explore 
in parts of Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
Enrollments have grown at virtually every type of institution over the last three 
decades, as illustrated by absolute numbers in Figure 2.3 and by relative growth over 
time in Figure 2.4. Most types of school grew their total enrollment by 30–40% over that 
period (a little over 1% annual growth on average). Enrollment growth was alternately 
faster and slower by decade: fast in the late 1980s, slow in the 1990s, faster again in 
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the 2000s, and then slower in the 2010s. Enrollment growth is counter-cyclical with 
economic and unemployment conditions, although not across the board at all kinds 
of institution or across all demographic groups (Dellas and Sakellaris 2003; Schmidt 
2018; Li et al. 2019); while it is widely observed and assumed, this general tendency 
for people to enroll in or return to university studies during tougher economic times 
or vice-versa when the economy and employment are strong is just that: a tendency, 
and not a hard and fast rule.
Figure 2.4.  Growth in total enrollment (all undergraduate, graduate and first professional students) 
relative to FY1987, averaged by Carnegie classification and control. The vertical bar 
indicates the onset of the Great Recession. Source: IPEDS (2020).
There are three types of institution whose enrollment growth trends stand out from the 
others. R3-M3 private schools grew in enrollment at double the typical rate (80% over 
the same period, about 2% annually), disproportionately in graduate students. This 
sector is dominated by a handful of schools with massive growth in online enrollments 
(see Section 6.11). The baccalaureate colleges make up the other two atypical trends. 
Private baccalaureate institutions have seen flat growth rates for fifteen or so years, 
while the small number of public baccalaureate schools have had declining growth 
over that period and have actually shrunk in absolute size by about 10% since the 
Great Recession.
As with basic budget sizes, basic enrollment numbers don’t tell us much more than 
size itself. Again, the interesting parts are what accounts for these enrollment patterns 
and what they mean for the business of the university. There’s plenty of that to come 
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2.3 Are budgets growing or shrinking over time?
Budgets at four-year colleges and universities have grown steadily over time. Figure 
2.5 illustrates how revenues have generally increased with occasional brief periods of 
decline during economic downturns. The effects of the Great Recession on revenues 
are especially noticeable in FY2009. Notice also that revenues tend to fluctuate more 
than expenditures although the trend is essentially the same for both—we’ll cover 
more detail on expenditures in Chapter 3. Even with economic fluctuations the broad 
increasing trend has been present for many decades (see Chapter 4).
Figure 2.5.  Trends in revenues and expenses (current dollars not adjusted for inflation or enrollment) 
by fiscal year averaged across the four public and private institution types. The vertical 
bar indicates the onset of the Great Recession. Source: IPEDS (2020).
The trend is sufficiently steep (4.4% per year for publics and 4.2% per year for privates 
in Figure 2.5) that it is twice the 2% general rate of inflation for this period (US Bureau 
of Labor Statistics 2018a), with the result that institutional budgets have essentially 
doubled over these fifteen years.2 For those of us that have worked on campuses since 
the early 2000s, it certainly doesn’t feel like our institutions now have twice as much 
money as we did back then—but despite the cognitive dissonance of this trend against 
the lived experience of multiple budget cuts, the data don’t lie! The brief and absolutely 
crucial explanation is that these trends are not adjusted for inflation or for increasing 
enrollments that together account for almost all of the trend (skip ahead to Section 
2  Although they are beyond our scope here, it is interesting to note for context that recent revenue 
trends have been flat at four-year for-profit institutions. Furthermore, at two-year institutions, recent 
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2.10 to see how the adjusted revenue trends are essentially flat). Also, underlying costs 
have also been rising inexorably (we’ll see much more on these topics when we cover 
expenditures in Chapter 3 and public funding in Chapter 4).
You may be wondering why the revenue fluctuations are relatively large for the 
privates compared to the publics. That’s because a key source of revenue for each is 
driven by different fundamentals: the publics receive allocations from state revenue, 
which is based on taxes and thus responds to broad economic conditions, in contrast 
to the privates, which do not receive state allocations and instead rely on endowment 
and investment revenues that are closely tied to the comparatively higher volatility of 
the stock market. We’ll look at all the major sources of revenue in the next few sections, 
and endowments in Chapter 13.
2.4 Where does the revenue come from?
Universities and colleges generate revenues from many sources. The average revenue 
picture across all types of four-year colleges and universities is shown in Figure 2.6. 
The revenue mix changes depending on the type of institution, public or private and 
large or small (see Section 2.5 coming up next). However, looking at the broad public 
and private averages first is a straightforward way to get a feel for the basics before 
we delve into crucial differences between types of schools. Two data notes: (i) here 
and in other similar figures I’ve used the average across types of schools to better 
show the central tendency, instead of the simple overall average that would be skewed 
towards the more numerous smaller schools in the set; (ii) for comparability across 
institutions, I have omitted hospital revenues where applicable, per the discussion in 
previous sections.
Figure 2.6. Share of FY2017 non-hospital revenues averaged across types of public and private 
institutions. Source: IPEDS (2020).
Public Private
Tuition & Fees State Appropriations Investment Income Grants & Contracts Auxiliaries Gifts Other
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The most important take-home point in this section is that tuition and fees are the 
dominant source of revenue. While certain types of institutions have always relied 
heavily on tuition, as an across-the-board pattern in all sizes of public and private 
universities, this is a relatively recent development involving several factors (see 
the rest of this chapter). Note that Figure 2.6 shows net tuition and fee revenue after 
subtracting discounts (e.g., scholarships and fellowships paid with institutional 
funds). Gross tuition and fee revenue can sometimes include a third to half as much 
again beyond net revenue (see Section 2.8). Tuition revenue is important not only 
because of its size, but also because it can be spent broadly and used to pay salaries 
and operating expenses (see Section 2.11).
People new to university budgeting are often surprised to learn that state 
appropriations are nowadays a relatively small part of institutional revenues, because 
they imagine (reasonably enough) that a state would be the signature funding source 
for a state university. For medium and large publics in particular, that has not been 
the case for many decades, and as a result those institutions have diversified their 
revenue sources over time. State allocations are still a critical revenue source in most 
public institutions, however, because of their role as a primary funding source that 
enables the institution to leverage additional funds such as grants and philanthropy 
(see Chapters 8 and 13).
Investment income can be thought of as the private university counterpart to 
state income, serving as the signature revenue source for private colleges (as state 
revenue is for publics). While it is not typically the major source of revenue on a 
private campus, investment income is nonetheless a critical revenue source. One 
difference, as we’ve already seen in Section 2.3, is that investment income is relatively 
more volatile and private colleges must allow for that in their financial planning. 
For example, Figure 2.6 uses FY2017 data, a good year for investment income, but 
in FY2016 many private institutions experienced low or negative investment income. 
There is a popular impression that private colleges in general are awash in investment 
income proceeds from their substantial endowments. This is not the typical situation 
and the misconception likely stems from conditions found only at the wealthiest (and 
hence highly visible and influential) private institutions (see Chapter 13 for more on 
this topic).
Grants and contracts can form a sizable portion of overall revenues, especially at 
larger research-oriented institutions. The Federal Government is the dominant source 
of these funds, although state and local governments and private industry are also 
significant sources. An important distinction is that these sponsored projects almost 
always involve restricted funds, because the funds are obtained and can only be 
expended for the purposes of the project. By definition, then, they are not to be used 
for the everyday running of the institution, and instead they augment the activities of 
the university. See Chapter 8 for more detail on research funding including direct costs 
and indirect cost recovery (the much maligned and misunderstood “overhead”).
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Auxiliaries are units within the university that are largely or wholly self-funded 
through a direct cost-recovery mechanism. Examples of auxiliaries include residence 
halls, dining services, bookstores, parking, and sometimes the athletics department. 
This slice of the pie in Figure 2.6 is largely committed because the revenues are used 
directly to pay for the activity that generates them. Well-run auxiliaries can generate a 
modest margin for investment in other priorities.
Gifts have always been a critical component of the budget for the privates, and 
increasingly they are a vital source of revenue at the publics too. Gift revenues come 
from new gifts each year made to the institution or its foundation(s). Gift revenue is 
distinct from investment income earned on the endowment (that is built on gifts from 
prior years). Fundraising, gifts and endowments are covered in Chapter 13.
Finally, there are countless other activities that generate smaller portions of revenue 
that vary by institution. For simplicity, these are all lumped together in the “Other” 
category in Figure 2.6.
2.5 How does the revenue mix differ by type of institution?
A useful way to appreciate the differences in institutional revenue mix is to compare 
portfolios by type and control of the school. Figure 2.7 shows pie charts that break 
out the same FY2017 data used in the previous section, illustrating several significant 
distinctions between the categories of institutions. For the publics, both tuition and state 
funding comprise a progressively larger portion of overall revenue as one shifts from 
large to medium and smaller schools. Conversely, the portion of revenue from grants 
and contracts diminishes across the span from large to small campuses, especially 
at the privates. For smaller publics, almost two-thirds of their revenue comes from 
tuition and state appropriations in roughly equal proportions.
For the privates, there are several notable differences. Needless to say, there is no state 
funding. For R1 privates, if one substitutes investment income for state appropriation 
as a functional parallel, then the rest of the budget mix is not unlike the R1 publics. The 
relative role of investment income declines with type for the other privates, although it 
rises in importance at the baccalaureate colleges. Another distinction across all private 
institutions is that, as expected, gift revenues are clearly a bigger part of the budget 
than at the publics. For medium and small privates, grants and contracts (essentially 
research revenues) are a relatively smaller portion of the budget, even compared to 
their similarly-sized public counterparts.
The dominance of tuition as a revenue source for the medium and small privates 
is clear, where it can form half or more of the institution’s revenue. Many articles have 
been written in the popular and higher education press about small privates being 
overly tuition-dependent in an unforgiving market, leading to a precarious financial 
standing and the risk of closure in some cases (Seltzer 2018). In contrast, at elite private 
baccalaureate colleges the relative role of tuition can diminish to about one third of 
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revenues and investment income can instead make up a sizable portion of revenue, 
averaging about 25%.
Presidents and chancellors, and their senior leadership teams, are usually acutely 
aware of their institutional revenue profile. They typically pay a lot of attention to 
developing strategies that can sustain current sources of revenue and grow additional 
income streams to support the academic mission. This awareness and attention to the 
revenue portfolio holds across all types of institution, even though some must deal 
with the reality of a more narrowly constrained business model than others.
2.6 How much is tuition?
Before looking at the details of tuition and fee revenue, it is useful to start with 
published tuition rates (the “sticker price” using the car sales analogy) and explore 
the details from there. In Figure 2.8 I’ve shown these data for entering undergraduates 
in FY2018 including the out-of-state portion for the publics. Naturally, the overall 
totals as well as the breakout details all vary by institution. Fees in these data are those 
that all students are required to pay, which are also different from place to place and 
variously include fees for information technology, student health service, library, new 
students, activities, athletics, and so on. These fees exclude those that vary by degree 
program or individual course fees—the annual total for them will differ individually 
by student and term. Program fees can sometimes add substantially to the overall 
amount in professional programs (e.g., engineering) and can be significantly more 
than regular tuition for special graduate programs such as an executive MBA.
Figure 2.8.  Published FY2018 annual undergraduate tuition and required fees by control and 
Carnegie classification, showing in-state tuition as well as combined additional tuition 



























Like Nobody's Business26 
Still, most students pay less than the full published rate, so one cannot simply multiply 
a university’s enrollment by the posted tuition to obtain its realized tuition revenue. 
Financial aid, in the form of both need-based and non-need-based aid (sometimes 
called merit aid), is available to every student and is contingent on family income as 
well as individual academic preparation (see Sections 7.5, 7.10 and 7.11 for more about 
price, affordability and debt). In addition to discounting with aid, further factors in the 
tuition revenue mix include international students and, at the publics, the proportion of 
in-state and out-of-state students, as well as online students, those attending summer 
sessions, and the mix of part-time to full-time students (see Sections 3.6 and 6.11). It 
takes a lot of important and detailed accounting, almost constantly throughout the 
year, to figure all these details and arrive at the institutional tuition and fee revenue.
2.7 How fast has tuition increased, and why?
Annual increases in published tuition and fees routinely garner media attention, 
shaping public opinion on the perceived costs of higher education. Even after 
adjusting for inflation, tuition and fees at all types of institutions have been trending 
upward for many years, consistently so since the early 1980s (Figure 2.9). Over the last 
three decades, published tuition and fees have approximately tripled in real terms, 
with average annual rates of 3.9% for in-state and 3.5% for out-of-state students at the 
publics, and 2.9% at the privates.
Figure 2.9.  Inflation-adjusted trends in published annual undergraduate tuition and required fees 
at public (in-state and out-of-state amounts) and private institutions, FY1964–2018, in 
2016 dollars. Prior to FY1988, private institution data include for-profit institutions. The 
vertical bar indicates the onset of the Great Recession. Source: NCES Digest (National 
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What is driving these increases? It is easy to jump to convenient conclusions and blame 
various supposed causes, such as administrative bloat, high faculty salaries, students 
demanding resort-like amenities, or reduced government support. In reality, it is 
not all these things, but instead a combination of fundamental economic forces that 
include some of these factors and some others—the core explanation on the causes of 
rising costs is in Section 3.7, with additional material in Chapter 4 on state funding, 
and in Section 7.5 on discounting.
2.8 What is included in tuition and fee revenue?
Net tuition and fees are those that remain after subtracting discounts and allowances 
(essentially financial aid) from the gross tuition and fee budget, as illustrated in Figure 
2.10. A sizable portion of aid comes from unrestricted university revenues, which one 
can think of as tuition revenue that is simultaneously “recycled” back to students as 
aid, with the remainder from restricted funds (gifts), Pell grants and other federal, 
state and local grants administered by the university. On average, for all degree levels 
and students, the overall aid-related revenue discount is about 39%, made up of 
the overall institutional revenue discount at about 26% and an overall government 
revenue discount of about 13%. These discounts to revenue are closely related to, but 
not the same as, the undergraduate tuition discount rate that is often simply called the 
discount rate. Given the vital role of tuition revenue, both discount calculations are 
key metrics for institutions to monitor and manage in tandem with recruiting as part 
of enrollment management (see Section 7.5 for more on tuition discount rates).
Figure 2.10.  Percentages of FY2016 gross tuition and fee budget (all degree levels) comprised of 
net tuition and fee revenue and associated financial aid expenditures, averaged across 
types of institutions. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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Figure 2.11 shows how aid discounts to revenue differ across types of institution. As 
one might expect, institutional aid is by far the dominant form of aid at the privates, 
averaging 44% at the small baccalaureate colleges and over 30% at other privates. At 
the publics the combined institutional aid is about 17%, but combined government 
aid plays a far larger role at public institutions. At the large publics, government aid is 
just under half of all aid, and at the smaller regional publics and public baccalaureate 
colleges it is over half of all financial aid, highlighting the critical role the smaller publics 
fulfil in affordability and access (see also Chapter 7). Unsurprisingly, institutions with 
higher tuition tend to discount at a higher rate and vice-versa, with correlations of 
0.73 and 0.65 respectively for in-state and out-of-state, which leads one to how much 
revenue an institution spends per student (see Section 3.3). Nationwide, aid discounts 
have been trending higher in recent decades—see more on tuition discount rates in 
Section 7.5.
Figure 2.11.  Average FY2016 aid discounts (for all degree levels) averaged by Carnegie classification 
and control. Unrestricted and restricted institutional aid comprise the total institutional 
aid; Pell grants and other federal, state and local grants comprise government aid. 
Source: IPEDS (2020).
2.9 How much revenue do institutions receive per student?
As we saw earlier in Section 2.3, gross revenues to higher education have risen over 
time. Increasing enrollments at new and existing institutions (plus inflation) make up 
most of the trend in increasing revenues and expenditures and so, to gain a comparable 
understanding of budgets across institutions, we often express data in terms of 
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FTE enrollment, including undergraduates as well as graduate and professional 
students.
Figure 2.12 illustrates FY2017 revenues per FTE student enrolled across types of 
institutions, now in dollars rather than in relative percentage terms as we introduced 
in the preceding sections. Note that these are core revenues that exclude auxiliaries, 
hospitals, and independent operations. The most obvious feature is that average 
revenues per FTE at private R1 universities dwarf all others. Revenues per FTE at 
private R2 universities and private baccalaureate colleges exceed revenues at all types 
of public institution on average (R3-M3 private institutions receive about the same as 
the smaller publics). At all types of institution, revenue components generally scale by 
size, even after the per-FTE adjustment, although there is a notable difference at the 
baccalaureate colleges that have relatively higher state appropriations at the publics 
and relatively higher investment returns at the privates.
Returning to the large revenues at R1 private universities, although they are 
prominent in name and reputation, these institutions have only half the enrollment 
of R1 publics on average (~17,000 versus ~32,000), which has the effect of increasing 
the per-FTE revenue amounts. Also, as we’ll see in the next section, investment returns 
are volatile from year to year and, particularly at R1 privates, they can range from the 
largest to the smallest (and even negative) component of the budget depending on the 
year. For example, the $63,000 in investment return per FTE at R1 privates in FY2017 
was just $3,600 in FY2016.
Figure 2.12.  FY2017 core revenues per full-time equivalent (FTE) student enrollment averaged by 
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Figure 2.13.  Trends in core revenues per FTE of student enrollment (2016 dollars) by fiscal year, 
averaged across public institutions (upper panel) and private institutions (lower panel). 
The vertical bar indicates the onset of the Great Recession. Gifts and investment return 
at public institutions were combined with other core revenue prior to FY2010; dashed 
lines indicate estimated amounts based on their FY2010 proportions. Investment return 
amounts below zero (losses) in FY2009 and FY2016 at private institutions are indicated 
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2.10 What are the trends in per-student revenues?
We covered overall higher education trends in both revenues and expenditures earlier 
in Section 2.3 and in short, before adjusting for enrollment and inflation, they are 
upward. Now that we have discussed revenues on a per-student basis, we move on to 
revenue trends per student FTE adjusted for inflation (per Section 1.4). To aid clarity, 
I’ve shown the per-FTE core revenue trends in separate panels for public and private 
institutions (Figure 2.13), and just at that aggregated level because the patterns by 
Carnegie type across the years are generally consistent with the proportions in Figure 
2.12 above.
Starting with the publics, over the last dozen years, tuition revenue has climbed from 
$6,628 to $8,797 per FTE, averaging 2.9% per year. State revenues dropped from almost 
$9,300 per FTE right before the recession to about $7,000 per FTE four to five years 
later with a $700 rebound since then. Grants and contracts are shown for completeness 
but obviously they are not directly related to student enrollment. Private gifts and 
investment income are both relatively small components at the publics; gifts increased 
from about $1,600 to $2,100 per FTE, while investment returns per FTE averaged under 
$1,000 but varied by hundreds of dollars from year to year. Significantly, total core 
revenues per FTE at public institutions (Figure 2.14) have decreased over the twelve 
years, from $35,893 to $33,436, an average reduction of -0.84% annually.
Figure 2.14.  Trends in total core revenues per FTE of student enrollment (2016 dollars) by fiscal year, 
averaged across public institutions and private institutions. The vertical bar indicates 
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At the privates, the volatility in investment returns is the most notable feature (Figure 
2.13). Over the last twelve years it has been nominally centered around $15,000 per 
FTE but has frequently been double or half that amount. The massive losses of FY2009 
are clear, and even in “normal” years these revenues can be close to zero or as high 
as $30,000 per FTE. Managing institutional finances with this kind of volatility can 
be challenging, particularly at the private R1 universities where investment returns 
can approach half the overall budget. Financial officers must budget these revenues 
conservatively, estimating the level that produces a reasonably constant funding 
stream from year to year by keeping funds in reserve from the good years to cover 
the bad years. We’ll examine cash on hand and related financial issues in Chapter 
10. Average tuition revenue increased from $18,760 to $21,503 per FTE, about 1.3% 
annually over the twelve years. Gifts rose from about $11,000 to about $12,000 over the 
period, averaging a 1.2% annual increase. It is crucial to note that total core revenues 
per FTE at private institutions (Figure 2.14) have been essentially flat (with high 
volatility) over the twelve years, as well as the post-recession years.
I want to reiterate just how important the trends are in Figure 2.14: in contrast to 
claims of rampant increases that use unadjusted numbers, on a per-student basis and 
adjusted for inflation, FY2006–2017 total core institutional revenues decreased at the 
publics and were flat at the privates.
2.11 Why isn’t all revenue treated the same way?
All money is green, as the saying goes, although at universities and other nonprofits 
the source of funds and their intended use lead to various shades of green with 
different associated allowable expenditures (Figure 2.15). This is what is meant by 
different “colors of money” in accounting slang on some campuses. We’ll leave the 
technicalities of fund accounting to the experts, but there are some relevant peculiarities 
that attentive campus citizens should be aware of. I’ve briefly mentioned the big ones 
already when introducing revenues: restricted and unrestricted funds.
Restricted funds, as the name implies, carry external stipulations limiting their use 
to specific types of expenditure. The largest sources of university restricted funds are 
expendable gifts and endowment income from gifts, as well as the direct cost portion 
of sponsored grants and contracts. Most donors designate their gifts for a specified 
purpose, such as a scholarship for women engineers or construction of a new biotech 
building. When the university accepts the donation, it obligates itself to spend the 
funds in accordance with the donor’s desires. Likewise, when the university is awarded 
a contract, such as a federal research grant from the National Institutes of Health, it is 
contractually obligated to spend the award only on the directly budgeted costs of that 
project (laboratory equipment, specialized labor, etc.).
Unrestricted funds, in contrast, can be used for most of the general expenses 
of running an institution, and their local names can vary, including general funds, 
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Figure 2.15.  Types of university revenue funds. Restricted funds are limited to externally stipulated 
uses. Unrestricted funds can be used for the general running of the institution. Some 




















institutional funds, state funds, and more. The largest sources of unrestricted funds are 
tuition and fees, interest earned on investments, state appropriations, the indirect cost 
recovery portion of grants that covers institutional facilities and administration costs 
(see Chapter 8), and income from auxiliary units.
Even unrestricted funds have some notable fine-print exceptions. For example, 
in many states public universities cannot use them to purchase alcohol, such as for 
special events and receptions (a common work-around is to use unrestricted gift 
income instead, especially as such events often involve donor development). Another 
kind of exception is income from specially targeted fees, such as course fees to cover 
expendable supply and equipment costs (e.g., laboratory courses in chemistry)—such 
fees are often approved for a narrow purpose only, and the related expenditures are 
usually vetted on a regular basis. These fees, as well as various special funds such 
as parking surcharges for the “free” campus shuttle, are often known as designated 
funds. Designated funds originate as unrestricted funds, but the Board or President/
Chancellor will designate them such that in practice they become restricted for most 
campus accounting purposes.
One further clarification on restricted endowment income versus unrestricted 
investment interest: the investments that produce unrestricted interest income originate 
from unrestricted institutional funds (e.g., money in the university’s bank accounts) 
and quasi-endowments (Board-designated institutional funds for investment) as 
well as undesignated gifts. At institutions with exceptionally large endowments, 
the unrestricted investment interest can be a major source of operating revenue. For 
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example, unrestricted funds account for about 30% of Harvard’s total endowment 
(Harvard University 2018).
Box 2.2. Complicated Fund Sources and Pitfalls
Restricted, unrestricted, and designated funds complement each other 
within the overall university budget. It can get complicated, though. 
Professor Overachiever might be paid a base nine-month academic year 
salary from unrestricted funds (tuition and state allocation), a stipend as 
the prestigious Eminent Alumnus Chair from restricted funds (endowment proceeds 
from a gift), plus a summer salary from both restricted funds (a research grant) and 
unrestricted funds (administrative stipend as department chair). Often these are just 
technical details that the department business manager can handle easily. But academic 
work is often more complex and intertwined than this tidy accounting world, which can 
trip up unsuspecting academics.
One example is spending on research grants where early results change the approach 
so that the project needs equipment that wasn’t listed or the population under study is 
changed to a more logical one that wasn’t anticipated in the grant. These shifts make 
perfect academic sense, but they are an accounting no-no unless formally approved 
by the granting agency. Another example might be a student awards committee that 
expands eligibility for a donor-endowed award because the rules have become outdated, 
but the chair forgets to first get the OK from the development office and donor.
2.12 Why worry about state appropriations and investment 
income if tuition dominates?
Despite the leading role of tuition revenue at essentially all US institutions nowadays, 
the two signature revenue sources of publics and privates—state appropriations and 
investment income respectively—are nonetheless each critical because of what we can 
spend them on. As unrestricted funds they are sizable sources of primary operating 
income. In many institutions, together with tuition, these revenues associated with the 
primary educational mission are the main way that we cover payroll and operations 
outside of the auxiliaries.
There are further implications: these two sources are linked to the psychology and 
culture of the institution. At the publics, decades ago (in the 1970s and 1980s), state 
appropriations averaged around 45% of institutional revenues and in some cases over 
75% (National Center for Education Statistics 1991; IPEDS 2020). Even at their present 
diminished levels, however, state appropriations represent (through taxes) the 
investment of society at large in public higher education. At the privates, funds from the 
founder and other major donors literally made the origin and ongoing independence 
of the college possible. Faculty, staff, students, alumni and the community are often 
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closely connected to the institutional philosophy that is exercised through these funds 
and changes to them are invariably newsworthy.
Another implication is leverage—as part of the primary activity revenue, these 
funds are necessary for the institution to obtain additional funding from other key 
revenue sources, such as gifts, or funding the research mission through grants and 
contracts (Figure 2.16). It is exceedingly difficult to succeed in sustaining a research 
enterprise on grant funds (so-called “soft” money) alone, and thus the primary 
funding for faculty and administrative staff furnished by tuition and signature 
revenues is key in enabling sustained external research support (and the associated 
quality and prestige). This primary activity revenue is a critical part of the research 
university’s business model (see Section 14.2) and a fundamental element in the 
unparalleled success of the US in research and graduate education since the mid-
twentieth century (see Section 8.2).
Figure 2.16.  Revenues broadly associated with primary activity (the educational mission) provide 
necessary leverage to enable other activities and their associated revenues. Revenue 
segments are for R1 public institutions illustrated in Figure 2.7.
2.13 What is the revenue significance of out-of-state and 
international students?
At private institutions the distinction between in-state and out-of-state students doesn’t 
apply, at least in the revenue sense, and there is a uniform sticker price for all students. 
At public institutions, which are supported in part by tax proceeds, substantially 
lower pricing for in-state students is built into the pricing structure, often by statute or 
charter. These are known as resident students for tuition purposes, while out-of-state 
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are typically billed at the non-resident rate although they pay slightly more at a few 
institutions (for more on international students, see Section 6.12).
As state funding for public higher education has diminished, non-resident students 
have come to play a role in tuition revenue at the publics that is far greater than their 
relative headcount. Detailed comparative data showing net tuition revenue from 
in-state and out-of-state students is not readily available, but we can easily examine 
enrollment data and show the revenue impact of non-resident students by inference. 
Figure 2.17 illustrates the relative proportions of in-state, out-of-state and international 
students across the types of schools in our set for first-time undergraduates. All 
types of private schools except the smaller regionals draw over half their incoming 
students from outside their home states, while at all types of public university the 
non-resident portion averages substantially lower with 15–27% being non-residents. 
As an individual counterexample, the University of Vermont has only 21% in-state 
first-timers, the lowest of all public universities (Vermont is among the public 
universities with the highest out-of-state tuition and fees, comparable to the University 
of California campuses)—clearly Vermont’s situation is atypical for the mix of tuition 
revenue (Despart 2015).
Figure 2.17.  Fall 2016 first-time undergraduate enrollment percentage mix of in-state, out-of-
state and international students at institutions, averaged by control and Carnegie 
classification. Source: IPEDS (2020).
With some simple assumptions, we can calculate a back-of-the-envelope estimate 
of the net tuition revenue impact of out-of-state students at a public university, as 
summarized in Table 2.1. In line A we use the average in-state and out-of-state FY2018 
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we assume an average 30% tuition discount across all students (in practice, in-state 
students often receive a higher percentage discount relative to out-of-state students, 
but we’ll keep it simple here and use an equal discount, just to be conservative). In 
line C we list the required fees, and in line D we obtain the tuition and fee revenue per 
student as the total of lines B and C. We assume an overall enrollment of 14,000 in line E 
(this number doesn’t matter in the end, but it helps keep the example understandable) 
with 75% as in-state students (this proportion does make a difference). We multiply 
the average revenue per student (line D) by enrollment (line E) to get the total net 
tuition and fee revenue for the institution in line F. Finally, in line G, we convert the two 
revenue totals into their percentages of the combined total.
Table 2.1. An illustrative estimate of the net tuition and fee revenue impact of in-state 
versus out-of-state students. See text for explanation.
Line Item In-State Out-of-State
A. Tuition $8,092 $21,195 
B. Less 30% discount $5,664 $14,837 
C. Fees $1,998 $2,329 
D. Revenue per student $7,662 $17,166 
E. Enrollment 10,500 3,500
F. Net Tuition & Fee Revenue $80,455,200 $60,079,250 
G. Percent 57% 43%
In this model, at 43%, the net tuition and fee revenue from out-of-state students is 
approaching half the total revenue although these students only comprise 25% of the 
total by headcount. If we vary the proportion of out-of-state students in the model, we 
can get a sense of their impact across typical public institutions: with 10% out-of-state 
students they generate 20% of the revenue, and with 30% out-of-state students we get 
close to a 50:50 revenue split. Thus, as a rough guide for a typical public institution, 
we can say that the net tuition and fee revenue portion from out-of-state students is 
1.7 to 2 times their headcount proportion. On a per-student basis in our model, as line 
D shows, an out-of-state student pays more than double that of an in-state student. 
These numbers are clearly significant in the business model of public institutions, and 
like the discount rate this is also a key metric for these institutions to monitor and 
manage in tandem with recruiting as part of enrollment management (see Chapter 7). 
Note that we’ve also simply included undergraduate and graduate students together 
for data reasons, although the undergraduate numbers will dominate the calculation 




3.1 Where does all the money go?
Higher education is a labor-intensive industry, so it’s no surprise that people, in the 
budgetary form of salaries, wages and benefits, are the single biggest category of 
expense for universities and colleges. More prosaically, meeting payroll is the biggest 
institutional bill each month.
Figure 3.1 shows the average mix of expenditures by nature of expense, one of two 
views of expenditures that we’ll examine. In this view, the proportions are remarkably 
similar across all types and sizes of our example institutions. It is easy to see that salaries 
and benefits combined make up over half of all expenditures. The remaining major 
natural expense categories are all under 10% of the total. Operation and maintenance 
of the physical plant (permanent built infrastructure), also known as O&M, is easy 
to cut in lean years but it inevitably accumulates into much larger costs over time, 
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Figure 3.1.  Percentages of FY2017 non-hospital expenditures averaged across institution types, by 
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which become even tougher to afford. Major equipment is accounted for through 
depreciation, spreading its cost over the expected useful lifespan rather than incurring 
it all in a single year. To use two everyday analogies, O&M is like maintenance on your 
house, while depreciation is like the annually decreasing value of your car. And, to 
complete the house analogy, interest in this case is what the institution pays on its debt 
(often in the form of bond financing to build buildings, see Section 10.3), which is like 
the mortgage payment on your house.
The other view of expenditures is by function of the expense, as illustrated in Figure 
3.2, where the same dollars are instead tagged to the core mission and supporting 
activities of the university. On average across our example institutions, instruction 
is the single largest functional expenditure and it includes faculty salaries and 
benefits, office supplies, and the administration of academic departments. Research 
here includes the cost of research centers and institutes as well as restricted funds 
(see Section 2.11) for sponsored research projects. Accounting of public service 
includes separately budgeted activities such as cooperative extension services, 
public broadcasting, and public information offices. Following the three core mission 
areas are four vital categories that support and supplement the core missions, and 
which together play a sizable role in the expenditure budget. Academic support 
covers activities that support all three mission areas such as libraries, computing, 
museums, and deans’ offices. Student services incorporates recruitment, admissions, 
the registrar’s office, career center, financial aid administration, and student clubs. 
Institutional support consists of general administration, executive leadership, the 
legal office, financial services, public relations, and facility operations. Auxiliary 
Figure 3.2.  Percentages of FY2017 non-hospital expenditures averaged across institution types, by 
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enterprises include residence halls, bookstores, and dining services (we’ve omitted 
hospitals to enable equivalent comparisons, as explained earlier). The remaining 
small categories comprise scholarship and grant aid expenses, independent 
operations, and other expenses.
These functional expenditure data highlight a point I made in Chapter 1, which is 
that universities are complicated institutions. Investing in the multiple interlocking 
and interdependent activities listed above is necessary for a thriving institution that 
carries out its mission well, and that’s why managing a university is a form of matrix 
management (cross-functional management, to be more precise, but that’s a story 
for another book). The university’s expenditure budget reflects this reality because 
in effect it is a matrix of the natural and functional views above (e.g., salaries, O&M, 
etc. within instruction, research and so on), only with hundreds of fine-scaled 
categories.
3.2 How does investment in major functions differ  
by type of institution?
There are some interesting patterns in the proportion of budget that types of institutions 
spend on major functional areas, the most notable being instruction and research. In 
Figure 3.3, perhaps the most remarkable pattern is the consistency in the proportion 
of budget invested in instruction—just over one third across all types of institutions. 
We can see that research expenditures shrink relative to instruction and other areas as 
one moves from the R1 schools to smaller institutions that do less research, just as one 
would expect. Expenditures on public service are, again as expected, a much larger 
portion of the budget at public institutions, especially the R1 & R2 publics (the groups 
that includes most of the land-grant institutions).
Academic support is a similar proportion across all types of school, but the portions 
of budget invested in student services show a relative increase at smaller schools with 
slightly greater portions at the privates. Private institutions expend relatively more 
on administration (institutional support) than do their public counterparts, with 
relatively higher portions at smaller public and private schools. Scholarships and grant 
aid are primarily a feature of public universities (as we’ve seen, private schools tend to 
discount relatively more instead). The portion of expenditures on auxiliaries is similar 
across all institutions. There are some notable differences in independent operations, 
with R1 private institutions far outweighing all others.
In Section 2.3 we saw that overall expenditures (and revenues) have trended 
upwards for years. Seeing the public-private differences in expenditures above and 
knowing that not only financial resources, but also enrollments differ across these 
schools, the logical comparison across institutions is to look at expenditures per 
student, which we cover in the next section.
Figure 3.3.  Percentages of FY2017 non-hospital functional expenditures averaged by Carnegie 
classification and control. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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3.3 What do institutions spend per student?
There are several ways to answer this question, and none of them is perfect because it is 
virtually impossible to untangle strictly student-related expenditures from other kinds, 
and because purposes often overlap. The simplest and least satisfactory approach is to 
take the entire budget of the institution and divide by the number of students, but at 
large research universities that would overestimate what was allocated to supporting 
students versus other activities. We could omit auxiliaries, independent operations, etc. 
and keep only the first six categories in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3, which is a version of 
the so-called Educational and General (E&G, or sometimes G&E) budget, but that still 
includes research and public service that could skew the comparisons. So, to focus in 
on educational and related spending only, we compute a version of the Education and 
Related (E&R) budget,1 which includes only expenditures on instruction, academic 
support, student services and institutional support.
As Figure 3.4 illustrates, the differences in E&R spending per FTE student across 
types of institutions appear to be dramatic, but (some) appearances can be deceiving. 
Starting with the publics, R1 universities appear to spend about one third to one 
half more per student than the medium and smaller publics. Recall from Section 
3.1, however, that all faculty costs are accounted for under instruction expenditures, 
and yet at research universities faculty time is split between teaching, research and 
service (often 40:40:20 or similar at an R1) with a higher research expectation than 
elsewhere. There is no precise way to adjust for this in national data, but as a (very) 
rough estimate we can simply deduct 40% from the instruction column for the R1 
universities to get a sense of more comparable numbers (given that this is a crude 
estimate, I have not shown a prorated adjustment for R2 or R3 schools, keeping with 
the simplest approach for now; we’ll return to this issue when we deal with research in 
Chapter 8). With the adjustment, instructional spending per student across the publics 
is around $10,000, with a little more spending per capita on support services at the 
bigger schools. After the R1 adjustment, all publics in our examples average in the 
$15,000 to $20,000 annual dollars per student range. Moving on to the privates, even 
after the adjustment the R1 private universities spend almost three times more per 
student than their public counterparts (over $60,000 per year). The R2 privates and 
baccalaureate colleges spend about double their public counterparts (about $37,000 
per student per year). Interestingly, the R3-M3 privates spend about the same as their 
public counterparts (about $20,000)—this may be because this category includes some 
of the most financially-stressed and tuition-dependent institutions.
Overall, the main take-home point from this section is that many private institutions 
spend about twice as much or more per student than public institutions do (parallel 
1  This is a simplified version of the Education and Related (E&R) budget suitable for calculation 
directly from IPEDS data. It is close, but not identical, to a detailed per-institution E&R calculation 
that accounts more precisely for small portions of some support costs.
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with their tuition which is also roughly double, see Section 2.8). We’ve known for 
several decades (Getz and Siegfried 1991) that the two principal reasons why spending 
per student differs across institutions are, first, differences in student to faculty ratios 
and, second, differences in part-time faculty and other instructional resources (see 
Chapters 5 and 6).
Figure 3.4.  FY2017 Educational and Related (E&R) expenditures per full-time equivalent student 
averaged by control and Carnegie classification. See text for estimate of R1 instructional 
spending without faculty research time. Source: IPEDS (2020).
3.4 What are the trends in per-student spending?
The trends in E&R and non-E&R expenditures as well as total expenditures are 
illustrated in Figure 3.5. I’ve only shown the overall averages across publics and 
privates because the patterns are broadly consistent by size of institution within those 
groups. At the publics the immediate adjustment to the recession and subsequent 
recovery involved a $3,000 (30%) drop in non-E&R spending per FTE, $2,000 of which 
was shifted to E&R spending with the remainder being cut, while at the privates 
the shifts were relatively subtle. At all institutions, since the recession, essentially all 
new expenditures have been invested into the educational mission (E&R). Over the 
dozen years following FY2004, inflation-adjusted E&R spending per student at public 
institutions shifted from 59% to 72% of the total, with most of that jump in FY2010 
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Figure 3.5.  Trends in Educational and Related (E&R), non-E&R and total expenditures per FTE of 
student enrollment (2016 dollars) averaged across public and private institutions. The 
vertical bar indicates the onset of the Great Recession. Source: IPEDS (2020).
Following the recession onset, both publics and privates took six years to again equal or 
exceed 2009 amounts in their overall spending per FTE (Figure 3.5). Given the rhetoric 
of runaway expenses in higher education, and as I similarly noted for revenues, this 
is an immensely significant point to emphasize: when examined on a per-student 
basis and adjusted for inflation, from FY2004–2017 the average rate of increase in 
total institutional spending was 0.7% annually at the publics and 1% annually at the 
privates (see Section 3.7 for details on underlying cost increases).
3.5 What share of costs are covered by tuition versus subsidy?
How much of what universities invest in E&R spending is paid for by tuition revenue? 
Or, phrased the other way around, what portion of educational costs are subsidized by 
the institution? As we saw in Section 2.5, net tuition is the biggest slice of the revenue 
pie at all types of institutions. We can compare that revenue to expenditure on E&R 
costs to see what share it covers. Whatever is not covered by tuition is considered the 
institutional subsidy, which largely comes from state appropriations at the publics and 
from investment and other revenues at the privates.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the tuition/institutional subsidy split. Given what we know 
about tuition revenues, it isn’t surprising that the publics generally cover a smaller 
portion of E&R costs with tuition than do the privates, which rely more on tuition. 
There are noteworthy distinctions in the details that relate closely to their tuition 
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2.5). The R1 publics receive a higher tuition portion than do the R1 privates, but 
the other smaller publics have a lower tuition portion and thus greater subsidy 
than their private counterparts. The tuition dependency (and therefore enrollment 
dependency) of the R3-M3 privates is stark, with over 87% of E&R costs being covered 
by tuition. These data reveal how types of institutions have varying capacities to 
subsidize the cost of education on a percentage basis, but it is worth keeping in 
mind that the per-student amounts in dollars are still substantially larger at private 
institutions (see Section 3.3).
Figure 3.6.  FY2016 Net tuition and fee revenue and remaining subsidy portions of Educational and 
Related (E&R) expenditures averaged by control and Carnegie classification. Source: 
IPEDS (2020).
The trends in the portion of E&R costs covered by tuition were significantly upward for 
the publics pre-recession and have been more-or-less flat since then, while the trend 
for the privates has been relatively flat with a slight increase post-recession (Figure 
3.7). At the publics, over the five years from FY2002–2006 the tuition portion of the 
split went from just over one third to almost half. There is a range by type of public 
institution: R1 publics have seen a steady increase continuing beyond the recession 
through FY2016, while public baccalaureate colleges experienced a decrease back 
to about 40%. The wavy shape of the overall curve for the publics results from the 
interplay between tuition and state revenues as economic conditions shift. Tuition 
can rise in good economic times (market forces) and bad (replacing losses in state 
funding) and state funding can rise in good times and fall in bad (tracking state tax 
revenue and often lagging by a year or more due to the budget cycle). While these 
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shift to less state funding and more reliance on tuition to cover the cost of public 
higher education. We delve further into public funding for higher education in 
Chapter 4.
Figure 3.7.  Trends in the net tuition and fee revenue portion of Educational and Related (E&R) 
expenditures averaged for public and private institutions (including the R1 and 
baccalaureate publics). The vertical bar indicates the onset of the Great Recession. 
Source: IPEDS (2020).
3.6 Do out-of-state students subsidize in-state students?
Yes and no. We can combine some of our earlier analyses to explain why. First, as 
we saw in Section 2.13, out-of-state students can contribute as much as twice the 
per capita share of overall net tuition revenue compared to in-state students. So, in 
a narrow sense, yes, they contribute a higher proportion of net tuition revenue and 
that revenue is essential. Nonetheless, in the broader sense, the apparent subsidy is 
significantly diminished, because net tuition revenue covers only about half the full 
cost of providing a student’s education (see Section 3.5) at public universities. This is 
clear in Figure 3.8 where the tuition and subsidy portions of E&R costs are broken out. 
We can see that out-of-state students don’t “pay for” in-state students but their greater 
revenue contributions are an important partial offset that nonetheless still doesn’t 
cover the entire cost of education. Government aid, institutional aid and additional 
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Figure 3.8.  FY2016 breakout of net tuition and fee revenue (in-state and out-of-state) and subsidy 
portions (institutional and government aid plus other institutional subsidy) of 
Educational and Related (E&R) expenditures per FTE enrollment for public institutions 






































Figure 3.9.  Student-oriented net price view of contribution to FY2016 total Educational and 
Related (E&R) costs per FTE enrollment for public institutions averaged by Carnegie 
classification. Net price is calculated using the assumptions of the model described in the 
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Instead of using the institutional budget picture we can also look at this from an 
individual student’s budgetary point of view. Figure 3.9 uses the assumptions 
of our simple out-of-state model (Table 2.1 in Section 2.13) to illustrate how the 
average tuition paid, even by out-of-state students, still does not cover the full cost 
of education. For our example, the average out-of-state student with 30% discount 
off sticker price through all forms of aid still only pays between 63% and 85% of the 
actual cost of education depending on the type of school. Likewise, in our model the 
average in-state student only pays 30% to 36% of the actual cost of education—this 
is by far the highest value for money in US university education. At about $8,000 
per year to attend an R1 public (ranked among the best universities in the world) 
and just over $5,000 per year for a small public (that also provides an excellent 
education), over four years this investment is about the same as the cost of a new 
car and yet it will pay out many times that amount over the career of the graduate 
(see Section 14.1). Needless to say, in years and decades past, when state support for 
higher education was relatively higher and tuition lower in real terms, the value was 
even greater (see Chapter 4).
From the two figures referenced above one could infer, correctly, that institutions lose 
money on in-state students. It’s reasonable for states to want “their” in-state students 
to benefit from the state support relative to out-of-state students. However, in most 
states the per-FTE state appropriation falls well short of the cost of a degree (Chapter 
4). So, between stipulated low in-state tuition rates and low state appropriations, there 
is indeed a marginal cost to a typical public institution taking on additional in-state 
students. As we’ve seen above, there is also a compensating marginal benefit to taking 
on additional out-of-state students.
Therefore, it is shortsighted for states to automatically assume that out-of-state 
students somehow “exclude” in-state students from attending—on the contrary, the 
extra margin from additional out-of-state students helps offset the greater unrecovered 
costs of in-state students. So long as the total number of in-state students served is 
greater than it would be without increasing out-of-state students, and so long as state 
allocations and in-state tuition underfund the cost of educating in-state students, for 
financial (and academic) reasons it is therefore good policy to expand the number 
of out-of-state students at a public institution if states want to serve more in-state 
students. Certainly, it is incumbent on the institution to maintain academic standards 
while doing so—doing this simply for budgetary reasons at the expense of institutional 
quality is financial (and academic) folly in the long run.
In deciding on the right mix of out-of-state to in-state students, institutional leaders 
must balance a commitment to educate in-state students with the reality that out-
of-state students help to lower costs for in-state students. Even if absolute numbers 
of in-state students increase, a declining share of in-state students can be politically 
difficult. In practice, we see larger increases in out-of-state students in states with small 
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populations, while states with larger college-bound populations are more easily able 
to achieve a balance between the two (Mitchell 2018).
3.7 Why do higher education costs rise so much?
We saw in Section 3.4 that higher education spending trends, when adjusted for 
inflation and considered on a per-student basis, have averaged under 1% annually for 
over a decade (while revenues remained flat or decreased). Yet, there are countless 
media articles about the soaring costs of college, and they’re not wrong either. The 
difference is in the definitions of price versus cost: to students and families, the 
“sticker price” as well as the net price paid after aid have indeed been increasing, 
while to institutions the underlying costs of doing business also rise relentlessly. We 
covered published tuition trends (price) in Section 2.7. We’ll focus on the underlying 
institutional costs in this section, and we’ll examine price and total cost of attendance 
from the student perspective in Chapter 7.
There are two overarching economic theories of cost in higher education: 
Baumol’s “cost disease” and Bowen’s “revenue theory” (Martin and Hill 2014).2 
Baumol’s cost disease3 recognizes that labor-intensive personal services industries 
don’t increase their productivity with scale (Baumol and Bowen 1966; Baumol 2012; 
Helland and Tabarrok 2019). In performing arts, you need more string quartets 
doing more concerts to reach a bigger live audience, in healthcare, you need more 
nurses and doctors to serve more patients, and in higher education, you need 
more instructors to teach increasing numbers of students. These fixed proportions 
constrain productivity to remain constant and, with regular pressures to increase 
wages to cover growth and inflation in the broader economy, the result is a bias 
towards ever-increasing production costs. Contrast this to other industries such as 
manufacturing and agriculture, where the effects of automation, scale and going 
digital have increased productivity and kept costs down.4 At the beginning of this 
chapter we saw that labor and related expenses account for the largest portion of 
institutional expenditures, so Baumol’s cost disease is an important driver of overall 
costs in higher education.
2  Interestingly, Baumol and a different Bowen introduced both ideas together in a 1965 essay (Baumol 
and Bowen 1965). William Baumol was a leading economist who taught at NYU and Princeton. His 
co-author was one of his doctoral students, William Bowen, who went on to become president of 
Princeton and later of the Mellon Foundation. The Bowen in Bowen’s Law is Howard Bowen, also 
an economist, and he too served as a president, at Grinnell College, the University of Iowa, and 
Claremont Graduate University.
3  Baumol outlined the theory but credits his economist colleague Alice Vandermeulen from UCLA 
with coining the term “Baumol’s cost disease” (Baumol 2012).
4  One of the most accessible explanations of the Baumol effect, with data, is a recent report by Helland 
and Tabarrok (2019).
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Bowen’s Law extends to all nonprofits, and it explains how marginal revenues are 
invested in excellence in a never-ending cycle. His revenue theory of cost is summarized 
as follows (Bowen 1980):
1. The dominant goals of institutions are educational excellence, prestige, and 
influence;
2. In quest of excellence, prestige, and influence, there is virtually no limit to the 
amount of money an institution could spend for seemingly fruitful educational 
ends;
3. Each institution raises all the money it can;
4. Each institution spends all it raises.
Taken together, these four rules lead toward ever increasing expenditures as 
universities compete for students and pursue prestige, such that higher prices lead to 
greater value that can lead again to higher prices in a circular process (Massy 2003). 
Also, a consequence familiar to many on campus is that when budget cuts or academic 
cost efficiency initiatives come along, they are almost invariably opposed because they 
are “cutting quality”—the precise product of Bowen’s Law.
Both theories operate simultaneously to drive higher education costs upwards. 
Empirical studies to test which one has the greater effect have come to differing 
conclusions. Although earlier analyses showed that cost disease dominates (Archibald 
and Feldman 2008), more recent work shows that Bowen effects are relatively larger 
than Baumol effects, and combined they explain 74% of cost changes at public 
institutions and 63% at private institutions (Martin and Hill 2014). I imagine that in 
practice the balance changes over time, but either way it’s clear that both forces lead to 
relatively higher costs for nonprofits that have constant productivity, such as colleges 
and universities.
The Baumol and Bowen theories have some corollary effects. One has been the 
evolution of increased production costs owing to a half-century shift in expectations 
by students and parents along with changing demographics and social policy 
(Thelin 2018). Decades ago, a smaller proportion of high-school graduates went 
on to college, and those that did were largely from middle- and upper-income 
families. Efforts to increase gender and ethnic diversity were in their infancy. While 
tuition was low compared to today, other costs such as books, board and lodging 
hindered access. There was little in the way of financial aid and banks would not 
issue loans to students without collateral. Later, the availability of Pell grants and 
federal loans greatly broadened access. Their portability also provided students with 
choice, leading to greater competition among colleges (Thelin 2018). Antiquated 
approaches to academic success were wasteful in human and financial terms: the 
infamous student orientation warning—look to your left, look to your right, only 
one of you will be here in four years—was not apocryphal. Institutions began to 
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invest in retention and student success through academic advising, co-curricular 
activities, recreation centers, mental-health care and career services. Support services 
such as these, along with necessary but unfunded compliance mandates, form the 
bulk of what is pejoratively called administrative bloat (see Section 5.9 for more on 
that topic). The expansion of academic and student services has led to relatively 
larger increases in the number of employees and associated costs in this part of the 
higher education workforce (see Section 7.1), an unintended but nonetheless classic 
Baumol effect.
A further noteworthy effect is called the principal-agent problem, which results 
from asymmetric information and differential interests in the outcome between two 
contracted parties. For example, when you need to take your car for repairs you (a) 
don’t have proper information on successful outcomes (repair success rates) so you 
rely on reputation, and (b) the mechanic has an incentive to charge you for things you 
don’t need rather than acting in your best interests. We see examples of this problem 
every day, including between voters and politicians, shareholders and company 
management, and clients and lawyers (Wikipedia 2018). In higher education the 
principal-agent problem is related to Bowen’s Law in that, without explicit data and 
meaningful metrics of output quality, spending on quality is effectively spending on 
reputation that thereby contributes to the cost spiral (Martin 2009).
So, how big is the net effect of these factors on higher education costs? The Higher 
Education Price Index (HEPI) tracks inflation in key higher education costs going 
back to 1961, and it includes salaries and benefits for faculty, administrators, clerical 
and service staff, as well as utilities, supplies and materials, and miscellaneous 
services (Commonfund Institute 2017a). Not surprisingly, it mirrors university 
budgets and is dominated by labor costs. One can think of HEPI as the inflation 
rate for the goods and services that higher education institutions purchase, much 
as the CPI is the general inflation rate for those that consumers purchase. Both are 
shown in Figure 3.10, in their index form with a common base year for comparative 
purposes and in terms of their annual inflation rates. Over a bit more than a half-
century, the two rates are highly correlated (r = 0.99) with the underlying costs of 
higher education clearly rising faster than general inflation. Looking at the annual 
inflation in each index, there have been alternating periods in which one exceeds the 
other, and over the entire period the HEPI inflation rate averages 0.65% above the 
CPI inflation rate. For the last decade this difference has been about 0.5%, which, 
as one might hypothesize, approaches the overall higher education spending per 
FTE growth rate mentioned at the beginning of this section. Finally, remember that 
we’ve been talking about costs. Price is covered in the sections on tuition (2.7) and 
discounting (7.5).
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Figure 3.10.  Trends in the Higher Education Price Index (HEPI) and Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
set equal to 1.0 in 1961 (upper panel) and trends in the annual inflation rate for each 
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Box 3.1. Higher Education vs. Healthcare Cost Increases
Higher education and healthcare both suffer from Baumol’s cost disease (see Section 
3.7) in that they are labor-intensive sectors that don’t gain production efficiencies with 
increased scale. Decade-averaged indices of cost increases in each sector have been 
similar for the last three decades (Figure B3), 3% to 4% in the 1990s and 2000s and about 
2% in the most recent decade.
Figure B3. Decade averages of annual percentage change in the Higher Education Price Index (HEPI) 
and inflation-adjusted National Healthcare Expenditures (NHE) per capita. Sources: Commonfund 
Institute (2017a) and CMS (US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2018).
3.8 What can be done to control costs in higher education?
Many remedies have been suggested to counter the seemingly inexorable cost spiral in 
higher education. The ones most likely to be effective in the long run are those that 
address the root causes outlined in Section 3.7 rather than the symptoms (i.e., price), so 
policies to deal with the escalating costs of college should avoid price controls and focus 
on cost controls instead (National Commission on the Cost of Higher Education 1998).
Some examples of cost-reduction approaches are shown in Figure 3.11. Suggestions 
for operational efficiency that target Baumol’s cost disease range from prosaic cost-
cutting to provocative change, such as outsourcing food services or rethinking athletics 
participation (Adams and Shannon 2006). Ideas for competing on outcomes aimed at 
minimizing the effects of Bowen’s Law focus on minimizing emphasis on reputation 
and prestige and instead providing meaningful data on instructional outcomes and 
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Most institutions strive to be more productive and efficient in providing a quality 
education at a low price. There are few if any campuses that haven’t implemented 
operational efficiencies in recent decades, especially since the Great Recession, and 
one of the most widely-established trends has been the greater use of faculty not on 
the tenure-track to deliver instruction at lower cost (see Chapter 5). Many campuses 
have achieved some success in improving retention and graduation rates because 
of a focus on data, but progress in managing and marketing by outcomes metrics 
is generally far less advanced than for operational efficiencies. Overall, the most 
thoughtful suggestions for reducing costs, and those most likely to be adopted in 
practice, are those that improve quality and enhance competitiveness by creating 
higher value.
3.9 Does the university make a profit?
No. As nonprofit entities, it would seem self-evident that universities and colleges 
don’t make a profit (remember, I’ve specifically excluded for-profit institutions from 
our scope in this book and they are obviously set up to make a profit as their primary 
goal). And yet, with the myriad activities across a campus, there are inevitably unit-
level or institutional surplus funds (or deficits) from year to year, often on purpose, 
although there are pitfalls if the surplus is too large (Bauman 2019). Informally, in a 
verbal shorthand, some might refer to such a surplus as a profit, but fortunately we 
have a precise and more appropriate term for use in the nonprofit sector: margin.
Why is a margin not a profit? They both have the connotation of “extra money left 
over” after subtracting costs from revenues, but if it isn’t saved for the next year then 
profit goes to shareholders as cash or to employees as a bonus. A nonprofit has no 
shareholders and its employees don’t get bonuses in a good year. Instead, nonprofits 
like universities have a social mission to benefit the public. Whether saved for later use 
or spent right away, at a nonprofit the margin is invested in the mission.
“No margin, no mission” is an adage that encapsulates the imperative for sound 
financial management of a nonprofit along with the necessity to grow funds for 
investing in improving and expanding the social mission. A university that is stagnant 
or under financial stress cannot do a decent job of serving its students or community. To 
do those things well, it must generate sufficient resources to deliver quality programs 
in addition to investing in adaptions and innovations to ensure its future success. In a 
nutshell, you can do more social good if you have a well-run institution with a margin 
that can help it continue to achieve and expand its mission (but beware of Bowen’s 
Law, see Section 3.7).
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Box 3.2. The University’s Bottom Line(s)
The so-called “bottom line” for a company is primarily to make a profit, whereas for a 
university the bottom line is social benefit in the form of educating students, discovering 
new knowledge, and serving the public. Profit is simple enough to define and measure 
in dollars. However, the three social bottom lines for universities are harder to define 
and measure, so we tend to use multiple metrics to monitor and manage them. Figure B4 
illustrates the upward trends in two key examples of these non-monetary bottom lines, 
graduates and scholarly publications for the US. These are imperfect output metrics so, 
for example, the number of degrees conferred does not necessarily equate with quality 
of education and the number of scholarly articles published is a proxy for knowledge 
discovered. Universities can monitor their own versions of these and related metrics 
to track and manage outputs. More important perhaps, but often harder to track, are 
outcomes; for example, job placement and career path of graduates, or most influential 
publications and long-term benefits of basic discoveries.
Figure B4.  Degrees conferred (bachelor’s, master’s and doctor’s) by postsecondary institutions 
per academic year and citable documents published in all subject areas in the SCOPUS 






4. Public Funding:  
Grant Aid, Loans and Appropriations
4.1 How does public funding for higher education work?
Public funding for higher education in the US, even just for public institutions, is 
relatively complicated as compared to many other countries where the national 
education ministry is the principal funder and overseer (see Section 4.14 later in 
this chapter). In the US, the states and some local governments fill most of this role 
(except for accreditation) for the public universities via appropriations. The Federal 
Government, rather than funding institutional budgets directly, supplies financial aid 
to students (depending on family income) who can use it to attend public or private 
institutions.1 Students and their families combine that aid with their own sometimes 
sizable contributions, and a portion of the combined amount flows to the institution as 
tuition, with the remainder used for living expenses. Many of these students will also 
receive substantial institutional aid from the university, as we saw in Chapter 3.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the four main players and the relative sizes of the flows between 
them for US public higher education. The two big public funding arrows are federal 
aid and state appropriations. The relative contributions of the Federal Government 
and the states have become more equal in recent decades, especially since the Great 
Recession. State spending used to dominate federal spending on higher education, 
but state funding declines occurred while the Federal Pell Grant Program expanded 
considerably (The Pew Charitable Trusts 2015). We’ll examine these two major funding 
sources below and in subsequent sections, but before doing that, let’s look briefly at 
the other arrows in the diagram.
1  The last decade saw a widening student aid scandal at for-profit colleges, where in many cases federal 
grants and loans accounted for over 90% of revenue, repeating a pattern that was seen in the past, 
such as with the GI Bill (Shireman 2017).
© Andrew C. Comrie, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0240.04
The institutional aid arrow looks narrower here than you might think from the 
pie charts of school types in Chapter 3—that’s because there are thousands of small 
four-year and two-year colleges in the overall higher education sector that sway 
the average to look more like their profile. Government grants and contracts made 
directly to the institutions are the other main flows in the diagram, and we’ll cover 
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Figure 4.1.  Public higher education funding flows with arrow thickness scaled to FY2012. State 
funding includes appropriations as well as grants and contracts for research. Federal 
and state flows represent aid to undergraduates. Federal grants to states include only 
higher education programs related to affordability. Land-grant appropriations and 
federally funded research projects are included as part of the funding from the Federal 
Government. Benefits from tax credits and deductions for higher education are not 























those in more detail when we discuss Research in Chapter 8. For the private institution 
version of Figure 4.1, one could simply omit state appropriations to universities 
(keeping grants and contracts), thereby switching that arrow from broad to narrow, 
and the overall result would be approximately correct. It would be even closer to 
correct if one made the federal arrow to students somewhat narrower to reflect the 
smaller proportion of Pell Grant students attending private institutions. In terms 
of the budgets from which these expenditures come, federal spending on higher 
education is about 2% of all federal spending, while higher education averages about 
9% of state spending (The Pew Charitable Trusts 2015).
To provide a relative sense of the public funding numbers, Figure 4.2 illustrates 
the major categories of aid and loan amounts for all undergraduate and graduate 
students. We see that federal grants exceed state and private grants while institutional 
grants top them all (as seen in Sections 2.8 and 3.6). In contrast, federal loans greatly 
exceed non-federal loans from banks, credit unions, private lenders, some states, and 
institutions. It is notable how small the Federal Work-Study Program is in comparison 
to the grant and loan programs, and at almost $1B (that’s Billion with a “B”) it 
also provides a scale reference for the staggeringly large numbers in the figure. All 
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these federal funds are accessed by the student who must submit a FAFSA (Free 
Application for Federal Student Aid) form that includes information on student and 
family income. And, just so it’s been said, grants do not need to be repaid and they 
lower the price paid, whereas loans do need to be repaid but they enable the costs to 
be spread out over time.
Figure 4.2. Student financial aid and loans for FY2017. Source: College Board (Baum et al. 2017).
4.2 How does aid add up on a per-student basis?
The total national investments in various forms of aid can be expressed in per-student 
FTE terms, making it easier to see the mix of aid for the average student. Figure 4.3 
illustrates trends in aid mix separately for undergraduates and graduate students 
because their aid profiles are different. In the academic year 2016–17 (AY2017) 
undergraduates received an average of $14,400 mostly made up of federal grants and 
loans, proportionally about 2:1, with much smaller amounts from other federal sources 
and non-federal loans. In contrast, graduate students received about double that aid at 
$27,950 with the federal grant to loan proportion reversed at roughly 1:2. Put another 
way, federal grant aid per student was similar at roughly $9,000, but graduate students 
received almost four times more in loans than undergraduates ($17,710 versus $4,620). 
There are multiple reasons involved in that difference, including prior years as a 
student with loans and, in some cases, anticipated higher subsequent earnings from 
pricier professional programs potentially justifying a higher loan. We’ll take a closer 
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Figure 4.3.  Average federal aid and non-federal loans per FTE undergraduate (upper panel) and 
graduate student (lower panel) in 2016 dollars by academic year. The shaded vertical 
bar indicates the onset of the Great Recession. Source: College Board (Baum et al. 2017).
Looking at trends in Figure 4.3, federal grant aid (mostly Pell Grants) has essentially 
tripled in nearly three decades, with a rapid post-recession acceleration for 
undergraduate aid. The growth in federal loans for undergraduates paralleled grant 
aid but has declined substantially (by about one third) since the recession. Graduate 
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dropping back a little. The grant to loan ratio for undergraduates was near 1:1 until 
after the Great Recession when federal and non-federal loans began a steady decrease. 
For graduate students, despite the overall upward trends and higher amounts, the 1:2 
grant-to-loan ratio has been roughly consistent since the mid-1990s.
Virtually all states provide grant aid to selected students, although the average 
amounts per student FTE are a lot smaller, at about 10% of federal aid grants (but 
remember that states also make appropriations that are often large—we’ll examine 
them in subsequent sections). Figure 4.4 shows the average amount of state aid per 
student over time for all states, averaging $790 per student in AY2016, with a range 
from $0 in New Hampshire to $2,100 in South Carolina (Baum et al. 2017). Just as for 
the federal data above, the denominator here for the state data is all students, to enable 
direct comparison. Note therefore that the denominator is not limited to eligible in-state 
students, and thus dollar amounts averaged across only in-state students would be a 
bit higher. However, the trends and proportions are unaffected by this quirk. Think of 
these numbers as aid for the average student across all students. We’ll look at aid per 
awarded student in the next section.
Figure 4.4.  State grant aid per FTE (in-state and out-of-state) undergraduate in 2015 dollars by 
academic year. The wider shaded bar indicates the onset of the Great Recession. Source: 
College Board (Baum et al. 2017).
As with other aid and loans, a substantial part of these state aid amounts will flow 
to institutions via tuition (in addition to state appropriations for public universities). 
Be aware that, rather than using tax revenues, some states fund their aid programs 
through so-called tuition set-asides where all students contribute a small amount to 
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has held at about 75% since the turn of the millennium. The relative role of state aid 
has shrunk over time, with the twenty-five-year trends in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 
exhibiting a 4% annual average increase in federal grant aid per student compared to 
the overall state aid trend, which exhibits about a 2.5% annual average increase per 
student. In this chapter we are focused on the macro supply of public funding—we’ll 
examine the student perspective related to indebtedness and affordability in Chapter 7.
4.3 What proportion of students get state aid,  
and how much do they get?
Figure 4.5 is a scatterplot of FY2016 state grant aid by award amount and the percentage 
of students awarded, for all fifty states plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, 
as well as the national averages. Figure 4.6 provides the matching percentages of need-
based versus non-need-based aid. Note that graduate students are included in the data 
behind these figures, but their effect is negligible because over 98% of state aid goes 
to undergraduates (NASSGAP 2017). Overall, looking at both figures, the national 
average shows that just under 30% of students were awarded state aid of about $2,400 
Figure 4.5.  FY2016 average grant aid per award and percentage of enrolled FTE awarded by state, 
including the District of Columbia (DC), Puerto Rico (PR), and the national average 
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in FY2016, about three-quarters of which was need-based. There are extremely wide 
ranges by state: Washington, DC awarded just 6% percent of students with large 
non-need-based grants of almost $7,000, Nebraska awarded over 70% of students an 
average award of just a few hundred dollars in mostly need-based aid, and Alabama 
awarded under 5% of students with less than $1,000 split about equally into need-
based and non-need-based aid.
Figure 4.6.  FY2016 average percentage of need-based and non-need-based state grant aid per award, 
including the District of Columbia (DC), Puerto Rico (PR), and the national average 
(USA). Source: NASSGAP (2017).
In addition to the obvious implications for students, there are consequences for 
institutions resulting from this broad range in state aid for students. Depending on their 
home state, and all else being equal, institutions will increase or decrease institutional 
aid to offset lower or higher state aid respectively, for total costs to the student to 
remain similar. This effect is amplified because in high-aid states, that aid effectively 
supplements institutional tuition revenue, whereas not only do institutions in low-
aid states not receive that aid revenue, but they also must subtract the compensating 
institutional aid from their relatively lower revenue.
4.4 How does public financial aid vary by institution?
In the previous sections on public financial aid we have looked nationally and at the 
states and, sure enough, aid plays out differently across various types of institutions 
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Figure 4.7.  FY2016 government grant aid to first-time full-time (FTFT) undergraduates by average 
amount per student awarded and by percentage of students awarded from federal (upper 
panel) and state and local sources (lower panel), averaged by Carnegie classification 
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averaged by category of institution. Government financial aid is primarily based on 
need and, because the mix of students with need varies by type of institution, we see 
the effect of that pattern in these data. Generally, students with greater need tend to 
enroll in relatively higher proportions at smaller rather than larger schools, and at 
publics more than privates, even though many schools go to great lengths to broaden 
the financial diversity of their student body and promote accessibility.
The two key patterns in federal aid in Figure 4.7 are firstly that students at private 
institutions receive higher aid awards than at the publics (likely to cover higher 
tuition) with a narrow award range close to $4,700 at the publics and, secondly, that, 
as expected, there is a greater proportion of students receiving federal aid at smaller 
regional schools, public and private. The state and local panel in Figure 4.7 shows 
a completely different pattern: the public-private contrast is evident in the higher 
percentage of students receiving aid at the publics (this is partly because many states 
do not provide aid to private institutions), which in this case also have the broader 
award range across different institution types compared to the privates. Looking across 
both sources of government financial aid, a similar percentage of students are awarded 
federal and state/local aid. However, federal aid awards are greater than state/local 
aid awards: the amount of federal aid per award is about $1,000 more than the state/
local award at the publics, and roughly $1,500 more at the privates.
Figure 4.8 illustrates the trends in government grant aid for public and private 
institutions (the Carnegie groups track similarly to their relative positions in Figure 
4.7, so I’ve plotted just public and private summary data to show the key trends and 
keep the charts legible). At both types of school, the percentage of students awarded 
federal grant aid gradually declined from the late 1990s until the recession and then 
jumped immediately post-recession to about 1.3 times the pre-recession level, before 
again commencing a gradual decline. Looking at the amount of federal aid awarded 
per student, there was a similar post-recession jump with sizable increases in award 
amounts before they dropped back down to the longer upward trend. Yet, the steep 
drops of over $1,000 immediately post-recession did not occur without consequence 
(especially when federal loans were flat at the same time, as we’ll see in the next 
section)—in partial compensation, institutional support rose during this period (as 
we saw in Chapter 3).
State aid trends are stark in their contrast, with the percentage of students receiving 
awards at the publics essentially flat since a period of rapid growth at the turn of the 
millennium, although state award amounts at those schools have steadily increased and 
almost doubled over the period in the chart. However, at the privates, the percentage 
of students receiving state aid awards has decreased steadily while award amounts 
have also decreased slightly. The net result, on an inflation-adjusted per student basis, 
has been a distinct shift in state aid dollars from private to public institutions over the 
last decade and a half.
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Figure 4.8.  Trends in grant aid (by fiscal years in 2016 dollars) awarded to first-time full-time (FTFT) 
undergraduates by percentage of students awarded (upper panel) and by average 
amount per student receiving an award (lower panel) from federal and state and local 
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4.5 What are the amounts and trends in student loans?
Previously, in Section 4.2, we saw how student loan aid compared to grant aid across 
all students. How do student loans look when we examine them on a per-awarded 
student basis as we’ve just done for financial aid? Figure 4.9 illustrates student loans 
by award amount and percentage of students awarded, for all loans and for federal 
Figure 4.9.  FY2016 loan aid to first-time full-time (FTFT) undergraduates by average amount per 
student awarded and by percentage of students awarded from federal (upper panel) and 
all sources (lower panel), averaged by Carnegie classification and control. Categories 
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loans (which account for the vast bulk of all loans) for first-time full-time students. 
The average federal loan amount is similar across all types of institutions, in a narrow 
range between $5,000 and $6,000 in FY2016. In contrast, the percentage of students 
with federal loans varies widely across types of institutions with roughly 40–60% 
across the publics and a remarkable range from about 25–70% across the privates. The 
R1 privates likely have low percentages of students with loans due to a high capacity 
to offer institutional aid and lower relative enrollments of financially needy students, 
as compared to the R3-M3 privates where most students are borrowing, likely because 
those institutions have a low capacity to offer institutional aid and have higher relative 
enrollments of financially needy students. As we saw in Chapter 2, these latter 
institutions are also those with the greatest tuition dependency—the student loan 
situation is yet another example of the serious challenges facing such schools.
There is an increment of about $1,000 to $3,000 above the federal amount when we 
consider all loans averaged across students with loans. Notice how carefully I phrased 
that—the data for remaining non-federal loans are distributed differently and these 
overall averages can be deceiving because “students with loans” includes those with 
just federal loans, those with just other loans, and those with both. The matching data 
for other non-federal loans are shown in Figure 4.10. Some first-time students are 
borrowing on average two to three times the amount of federal loans in other loans, 
Figure 4.10.  FY2016 other non-federal student loan aid to first-time full-time (FTFT) undergraduates 
by average amount per student awarded and by percentage of students awarded, 
averaged by Carnegie classification and control. Categories are differentiated by circle 
size and color for easier comparison. As a reference to highlight the different scales 
of these other loan data, the federal loan data from Figure 4.9 are plotted in the gray 
rectangle corresponding to the axis ranges used in that figure. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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more at the privates than at the publics and as much as $18,000 at R2 private schools. 
Fortunately, only a small fraction of students takes out these large other loans, about 
6% at the publics and about 10% at the privates (except R1 privates where it’s 4%).
That takes us back to the lower panel in Figure 4.9—it’s the small proportion of 
students with high other loans that raise the all-sources average above the federal 
amount. I’ve included the all-sources number because we have much longer trend data 
for this amount than for the subcategory amounts. Given the media hype about student 
loans (warranted hype when applied to the for-profit sector in particular), it is instructive 
to note that averaged across all types of institution, 53% of students have loans and for 
those who do, their loans average $7,228 in FY2016. For these students, that’s about 
$30,000 over four years of study. If we average that number across all students for the 
“average student debt”, it is about half: approximately $15,000. Unquestionably, we’d 
like that number to be as close to zero as possible, but this amount of debt for the average 
student compared to a lifetime of increased earnings is still an unbeatable deal. On the 
other hand, there is a tiny percentage of students who borrow immense amounts into 
the hundreds of thousands, many of whom will struggle with that debt for years or 
decades. We’ll return to student indebtedness in Section 7.11.
Trends in student loans by institution type generally track their relative positions 
in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10, so I’ve plotted summaries of the trends by public and 
private institution in Figure 4.11 to keep the charts uncluttered as I did for financial aid. 
At the publics, we see a flat percentage of students with loans in the mid-40% range 
that rises in the pre- and post-recession years and then levels off in the mid-50% range. 
At the privates there has been variability in the mid-50% range for a long time, and 
this dropped slightly post-recession. In the shorter period we have for the breakout 
data, we see almost identical patterns in the federal loan percentages and a decrease 
in other non-federal loans by as much as one third at the privates. The one pattern 
that is masked in these summary trends is the dramatic decrease in the percentage 
of students with loans at R1 privates, from 48% in FY1999 down to 28% in FY2016—
as mentioned before, these institutions are best-positioned to use institutional aid in 
offsetting costs to students.
Moving on to loan amounts, most of the jump of about $2,000 across all student 
loans occurred from FY2007–FY2009 and they have been essentially flat since then (in 
real dollars adjusted for inflation). The loan amounts of federal loans have decreased 
slightly in recent years, but other non-federal loan amounts have continued a steep, 
steady increase of almost $3,000 since the recession for that small percentage of students 
who take out these loans. Clearly, with the amounts for federal loans staying relatively 
flat over that period, the market has stepped in for a certain category of student.
A final point on trends in student borrowing: the share who borrow and the amounts 
borrowed also vary by income level. Comparing changes from FY1996 to FY2016, both 
shares and amounts have risen, especially in the upper two quintiles (income greater 
than $69,000) where the share of bachelor’s degree completers borrowing doubled 
and the amounts more than doubled (Delisle 2019). High-income families borrow 
Like Nobody's Business72 
more than low-income families and they do so at rates that now approach those of 
low-income families. Importantly, though, for high-income families the loan amounts 
at graduation are a much smaller proportion of family income (less than half), while 
for the lower-income quintiles the amounts can be equivalent to double the annual 
income (Delisle 2019; Seltzer 2019a).
Figure 4.11.  Trends in student loan aid (by fiscal years in 2016 dollars) awarded to first-time full-
time (FTFT) undergraduates by percentage of students awarded (upper panel) and 
by average amount per student receiving an award (lower panel) from all, federal and 
other sources, averaged for public and private universities. Loan data broken out by 
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4.6 What is the history of state investment in higher education?
If there is a topic in higher education funding that gets as much press as tuition or 
student loans, it might be state appropriations. On public university campuses, state 
funding (or the lack thereof) has been the leading funding topic for decades. As a 
result, there is plenty of myth and misunderstanding on this subject. So, let’s shed 
some light by looking at the numbers, starting with the long view. By combining data 
from multiple sources, I have managed to assemble a unique almost century-long data 
set on state funding and associated variables, which we’ll examine in this section.
State investments in higher education take place in the context of broader economic 
conditions, illustrated in Figure 4.12. Important macroeconomic dynamics and 
policies undergird these trends—I’ll briefly review the major features, but I’ll leave 
further explanation to the economists. The classic national economic indicator is Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), known as real GDP in its inflation-adjusted form. The 
historical trend in real GDP shows the Great Depression, a spending surge in World 
War II (WWII), the postwar expansion of the 1950s and 1960s, a slowdown in the 
1970s followed by continued overall growth with expansion/recession every five to ten 
years through the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s, and most recently the Great Recession 
that began in 2008–09 and lasted several years.
Figure 4.12.  Historic trends in real (inflation-adjusted) GDP (calendar years) and all state expenditures 
(fiscal years, 2016 dollars). Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis (2018a; 2018b).
Looking at the total expenditures of all the states (i.e., on everything, not just 
higher education, and adjusted for inflation) in Figure 4.12, not surprisingly we see 
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spending expanded dramatically during the 1960s, slowed down in the 1970s and 
then decreased into the early 1980s recession. State budgets grew modestly in the 
late 1980s, slowed in the 1990s, and as they accelerated again in the early 2000s they 
also became more volatile. The Great Recession saw the largest and longest decrease 
in state spending and has been followed by a modest recovery with slower growth 
than in GDP.
State appropriations for public higher education (also inflation-adjusted and 
including four-year and two-year institutions) roughly track the general economic 
trends over the last century (Figure 4.13). Two broad eras are discernable: first, a 
relatively smooth and remarkably steep expansion that occurred without interruption 
from the postwar years until 1979 and, second, a subsequent period of great volatility 
through to the present, characterized by numerous surges and cuts in appropriations 
(the Great Recession being the largest). We’ll compare these state higher education 
expenditures to all state spending below, but first let’s include enrollment.
Figure 4.13.  Historic trends in all state higher education appropriations (2016 dollars) and total 
enrollment in all public degree-granting postsecondary institutions (four-year and 
two-year). Sources for appropriations: Snyder (1993) for FY1930–1959, odd years 
interpolated from even years; Grapevine for FY1960–1999 (Illinois State University, 
Center for the Study of Education Policy 2018); SHEEO-SHEF (2017) for FY2000–2017. 
Sources for enrollment: Snyder (1993) for FY1930–1947, odd years interpolated from 
even years; NCES (National Center for Education Statistics 2017) for FY1948–2017.
It turns out that state appropriations have broadly tracked student enrollment in 
public institutions over the last century (Figure 4.13), although again the story is 
in the fluctuations. For the enrollment data, while FTE enrollment would be more 
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instead—fortunately, their trend patterns are similar (and likewise, these enrollment 
data cover four-year and two-year institutions, matching the state funding). State 
funding variations don’t align directly with enrollment fluctuations for at least a 
couple of reasons. The main reason is that annual state higher education budgets 
are strongly influenced by political and economic forces that shape the entire state 
budget. The needs of, and political attitudes towards, higher education are of 
consequence in some years, but at other times alternate factors will dominate such 
as changes in tax revenue and spending on other rising costs like health. We’ll return 
to this topic in several ensuing sections. The other reason for state appropriation 
and enrollment fluctuations to be out of sync is that, while a little inconsistent, 
it’s not uncommon for enrollments to increase during economic downturns when 
jobs are harder to come by and people return to school to upgrade their education 
credentials.
Returning to enrollment trends, we can see the decrease in WWII followed by the 
increase associated with the GI Bill. Enrollments increased steadily from the early 
1950s onwards, increasing even more steeply during the 1960s. This was when the 
baby boomers went to college, as well as many more women and people of color. The 
ideas of equality and access slowly made their way into policy during this time, some 
reflected in the recommendations of the 1947 Truman Commission (Gilbert and Heller 
2010). At the national level there was a substantial expansion of federal aid. At the 
state level, community colleges also underwent huge growth in this period, opening 
at a rate of one per week in the late 1960s. After peaking in 1976, enrollments entered 
an era of approximately decade-long variations around a slower overall growth trend, 
which has continued through to the present day.
So, now that we’ve reviewed the context, what are the historical trends in state 
appropriations per student? Figure 4.14 illustrates the history of state investment 
per student in public higher education, using the same data as above including all 
postsecondary institutions (four-year and two-year) and adjusted for inflation. After 
some volatility before and during WWII, we see the characteristic steep postwar rise in 
state appropriations per student through the 1950s and 1960s into the mid-1970s, from 
about $3,500 to about $6,500. From that point onwards through to the late 2000s, per-
student state appropriations went through a volatile period with several quasi-cyclical 
periods of 5–10% variations. The Great Recession was a signal event, with average state 
investment per student dropping from $6,722 in 2008 to $4,981 in 2012 (a 26% cut). 
This recent drop mirrors the one in the Great Depression of the 1930s and is about half 
the size of the postwar rise. For the record, that 2012 number was last seen in 1959! It 
has bounced back a little in the last few years, but contemporary state investment per 
student is the same as in the 1960s.
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Figure 4.14.  Historic trend in all state higher education appropriations per student in all degree-
granting postsecondary institutions (four-year and two-year), in 2016 dollars using 
total enrollment. Sources for appropriations: Snyder (1993) for FY1930–1959, odd years 
interpolated from even years; Grapevine for FY1960–1999 (Illinois State University, 
Center for the Study of Education Policy 2018); SHEEO-SHEF (2017) for FY2000–2017. 
Sources for enrollment: Snyder (1993) for FY1930–1947, odd years interpolated from 
even years; NCES (National Center for Education Statistics 2017) for FY1948–2017.
Early in Chapter 2 we saw that our institutional budgets have doubled in the last fifteen 
years, and yet, as I mentioned, that fact didn’t align with the lived experience on campus. 
Now we see why—those increases went to inflation, and especially to enrollment 
growth. If we calculate the year-to-year percentage changes in state appropriations 
per student, the result is a chart that illustrates how state appropriations were felt by 
institutional budgets (Figure 4.15). The long, uninterrupted period of state funding 







































































































We can do a related calculation and express state higher education appropriations 
in relation to the economy, or more specifically to overall state budgets. Those values 
are illustrated in Figure 4.16 as a percentage of GDP and as a percentage of overall state 
expenditures. The two measures show similar patterns, with the recognizable postwar 
growth through to the highpoint in 1975 for the GDP curve and to the early 1980s for 
the state budget curve. The post-1980s plunge, however, is stark and dramatic. Relative 
to the overall economy and to state budgets, state appropriations to higher education 
have dropped by almost half over the last three decades. States have not invested this 
small a percentage of their budgets (slightly over 3%) in higher education since the 
late 1950s.
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Figure 4.15.  Historic annual percentage change in all state higher education appropriations (2016 
dollars). Sources: Snyder (1993) for FY1930–1959, odd years interpolated from even 
years; Grapevine for FY1960–1999 (Illinois State University, Center for the Study of 



































































































Figure 4.16.  Historic trends in all state higher education appropriations as a percentage of real 
(inflation-adjusted) GDP and of all state expenditures (2016 dollars). Sources for 
appropriations: Snyder (1993) for FY1930–1959, odd years interpolated from even years; 
Grapevine for FY1960–1999 (Illinois State University, Center for the Study of Education 
Policy 2018); SHEEO-SHEF (2017) for FY2000–2017. Sources for state expenditures and 
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Not surprisingly, many in public higher education view this as a travesty. Despite being 
a fundamental shift that has been underway for decades, universities were in denial 
and throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s they (we!) clung to hopes of a return to 
the halcyon days of long ago. Looking at the swings of recent decades in Figure 4.14, 
such hopes weren’t without reason, but the structural decline in state higher education 
spending seen in Figure 4.16 is the deeper trend. Only with the shock of the Great 
Recession did public higher education lift its head out of the sand and acknowledge that 
the old days of growth and high state investment were not coming back anytime soon.
There are plenty of questions about all of this. Depending on their political bent, 
policy advocates wring their hands about massive state defunding of higher education 
or about the upward spiraling costs of attending college. Others worry about the 
underlying shift in higher education from a public to a private good. Some believe 
that state legislatures “have it in” for higher education and will continue to cut, and 
yet others wonder where all those state expenditures have gone instead. We’ll return 
to those questions, but first we will take a closer look to see how this plays out across 
types of institutions and states.
4.7 How have state appropriations changed by type of institution?
Using a shorter data record, we can disaggregate the nationwide trends of the 
previous section and examine them for four-year schools by type of institution. Figure 
4.17 shows the average state appropriations and enrollment across all the four-year 
public institutions in our data set. State appropriations (in 2016 dollars) had some 
large swings of 5–10% during the last thirty years, but have ended up essentially flat 
over that time, about $115M at the average institution. In contrast, average enrollments 
over the same period have grown by about 40%, currently about 15,000 students at the 
average institution. The one exception in enrollment trends is the group of 20 small 
public baccalaureate colleges—their enrollments (not shown) were mostly flat over 
this period, averaging about 2,200 until after the Great Recession; since then they have 
declined by almost 10% and were down to about 2,000 students at the average college 
in 2017, a worrying trend for those schools.
Figure 4.18 illustrates state appropriations per student (now as FTE rather than 
total enrollment that was necessary for the historical trends in the previous section) 
for the four Carnegie groups of public institutions. We see the same overall patterns 
with several pre-recession cycles followed by the post-recession decrease in per-FTE 
state funding. The R1 schools saw the largest absolute and relative decreases, about 
$4,000 per student or roughly one third. The R2 and R3-M3 schools saw decreases of 
around $1,500 per student, about 15–20%. The baccalaureates have seen fluctuations 
in per-student funding but have trended flat overall because of their post-recession 
enrollment declines mentioned above, which occurred concurrently with the decrease 
in funding. A recent study found that a 10% decrease in state appropriations at public 
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Figure 4.17.  Trends in state appropriations and enrollment at public institutions, averaged within 
and then across the four Carnegie classification groups. Amounts are in 2016 dollars 
by fiscal year and twelve-month full-time equivalent enrollment by academic year. To 
provide long-term trends prior to 2004 (dashed line), twelve-month FTE enrollment 
is estimated from total Fall enrollment (full-time plus part-time) by using the average 












































































































Figure 4.18.  Trends in state appropriations per student at public institutions, averaged by Carnegie 
classification. Amounts are in 2016 dollars per twelve-month full-time equivalent 
enrollment by fiscal and academic year. To provide long-term trends prior to 2004 
(dashed lines), twelve-month FTE enrollment is estimated from total Fall enrollment 
(full-time plus part-time) by using the average 2004–2006 ratio of the two for each 








































































































Like Nobody's Business80 
research universities led to a 3.6% decrease in bachelor’s degrees awarded and a 
7.2% decrease in PhD degrees completed; non-research publics had fewer alternative 
revenue sources that necessitated lower spending and higher in-state tuition (Bound 
et al. 2019).
We can compare these changes in state investment per student to total institutional 
spending on each student, using the E&R expenditures per FTE we examined in 
Section 3.4. Figure 4.19 shows state appropriations per FTE as a percentage of E&R 
expenditures per FTE for FY2006–2016 by Carnegie group for public institutions. 
There was a post-recession plunge from covering about 60% of education-related 
spending down to about 35% at most institutions, with the baccalaureate colleges 
showing much the same pattern but shifted about 5% higher. These dramatic changes 
represent a fundamental shift in society’s support of public higher education. More 
candidly, the states are no longer majority stakeholders in public higher education.
Figure 4.19.  Recent trends in state appropriations per FTE enrolled at public institutions as a 
percentage of Education and Related (E&R) expenditures, averaged by Carnegie 
classification and based on amounts in 2016 dollars per twelve-month full-time 
equivalent enrollment by fiscal and academic year. Source: IPEDS (2020).
4.8 How much does each state spend per student?
There is an extensive range in annual spending per student across the 50 states (see 
Figure 4.20), from about $3,000 in Vermont and New Hampshire to over $15,000 
in Alaska, Wyoming, Illinois and Hawaii, with the US average slightly over $7,600 
and the median slightly over $6,500 in FY2017. The reasons for the varying amounts 
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enrollments, policy environment, other demands on appropriations, etc. Note that 
these figures are for all postsecondary schools, two-year and four-year, and while 
the underlying data and analyses are similar to those in preceding sections, they are 
not identical.
Figure 4.20.  FY2017 state and local funding for post-secondary education per student (upper panel) 
and ten-year change (FY2007–FY2017) in funding per student (lower panel), by state, 
in 2017 dollars. Source: College Board (Ma et al. 2018).
The ten-year percentage change in state funding per student from FY2007–FY2017 
spans the period preceding and following the recession (Figure 4.20). The percentages 
on the left axis are substantial—with a median of negative 12%, the majority of states 
are still considerably below their pre-recession investments in higher education, with 
Arizona (that also had increasing enrollments) and Louisiana down almost 40% 
over the decade. A handful of states’ investments are up over the decade, by 5–10%, 
with Montana at 13% and North Dakota at 53% (both with high oil revenues and low 
enrollments). The 56% increase for Illinois was a dramatic change aimed mostly at 
under-funded pensions (Ma et al. 2018), in contrast to the negative 23% for the five 
years FY2008–2013 in the heart of the recession (Weisman 2013). These data provide 
yet more evidence of how state higher education spending per student was slashed 
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4.9 Where has state spending gone instead of higher education?
The largest expenditures in state budgets go to elementary and secondary education, 
followed by Medicaid, then higher education, and then corrections (Figure 4.21). 
Smaller amounts go to public assistance and transportation, with all other spending 
including, for example, budgets of state agencies. Higher education accounted for 9.7% 
of state general fund expenditures in FY2018—roughly one quarter of K-12 education 
spending and one half of Medicaid spending.
Figure 4.21.  FY2018 general fund expenditures by category totaled for all states. 
Source: NASBO (2018).
With these proportions as context, the real story is in the trends (Figure 4.22). As 
we know from the preceding sections, state funding per FTE student has been in 
decline for some time, and we see that pattern when looking at higher education 
expenditures as a share of all state general fund expenditures, where it dropped from 
15.5% in FY1987 to the 9.7% in FY2018 mentioned above. This systematic decrease 
can be viewed, perhaps simplistically, as part of a concerted policy to defund higher 
education. While there may be an argument to be made in that regard, the reality 
is more complicated: decreases in state support also reflect tough choices that states 
have had to make in reaction to compulsory Medicaid spending, escalating pension 
contributions, and wanting to sustain K–12 education (The Lincoln Project: Excellence 
and Access in Public Higher Education 2015). The main culprit is the rising cost of 
mandatory contributions to health services through Medicaid, which has increased 1.5 
times since FY1987, from 8.1% to 20.2% of state general fund expenditures. Therefore, 
limiting the growth of healthcare costs is essential not only for healthcare reform but 

































4. Public Funding  83
corrections are sometimes blamed for “receiving” the higher education dollars, the 
share spent on corrections has been essentially flat since the mid-1990s.
Figure 4.22.  Trends in percentage share of state general fund expenditures for higher education, 
Medicaid and corrections, FY1987–2018. Source: NASBO (2018).
4.10 When did tuition revenue overtake state revenue?
In FY2010, for the first time, four-year public colleges and universities depended more 
on net tuition revenue than on state appropriations for funding support. We saw this 
in Section 4.7, where we broke out state appropriations as a share of E&R expenses by 
type of institution (Figure 4.19). Figure 4.23 illustrates state appropriations and net 
tuition revenue explicitly, where we can plainly see the FY2010 transition when the 
student share of educational cost first exceeded the state share. The two trends have 
diverged further since then, and in FY2016 the student share was almost 50% higher 







At the state level, for all postsecondary institutions (four-year and two-year), 
FY2017 marked the first time that over half of all states relied more on the student 
share than on the state share to fund public higher education (SHEEO-SHEF 2017). 
In other words, the median state share dropped below 50% for the first time in FY2017 
(for the average it was FY2012). Figure 4.24 shows the FY2017 state share of public 
higher education funding relative to the student share on a state-by-state basis, with 
28 states now below the 50% mark. As we’ve seen in related state comparisons, the 
states vary widely in per-FTE support of higher education, from 80% and more 
in California and Wyoming, to 21% and 13% respectively in New Hampshire and 
Vermont. Since the Great Recession, the state share has decreased in all but two 
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Figure 4.23.  Recent trends in state appropriations and net tuition revenue in 2016 dollars per FTE 



























states (North Dakota and Wyoming) although most states’ relative ranking does not 
shift markedly from year to year (SHEEO-SHEF 2017).
Figure 4.24.  FY2017 state higher education appropriations as a percentage share of combined 
educational revenues (state higher education appropriation per FTE plus net tuition 
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4.11 Do state funding cuts increase tuition?
Yes, cuts in state appropriations to public universities do increase tuition, but not in a 
1:1 relationship. Figure 4.25 illustrates the relationship over three decades as annual 
percentage changes and, generally, tuition rises more when state appropriations fall 
and vice-versa (FYI, the correlation between these data series is a bit over 0.4). Given 
the analyses in previous sections this question may seem like a no-brainer, although 
in politically-tilted debates on state higher education funding the effect is claimed to 
range from near zero to 100% (Seltzer 2017). We know from previous sections that 
when state appropriations decrease, institutions take a variety of actions to decrease 
expenditures and increase other revenues (e.g., cutting labor costs, enrolling more 
out-of-state students if the institution has market access to them) while increasing 
tuition as a partial offset. Using advanced analyses to adjust for extraneous effects 
(e.g., state limitations on tuition increases, political bias in appropriations) rather than 
simple correlation, the pass-through rate has averaged about 26% since the late 1980s, 
although before 2000 it was about 10% and since then it has been 32% (Webber 2017). 
Multiple analyses have come to similar conclusions, that state funding cuts explain a 
significant and likely growing portion of tuition hikes and, furthermore, beyond the 
debate between advocates for greater support of higher education or advocates for 
restraint in government spending, the reactions of an institution to decreased state 
investment depend on its market position (Baum et al. 2018b).
Figure 4.25.  Annual percentage change in inflation-adjusted published tuition and fees (in-state) 
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4.12 Does performance funding work?
No, but that may be okay. Let’s review some background before returning to this 
question. The appeal of performance funding, sometimes called performance-
based funding or outcomes-based funding, is that it supposedly incentivizes public 
institutions to pursue improved student outcomes based on specified metrics (e.g., 
graduation rates). Historically, state higher education funding was made through 
block appropriations or based on enrollment. Tennessee adopted the first performance 
funding program in 1979, followed by several more states in the following years, 
growing to 21 states in 2001, but dropping to almost half that number in the subsequent 
decade before rising again (McLendon and Hearn 2013). The most recent total, which 
includes states with performance funding for both two-year and four-year schools, was 
as high as 35 states in 2015 and 29 states in FY2020, depending on how one counts (Li 
2018; Rosinger et al. 2020). Many programs have been reformulated to add or subtract 
accountability measures and to address challenges such as year-to-year volatility 
and avoiding unintended consequences for student equity. Furthermore, designing 
these programs for mission-differentiated institutions and sustaining them over time 
has proven difficult in ever-changing fiscal and political environments (McLendon 
and Hearn 2013; Obergfell 2018). Beyond the inherent attractiveness of the targeted 
quality-assurance element, the accountability aspects of performance funding in the 
face of tight state budgets, rising tuition and greater attention to oversight would seem 
to ensure that it will be around for the foreseeable future (Obergfell 2018).
Performance funding programs vary a lot, even across the 21 states that currently 
have them for four-year institutions (Figure 4.26). In 5 states, 80% to 100% of the 
state appropriation is tied to performance funding while it is 10% or less of the state 
appropriation in about a dozen states. Depending on the state, these amounts are 
determined via 1 to 10 or more metrics that fall into typical categories, frequently 
including those related to degree completion as well as job placement, critical fields 
(e.g., STEM, health professions), equity and diversity measures, and other metrics such 
as financial efficiency (Li 2018). Thus in North Dakota, for example, 100% of the state 
allocation is determined solely by credits earned (a completion-related metric) versus, 
say, Florida, where metrics in all five categories (credits earned, undergraduate and 
graduate degrees awarded, time-to-degree, graduation rates, employment outcomes, 
critical fields, Pell Grant/low-income student rates, and instructional costs) determine 
22% of the state appropriation (Li 2018).
Coming back to whether performance funding works as intended, most but not all 
empirical research studies have found that degree completions and graduation rates 
have not improved as a direct result of performance funding (Dougherty et al. 2014; 
Hillman 2016; Callahan et al. 2017; Hillman et al. 2018; Li 2018). There are several 
possible reasons for this: performance funding assumes that institutions will respond 
to the incentive, that the effect of performance dollars in the face of state divestment 
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Figure 4.26.  The 21 states with performance funding for four-year public colleges and universities in 
FY2018, showing percentage share of state appropriations tied to performance funding 
and the mix of performance metric types (unweighted proportional count) within each 
share. Performance funding in Kansas, Oklahoma and Missouri applies to new state 






























































in higher education will be felt, and that the institution has the capacity to implement 
completion strategies above and beyond those already in place before the incentive. 
Additional confounding effects include the inverse cyclical relationship between 
enrollments and economic conditions, and that attention to completion, diversity, 
and other measures in higher education has been increasing independently of 
performance funding. Even if the evidence for an empirical link is weak, performance 
funding policies continue to enjoy political and foundation support (Fain 2015). While 
outcomes haven’t clearly shifted, some equity concerns such as shifts in low-income 
enrollment and funding disparities across different types of institutions have been 
raised (Rosinger et al. 2020). Performance funding has undoubtedly drawn campus 
and stakeholder attention to completion and other important outcome metrics, 
resulting in a silver lining of constructive changes in institutional practices such as 
developmental pre-college courses, accelerated programs, supplementary instruction, 
and tutoring (Li 2018).
4.13 Can’t we simply privatize a public university?
From time to time, especially after reductions in state support such as during the 
Great Recession, and often in tandem with frustrations about regulatory constraints, 
public campus leaders and others raise the idea of “going private.” Alas, the dream 
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of complete autonomy with minimal budgetary impact doesn’t stand up to the 
cold facts of reality. There is no question that state disinvestment, coupled with 
increased tuition dependence, the necessity for fundraising, and more private sector 
partnerships, have led public universities (the R1 flagships in particular) to appear 
more like private institutions in those respects. However, the leap from there to total 
privatization is sufficiently far that virtually no institutions have done so, apart from 
a few that were set up with a special situation or independent funding from the start 
(Ebersole 2014).
There are at least a half-dozen financial reasons, and numerous non-financial 
reasons, as to why total privatization is impracticable (Chapter 10 covers several of 
these topics in more breadth):
• Annual Revenue Flow: We saw in Chapter 2 and in several earlier sections 
of this chapter that in some states, especially those with the lowest shares 
of state revenue on the right of Figure 4.24 such as Vermont, the low levels 
of state appropriations mean that total elimination of those funds from an 
institution’s budget could be a survivable event. For the average public 
institution, however, the state slice of the revenue pie is critical for at least 
two reasons: (i) it funds core activities that leverage others (see Section 
2.12), thereby amplifying the loss, and (ii) the size of endowment necessary 
to replace it is out of reach in most cases. Consider a large university that 
receives $200M each year in state appropriations—it would need a new 
endowment of roughly $4B to supply a similar annual income stream. Yet, 
a smaller school that receives only $20M in annual state support could 
conceivably raise $400M to provide a similarly sized stream of annual 
endowment proceeds.
• Facilities: A major sticking point, buildings, grounds and other physical 
infrastructure are owned by the state and would have to be purchased, 
because states cannot give public property away to private entities. The 
biggest public campuses comprise hundreds of acres and hundreds of 
buildings that together would cost billions of dollars while smaller campuses 
would total in the hundreds of millions.
• Employee Benefits: Pensions, retirement plans, and healthcare contributions are 
handled differently across the states, and in those with large commitments to 
past or current employees the state is unlikely to assume those costs, so they 
would need to be covered by the privatized institution. These costs are hard 
to generalize but would likely be in the tens of millions of dollars annually 
at bigger institutions.
• Bonds and Ratings: Most campuses have debt payments on buildings, often 
funded directly or indirectly through bonds that were issued based on their 
being a public entity. Furthermore, the interest rate on any new bonds is 
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strongly influenced by the rating of the institution’s perceived future ability 
to pay for them. Again, these costs are hard to generalize, but could total a 
few percent of the annual institutional budget.
• Alumni and Donor Contributions: with a major identity change, an institution 
will need to consider the implications for income from philanthropic gifts. 
There would without doubt be a concerted effort to rally support for the 
evolving new identity, and to use it as a fundraising opportunity. Still, the 
privatization move would minimally raise questions about past donations 
that were made based on the institution having a public mission, and there 
may be current donors who decide to withdraw their support.
• Charter and Name: Public universities receive their charter and public 
mission, as well as their name, by constitution or law. A privatized institution 
could finesse a modified public service mission, but if a name change was 
required by the state it would have significant implications for marketing 
and branding, and therefore enrollment, all else being equal. Universities 
and colleges are built on reputation and brand, so a name change would be a 
serious business risk and would need both a comprehensive rebranding plan 
and a long-term marketing investment to mitigate potential losses.
The upshot of these considerable impediments is that institutions contemplating 
significant privatization are likely to maintain their core public status and instead 
select hybrid solutions that enable them to partially address their challenge. The state 
with perhaps the most notable examples of hybrid shifts in recent years is Oregon, 
whose major universities have evolved towards greater autonomy with new regulatory 
and financial structures while retaining their public status (Wang 2013). Complete 
privatization was subsequently suggested by a state task force as one option to cut a 
huge shortfall in the public pension system, although implementation seems unlikely 
for all the reasons discussed above (Lehman 2017).
Privatization is more often seen in less dramatic but wider-reaching ways. There are 
countless public-private partnerships across the US higher education landscape and 
virtually every campus has something of that sort that fits under a wider banner of 
privatization: typical examples include spinning off or subcontracting dining services, 
bookstores, conference centers, and parking, as well as some non-auxiliary services 
like online enrollment recruiting and collaborative research space with companies 
(see Section 10.7). There is a lively discussion surrounding this broader notion of 
privatization, ranging from support to condemnation, and an accompanying set of 
structural dynamics related to declining public support and a neoliberal economic 
environment (Berdahl 2000; Morphew and Eckel 2009; Tierney 2012; Lambert 2014; 
Newfield 2018).
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4.14 How are universities funded in other countries?
The higher education system in most countries is typically overseen by the national 
education ministry, often with substantial funding coming from the national 
government for public higher education. The US is unusual in having non-
governmental regional accreditors provide oversight in place of the US Department 
of Education and, moreover, our public higher education institutions are funded and 
administrated primarily by the states with the Federal Government providing student 
aid and research investment. There is plenty of variation around the world and in 
some countries the states (or their equivalent) and cities may also fund public higher 
education. Many, but not all, countries also allow private institutions—globally, about 
33% of higher education enrollment is at private institutions (Levy 2018). In some 
countries they are predominant, such as South Korea, Japan, and Brazil with between 
70% and 80% enrollment in private higher education; India has the largest total private 
enrollments, with 58% of higher education enrollments being at private institutions 
(Levy 2018).
To understand public higher education funding internationally, it is useful to 
appreciate the other ways in which US higher education can be different. The tradition 
of going away to college is a part of US culture, but it is far less common in other 
countries where students typically attend an institution in their home city, which 
means that residence halls can have a decreased role. The whole concept of high-
visibility college sports is American to the core—while there are club sports at many 
universities around the world, none of them have television contracts! Research is 
handled differently in some countries and may take place at government laboratories 
rather than on teaching-focused campuses. In most countries a smaller proportion of 
high school graduates goes on to university, and technical and vocational colleges play 
a relatively larger role. And, compared to the United States, tuition and fees at public 
institutions are generally lower (or even zero) in other countries.
It is hard to account for all these differences, but somewhat dated and limited 
national-level summary data enable some broad comparisons of investment in 
public higher education (combined for all levels of government in Figure 4.27). It is 
interesting that, in relative terms as a percentage of GDP, higher and lower income 
countries have similarly wide ranges in the amount they invest in higher education, 
and that the US ranks in the middle of high-income countries by this measure. The 
pattern changes when expressed in absolute dollars per student, and unsurprisingly 
it generally scales with the income level of the countries. Remarkably, the US also 
falls in the middle of the high-income countries by this measure of government 
spending on public higher education. Naturally, government spending is only part 
of the picture and it is worth noting that the US is among the countries with the 
highest household contribution to total higher education expenses (United Nations 
Children’s Fund [UNICEF] 2015).
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Figure 4.27.  Government expenditures on public higher education as a percentage of GDP and per 
student in US$, both for 2014 and grouped by World Bank country income classification. Sources: 
UNESCO (2019) and The World Bank (2019)
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5.1 What is the organizational structure?
Early in my career as a central administrator, I was chatting with a senior faculty 
member, excitedly describing the facilities, coordination and support services that my 
unit provided to campus. He wasn’t buying it, and his inner curmudgeon kicked in 
as he said, “Humph, I don’t need all this extra stuff that wastes money, I can teach my 
students with just a table and chairs on the lawn.” At the time I bit my tongue and 
didn’t retort that he might need a tree to provide shade and shelter, not to mention all 
the invisible background support required to enable his supposedly administration-
free fantasy. I’ve thought about our conversation many times since then, and from it 
I’ve developed a useful visual metaphor of how the supporting services of a university 
(boringly known as administration) support the core activity of learning: I imagine a 
silhouette in the style of a Japanese woodblock print, containing a student and teacher 
at the focal point under a tree, with its branches reaching over them to provide shade 
and its roots extending below, invisible to them but vital nonetheless.
While that image may be sentimental (and probably more appealing to support 
staff than faculty members), there are indeed many visible and not-so-visible 
functions that are necessary to enable the effective operation of a contemporary 
university. In most universities, budgets and people are organized in a more-or-
less standard structure of functional units, each one typically a vice-presidential 
division reporting to the president (Figure 5.1). Naturally, academic affairs are the 
raison d’être for the university and this area includes all the colleges, schools and 
departments from Anthropology to Zoology, as well as services directly supporting 
the faculty and academic programs such as libraries and online education. Student 
affairs include recruitment and admissions as well as many co-curricular aspects of 
student life such as clubs, health, and residence halls. The research office is well-
known in many academic units because it is the source of startup funds to help 
faculty obtain external research support, but in addition to supporting research 
with funds and services it also has an extensive set of compliance functions (human 
subjects protection, data privacy, animal care, laboratory safety, financial conflict 
of interest management, and more). In many institutions the Provost oversees the 
academic, student and research areas. The finance and facilities division manages 
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the institution’s money, major capital projects and physical facilities (buildings, 
grounds, utilities, etc.). If the university has a hospital or works closely with one, 
there is typically a division handling the health sciences and it may include academic 
health programs (e.g., medicine, nursing) if they are not under academic affairs. 
Large athletic programs can include a dozen or more men’s and women’s sports in 
addition to their staff overseeing operations. The advancement area typically includes 
alumni relations and the fundraising operation. Finally, there are numerous other 
smaller administrative offices—a few examples of those are included in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1.  A generalized high-level functional organizational structure for a large research 
university, showing the major vice-presidential areas and selected subareas within each. 
These major divisions are the fundamental management, budget and employment units 
of the institution.
As we saw in Chapter 3, employees and their benefits are the largest investment that 
a university makes every year. The human resources division often resides in the area 
overseeing business and financial operations, and its functions include employee 
recruitment and hiring, onboarding, compensation, payroll, training and compliance, 
and organizational development and effectiveness. The remaining sections in this 
chapter review the basic financial elements of the university’s human resources: the 
number and types of employees working on campus, their associated salaries and 
benefits, and related trends. In other words, in this chapter we’ll cover people and 
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5.2 How many employees are there?
The Carnegie classification is tied to institutional size, and thus it is no surprise to 
see a clear scaling by number of employees across those categories (Figure 5.2). At 
the broadest level it is useful to group staff into full-time and part-time, instructional 
(including faculty) and non-instructional, as well as medical and non-medical. Staff 
numbers and salaries in medical schools are sufficiently high that they can skew the 
summary data despite being present in less than 10% of institutions overall. Medical 
schools are clustered principally in R1 institutions, with R1 privates having a higher 
proportion and therefore more medical employees (almost one third of the total) on 
average than at R1 publics.
Figure 5.2.  FY2018 employee headcount by full-time (FT) and part-time (PT) status as well as 
instructional and non-instructional position, for medical and non-medical staff, all 
averaged by Carnegie classification and control. Source: IPEDS (2020).
Looking further at Figure 5.2, full-time employees make up 80% or more of the total at R1 
and R2 schools and at private baccalaureate colleges, while that percentage is in the lower 
70s at the smaller publics, and a little over 60% at the R3-M3 privates (parallel to their 
challenging financial position). Across almost all types of institution, non-instructional 
staff are in the majority, around three quarters of the total at the bigger schools and 
closer to one half at the smaller schools. Furthermore, non-instructional staff are mostly 
full-time (84% to 91% across types of schools). Among the instructional staff, part-time 
employees are more common. While part-time lecturers and instructors form less than 
one quarter of all instructional staff at R1 schools, their representation approaches and 
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The total number of campus employees has been growing steadily (Figure 5.3) 
and is up 22% over the last sixteen years, although the COVID-19 pandemic has led 
to employee reductions (Bauman 2020). Within that overall growth, the number 
of full-time and part-time faculty has increased, as has the number of full-time 
support staff, although the number of part-time support staff has decreased slightly. 
The share of instructional to non-instructional staff has remained almost flat, with 
all instructional staff increasing slightly from 29% to 30% of total employees over 
this period.
Figure 5.3.  Unadjusted trends in employee headcount by full-time and part-time status as well as 
instructional and non-instructional staff, averaged across all eight types of institution by 
fiscal year. Source: IPEDS (2020).
To properly evaluate the trend in employee numbers, we must account for student 
enrollment growth. Once we make that adjustment, we see that the ratio of employees 
per 1000 students1 has remained essentially unchanged over the data period (Figure 
5.4) at about 200 on average for non-instructional staff, and increasing slightly from 
about 80 to 85 for instructional staff. Overall then, the number of employees has 
simply scaled with enrollment growth over time. However, within that essentially flat 
trend there are noteworthy patterns in employee trends among the various types of 
institutions, which we will explore in the rest of this chapter.
1  The astute reader will notice that employees per 1000 students is simply the inverse of students per 
employee, a common metric often focused on the faculty as students per faculty member. I’ve used 
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Figure 5.4.  Trends in instructional and non-instructional staff adjusted by total fall student 
enrollment, expressed as staff per 1000 students, averaged across all eight types of 
institution by fiscal year. Source: IPEDS (2020).
5.3 How much are employees paid?
Average FY2018 salaries for full-time non-medical staff are illustrated in Figure 5.5 with 
a comparison of instructional versus non-instructional salaries by type of institution, 
using the typical contract lengths of nine months for academic appointments and 
twelve months for other staff. Instructional staff (which includes the professorial faculty 
ranks as well as lecturers and instructors) are paid more than non-instructional staff 
on average, presumably because of national market forces related to specialization and 
advanced degree requirements. Instructional staff members are also paid relatively 
more at the bigger publics and privates. In general, the pay at private institutions 
is higher at comparable sizes of schools across instructional and non-instructional 
staff, again except for the R3-M3 privates where the pay is about the same as at the 
corresponding publics. The salary premium at private institutions averages 17% 
more for instructional staff and 14% more for non-instructional staff. For the average 
instructional staff salary, there is a notable difference of more than $35,000 per year 
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Figure 5.5.  FY2018 salaries of full-time non-medical staff, averaged by Carnegie classification and 
control. Annual amounts are for the typical contract period with instructional staff 
salaries equated to nine months and non-instructional salaries for twelve months. 
Source: IPEDS (2020).
5.4 What is the size of the faculty?
As I noted previously, the Carnegie classification is closely related to overall institution 
size, and so we see the size of the instructional staff being largest at R1 universities 
and smallest at baccalaureate colleges (Figure 5.6). A quick technical note: the 
faculty can include non-instructional members (e.g., those focused on research), so 
the term instructional staff is more precise, although at the level we’re examining 
there isn’t much practical difference between the two and we can use the faculty as 
shorthand. Returning to Figure 5.6, at most types of institution there are roughly 
similar proportions of the three professorial ranks and fewer lecturers and instructors. 
However, at R1 schools there is a remarkable sliding proportion of headcounts by rank, 
with more full professors and successively fewer members of each lower rank. The 
reason for this stark difference is unclear but, given that this is an R1 phenomenon 
only, it is likely a function of higher research activity. The three professorial ranks total 
78% of the total across all institutions, a remarkably consistent percentage that varies 
only by a few percentage points across institution types. Note that this observation is 
for full-time positions, and that there are higher proportions of part-time instructional 
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Box 5.1. Faculty Titles: A Primer for the Uninitiated
Faculty job titles can seem confusing to those unfamiliar with the practices of the 
academy. Ironically, for institutions that are such bastions of egalitarianism, the formal 
hierarchy of earned and ranked job titles and the implicit campus class structure they 
produce are remarkable. The basic structure is simple enough, with three faculty ranks 
for those who are tenured or on the tenure track (Figure B5). Professors are the most 
senior and, because “professor” is also a generic term for anyone teaching at a university, 
for precision we talk about Full Professors. Associate Professors are in the middle rank, 
and Assistant Professors are the most junior of these three. Typically, but not always, the 
upper two ranks have achieved tenure while Assistant Professors are working towards it 
(see Chapter 6 for more on tenure). Faculty members not on the tenure track, also known 
as the contingent faculty, have various job titles, the most common being lecturer and 
instructor for teaching, with various titles for researchers, librarians and other specialists. 
Their appointments may be multi-year, one-year, less than a year, by course or project, as 
well as full-time or part-time.
Where things get confusing is the plethora of modifiers. We have honorary titles such 
as Distinguished and Regents’ Professor, and endowed chair titles such as the John Smith 
Professor of XYZ. There are Professors of Practice (often practitioners whose primary job 
is not on campus, but sometimes core faculty by another name), and Clinical, Research 
and Teaching Professors, who may be tenure-track or contingent depending on the 
institution. Visiting Professors of various ranks may indeed be visiting for a semester 
or a few weeks every year, paid or unpaid, or may be local contingent faculty. Some 
individuals may have split appointments across multiple departments and others 
may have courtesy titles in cognate fields that variously might be called Joint or Dual 
Appointments. We also have titles such as Adjunct Professor, a poorly-defined term 
that may or may not signal contingent and/or part-time or class-by-class status. To cap 
things off, titles can be combined to obtain inscrutable ostentations such as the Jane Doe 
Distinguished Clinical Research Professor of Underwater Basket Weaving!
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Figure 5.6.  FY2018 counts of full-time non-medical instructional staff, averaged by Carnegie 
classification and control. Source: IPEDS (2020).
There are several key differences among the trends in instructional staff size when we 
break the data out by type of institution (Figure 5.7). The first pattern to note is that the 
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Figure 5.7.  Trends in full-time instructional staff adjusted by total fall student enrollment per 
fiscal year, expressed as instructional staff per 1000 students, averaged by Carnegie 
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growth over time) is generally lower at public institutions than privates. The second 
notable pattern is that the trend in adjusted faculty size has been flat for several decades 
at the larger publics and the R3-M3 privates, while it has been increasing relative to 
enrollment at the R1 and R2 privates, as well as both public and private baccalaureate 
colleges. Recall that at the latter small colleges, enrollments have been relatively flat 
and even decreasing, so some if not all of the increase in faculty ratio is attributable to 
a change in the denominator. Generally, though, after adjusting for enrollment growth 
the full-time faculty to student ratio at most publics has remained about the same size, 
while it has grown (albeit modestly) at an annualized rate of 0.5% to 0.8% at most 
privates.
5.5 How has faculty composition changed by rank?
The mix of faculty ranks relative to each other began shifting noticeably in the late 
1990s (Figure 5.8). Looking across all institutions, the percentage of full professors 
declined from 35% two decades ago to 29% of the instructional faculty in recent 
years, while at the same time the percentage of lecturers and instructors rose from 
5% to 13% and 9% respectively. The percentage of associate and assistant professors 
has remained relatively level by comparison, varying by a few percent at or above 
the 25% level. This is an interesting case in which the Great Recession that hit in 
FY2009 was not the initial force for change. Instead, the long economic expansion 
that had been underway since the postwar years ended with the recession of the early 
1990s. This period saw increased unemployment and an extended real estate slump, 
Figure 5.8.  Trends in percentage share by rank of full-time instructional staff, averaged across all 
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multiple years of state budget cuts at the publics and lower market returns for the 
privates, that together partly catalyzed universities to shift their hiring patterns. Two 
related elements were at play, the first simply being less money and the second being 
uncertainty about future funding, so that money freed up by retiring senior faculty 
members was more likely to be deployed in hiring non-tenure track faculty (i.e., those 
with shorter-term contracts and lower budgetary obligation) than in growing the 
junior ranks of the tenure-track faculty.
These broad patterns occurred in institutions of all types and sizes, but naturally 
there are some differences among them. The net change in percentage share of each 
rank is illustrated for our eight institution types in Figure 5.9. The decrease in the 
proportion of full professors occurred across all types of school, although it was 
less at the privates (except the R2 privates) and more at the publics (except the 
public baccalaureate colleges). Likewise, the growth in proportions of lecturers and 
instructors has been ubiquitous, although relatively more at larger universities and 
less at smaller schools where those proportions were slightly higher initially (except 
for private baccalaureate colleges, where the proportions of all ranks have shifted the 
least of any type over time). The overall trends of relatively fewer full professors and 
relatively more non-tenure track faculty do not appear to have ameliorated in recent 
years. Given that the relevant financial pressures on institutions have not diminished, 
these trends in the composition of the faculty will presumably continue for the 
foreseeable future.
Figure 5.9.  FY1998–FY2018 change in percentage share by rank of full-time instructional staff, 
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5.6 What is the proportion of part-time faculty members?
Part-time faculty members currently make up almost 60% of the faculty at private R3-M3 
schools, a far greater proportion than at any other type of institution (Figure 5.10). The 
next largest percentage is 44% at the R3-M3 publics. These two categories together 
comprise almost two thirds of all institutions in our data set (see Figure 1.2 in Chapter 
1) and thus part-time faculty form a substantial part of the overall faculty at most of 
the nation’s universities. In contrast, however, the share of part-time faculty at public 
and private R1 universities is 22%. These dissimilarities relate to the tuition-dominated 
revenue portfolios of the smaller teaching-oriented schools versus the diverse revenue 
streams at large research universities. Importantly, and not in Figure 5.10, R1 and R2 
schools have graduate teaching assistants that partially offset their lower part-time 
faculty numbers. By necessity, financial pressures at teaching and tuition-dominated 
institutions will incentivize lowering the cost of education, most of which is labor cost 
(including support-staff labor, not only instructional labor). A revealing indicator in this 
regard is the number of credit hours taught by various types of faculty members (Geiger 
2011), with part-timers among the highest when pro-rated. It follows that cost savings in 
instructional salaries and benefits from part-time appointments have been found across 
all types of institutions and over time (Hurlburt and McGarrah 2016a). 
Figure 5.10.  Trends in part-time instructional staff as a percentage share of total instructional 
staff, averaged by Carnegie classification and control per fiscal year. Complete data 
are unavailable for odd years FY1995–FY2015; those values are interpolated from 
neighboring even years. Source: IPEDS (2020).
There have been widespread increases in the share of contingent (non-tenure track) 
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commented upon and studied (American Association of University Professors 2019a; 
Hurlburt and McGarrah 2016b). As with the non-tenure track faculty (see Section 5.5), 
significant trends in the relative share of part-time faculty were underway in the 1990s 
at all types of institution and their growth rivaled that of lecturers and instructors until 
roughly the turn of the millennium (Figure 5.10). Over the two decades since then, the 
proportion of part-time faculty has been relatively flat at the larger universities and 
at private baccalaureate colleges (and has decreased at R1 privates), with ongoing 
slower growth at the smaller publics.
We can look further back in time using broader data for all four-year and two-
year postsecondary institutions to gain some perspective (Figure 5.11). The growth 
in the percentage of part-time faculty has three distinct periods, a steep rise in the 
1970s, followed by slower and mostly steady growth for three decades from the 1980s 
through the 2000s (with some variability in the early 1990s that may relate to a change 
in data collection), and most recently an unprecedented decline since the 50% peak 
in FY2012. What is driving these patterns, in general and by institution type? The 
1970s saw record enrollment growth (see Figure 4.13), much of which was absorbed 
at two-year community colleges, while investment returns from the market shrunk 
for the privates and state spending per student flattened and became more volatile 
for the publics. Higher education’s glory days of funding were over and one way that 
institutions coped was to hire an increasing share of part-time faculty members. The 
Figure 5.11.  Trends in part-time faculty as a percentage of total faculty across all degree-granting 
postsecondary institutions (four-year and two-year) and averaged for all institutions in 
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financial pressure to keep costs down along with the year-to-year uncertainty have 
been present ever since, along with the further rise in part-time teaching positions. 
Those institutions that rely most heavily on tuition revenue have felt these forces the 
strongest, and they are the ones with the highest proportion of part-time faculty. We 
don’t see the recent declining trend in our four-year only dataset (Figure 5.11); it 
represents a shift only at two-year colleges where the entire faculty has shrunk by 18% 
from FY2012 to FY2018 (National Center for Education Statistics 2018b)!
5.7 How much do the faculty earn?
Salaries across the academic ranks increase as expected from junior to senior positions, 
with assistant professor salaries averaging 60% to 70% of full professor salaries and 
instructors being paid about 50% of what full professors receive on average, depending 
on institution type (Figure 5.12). These average data obscure the considerable salary 
differences across disciplines; we’ll cover those in Chapter 6. Overall, the highest 
salaries are paid at private institutions and pay across public institutions averages 
14% below that at the privates. Private-public percentage differences in salary by rank 
and institution type are highlighted in Figure 5.13. The dichotomy between public 
and private salaries is strongest at R1 schools, especially for full professors at public 
R1 universities, who make 26% less that than their private counterparts. The private-
public salary imbalance at the R1 and R2 institutions has worrying implications for the 
locus of top research talent and it fuels a brain-drain that could undermine the historic 
strength of the nation’s public research universities (see Chapter 8 on research). The 
Figure 5.12.  FY2018 nine-month equated salaries of full-time non-medical instructional staff, 
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interesting exception is again the set of R3-M3 private institutions, which pay their 
professors about 8% less than their public colleagues while paying lecturers and 
instructors about the same as at the publics.
Figure 5.13.  FY2018 percentage differences of nine-month equated salaries of full-time non-medical 
instructional staff at public institutions as compared to private institutions, averaged by 
Carnegie classification. Source: IPEDS (2020).
Overall, the increase in private university faculty salaries as compared to their public 
colleagues has been attributed to the relatively higher tuition increases at the privates 
(Ehrenberg 2002). The growing salary ranges as one moves from smaller to larger 
institutions is primarily tied to the growing spread of state appropriations per student 
across the publics and a counterpart expanding spread in endowment per student 
levels across the privates (Ehrenberg 2002). Also, the same work controlled for other 
factors and holding them constant found that universities with the most growth in 
inflation-adjusted research expenditures per faculty member from institutional funds 
had the largest increase in their student-faculty ratio (Ehrenberg 2002).
In the decades before the Great Recession, inflation-adjusted faculty salaries at all 
ranks rose steadily except for a flatter period of a half-dozen years during and after 
the early 1990s recession (Figure 5.14). In contrast to more than a quarter-century of 
general salary growth leading up to FY2009, faculty salaries averaged by rank across 
all institutions have been flat for the decade since then. However, within that average 
austerity are some remarkable salary trends by institution type and rank, illustrated 
in Figure 5.15 as percentage changes from FY2009 to FY2018. At smaller schools, both 
public and private, all ranks saw decreases of between 2% and 8% in their inflation-
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ranks received increases of 1.5% to 8%, while the trends were smaller and mixed across 
ranks at R1 and R2 publics.
Figure 5.14.  Trends in average inflation-adjusted faculty salaries by rank, equated to a nine-month 
contract, averaged across institution type by Carnegie classification and control. Source: 
IPEDS (2020).
Figure 5.15.  FY2009–FY2018 percentage change in average inflation-adjusted faculty salaries by 
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The growth in salaries from FY1985–FY2009 averaged 31% for tenure-track faculty 
(34%, 28% and 31% respectively for full, associate and assistant professors) while it 
was slightly lower at 27% for non-tenure track faculty (25% and 29% respectively for 
lecturers and instructors). On the other hand, average full and associate professor 
salaries declined by about 2.5% from FY2009 to FY2018, while salaries for assistant 
professors, lecturers and instructors decreased less. by roughly 0.5% to 1%.
5.8 What are the types of support staff and their salaries?
As we saw in Section 5.2, most university employees are not on the instructional staff, 
and instead they work in many kinds of support positions. To provide a sense of the 
wide range of support staff positions on campus, the IPEDS non-instructional staff 
categories and some example occupations in each are listed in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1. Non-instructional support staff categories and selected examples of occupations 
and fields. Sources: IPEDS (2020) and US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010).
Category Example Occupations & Fields
Research Researchers (Non-Instructional) in all disciplines
Public Service Agricultural Extension; Clinical Services; Continuing Education
Librarians, Curators & 
Academic Support
Librarians; Curators; Archivists; Academic Affairs & Other 
Education Support (Non-Instructional)
Management Chief Executives; Vice Presidents; Executive Directors & 
Directors; Managers of Operations, Marketing, IT, Purchasing, 
Transportation, Human Resources, Food Service
Business & Finance Accountants; Auditors; Budget Analysts; Benefits Specialists; 
Compliance Officers; Financial Analysts; Fundraisers; Meeting 
& Event Planners
IT & Technical Computer Systems Analysts, Developers & Programmers; 
Architects; Engineers; Life, Physical & Social Scientists
Community, Legal, Arts & 
Sports
Community & Social Service; Legal; Arts, Design, 
Entertainment, Sports & Media
Healthcare Practice Physicians, Nurses, Therapists, Counselors, Pathologists, 
Veterinarians, Laboratory Technicians
Service Healthcare Support; Security; Food Preparation & Serving; 
Building & Grounds Cleaning & Maintenance
Sales Retail Workers, Cashiers, Sales Representatives, Telemarketers
Office & Administrative 
Support
Clerical Assistants; Records Clerks; Executive & 
Administrative Assistants; Postal Services; Receptionists
Natural Resources, 
Construction & Maintenance
Farming, Fishing & Forestry; Construction; Installation, 
Maintenance & Repair
Transportation & Production Bus, Car & Truck Drivers; Machine Operators; Carpenters; 
Painters
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The number of non-instructional support staff in each of the major job categories 
is roughly consistent at public and private institutions (Figure 5.16). The biggest 
staff categories are office support, IT, management, business and service. Public 
institutions have slightly more staff on average across institution types. The larger 
research-focused institutions have relatively more staff in research, business/finance, 
and IT/technical roles than the smaller schools, which is what we might expect given 
their missions.
Figure 5.16.  FY2018 counts of non-instructional support staff (full-time, non-medical) by type, 
averaged by Carnegie classification and control. Source: IPEDS (2020).
Support staff salaries are not available by rank or seniority except for those in 
management roles. As one would expect, managers earn more than regular staff 
members, with managers averaging over $100,000 per year and regular staff 
averaging in the $40,000 to $60,000 range (Figure 5.17). The higher-earning fields 
on average include research, IT/technical, and business/finance, while office 
support, sales, and service occupations are at the lower end. Unsurprisingly, public 
institutions pay staff less than the privates, averaging 7% lower across the board, and 
ranging from twice that difference between R1 schools to 2% less at R3-M3 private 





















































































































































































IPEDS only began collecting detailed salary data for non-instructional employees 
in FY2013, so the trend data don’t yet provide much information beyond looking like 
those for instructional staff. Average inflation-adjusted support staff salaries increased 
about 3% from FY2014 to FY2015, and by small amounts in the other years.
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Figure 5.17.  FY2018 twelve-month salaries for types of non-instructional support staff (full-time, 
















































































































































































5.9 Is administrative bloat a myth?
If ever you hear the phrase “administrative bloat,” know that it works like chum in the 
water to get the sharks circling. This trope relies on the age-old mistrust the faculty has 
of administrators as misguided or even malicious instruments of corporatist power, 
and on the assumption that administrators have been proliferating for years, “wasting” 
money that could be used to hire more faculty members instead. In this particular 
context, an administrator is a well-paid individual in an academic managerial role 
such as a dean or vice provost, or a vice president in a non-academic administrative 
area like human resources or communications, i.e., higher administration. Rarely does 
the sense of the term extend to rank-and-file professional staff members carrying out 
their support roles in lower-level administration.
Administrative bloat in the sense above is a myth: higher administrators are 
not escalating relative to the faculty or students and have not done so for decades 
(Desrochers and Kirshstein 2014; Kelchen 2018). However, the relative numbers of 
professional support staff2 have indeed been rising. These trends are made plain by the 
data in Figure 5.18, which shows that the number of executive administrators per faculty 
member has remained constant at about 0.3, while the number of professional support 
staff per faculty member has increased by almost half (0.7 to 1.0) in nearly two decades.
2  Professional staff positions require at least a bachelor’s degree.
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Figure 5.18.  Trends in executive/managerial administrators and professional support staff per 
faculty member (all full time) averaged across all eight types of institution by fiscal 
year. Data categories changed in FY2013 and were aligned to the closest match. Source: 
IPEDS (2020).
The fastest-growing professional staff segment has been student support services 
(see more about those spending trends in Section 7.8). These positions include 
advisors, counselors and other professionals who, in some cases, perform duties that 
otherwise the faculty would have to do. In other cases, they serve in roles that didn’t 
necessarily exist in prior decades and are now providing essential support that is 
expected by students and parents. This type of position has grown relative to other 
staff, which would at first glance appear to indicate “lower administration bloat,” but 
that’s not the whole story. Some other staff categories have shrunk over time, resulting 
in a relative balance in overall non-instructional staff proportions; recall from Figure 
5.4 that the overall trends in all non-instructional staff have remained parallel to 
trends in instructional positions. So, while the two trends (flat higher administration 
and growing professional staff, especially in student services) might appear to be 
contradictory in relation to administrative bloat, they are not—the relative increase 
in professional staff is offset by relative decreases in other staff categories in relation 
to all instructional staff. What we have seen is simply a shift to a greater proportion of 
staff in the professional category relative to other staff positions, with all-staff totals 
remaining parallel to trend in instructional staff. Therefore, whether in its classic 
higher administration invocation or more broadly relating to non-instructional 
staff, administrative bloat is a false hypothesis that refuses to die. It is likewise a red 
herring in arguments about rising costs in higher education, which have structural 
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5.10 How do we account for graduate assistants?
Graduate assistants are distinctive in an accounting sense because they are a special 
kind of student-employee hybrid. A graduate assistantship is a form of financial aid 
awarded only to selected students on a per-semester basis to enable them to attend 
graduate school (an assistantship is not like a regular job for which anyone can apply). 
Yet, graduate assistants clearly perform work in teaching or research, typically half-time 
or less. Graduate assistants are completely different to regular staff members attending 
a graduate program who may receive qualified tuition reduction as an employee 
benefit, and whose job does not depend on satisfactory academic performance in the 
program. The hybrid nature of a graduate assistantship simultaneously enables many 
students to attend graduate school while providing academic labor to their program, 
the latter having sometimes led to labor relations disputes and efforts to organize, 
most recently at elite private institutions (Kroeger et al. 2018).
Graduate assistants are, needless to say, found at schools with graduate programs, and 
those are primarily R1 and R2 institutions (Figure 5.19). The teaching/research assistant 
percentage split is 57:43 at R1 publics and close to that at R2 public and private schools, 
but the split at R1 privates is exactly the opposite way around (43:57) with more research 
than teaching assistants. The typical graduate assistantship is awarded to a full-time 
research doctoral student (or research master’s student) and rarely to graduate students 
in professional programs (e.g., EdD, MBA, MD) or part-time graduate students. Figure 
5.19 also shows that the share of all full-time graduate students receiving assistantships 
Figure 5.19.  FY2018 total unadjusted counts of graduate assistants (teaching, research, other) as a 
share of full-time graduate student fall enrollment, averaged by Carnegie classification 
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at public institutions is double the share at private institutions (43% versus 21%), which 
is due to a combination of factors at the privates: smaller undergraduate enrollments 
needing fewer teaching assistants, relatively larger graduate enrollments, especially in 
professional programs, and more self-paying graduate students.
Trends in the unadjusted counts of graduate assistants have been rising over the 
last decade and a half, by roughly 1% annually at the publics and about 3% at the 
privates. As with the instructional staff, we should adjust these totals to account for 
enrollment growth over time, and those adjusted trends are shown in Figure 5.20. Note 
also that these totals are for all graduate assistants, teaching, research and other; on 
average, teaching assistants are 53% and 40% of all graduate assistants at public and 
private universities respectively. Adjusted graduate assistant trends were rising until 
the mid-2000s at all four types of institution, after which they leveled off and even 
receded at the R1 publics. At the privates, the trend in graduate assistants increased in 
the early 2010s and rose to about 10% more than at the publics.
Figure 5.20.  Trends in graduate assistant headcount adjusted by total fall student enrollment, 
expressed as graduate assistants per 1000 students, for public and private R1 and R2 
institutions by fiscal year. Source: IPEDS (2020).
5.11 How much do graduate assistants earn?
Graduate assistantship stipend amounts are not collected comprehensively on a 
national basis in IPEDS (although it does count the number of graduate assistants). 
Instead, total assistantship dollar amounts (among many other variables) are collected 
every few years via sample (National Center for Education Statistics 2018a), but when 
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on, they can be unreliable or unavailable because of small sample sizes. These data 
are also not specified by appointment level (half-time, quarter-time, etc.). Full-time 
research doctoral students are the most consistently comparable subgroup across 
institutions and categories to receive a half-time graduate assistantship, typically a 
nine-month or ten-month stipend for teaching and often for twelve months as a 
research assistant. Given the above constraints, these “most comparable” stipends are 
illustrated in Figure 5.21. Graduate assistantships across all fields are 30% lower at R1 
publics compared to R1 privates, almost $18,000 versus nearly $26,000 (the difference 
is 9% at R2 schools). Dividing the data by major academic field, half-time nine-month 
stipends in STEM fields are higher than in others (about $21,000 versus about $16,000), 
and the public/private difference holds except in business-related majors. In the life 
sciences, graduate assistant stipends are often linked to the predoctoral amount 
stipulated annually by the National Institutes of Health, which at $23,376 for FY2016 
(National Institutes of Health 2016) falls right between the average public and private 
half-time stipends for life and physical sciences. By the way, it is sometimes incorrectly 
assumed that, as teachers or researchers, graduate students are “cheaper” than their 
nearest staff counterparts: instructors or postdoctoral researchers (for more on this 
topic, see Section 8.5).
Figure 5.21.  FY2016 half-time (0.5 FTE, non-summer) graduate assistantship amount for full-time, 
full-year research doctoral students averaged by Carnegie classification, academic field 
and control. Note that data for some categories are unreliable or unavailable because of 
small sample sizes. Source: NPSAS:16 (National Center for Education Statistics 2018a).
Trends in graduate assistantship stipends are hard to discern with much precision 
given the data issues mentioned above, but such as they are, the inflation-adjusted 
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the NPSAS survey data is roughly 1.5%, which is interestingly slightly higher than that 
for the faculty. Amounts at the publics have been essentially flat since 2000 given the 
variability in the data, while at the privates they have been flat in the post-recession 
years. Inflation-adjusted NIH stipends have likewise been flat since the recession and 
are now a bit lower in real terms than they were in 2004 after they rose with the NIH 
budget-doubling between 1998 and 2003.
Figure 5.22.  Trends in half-time (0.5 FTE, non-summer year) graduate assistantship amounts 
for full-time, full-year research doctoral students at public and private R1 and 
R2 institutions, and trend in the stipulated NIH pre-doctoral stipend amount for 
graduate research assistants (0.5 FTE, full-year), all by fiscal year in 2016 dollars. 
Sources: NPSAS:16 (National Center for Education Statistics 2018a) and NIH 
(National Institutes of Health 2016; 2019).
5.12 How much are employee fringe benefits and costs?
Full-time university employees, whether academic or regular staff, have an associated 
set of fringe benefits and related costs that are paid by the institution in addition to an 
employee contribution. On average, as we saw in Figure 3.1, employee fringe benefits 
total an additional one third of salary costs. IPEDS stopped collecting detailed fringe 
benefit data after FY2011, but fortunately the set of benefits has remained essentially 
unchanged since then, so we can still usefully examine those data (Figure 5.23). In 
addition to major benefits like healthcare, retirement and social security, there are other 
items such as workers’ compensation, disability income protection, unemployment 
compensation, group life insurance and housing allowances. A signature benefit in 
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is a valuable benefit for many employees and is therefore an important incentive in 
attracting workers into higher education. The dollar value to the employee, and cost 
to the institution, can be significant, especially at private institutions with their higher 
tuition levels. Some benefits have a vesting period of several years before they are 
fully usable (e.g., retirement, tuition). Public institutions often participate in their state 
benefits program, which may include a pension system as well as a healthcare plan 
that is purchased on the open market.
Figure 5.23.  Most recently available (FY2011) per-employee fringe benefit expenditures (equated 
nine-month contract) for public and private institutions, in 2016 dollars. Retirement 
plans are within five years of appointment; tuition and other items include restricted 
and unrestricted expenditures. Source: IPEDS (2020).
The public-private dollar difference in employer benefit contributions in Figure 5.23 is 
likely due to the higher salaries at the privates; likewise, the higher salaries at R1 schools 
lead to relatively higher dollar contributions too. When expressed as a percentage of 
salary, this relationship can be inverted. For example, in FY2018 the average faculty 
retirement benefit as a percentage of salary was 11.7% at four-year publics versus 7.3% 
at non-religiously affiliated four-year privates (American Association of University 
Professors 2018).
Fringe benefit costs grow faster on average than any other costs in higher education, 
with an average annual increase of 3.9% over FY2007–FY2017 (Commonfund Institute 
2017a); also, see the HEPI (Section 3.7), which indexes all higher education costs and 
averaged only 2.4% growth over the same period. The fast-rising cost of healthcare 
is a major component of the overall growth in fringe benefit costs, affecting not only 
universities and colleges but all employers. Healthcare premiums have doubled in the 
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annually even after adjusting for inflation, but subsequently stabilized somewhat in 
the late 2000s and have remained mostly under 4% since then, again after adjusting 
for inflation. The employer contribution has remained in the mid-80% range for most 
of these two decades. However, one of the key ways that plans keep prices down is 
through deductibles. Both the number of high deductible health plans and the amount 
of the deductible has been rising, and since 2008 annual deductibles for covered 
workers have increased eight times as fast as wages (Kaiser Family Foundation 2018).
Figure 5.24.  Worker and employer contributions to health insurance premiums (single coverage) 
and year-to-year percentage changes in total premiums, in 2016 dollars. Source: Kaiser 
Family Foundation (2018).
Retirement benefits have been undergoing structural changes for some time. Defined 
benefit (traditional pension) plans are in retreat, while defined contribution (retirement 
investment) plans have been on the rise since pre-tax 401(k) plans were established in 
1978. At public universities, with their state public pension plan links, 11% currently 
offer a pension plan only, 10% offer a defined contribution plan only, and 79% offer 
both kinds of plan, whereas at private universities only 1% are currently limited to a 
pension plan, 92% offer a defined contribution plan only, and 7% offer both (Sibson 
Consulting 2018). Overall, the average higher education employer contribution to 
defined contribution retirement plans is 8.7%, which is a valuable benefit at two to 
three times more than the typical corporate contribution (Sibson Consulting 2018).
Finally, universities variously offer a range of additional benefits to employees. 
Certainly, all offer paid and unpaid leave programs, but they differ in what they 
include, such as vacation time, sick leave, paid time off, extra holidays, short-term 
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sabbatical leave. About half of institutions offer employee assistance programs (Sibson 
Consulting 2018) and non-traditional benefits as well, such as financial consultation, 
clinical counseling sessions, legal consultation, stress management, group life 
insurance, professional development, wellness initiatives, access to campus fitness 
centers, as well as resource and referral services for substance abuse, elder care and 
childcare. These benefits can go a long way to creating a desirable workplace, and 
while their cost to the institution is not large in comparison to healthcare or retirement, 
they still need to be monitored and managed.
6. Academic Affairs
6.1 What does a college budget include?
Colleges are even more varied than the universities in which they exist. A broad 
Arts and Sciences college at an R1 university may contain two or three dozen 
departments with many hundreds of faculty members, while a small professional 
school (e.g., Nursing, Law) at the same university may have only two or three dozen 
full-time faculty members and no department structure. Furthermore, an entire M3 
university or baccalaureate college may be the equivalent of a single college at an 
R1 institution.
I’ve created an example high-level annual college budget that could represent a 
modestly sized R1 college or a large college at a smaller institution (Table 6.1), in 
which the precise numbers are less important than the budget components that they 
illustrate. For professional schools, say in Law or the health professions, that have 
more financial autonomy and often no undergraduate program, it is simple enough 
to modify the estimates accordingly. Let’s examine the example in detail, starting on 
line 1 with the revenue section. I’ve specified undergraduate and graduate net tuition 
as if they were calculated in a responsibility centered management (RCM) or activity-
based budget environment. As explained in Section 6.2, that approach is merely a 
way to allocate a share of revenue based on activity, and these two sources would 
simply be allocated from the central university budget in a traditional (incremental) 
budget environment. We’ll assume that the college teaches 25,000 undergraduate 
student credit hours (SCH) to all students, including general education and classes 
taken by students majoring in other colleges, a typical class being three credit hours 
per student. We’ll also assume that the college receives $300 per credit hour for a 
total of $7.5M. In addition, we’ll assume the college has 2,000 majors in its degree 
programs and that the college receives $1,250 per major for a total of $2.5M. These 
two amounts together make up the $10M undergraduate net tuition revenue (line 2). 
The university pools all tuition revenue and subtracts financial aid before allocating 
revenue to the colleges as a net amount. The calculation is similar for graduate 
programs; we’ll assume 7,000 graduate SCH at $300 too, which generates $2.1M, 
plus 1,200 graduate majors also at $1,250 that generates $1.5M. Those two amounts 
total $3.6M and although that number is already net of any central financial aid 
© Andrew C. Comrie, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0240.06
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as for undergraduates, individual graduate programs often award tuition waivers 
as part of recruiting. We must subtract those locally-awarded waivers, which we’ll 
assume amount to $0.6M, leaving a net graduate revenue of $3M (line 3). 
Table 6.1. Example annual college budget, showing major categories of revenues and 
expenditures, including shares of revenue and institutional costs. See text for explanations.
Line Item Detail Amount ($)
1. Revenues
2. Undergraduate Net Tuition Undergraduate revenue, net of central aid* 10,000,000
3. Graduate Net Tuition Graduate revenue, net of central and local aid** 3,000,000
4. Fees Program and course-specific fees 500,000
5. Research (F&A) Indirect cost recovery from grants*** 1,000,000
6. TOTAL Teaching & Research 14,500,000
7. Institutional Allocation University revenues, e.g., state, investments 5,000,000
8. Philanthropy Endowment income and gifts 1,000,000
9. TOTAL REVENUES 20,500,000
10. Expenditures
11. Facilities Share 60,000 ft2 @ $25 per ft2 1,500,000
12. Support Units Share 35% of Teaching & Research 5,075,000
13. Central Investment Share 3% of Teaching & Research 435,000
14. TOTAL Support Cost Share 7,010,000
15. Salaries—Faculty 70 @ $80,000 per year average 5,600,000
16. Salaries—Staff 15 @ $50,000 per year average 750,000
17. Teaching Assistants 80 @ $30,000 per 0.5 FTE per year 2,400,000
18. TOTAL Salaries 8,750,000
19. Fringe Benefits 36% of Total Salaries 3,150,000
20. TOTAL Personnel 11,900,000
21. Operations Office supplies, lab equipment, travel, etc. 1,500,000
22. TOTAL Operational Budget 13,400,000
23. TOTAL EXPENDITURES 20,410,000
24. Net Revenues-Expenditures 90,000
*Undergraduate activity: 25,000 student credit hours @ $300 = $7.5M; 2,000 majors @ $1,250 = $2.5M;  
total = $10M
**Graduate activity: 7,000 student credit hours @ $300 = $2.1M; 1,200 majors @ $1,250 = $1.5M; less $0.6M local 
aid (tuition waivers); total = $3M
***Research grant revenues: $1M of indirect cost recovery for use of facilities and administration @ 50% of $2M in 
direct grant costs; grant total = $3M
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The college also receives fee income to cover special program and class-specific 
costs not covered by regular tuition that we’ll assume is $0.5M (line 4). For research 
income, the direct costs are restricted funds that are budgeted separately but indirect 
cost recovery contributes back to the regular budget. Thus, if we assume gross 
revenue from research grants of $3M, $2M of that would be direct costs involved in 
carrying out the research (researcher time, equipment, supplies) and $1M would 
reimburse the university for associated facilities and administration costs (space, 
accounting services, compliance, etc.) assuming a 50% indirect cost rate. The college 
receives the $1M as revenue here (line 5) but will use it to pay its share of those costs 
when we get to expenditures. All teaching and research revenues thus total $14.5M 
(line 6).
Most colleges require an institutional allocation beyond teaching and research 
revenue to cover all costs, assumed as $5M in this example (line 7). This amount would 
typically come from state appropriations and/or investment and endowment income 
depending on whether this was a public or private institution. The final revenue item 
is income from philanthropy, assumed to be $1M (line 8). These are restricted funds, 
but typically a portion is directed towards endowed chairs and program support; 
increasingly such funds effectively add to the operational budget. All revenues for our 
example college total $20.5M (line 9).
Moving on to the expenditures section (line 10), we’ll again specify the first few 
items in an RCM context. These support costs (lines 11, 12 and 13) reflect the college’s 
share of space and central administrative support units. In an incremental budget 
the college would not see these items and they would be subtracted from tuition and 
institutional revenues before allocations were made. The college’s share of all facilities 
costs (construction bond payments, maintenance, etc.) is computed as the share of 
space it uses, here assumed to be 60,000 net assignable square feet at an assumed rate 
of $25 per square foot for a total of $1.5M (line 11). The college’s share of all non-
college support unit costs is slightly over $5M at an assumed rate of 35% (line 12). For 
simplicity I’ve used a simple flat rate based on total teaching and research revenues, 
but in practice this would likely be a combination of different rates on undergraduate, 
graduate and research activity. The college’s contribution to the central fund used for 
reinvestment back into the colleges is a little under $0.5M at an assumed rate of 3%, 
again levied as a flat rate on all teaching and research revenue for simplicity in this 
example (line 13). The college’s combined support cost share totals slightly over $7M 
(line 14).
Personnel costs include salaries and stipends and associated fringe benefits. Our 
example college has 70 FTE faculty members with an assumed average salary of 
$80,000 across a mix of all faculty ranks, for a total of $5.6M (line 15). There are 15 
support staff at $50,000 average salary, totaling $0.75M (line 16). The stipends for 80 
0.5 FTE graduate teaching assistants, at an assumed $30,000 each, come to $2.4M (line 
17). Together, employee pay totals $8.75M (line 18) to which we add fringe benefits 
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at an assumed rate of 36% to get a bit over $3M (line 19), with total personnel costs 
thus amounting to $11.9M (line 20). The fringe benefit rate is also a simplification for 
sake of example, as different position types may have different associated rates, and 
even more simplistically I’ve assumed that it includes tuition for graduate assistants 
here too. The final budget item covers all other costs of operations such as classroom 
and teaching materials, office supplies, equipment maintenance, travel and so on, and 
I’ve assumed a value of $1.5M for all operations (line 21). The total operational base 
budget combines personnel and operations costs for a total of $13.4M (line 22). When 
added to the support cost share, total expenditures slightly exceed $20.4M (line 23), 
leaving a small net remainder from overall revenue (line 24).
This example includes the major parts of a college budget and although it glosses over 
umpteen minor items, the main point is to provide a relative sense of the components 
and how they might interact. For instance, to add one additional assistant professor 
at $73,000 salary will require about $100,000 including benefits on a sustained annual 
basis. That expenditure is the equivalent of an additional 460 SCH (333 SCH plus a 
further 127 SCH to cover the combined 38% support cost share) and it assumes there 
is a spare office for the new person, otherwise the extra space and facilities cost will 
be $2,500 for a 100 square foot office. That 460 SCH represents 153 class seats using 
3-credits per class, which at 30 credits per year is about 5 net new students. The point 
about them being net new is critical—if they simply move internally then that doesn’t 
produce new revenue for the institution. Alternatively, increasing the endowment by 
about $2M would produce revenue of about $100,000 annually, and it could be used to 
offset funds to retain some star professors through endowed chairs, thereby freeing up 
funds for a new assistant professor. Not surprisingly, there are multiple combinations 
and, in practice, there are many efforts going on simultaneously to grow revenue and 
control expenditures.
A final thought on academic unit budgets: because departments represent 
disciplines and fields, they are the fundamental organizational units. However, a 
generic example department budget isn’t especially useful because each department 
has a unique institutional context and a cost structure that varies by discipline. 
Still, one can think of a department budget as a smaller version of a college budget. 
A college such as the one in this example might have five or so departments, some 
small and some large, and the college budget would be allocated among them and the 
dean’s office. So, adjusting this budget and dividing everything by five or ten would 
provide a generic department budget. However, the challenge with smaller units like 
departments is that they individually have constrained revenue and expenditure 
portfolios; therefore, they may need to receive or supply cross-subsidies within the 
college, requiring careful judgment and management by the dean.
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6.2 What is RCM or activity-based budgeting?
One of the biggest changes in university budgeting in recent decades has been the 
increasingly widespread adoption of a budget model that distributes responsibility 
for managing revenues and expenditures. Such an approach is known variously as 
Responsibility Center Management (RCM), Responsibility Centered Management, or 
more generally as Activity-Based Budgeting (ABB). Compared to the other prevalent 
model, incremental budgeting, RCM is a fundamentally different approach for major 
subunits of the university, particularly schools and colleges, to manage how they 
generate and spend resources. There are articles and whole books on RCM (Kosten 
and Lovell 2011; Curry et al. 2013) and its implementation, something I led at my 
institution, and from which I learned a great deal about many of the topics in this 
book. As with all the topics we are covering, I provide simply the essence of RCM here.
RCM adoptions are a response to the “hat-in-hand” approach of incremental 
budgeting. In that traditional model, units request an increase in their budgets for the 
following year, based on current needs and new initiatives, from central administration. 
Under RCM, the dean is given responsibility for all budgetary aspects of the college 
(hence the term ”Responsibility Center”), not only for generating the revenues but also 
for managing costs effectively. Neither of these is a feature of incremental budgeting. 
It is not surprising, then, that the rise in RCM budgeting has echoed the trend toward 
increasing tuition-dependency.
RCM has evolved over the last several decades, so that a recent RCM model 
can differ in key ways from older implementations (interestingly, with a greater 
role for central administration management) as institutions learn from each other 
and adapt the approach to suit their own situations. RCM’s roots lie in the budget 
models of some of the oldest private universities, where each school or college had 
an independent budget in the federation making up the university, with “every tub 
on its own bottom” (or ETOB) as the saying at Harvard goes. If ETOB is at one end 
of the spectrum and government agency-like central budget control is at the other, 
proponents of contemporary RCM aim for it to combine the best of both worlds 
somewhere in the middle. However, RCM evolved from the ETOB end of the spectrum 
(mostly at the privates) many decades ago. It has only seen broader implementation at 
the publics since the 1990s and into the 2000s and 2010s. Given its varied history, when 
a university is considering RCM as a new budget model, critiques may be raised based 
on perceptions of older ETOB-like models. For example, under classic ETOB a college 
could theoretically go out of business with little opportunity for intervention from the 
rest of the university. In contrast, contemporary RCM is built around the concept of 
subventions (cross-subsidies) in the institutional budget, such that academic priorities 
are supported by a shared mix of higher- and lower-revenue units and activities.
At the unit (college) level, the change in thinking relative to incremental budgeting 
is that the base budget no longer arrives automatically each year—if unit activity 
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rises relative to others then the unit’s share of the overall budget rises too (and vice-
versa!). Under either budget system, it is a convenient local fiction that a base budget 
is semi-permanent—as we’ve seen in many of the preceding sections, the institutional 
revenues behind those budgets have been changeable, but they aren’t consistently 
felt locally. Under RCM, colleges sense more closely both the opportunity and 
precariousness in institutional budgeting that before was largely the concern of senior 
central administration. Under incremental budgeting, the focus is typically more on 
academic priorities rather than their revenue or cost dimensions. These differences are 
at the heart of critiques of both systems.
Figure 6.1 illustrates RCM as compared to incremental budgeting, in a nutshell. 
Under RCM, colleges (responsibility centers) receive their share of campus revenues 
as well as their share of costs. Many of those institutional costs (e.g., space and 
facilities) are invisible to colleges under incremental budgeting, but under RCM the 
college sees the cost and is provided the (previously invisible) budget to pay for those 
costs. Notice that colleges likewise see and pay for the costs of central support units 
(student affairs, human resources, etc.) that were also previously invisible. The net 
effect of these changes on a college budget is zero in dollar terms, but significant in 
terms of perception.
Under the incremental model, a college that taught more (or less) than it did the 
previous year would not necessarily see the change in marginal revenue, whereas 
under RCM it would see the related revenue increase (or decrease) as well as the 
associated costs. In RCM, the revenue-generating activity of all colleges is tracked using 
simple metrics (e.g., total credit hours, enrolled majors, sponsored project revenue) 
and revenue is allocated by each college’s share of the total activity. Costs are allocated 
based on share of space occupied for facilities and via a proportional share of support 
unit costs. These costs are often called taxes, and one of the most important taxes is a 
contribution to a strategic investment fund that is managed centrally and is available 
to fund new initiatives.
It is worth underlining that RCM itself doesn’t “make” any decisions, it is merely 
another way of getting to a budget allocation. It provides latitude for central control 
and management through subventions and strategic investments while prioritizing 
a decentralized approach that ideally enables greater entrepreneurial activity by the 
units. Because the activity formulas and metrics are well-known, RCM proponents 
claim that it is more transparent and predictable than the incremental model. Still, a 
well-run incremental budget system with comparable levels of communication can be 
transparent and effective at stimulating innovation too. In practice, neither is perfect: 
both have many positive attributes as well as unintended consequences and perverse 
incentives that require active management for the system to work well.
RCM is structured to incentivize and optimize revenue generation and cost-
effective practices. In doing so, it places increased authority and accountability 
on the deans and vice presidents. While RCM proper operates at the college level, 
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it relies upon clear communication between colleges and their departments for it to 
succeed—faculty must understand the within-college budget model so that they can 
connect their innovations and adaptations with college incentives. It is not unusual 
for communication to be oversimplified at this level, resulting in a “dollars for butts 
in seats” mentality that is hard to counteract. Furthermore, because universities are 
necessarily academically decentralized, many important decisions with financial 
implications are made at the department level. Yet, RCM is not designed to be a 
department funding mechanism—that model must be able to handle a relatively 
higher variance in subventions within and across departments because their budgets 
are not sufficiently diverse or large enough to absorb “noisy” fluctuations. Thus, the 
dean must balance academic priorities with budget trends while providing short-term 
budget stability. This is the reason that RCM is primarily used at larger universities, 
where the responsibility centers (colleges) have enough varied programs that they can 
manage year-to-year swings in the budgets across their internal units (departments).
While RCM is often implemented in response to the perceived shortcomings of 
incremental budgeting (e.g., no incentives to cut costs, dollars don’t necessarily follow 
teaching activity), RCM is not a panacea and it doesn’t print money. RCM can lead to 
an everyone-for-themselves attitude, with units competing over the size of their slice 
of the pie because they have less control over growing the whole pie (for example, 
colleges poaching enrollments from each other instead of attracting new students to 
the university). The core notion of a well-implemented RCM budget system is that it 
should incentivize rapid local responses to opportunities and challenges that together 
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benefit the institution, by aligning the locus of revenue and cost decisions with the 
locus of academic decisions. In practice, as I’ve mentioned, both incremental and RCM 
approaches are messy and imperfect, requiring many complicated adjustments to fit 
them to a complicated institution. One thing both systems have in common: campus 
units will gripe about their budgets either way because there are winners and losers 
under both, and because there is never enough money to support and grow the size 
and quality of every campus program (see Bowen’s Law in Section 3.7).
6.3 What is the cost of producing a degree?
It turns out that this simple question is devilishly hard to answer accurately. The reason 
is that we don’t account for activities in a way that makes it easy to answer. We can 
indeed calculate useful institution-wide figures summed across all levels of degrees 
and all disciplines, but the minute we want to examine the cost of producing just 
bachelor’s degrees, PhD degrees, MD degrees, etc. or the cost of producing degrees 
in Economics, Engineering or English, we run into all kinds of issues. Let’s look at the 
institution-wide numbers first before unpacking them in the next couple of sections.
We discussed E&R (education and related) expenditures, the subset of all 
expenditures related to delivering and supporting instruction, in Chapter 3. In particular, 
we looked at E&R expenditures per student FTE in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, which is a useful 
way to compare investments per input. For investments per output we calculate E&R per 
degree awarded instead (Figure 6.2). By this measure of institutional cost of education 
per degree we see many of the same patterns as we did with the per-FTE calculation: 
the privates spend about twice as much per degree than do the publics, with the private 
baccalaureate and R1 institutions spending $150,000 to almost $250,000 per degree, as 
compared to other schools spending $60,000 to $100,000 per degree in recent years.
It’s tempting to mentally divide by four to obtain an annual cost, but it’s not that 
simple. These amounts include all levels of degrees, undergraduate, professional and 
graduate, each with a different typical time-to-degree. Many undergraduates don’t 
finish in four years (and others transfer away or don’t complete), master’s degrees take 
two years or less, a PhD can take six-plus years, and their relative proportions differ 
by institution. Therefore, the E&R cost per FTE metric analyzed in Chapter 3 is better 
suited to obtaining an annual amount. We can also see that research universities have 
a higher cost structure than the other institutions, an important part of that being the 
relative mix of faculty workload. Nevertheless, E&R spending per degree is widely 
used as a cost-of-production metric to benchmark output efficiency in an economic 
sense, and it is also useful to analyze trends. In the data underlying Figure 6.2, from 
FY1987–2009 the annualized growth rate in cost-per-degree across public institutions 
was 0.7% (aligning with labor cost, see Section 3.7) and a striking 3.1% across private 
institutions. Post-recession, from FY2009–2017 the two rates were both modest at 0.6% 
and 0.5% respectively.
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Figure 6.2.  Trends in Educational and Related (E&R) expenditures per total degrees awarded in 








































































































6.4 How does the cost of degree production vary by discipline?
Systematic national data on discipline-specific costs are not widely available, in 
part because disaggregated department-level data on teaching workloads, salaries, 
etc. would risk revealing individual personal information. The National Study of 
Instructional Costs and Productivity, known as the Delaware Cost Study, was initiated 
by a consortium of institutions in the 1990s to collect such data voluntarily for internal 
benchmarking by participants, and it now includes hundreds of four-year public and 
private institutions (Higher Education Consortia 2019).
Fortunately, a recent study has provided the first wide-ranging analysis of program-
level costs based on those data (Hemelt et al. 2018). The authors used sophisticated 
modeling to analyze the relative effects of class size, instructor salary, workload, and 
non-personnel expenses as key drivers of cost differences by discipline. For ease of 
understanding, I have converted the results from natural log form into percentage 
form, showing cost per SCH relative to English for 20 fields for each of the four drivers 
and as an overall net difference (Figure 6.3). There are wide ranges in the differences 
across fields, overall and in the component drivers, especially salary and class size. 
Note that average salary in a department is a function not only of the disciplinary 
market-based salary but also the mix of faculty types (tenure-track, contingent, 
teaching assistants). Also, the average class size in a department depends on the mix 
of lower-division undergraduate classes versus typically smaller upper-division and 
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graduate classes. Departments that provide introductory or fundamental classes to 
students across the university, such as Mathematics or English, have a different average 
class size to those that focus more exclusively on professional or graduate education. 
Overall, engineering and nursing degrees are relatively costly (roughly double the 
cost of English degrees), while education and fine arts with small salary effects are still 
30–40% more expensive because of class size. Business and accounting are interesting 
cases because, although salaries are relatively high, the effect of class size lowers their 
overall cost. At the other end of the scale, disciplines such as psychology, sociology, 
philosophy and mathematics are less costly primarily because of their average (mix 
of) class sizes. While faculty workload (class sections per faculty member per year) 
is a contributing factor in some disciplines, its overall effect is not large, while non-
personnel costs (e.g., equipment) are relatively unimportant overall. The study found 
these results to hold across all institution types meaning, for example, that psychology 
is consistently less expensive than physics whether at an R1 public university or a 
private baccalaureate college (Hemelt et al. 2018).
Figure 6.3.  Instructional expenditures per student credit hour (SCH) by field of study, expressed 
relative to English for four cost drivers and the net overall difference, using 2013–2015 
data from the Delaware Cost Study. Data are converted to percentages from the original 
modeled natural log cost differences. Source: Hemelt et al. (2018).
6.5 Do the humanities cross-subsidize the STEM fields?
This is a loaded question for two reasons, one because there are several layers of answer, 
and two, because it is an attention-grabbing ringer for the broader question of whether 
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unequivocally, cross-subsidies exist in almost every university and for good reason: 
not doing so would undermine academic priorities that enable students to select 
and combine classes from multiple fields and to change majors if necessary, without 
worrying about cost. There has nonetheless been a longstanding practice of adding 
what are essentially surcharges for some fields that are more expensive or where the 
market (i.e., anticipated future earnings such as for an MBA) will support a higher 
quality program. But importantly, cross-subsidies and surcharges at the department or 
program level are not the whole story as they still don’t cover the full cost: the bigger 
truth is that virtually all programs are subsidized.
Let’s return to the original question about humanities and STEM and use it as a worked 
example to understand the various layers of this answer (Table 6.2). Fundamentally, as 
we saw in Section 6.4, because many humanities fields (e.g., English, history, philosophy, 
and many languages) have modest salaries and can be offered effectively at a moderate 
class size, on average they are less expensive to operate than most science and technical 
fields (e.g., physics, engineering) that have relatively higher salaries, smaller classes 
and/or lower teaching loads (Figure 6.3). But recall that mathematics, the “M” in STEM, 
is among the least expensive disciplines to teach. Those direct instructional costs per 
SCH by discipline are approximated from the study mentioned previously (Hemelt et 
al. 2018) and they are the starting point in our example (Table 6.2, line 1). You’ll see 
that they range from $165 per SCH for mathematics to $400 per SCH for an engineering 
program, with an overall average of slightly under $240 per SCH. So, as a layer-one 
answer, the underlying direct instructional costs of the humanities are lower than in 
STEM on average, but it is important to keep in mind that the disciplines in each group 
have a mix of cost structures and the groups are not monolithic. Now we assume a net 
tuition amount of $350 per SCH (line 2), which as a guide is $10,500 per year based on 
Table 6.2. Example of the layers of cross-subsidization across disciplines. Amounts are in 
dollars per student credit hour (SCH).
Line Item Humanities STEMEnglish History Philosophy Physics Engineering Math
1. Direct Instructional Cost (200) (190) (180) (285) (400) (165)
2. Net Tuition 350 350 350 350 350 350
3. Differential Tuition/Fees - - - - 50 -
4. SUBTOTAL 150 160 170 65 - 185
5. Indirect Support Cost (240) (240) (240) (240) (240) (240)
6. OVERALL TOTAL (90) (80) (70) (175) (240) (55)
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a standard 30 SCH load for a full-time student, representative of a public institution. 
We also include differential tuition for the Engineering program at $50 per SCH (line 
3), which equates to $1,500 per year on top of base tuition. Our initial subtotals (line 4) 
show the humanities disciplines generating positive margins of $150 to $170 per SCH, 
whereas physics generates $65 per SCH, engineering breaks even and generates zero, 
and math produces $185 per SCH. Many arguments about cross-subsidies will focus 
solely on the disciplinary cost data as a layer-one answer or will use these offset-by-
revenue subtotals as a layer-two answer.
As I’ve intimated above and explained earlier in this chapter, our example so far 
is incomplete because it does not include all costs related to education. We mustn’t 
forget the indirect instruction-related costs of academic support, student support 
and institutional support, that together form the “R” in E&R (education and related) 
expenditures. From Chapter 3 and elsewhere we know that those are roughly 
equivalent to instructional costs, so we’ll include them as a flat rate of $240 per SCH 
across all disciplines (line 5). The resulting overall total (line 6) shows the fully-
costed picture: all fields generate negative margins and they are all subsidized from 
other institutional funds (e.g., state funding at the publics or investment income 
at the privates). So, the layer-three answer to our question is that all fields “lose” 
money, humanities and STEM included, but the humanities are subsidized relatively 
less than STEM.
There are at least two implications of this conclusion. First, when a department 
proposes a new degree program that will add students and local revenue, remember 
that unless it is an unusually high tuition program with little to no financial aid 
(such as a professional program aimed at executives), odds are that it will still incur 
costs to the institution that need to be built into budget plans. Second, the impact 
of subsidies for all will be modulated by enrollments, such that low or high subsidy 
programs may in turn have high or low enrollments that can amplify or diminish 
their overall financial impact in total dollar terms. Oftentimes these effects can 
creep up on an institution as enrollments ebb and flow across the disciplines. We’ll 
examine those next.
6.6 How have popular majors shifted over time?
Student enrollments have more than doubled over the last half-century (Figure 4.13), 
though not all undergraduate majors have grown in matching proportions. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly given the digital revolution, from FY1971 to FY2016 library science 
shrank from 1,000 majors to less than one tenth of that number, while computer and 
information sciences grew almost 30-fold from about 2,000 to over 60,000. In relative 
terms, library science went from 0.1% of all majors to almost zero, while computer 
and information sciences grew from 0.3% to 3.4% of all majors, more than a tenfold 
relative increase (Figure 6.4).
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Figure 6.4.  Trends in percentages of all bachelor’s degrees awarded by field of study at postsecondary 
institutions, per academic year at five-year intervals. Source: NCES Digest (National 
Center for Education Statistics 2018d).
These sorts of shifts can have significant financial and personnel implications for 
departments that shed or gain majors (and SCH) relative to others on campus. In 
the short term, annual fluctuations are often handled by adjusting class sizes or by 
increasing or decreasing the number of contingent faculty members and class sections. 
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absolute growth or decline will almost inevitably lead to a concomitant shift in the 
tenure-track faculty. In a decline, depending on the career demographics of the 
department in question, the adjustment to the underlying cost structure may happen 
expediently, via attrition of positions through retirements and individual job moves, 
or it may be delayed considerably.
Returning to Figure 6.4, let’s review the most dramatic shifts in sheer numbers of 
majors over the forty-five years. The two fields that have grown the most are business and 
health. Business, management and marketing added over 250,000 majors and the health 
professions added over 200,000 (most of that in the last decade), which represented 
relative increases in percentages of all majors of 5.6% (13.7–19.4%) and 8.9% (3.0–
11.9%) respectively. Other growth fields in absolute terms include communication/
journalism, psychology, biosciences, visual/performing arts, computer/information 
sciences, and engineering. Some of those, such as communication/journalism and 
computer/information sciences, increased their share of all majors by several percentage 
points, while others such as psychology and biosciences saw modest growth in their 
relative share of all majors.
The field that has shrunk more than any other is Education, with total enrollments 
dropping by half (from 176,307 to 87,147) between FY1971 and FY1986 and holding 
roughly constant since then, accounting for its 16.5% (21.0–4.5%) reduction in 
share of all majors over the half-century. English language and literature, much like 
education, lost about half of its enrollments in the 1970s (dropping from 63,914 to 
31,922 from FY1971–FY1981) and although it recovered somewhat in the 1990s, it has 
dropped again in recent years. That’s a 5.4% (7.6–2.2%) drop in relative share of all 
undergraduate majors over the forty-five-year span. Although their enrollments are 
smaller, foreign languages, literatures and linguistics mirrored the decline/recover/
decline-again pattern of English, and hundreds of foreign language programs have 
closed in recent years (Johnson 2019). Mathematics and statistics saw a similar decline 
and has recovered only in the last decade. With net flat enrollments over the half-
century, both fields were crowded out by other growing fields and each saw their share 
shrink from about 3% to about 1% of all majors. One final interesting example is social 
sciences and history, which enrolls about 160,000, again net flat over time, but with a 
similar cycle to English, in that it has seen a substantial loss of 10.1% (18.5–8.4%) in 
relative share, second only to education.
Not only do these shifts illustrate the dynamics behind changing departmental 
fortunes within the university, but they also reflect broader vicissitudes in the academy 
and in society. There is no denying that students vote with their feet (as do parents 
with their dollars). Like it or not, those votes reflect diminished interest and support 
for majors in education, languages and literature alongside increased attention for 
business and health. We can and should vigorously debate those priorities and what 
they mean, as US higher education has done since the late 1800s and before. As we do so, 
it’s worth a reminder that ours is the system that, through the land-grant acts, inserted 
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a more practical education into the classical curriculum of the day. Furthermore, it is 
also the system that in the mid-twentieth century massively expanded access to higher 
education and thereby the purposes and people that it serves.
6.7 What does it cost to run a graduate program?
Graduate education is the jewel in the crown of US higher education. It has long been 
the envy of the world and remains so, despite rising competition from Europe and 
Asia. Several factors contributed to the ascent of US graduate schools: co-evolution 
with disciplinary specialization (especially in the sciences) during the twentieth 
century, the inclusion of advanced coursework rather than “dissertation only” 
degrees, unprecedented government research investment during the postwar years 
which fueled the rise of research universities including support for research assistants 
(RAs), and simultaneous massive growth in undergraduate enrollments which 
fueled support for teaching assistants (TAs). The US model, especially for the PhD, 
of a structured experience through advanced seminars and mentored apprentice-like 
research training, along with a part-time assistantship to support the student, was 
radically different from the lone scholar model prevalent in Europe. I could go on 
about the many other innovative attributes of US graduate education, but I’ll spare you 
that excursion and instead make my point about graduate programs and university 
business: while this approach undoubtedly enables the highest quality education, by 
paying one’s students to attend graduate school, educating them in very small classes 
and providing them with extended one-on-one training with renowned experts, it is 
an incredibly expensive (and on the face of it, utterly foolish) business model! How do 
we make it work?
It works by the mutual reinforcement of attracting the best faculty and the best 
graduate students who want to work on their scholarly topic together. Crucially, it’s 
also built around the teaching support required for the undergraduate operation and, 
in fields where sponsored projects are available, the competitive research grants that 
those faculty win. There is one other distinct model, the professional master’s degree, 
that teaches technical and/or executive content and that, because of desirability and 
anticipated future earnings, can charge market rates without assistantships and tuition 
waivers.
Let’s do some numbers. For a tuition/fee-driven professional program, things are 
straightforward enough that we don’t need a worked example; the program revenue 
must simply be enough to fund the costs of operating the program. For the PhD scenario, 
I’ll keep things simple and deal with program-level funding only, acknowledging 
that other institutional support costs are out there. In partial justification thereof, 
we’ll assume our scenario is taking place in an existing department with an active 
undergraduate program and the faculty already in place. At some point those faculty 
members, especially if this is a research university, will want to start a graduate 
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program. With the large expenses of core infrastructure and salaries covered, so the 
thinking goes, the marginal costs of adding a few core graduate classes to augment 
classes already available in related fields is low.1 Question: OK, so what does it cost? 
Answer: about a million bucks a year. Never fails to get people’s attention.
Here’s the logic (Table 6.3), line by line, for the basic first-order (program level) 
annual costs of a PhD program. We’ll provide half-time assistantships at a going rate 
of $25,000 per year (line A). Each student’s tuition will need to be covered, either by 
paying it directly (typically via a research grant) or via an internal waiver (typical of 
teaching assistantships), plus an amount for benefits, and we’ll assume that to total 
$15,000 per year for a public university (line B). A doctoral program needs to meet 
minimum size or productivity requirements, which are often imposed by boards, for 
example an average of 3 graduates per year (line C). A minimum size is also necessary 
for academic reasons to enable a viable cohort for class sizes. If the program offers its 
classes on a two-year rotation, that means 6 students in a graduate seminar. Attrition 
is easily forgotten because, by definition, those students are no longer in the program 
(whether for academic or personal reasons), so we’ll add 1 per year for attrition (line 
D). Therefore, the program must plan to admit and support 4 students per year, and 
further support them for the duration of the program. We’ll assume the average time-
to-degree in our example discipline is six years (line E). As an aside, one can infer that 
this must be a nominal five-year program as students rarely complete early and more 
often take longer, given the vagaries of their dissertation projects. 
1  Permutations of this basic scenario were proposed to me several times per year when I was a graduate 
dean, which is when I developed this back-of-the-envelope approach to help the faculty hone (or 
abandon) their plans.
Table 6.3. Example of annual first-order costs of a modest PhD program (see text for 
explanation).
Line Item Amount
A. Assistantship stipend (0.5 FTE) $25,000 
B. Tuition & benefits $15,000 
C. Minimum completions per year 3 
D. Attritions per year 1 
E. Average time to degree (years) 6 
F. Program coordinator (0.5 FTE incl. benefits) $35,000 
G. Operations $30,000
H. CALCULATED TOTAL: (A + B) × (C + D) × E + F + G $1,025,000
The program thus has a steady state of 24 students, 4 per year for six years (slightly 
less if there is some early attrition, but we’ll ignore that for simplicity). The program 
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will need to add a staff member to coordinate admissions, exams, funding, etc.; a half-
time position is enough for this modest-size program (line F). Finally, there are always 
operational costs (travel, computers and printers, etc.) so we’ll plug in a number 
for that (line G). As mentioned above, we will ignore other marginal costs such as 
foregone undergraduate teaching activity/faculty time, central support costs, and 
space. Adding it all up, we get a total of slightly over $1M per year (line H).
To succeed, the program must have the capacity to support twenty-plus students 
and some operations costs on a sustainable basis. The mix of TAs and RAs to achieve 
that varies from virtually 100% TA in the disciplines with little to no grant activity 
(e.g., humanities) to virtually 100% RA in grant-active disciplines (e.g., biosciences), 
and with many disciplines somewhere in between. For a 50:50 mix, 12 TAs would 
be derived from, say, 36 discussion or lab sections (at 3 per TA), each with 25 to 30 
undergraduates, for 2 semesters, which is about 2,000 undergraduates or 6,000 SCH 
per year. The RAs would each be supported by grants with a minimum of, say, $100,000 
in direct costs (the RA, principal investigator, other staff, equipment) plus indirect 
costs at 50%, totaling $150,000, which for 12 RAs approaches $2M per year in external 
grant support. These numbers reflect an active teaching and research operation. A 
graduate program with less than those levels of activity will need to obtain additional 
funds from the dean, who will cross-subsidize from other areas.
6.8 How much do the faculty earn by discipline?
In Section 5.7 we saw how overall faculty salaries were stratified from senior to junior 
rank and how they were generally stratified by size/type of institution. In Section 6.4 we 
saw how average faculty salaries by discipline were a key driver explaining differences 
in the cost of producing a degree across academic fields. To round out our coverage 
of salaries, Figure 6.5 illustrates average salaries of tenure-track faculty by rank across 
a set of 32 disciplinary fields. These data are collected by survey each year, with the 
FY2018 data representing 696 institutions and 162,818 full-time tenure-track faculty 
members (College and University Professional Association for Human Resources 2019). 
The emphasis here is on the variations across disciplines, which are determined by 
the market. The top end of the salary spectrum contains fields that compete, at least in 
part, with higher private-sector salaries such as law, business, engineering, computer/
information science, architecture and the health professions. Note that medical school 
faculty, most of whom are practicing physicians, are not included in these data and their 
salaries are considerably larger than the others shown here (see also Chapter 11). In 
most arts and sciences disciplines, where there is little direct private-sector competition 
with academia, salaries across those fields fall in a compressed range of about $15,000 
in each rank, or within roughly plus/minus 10% of the average. These ranges reflect 
moderate competitive forces in the disciplinary salary markets. In these sorts of fields, 
theology, the arts, languages and literature are at the lower end of the salary spectrum 
with social sciences and STEM fields in the middle ranges.
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Figure 6.5.  FY2018 Tenured and tenure-track faculty salaries by discipline and faculty rank, sorted 
by the disciplinary three-rank average. Source: CUPA-HR (College and University 
Professional Association for Human Resources 2019).
6.9 What are the financial implications of tenure?
This is another one of those fraught questions where the opinion-to-fact ratio runs high 
in discussions about the ills of higher education. Tenure is misunderstood by many, 
including those in the professoriate. To avoid confusion, let’s start with a definition 
and follow that with a few paragraphs of basic explanation:
Tenure is the granting of certain employment protections against arbitrary dismissal 
that, absent just cause for discharge, create the expectation of renewed appointment 
each year.
Employment contracts span a spectrum regarding the protections they contain. In 
jobs with low protections, employees work “at will” and they can be dismissed on 
the spot for no reason and without much, if any, due process. In jobs with medium 
protections, employees might receive a reason for dismissal and may have recourse to 
a review process and, assuming no egregious wrongdoing, they will receive notice of 
their employment and pay ending after several weeks. In jobs with high protections, 
such as those with tenure or union contracts, before dismissal there is an extensive 
review process that typically goes beyond the employee’s direct supervisor, there are 
established rules about what are and are not valid reasons for dismissal (“just cause”), 
and again assuming no egregious wrongdoing, the notice of employment and pay 
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A tenured appointment is preceded by a probationary period (typically five to 
seven years) on the tenure track. Although there are exceptions, assistant professors 
are usually on the tenure track and associate and full professors are usually tenured. 
An assistant professor must demonstrate sufficient quality and quantity of scholarly 
work to be granted tenure (and if denied will depart the institution or move into a 
non-tenure job). Most universities have annual and/or post-tenure review systems 
for ongoing assessment of productivity. Contrary to misconception, tenure is not a 
sinecure and just cause for dismissal includes poor job performance. Other just causes 
include things like violations of research integrity, serious violations of institutional 
rules (e.g., stealing, severe harassment), and moral turpitude.
Tenure exists primarily to protect its close relative, academic freedom, so that 
professors cannot be fired for teaching or doing research in their area of expertise 
that may be politically unpopular, undesirable to certain interests, or otherwise 
controversial. History has plenty of examples of this, such as Galileo’s imprisonment 
for being at odds with the Church by positing that the Earth revolved around the 
Sun, and prohibitions on teaching Darwin’s theory of evolution, as well as multiple 
contemporary calls for professors to resign or be fired because of their work on 
divisive issues (e.g., the politics of race and religion, or “unpatriotic” findings on 
terrorism). In my own research specialty, climate science, I have colleagues who have 
felt the pressure of the fossil-fuel industry and associated political forces for whom the 
scientific findings are an inconvenient truth.2 The American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP) is the keeper of the flame for academic freedom and tenure 
(American Association of University Professors 2019b; 2019c); its 1940 Statement of 
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (American Association of University 
Professors 1940) is the definitive document on the subject and the AAUP website has 
further supporting material.
Returning now to the financial implications of tenure, it’s been said that the 
granting of tenure is a million-dollar decision. That’s because a professor, once tenured, 
might be expected to work another thirty years at the institution (or move to another, 
ensuring that the new position comes with tenure). The original statement must date 
back many decades, because at current associate and full professor salaries the long-
term commitment of the institution is closer to three million dollars without including 
benefits. An interesting economic corollary of this implication is that, compared to 
positions they might obtain in the private sector, professors are willing to accept lower 
pay with tenure because of the implied long-run commitment and perceived lower 
risk of job loss. Much can be made (misguidedly) from the fact that tenure imposes 
large fixed costs on the institution and that universities need greater flexibility in how 
they allocate resources. This argument is specious because, and we’ve seen elements 
2  The term is a good one, even without being enshrined as the title of Al Gore’s award-winning movie. 
Interestingly, the movie’s title was debated right up until its screening at Sundance (Armstrong et al. 
2016).
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of this point in every chapter of this book so far, tenured professors make up a small 
proportion of the overall university budget. Let’s do those numbers to make it clear.
Although we examined faculty ranks and trends in Chapter 5, there we dealt with 
tenure status as implied from job titles. To look at tenure numbers explicitly, Figure 
6.6 shows the share of faculty by tenure status. Although the patterns are generally 
similar to the earlier charts on faculty rank, there are some differences in the details 
here because we are including part-time faculty as well as non-instructional faculty 
(typically research faculty at the bigger schools). About half the faculty are on the 
tenure track or tenured, with a higher proportion at R1 than R2 schools, and lowest 
at the R3-M3 institutions; the share is largest at baccalaureate colleges, especially the 
privates. These proportions are unevenly affected by the share of part-time versus 
full-time contingent faculty that can exceed 60% and even 70% at medium and small 
institutions. Overall, by headcount, tenured faculty average under 40% of the total. If 
we compare the underlying numbers to total non-medical employees (back in Figure 
5.2) the we find that the tenured faculty averages about 12% of the total. That means 
that 88% of the labor pool is “flexible” in an economic resource sense. Furthermore, we 
saw in Chapter 3 that labor expenditures average about two thirds of all expenditures, 
so there is even more flexibility of resource allocation in the overall budget. In short, 
despite looming large in a perception sense, tenure is not any more limiting in fact 
than many other parts of an institution’s financial commitments.
Figure 6.6.  Share of non-medical faculty in instruction, research and public service by tenure status 
in FY2018. Tenured and tenure track faculty are shown as combined full-time and 
part-time appointments (less than 3% are part-time), while contingent faculty not on 
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Another oft-misunderstood financial aspect of tenure is what happens if there is no 
money. It is critically important to understand that tenure is an employment protection, 
and not the employment itself. Put more plainly, there is no money attached to tenure. 
If a university runs out of money, as has happened at some small colleges in recent 
years, that “financial exigency,” as it is known, is considered a just cause that can 
enable the dismissal of tenured faculty members. Now, a university that decides it 
wants to close one department can’t easily claim “Sorry, we don’t have enough money, 
we need to close your department and get rid of the tenured professors!” Apart 
from the institution likely being able to carry out more conventional budget cuts 
if this was just one department in question, the university would have to declare a 
financial exigency, a last-ditch kind of move (somewhat akin to restructuring to avoid 
bankruptcy in the for-profit world) that can have significant consequences for its bond 
rating and ability to borrow. But if it really is in dire straits, a university can indeed lay 
off tenured faculty. A related scenario applies to medical schools, where the faculty are 
basically funded from their clinical activity. If the hospital goes belly-up and cannot 
meet payroll, the university will likely have no alternative way to cover the sizable 
salaries of the medical school professors, tenured or not.
Box 6.1. Competition in Faculty Hiring is (Sort-Of) Like 
Professional Sports
The arcane ritual of hiring a professor can seem odd to those outside the 
academy. It helps to think of departments as a bit like professional sports 
teams. Disciplines are specialized fields that don’t generally compete 
across fields for faculty members, just as football doesn’t compete 
with basketball for players. Within each discipline, however, there is 
competition taking place across institutions and among the faculty in the 
field: institutions compete for the “best” faculty members and faculty members compete 
for the “best” jobs. As with any other career, while salary and prestige certainly play into 
job changes, there are many other factors influencing when or why people change jobs 
(e.g., family, location, position “fit”). Faculty jobs differ from most others because, in all 
but the biggest cities, there is generally a maximum of one potentially suitable position 
in that specialty at the university or college in that town. If a town has one basketball 
team, then there is generally only one point-guard position that might become available. 
In either case, many people will try out for that one slot when there’s an opening. In a 
departure from the metaphor, tenure-track faculty hiring is largely done by the team 
(the whole department or a committee) and finalized by the department head and dean. 
When an offer is made, there may be a counteroffer by the person’s current department. 
Sometimes there are pre-emptive retention offers to dissuade someone from looking to 
move. For professors, the money is nowhere near as big as in professional sports, but the 
odds of landing a position are arguably better!
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6.10 How do we account for faculty time  
and workload distribution?
Faculty members are the keystone species in the ecosystem of university employees, 
the core individuals carrying out the academic mission. Even so, the mix of duties 
reflecting that mission is not uniform across faculty members, plus the academic year 
is inherently seasonal, so how do we account for what the faculty is paid to do? It 
turns out that descriptions of faculty workload and cadence, and associated lingo, 
follow some common conventions across the wide variety of US higher education 
institutions; differences from one institution to another are typically minor variations 
on the overall theme.
Let’s get a stone out of the faculty’s shoe right up front. There are those outside 
the academy who think that all the faculty do (or ought to do) is teach, by which they 
mean that faculty members should be in the classroom instructing all day, because 
that’s all that universities do, right? That’s as ridiculous as saying that lawyers must 
be in court all day or that, ahem, legislators are supposed to be in session all the time. 
Enough said.
Faculty members are “exempt” employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA), meaning that they are exempt from overtime pay and the minimum wage. 
Exempt employees are not paid by the hour but instead receive a salary for the overall 
work they perform, typically in professional, administrative or executive positions. The 
faculty, like other members of the learned professions, meet the professional exemption 
test because their duties are primarily intellectual, require advanced knowledge 
in a field of learning, and regularly entail the use of discretion and judgment (US 
Department of Labor 2016; 2018).
Contrary to casual assumption among uninitiated faculty members, there is no 
presumption of a forty-hour work week precisely because they are exempt employees 
under the FLSA; one is paid to get the job done no matter how little or how much 
time it takes. Studies have consistently found that full-time faculty members work fifty 
to sixty-plus hours per week. As long ago as 1942 the median was fifty-eight hours 
(Charters 1942), in 1992 and again in 2004 the average for full-time faculty at four-
year institutions was fifty-four hours (National Center for Education Statistics 1993; 
2008; Cataldi et al. 2005), another study obtained an average of sixty-one hours at 
Boise State University (Ziker 2014), and University of Wisconsin-Madison reported an 
average of sixty-three hours per week (Blank 2015). Where cited across these sources, 
the variation across institution types, faculty ranks, and disciplines was consistently 
small, typically plus/minus a few hours.
The “hours worked” number therefore represents a faculty member’s 100% total 
effort, a denominator that is variable from person to person (and to head off a corollary 
rookie assumption to the one above, there is no connection between effort percentage 
and a forty-hour work week). The 100% is split among the three core academic mission 
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activities of teaching, research, and a range of other public/professional service duties 
such as administrative assignments, clinical activity, cooperative extension, university 
and professional review teams and committees, and peer-review or editorial service 
for scholarly journals. When referring to faculty workload, one properly means the 
mix of percentages across all these activities that add up to 100% overall, although it 
is sometimes used less precisely and confusingly as a contraction of faculty teaching 
workload (a.k.a. teaching load).
Most, but not all, faculty members are appointed to work an approximately nine-
month academic year. Depending on whether a campus calendar is based on semesters 
or a quarter system, exactly how long those last, and local policies on expected pre-term 
preparation and post-exam grading periods, the appointment period may be as short 
as seven or eight months or extend to ten; in any case, the standard academic year does 
not include summer and the standard faculty member is technically unpaid for that 
time. There are plenty of exceptions to this general practice. At land-grant universities, 
professors in agriculture often have an association with Cooperative Extension and 
may therefore have twelve-month contracts. Likewise, medical school professors have 
associated clinical responsibilities and twelve-month appointments. Faculty members 
at research universities in disciplines where external grant funding is available have 
an incentive to augment their nine-month (i.e., three-quarter time) salaries up to the 
full twelve-month equivalent, as compensation for grant-specified research performed 
over the summer (and in short breaks depending on local policy). Grants can also be 
used to “buy out” teaching in a regular semester using an appropriate percentage of 
the individual’s salary. Department chairs and others doing part-time administration 
duties may also receive summer compensation for their duties if they are expected to 
work during that time.
You may have heard of faculty members doing outside consulting work. Any such 
activities must take place strictly outside of the effort and hours discussed above, and 
independently of the institution. Many universities have a contractual prohibition on 
full-time faculty members working for another entity, with a carve-out for consulting 
done as an individual. Best practices for such consulting include pre-approval by a 
supervisor to ensure that the faculty member has the time and flexibility to handle an 
outside commitment without negatively affecting primary faculty duties, and to cross-
check potential conflicts of interest.
Statements of faculty workload distribution apply to the academic year and are 
often expressed as a string of three numbers representing teaching, research, and 
other service,3 totaling 100%.4 For example, a common distribution at R1 institutions is 
3  Convention varies as to the order of the three numbers. The third is almost always service; however, 
teaching and research can be in either first or second place and they are sometimes ordered such that 
the bigger of the two comes first. It’s best to check.
4  The individual percentages are typically round numbers in multiples of 10, sometimes multiples of 5, 
and occasionally in some finer split. The general idea is that they are broad estimates of effort meant 
to provide a shorthand summary of a complex set of activities, often interrelated, rather than a precise 
accounting.
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40/40/20, whereas at an institution with lower research and higher teaching emphasis 
a 60/20/20 distribution would be more typical. Contingent faculty members with a 
teaching assignment might have an 80/0/20 distribution, while a research professor 
doing no teaching might have a 0/80/20 distribution. Often, new faculty members 
will be assigned a lower initial teaching load so that they may get up to speed in the 
first year or two. Survey data of faculty work time percentages illustrate the three-part 
average workload distributions across types of institutions with astonishing clarity 
(Figure 6.7). The other service component is almost unwavering at just over 20% across 
all types of school, with the share of teaching and research activity varying primarily 
with the missions of the schools and showing little distinction between public and 
private institutions.
Figure 6.7.  Work time distribution of full-time faculty and instructional staff by level and control 
of institution. Source: NCES Digest/NSOPF:04 (National Center for Education 
Statistics 2008).
Teaching can comprise many activities, some easier to count than others: large 
introductory undergraduate courses that may or may not have graduate teaching 
assistants; medium size upper-division classes with a heavy writing emphasis; 
small graduate seminars; multiple sections of the same class versus each class being 
different. There is more outside the classroom: class preparation; grading; advising; 
mentoring; curriculum coordination; and more. Useful metrics can include student 
credit hours, classroom hours, class size, student contact hours (the two previous 
metrics multiplied together), and of course, number of class sections. All these items 
are primarily about quantity, and none deal with quality (assessment of teaching and 
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have formulated local combinations of the above that strive for an equitable balance of 
teaching commitments, at least within disciplines or colleges.
Despite the minutiae, and much as for workload distribution, a simple lingua franca 
of teaching loads is widely used for shorthand purposes and it is based simply on 
classes (sections) taught by semester and year. For example, a professor at a research 
university might teach a 2-2 load, meaning two classes in the Fall and two in the Spring 
semester of a regular academic year, while a professor at a baccalaureate college might 
teach a 3-3 load with lower expectations for research. A 4-4 load is usually only carried 
by lecturers and instructors at a university, because their assignment is dominantly 
teaching (a 5-5 load is ordinarily only found at a community college). As an astute 
reader, you may have noticed that teaching one section seems to correspond to about 
10% of effort but beware, “there be dragons”, as the edges of ancient maps used to 
proclaim, because both workload distribution and teaching load are highly generalized, 
and they gloss over details and customs that can be of great consequence locally.
Now that you know the jargon, you can decipher a comment like the following 
that you might easily hear at a faculty gathering: “I’m at fifty percent admin while I’m 
department chair. I’m glad the dean agreed to a one and one load, so I can keep my 
research going.”
6.11 What is happening in online higher education?
As with other sectors experiencing digital transformation, online higher education has 
seen its fair share of hype and myth, while evidence is emerging about significant 
changes that are under way. Let’s review the former before analyzing the latter.
• Money: Online technology was supposed to drive down the price of a degree 
by driving down the cost of production. Hopes for cheap (or virtually free) 
degrees, or inversely, institutional hopes for a windfall, have not materialized. 
Marketing, instructional support, and course development drive costs up 
while competition drives pricing down, and the upshot is that the typical 
institution charges near-standard tuition, often more with fees (Poulin and 
Strout 2017; Legon and Garrett 2018).
• Disruption: Clayton Christensen originated the theory of “disruptive 
innovation” and applied it to higher education (Christensen and Eyring 
2011), and he followed that book with predictions that half of American 
universities would go bankrupt within a decade (Lederman 2017). It’s been 
almost a decade and nothing of that scale has happened. The core idea is 
that online technology fundamentally changes the business model for higher 
education, leading to the disruption seen in other sectors. While his timing 
and hyperbole were wrong, the jury is still out on his underlying ideas.
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• MOOCs: Massive Open Online Courses perhaps defined the high-water mark 
of online hype in higher education, circa 2012. Elite universities and others 
opened MOOCs to anyone for free but, pointedly, not for credit towards a 
degree. Millions registered for these classes in the US and around the world; 
exceedingly few (3–5%) completed them (Coffrin et al. 2014) and specialized 
interventions to raise completion have not had widespread success (Kizilcec 
et al. 2020), although MOOCs may yet find a limited role (Yang 2013; Hoxby 
2014; Impey 2020).
• Access: The potential of online higher education to reach those who 
traditionally have not had access, domestically and internationally, still holds 
promise although there has not been much progress in online utilization by 
low-income and other under-served populations in the US, or by people 
in developing countries. But, and it is a big but, access to online higher 
education has been transformational for those already in the workforce and 
in the military (see below).
• Unbundling: Amid the disruption and MOOC fever, online was supposed to 
lead to the unbundling of degrees as the core credentialing vehicle. Degree 
programs and classes would be split into modules and via micro-credentialing 
(e.g., badges) could be used alone or assembled into certificates. There’s some 
of that in workplace training, but it’s not visible in online higher education 
where the fully-online degree is the core strategy (Legon and Garrett 2018).
• Poor Quality: In the early days the quality of teaching and content in online 
higher education carried a stigma. A side-benefit of the MOOC infatuation 
was the engagement of the elite institutions, which helped overcome 
perceptions of poor quality. Nowadays, even with the pandemic-related 
surge in online delivery, it is increasingly considered equivalent in quality to 
conventional higher education (and indeed better than a mediocre face-to-
face lecture class).
• Luddites: In other sectors there were sentimentalists, such as those who could 
not imagine reading the newspaper on anything but paper (and a day late), 
or those who could not imagine losing the ambience and serendipity of 
the neighborhood bookstore. Let’s also not forget the spectacular strategic 
shortsightedness of Kodak not anticipating digital cameras or Blockbuster 
video stores not grasping the advent of Netflix and streaming. Nostalgia for 
the ivied groves of academe,5 along with uncritical denial of the advantages 
of online technologies, is not a viable strategy.
5  This evocative phrase was used by Mary McCarthy (1952) as the title of her academic novel, one of 
the first in the genre that has since grown to include dozens (Wikipedia 2019a). Selected gems include 
Jane Smiley’s Moo (1995), Straight Man by Richard Russo (1997), Disgrace by J.M Coetzee (1999) 
which helped him win a Nobel Prize, and Julie Schumacher’s Dear Committee Members (2014).
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Online tools clearly add value to multiple aspects of teaching, learning and knowledge 
dissemination through multimedia materials, asynchronous and synchronous delivery, 
and perhaps most importantly in comparison to earlier distance technologies such as 
video courses, interactivity. Yet, face-to-face higher education, especially for eighteen- 
to twenty-two-year-olds in the US university context, has strong experiential and 
extra-curricular components that are not easily replicated online. The online debate, 
when considered coolly and without hype, is not an either/or discussion between 
these two alternatives; the smarter approach is to consider how mode meets market 
and mission. US universities are already diverse in their markets and missions (small 
elite private, large public research, regional comprehensive, technical or liberal arts 
focus, commuter or residential, applicants who are high school graduates or already 
in the workforce, etc.), and online approaches will have advantages and disadvantages 
particular to each context. In some cases, online approaches will complement and 
strengthen an institution’s business model, and in others they may indeed threaten 
that model. Savvy institutions are figuring out what is best for them and adjusting 
their courses accordingly. Some have implemented dramatic changes, others are 
steadily diversifying, and many others are still on the sidelines. Much of this has been 
accelerated by the flip to remote instruction during COVID-19, but it remains to be 
seen what mix institutions will return to post-pandemic.
It’s important to include data from outside the four-year nonprofit segment for 
context, because much of the early action in online higher education has been in for-
profit institutions. All institutions with more than 10,000 fully-online enrollments 
in FY2019 are shown in Figure 6.8, which includes not only for-profits but also 
baccalaureate special-focus colleges and two-year institutions along with our usual 
set of four-year nonprofit institutions by type. Examining the set by sheer size of 
online enrollments, in FY2019 the University of Phoenix had 94,000 enrolled online, 
a shadow of the 470,000 it had in 2010. It is now the third-largest online school, with 
Western Governor’s University (WGU) leading the pack at over 120,000 and Southern 
New Hampshire University (SNHU) at 97,000, both R3-M3 private nonprofits that 
have risen quickly in recent years (McKenzie 2018b). Several other for-profits and 
privates follow them, and at position number seven we find the largest public online 
university, the University of Maryland University College (UMUC). As an example of 
an evolving public institution, UMUC has been around since 1947, primarily serving 
military members and working adults in the region; it recently announced plans for 
a name change and associated global expansion strategy (McKenzie 2019c). Other 
major publics with a sizable online presence are ASU and Penn State, as well as two 
that have acquired previously for-profit institutions that are now affiliated with the 
parent public nonprofit: Purdue and its purchase of Kaplan (Purdue University 2018), 
and the University of Arizona and its acquisition of Ashford (McKenzie 2020b). The 
rising role of the nonprofits versus the for-profits in recent years has been especially 
noticeable, with nonprofit status signaling quality against growing skepticism of the 
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for-profit sector in the wake of student loan scandals and the enforcement of gainful-
employment regulations (McKenzie 2018b). A related development has been the rise 
of online program management (OPM) companies to help colleges grow their online 
course offerings. Those contracts can cede extensive control and up to half the tuition 
revenue to the OPM, what a recent report calls a “deeply unsettling picture” (Hall and 
Dudley 2019).
Figure 6.8.  All institutions with greater than 10,000 students in exclusively online (a.k.a. distance) 
enrollment for FY2019 (Fall 2018), by Carnegie classification and control, including 
private for-profit institutions, baccalaureate special-focus colleges, and two-year colleges. 
Source: IPEDS (2020).
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Box 6.2. A Parable for Online Higher Education
While there is little question that change is afoot, it is not entirely clear in what ways 
online education will reshape universities. Think for a moment about the nature of 
adaptation to technological change in dramatic entertainment: just over a century ago, 
it was all about on-stage productions in a theater; with the advent of movies, some 
aspects of theater moved to the new technology and others remained on stage; television 
brought a new wave that did the same and in turn disrupted both the theater business 
and movie-going; and more recently, on-demand streaming video services have changed 
the game again. My point is not the technological change per se, it is that today we still 
have the live experience of stage theaters, the immersion of movie theaters (Figure B6), 
and the convenience of home viewing, with each adapted to its niche. Make no mistake, 
there were upheavals with each new technology, such as individual theaters closing or 
adapting to showing movies, or the rise and fall of drive-in movies, the demise of the big 
three television networks and the rise of cable, and now the shift from cable to online 
services. In this scenario, which I think is more apposite to higher education than the 
all-or-nothing examples like Blockbuster and Netflix, there is an evolutionary space for 
prior forms, especially those with an intrinsic experiential component. Crucially, the 
evolved niches are still competitive and require continual adaptation to remain relevant 
and financially viable.
Figure B6.  This photograph from July 1, 2006 shows the County Theater in Doylestown, Pennsylvania, 
a glorious art deco building from 1938 that is still showing movies today. Source: 
Frederick (2006), Flickr, CC BY 2.0, https://www.flickr.com/photos/galfred/180834829.
Looking now across institutions by type, we can see that the schools with the largest 
online enrollments are unevenly spread across categories (Figure 6.8). This is partly 
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because several of the R1 publics designate their online campus as a separate “branch” 
campus, which is why they show up in the R3-M3 category. Others have a brick and 
mortar campus identity but they are generally not flagship institutions (e.g., UT 
Arlington but not UT Austin) although some are large (e.g., University of Central 
Florida). Also, there is a growing set of schools in the 5,000 to 10,000 online enrollment 
range (not shown) that are making concerted efforts to grow, such as Georgia Tech, 
which is carving out a particular niche to become a market innovator (Schroeder 2019). 
The largest online R1 privates are likewise in that next group of several thousand 
enrollments, and all are elite names (e.g., Johns Hopkins, USC, and Harvard). There 
is a handful of R2 schools in this smaller-enrollment group as well and, as one might 
expect, almost no baccalaureate colleges have significant online enrollments. As we’ve 
seen, the action is in the R3-M3 category, where WGU, SNHU, and Liberty University 
are many times larger than most of the other nonprofits doing online education. The 
number of institutions with substantial online enrollments is still small enough to fit in 
one figure today, but online enrollments have increased for fourteen consecutive years, 
with growth in 2016 exceeding 7% across nonprofit institutions (Seaman et al. 2018). 
No doubt, the online pivot across higher education during the COVID-19 pandemic 
will add to this trend.
Returning to our regular set of schools, online enrollment data reveal distinct 
patterns when examined by sub-category (Figure 6.9). Exclusively online enrollments 
average 5–10% of total enrollments for most types of institutions; private baccalaureate 
Figure 6.9.  Exclusively online (distance) and blended online/face-to-face enrollment as a share of 
total enrollment, as well as shares of exclusively online enrollment by degree level and by 
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colleges average just 1% and, as we’ve seen above, the R3-M3 privates have the highest 
share, averaging 26% of total enrollment. Thus today, at the most common type of 
institution in the nation, the same type that is most financially challenged and has the 
highest proportion of contingent faculty, over one quarter of all students are already 
completely online and effectively don’t set foot on campus.
An interesting development has been the rise in blended or hybrid courses, in 
which students take a mixture of face-to-face and online classes while attending an 
institution. These statistics are not typically included in counts of “online” students 
because the classes are taken by students who are campus-based. A student, typically 
an undergraduate, may opt to take the online version of a class because of scheduling 
around other classes or a part-time job, availability of open slots, preference for an 
instructor, degree requirements, etc.—in other words, for many of the same reasons 
they choose face-to-face classes. In Figure 6.9 we can see that students taking online 
classes in blended mode are more common at publics than privates, more than 20% 
of all enrolled students at R1, R2 and R3-M3 publics in a given semester. Because the 
individuals taking the classes change from one semester to the next, this means that 
the typical face-to-face undergraduate takes several online courses before graduating. 
Strikingly, while relatively commonplace, blended learning is not a core strategy at 
most institutions (Legon and Garrett 2018).
Returning to exclusively online enrollments, you may be surprised to see that 
graduate students make up a large share of the total, and they constitute the majority 
at most privates and R1 publics. It turns out that professional and technical graduate 
degrees for working adults wanting to upgrade their qualifications were one of the 
early success areas in online higher education; e.g., business, information technology, 
education, and healthcare were the most popular in 2016 (Silber and Chien 2016). 
Undergraduate enrollments have since followed and will probably dominate in 
the long run by sheer force of numbers. As expected, research-focused institutions 
have greater proportions of online graduate students while the R3-M3 schools and 
baccalaureate colleges have higher proportions of undergraduates.
The location of exclusively online students may also surprise you. At most types 
of institutions, the lion’s share of online students is located nearby, in-state. For 
undergraduates, the national median across all institutions is just 13 miles away, 130 
miles on average (Campbell and Wescott 2019). Students from within the institution’s 
state make up over half of all online enrollments across most types of school. The 
exceptions are the R3-M3 privates (likely skewed by those few extremely large schools) 
and the R1 privates whose elite branding enables a national market. The share of 
online international students is small and averages just a few percent at most types 
of institutions, a counterintuitive pattern given the potential reach of online and the 
international nature of other internet technologies. Again, the R3-M3 schools are the 
exception with over 20% international online enrollments.
To round out our picture of the typical online student, the data show that age 
and occupation differ from the conventional fresh-from-high-school student. Across 
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all postsecondary institutions (not just four-year nonprofit institutions) in FY2016, 
the percentage of undergraduates whose entire program was online (i.e., distance 
education) was under 4% for age groups under twenty-three years old, and more than 
22% for age groups thirty years or older (Campbell and Wescott 2019). The same data 
set shows that for non-military undergraduates about 10% are enrolled in online-only 
programs, whereas for veterans and active duty military the figures are 20% and 33% 
respectively (Campbell and Wescott 2019). Lastly, for undergraduates not working, 
7% are in online-only programs versus 22% for those who are working full time 
(Campbell and Wescott 2019).
Comprehensive financial data for online programs are not readily available, 
although we can certainly infer funding flows from the various types of enrollment data 
above. Further insights on the funding of online programs can be gained from a regular 
survey of chief online officers (Figure 6.10). About half of these respondents see online 
programs as net sources of revenue for the institution with almost one third seeing 
variation in cost/revenue balance across programs. Most programs charge standard 
tuition, many with additional fees (Legon and Garrett 2018). Standard tuition at private 
institutions is much higher than at the publics, and therefore the privates are less likely 
to charge higher online tuition than the publics, given competitive market pricing for 
high-demand and high-reward programs. The allocation of online revenues is seldom 
dedicated solely to supporting online activities; a combined-revenue-for-general-needs 
Figure 6.10.  Survey responses of chief online officers at public and private four-year institutions 
regarding net cost or revenue generation of online programs, tuition rates charged, 
and whether online budget allocations are dedicated to online, split between online, 
academic departments and the general institution, or combined with all revenue for 
general use. Categories do not total 100 because of omitted responses and/or multiple 
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model is the most common at private institutions, while public institutions use almost 
equally either a split model (between online, academic departments and general 
needs) or the combined revenue model.
A recent development is the formation of private companies and university spin-
offs competing in the market for employer-provided tuition benefits (Fain 2019). Some 
of that market is for workers who have some college education but did not complete 
a degree, and another segment is the provision of customized online credential 
programs that are not full degrees. These intermediary online-brokering companies 
offer streamlined services to employees, matching them with education providers 
and managing their tuition reimbursement process, while receiving revenue for those 
services from the sponsoring employer. No doubt this new space will be developing 
rapidly as online education evolves.
6.12 What is the budget role of international programs?
International programs have the laudable educational goal of creating graduates who 
are globally informed. Not only do US students study abroad, experiencing life in a 
different culture first-hand; the world also studies in the US, bringing a valuable array 
of international perspectives stateside. In addition to generating cultural exchange, 
international programs also involve money and markets.
It is useful to appreciate that there are four (sometimes intentionally confused) 
logics at work in international student mobility (Usher 2019): the pilgrimage logic in 
which scholars gathered in centers of learning as an academic rite of passage (e.g., 
medieval times, or Americans to the UK or Germany in the late 1800s); the soft power 
logic of mutual bond-strengthening (e.g., the US Fulbright program, or the Erasmus 
program across Europe); the war-for-talent logic in which higher education serves as 
an international talent magnet for the host nation (e.g., the US since the 1950s); and, 
the pecuniary interest logic in which revenue from international students bolsters the 
bottom line of income-challenged public and private universities (e.g., the UK starting 
in the 1980s, Australia in the 2000s, and the US especially since the Great Recession). 
The four logics are not mutually exclusive and often the pecuniary interest logic is 
camouflaged in soft power or war-for-talent terms (Usher 2019).
Budgetarily, most of the action is with inbound international students (the 
preferred term, rather than foreign students). Their impact is analogous to that of out-
of-state students, as we saw in Section 2.13, and growing numbers of universities are 
contracting with companies that recruit international students into so-called pathway 
programs with mixed success (Redden 2018). Figure 6.11 illustrates international 
undergraduate and graduate student enrollments as a share of total enrollment by 
type of institution for FY2018. International graduate students are disproportionately 
over-represented (about double the overall rate and reflecting the war-for-talent logic 
among others) and naturally they are found predominantly at R1 and R2 institutions; 
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furthermore, note that graduate students make up half of all international students 
at R3-M3 privates. The highest proportions of international students are found at R1 
private universities (over 20%) and at R1 publics and R2 privates (over 10%), with 
other types of schools averaging 6% international students or less.
Figure 6.11. FY2018 undergraduate and graduate international enrollment as a share of total 
enrollment, averaged by Carnegie classification and control. Source: IPEDS (2020).
Trends in international enrollments have been generally upward across all institution 
types for several decades (Figure 6.12), growing at approximately twice the rate of overall 
enrollments. International undergraduate enrollments grew modestly through the late 
2000s and then surged dramatically following the Great Recession, presumably in part 
as an institutional revenue opportunity. International graduate student enrollments saw 
more consistent growth overall with periods of variability. The consequences of post-9/11 
immigration rule changes can be observed as a multi-year downturn in international 
enrollment in the 2000s; likewise, the downturn in FY2017 and FY2018 appears to 
coincide with country-specific immigration bans and widely reported anti-immigration 
rhetoric. That downturn continued in FY2019, and in Fall 2020 the lockdowns and 
border closures due to the COVID-19 pandemic led to an estimated 43% plummet in 
new international enrollment (Fischer 2020). International enrollments have rebounded 
after other major international events (e.g., the 9/11 attacks in 2001), but it is not yet clear 





































The total numbers of international students and their primary sources of funding 
are shown in Figure 6.13. International undergraduates are largely self-funded (with 
funding by their families or by their home governments or institutions) and only about 
9% are funded by the host institution. This is critical from a revenue standpoint: we 
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Figure 6.12.  Trends in undergraduate and graduate international enrollment by fiscal year, 
totaled across the eight institution types. Values for FY1986, FY1988 and FY1990 are 
interpolated from neighboring years. Shaded bars indicate the onset of major changes 




can infer that most international undergraduates are paying near-full tuition (and at 
the publics, this would be at the out-of-state rate). The corresponding share is smaller 
for international graduate students because a greater proportion of them are funded 
by the host institution. This funding is typically via graduate assistantships, and we 
saw in Section 5.9 that those are split roughly 50:50 between research and teaching 
assistantships. While research assistants usually have their tuition paid by the grant 
from the funding agency, teaching assistant tuition is typically foregone institutional 
revenue. Therefore, about 15–20% of international graduate students are funded by the 
host institution directly. For completeness, Figure 6.13 shows that non-degree seeking 
students (e.g., visiting for a semester) at either level are a small proportion of the total; 
also shown are more than 200,000 international students who, after completing their 
full-time studies, stay on for Optional Practical Training, employment in their field 
that is directly supported by a salary from the employer and is time-limited (one year, 
longer in STEM fields).
More than half of all international students in the US were from just two countries 
in FY2019: China (34%) and India (18%), and they have supplied essentially all the 
dramatic post-recession growth in international enrollments (Figure 6.14). Enrollments 
from South Korea and Saudi Arabia, the next two leading countries of origin, have 
decreased in recent years; the trend for all remaining countries (not shown) was 
essentially flat from FY2000 to FY2014 followed by modest recent growth through 
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Figure 6.13.  All international higher education students in the US and their primary source of 












































FY2018. The dominance of China and India in the portfolio means that any negative 
geopolitical or immigration issues between these countries and the US could have 
substantial financial consequences for tuition-dependent institutions. For example, if 
enrollments from those two countries returned to pre-recession levels, a drop of about 
40% in total, a school with 5% international enrollment would see that drop to 3%, 
representing a 2% decrease in total enrollments and associated tuition revenue.
International programs have several other dimensions, including study abroad 
(i.e., outbound students), exchange (both directions), and international branch 
campuses. Because study abroad can entail a significant expense from the student 
and family perspective, US institutions tend to run their own programs on a cost-
recovery or small margin basis rather than as a significant institutional net revenue 
source (although there are a few that specialize in study abroad, as well as numerous 
third-party operators). Over 330,000 US students study abroad each year, with Europe 
dominating the top destinations, which for FY2018 were, in order: UK, Italy, Spain, 
France, Germany, Ireland, China, Australia, Costa Rica, Japan, South Africa, and 
Mexico (Institute of International Education 2019).
Exchange programs are entirely different. Their philosophy is to avoid imposing 
additional costs on the student through a simple mechanism: bodies move, tuition stays 
put. Agreements are set up so that the students effectively switch seats with neutral 
institutional impact because they keep paying tuition at home, and the institutions 
ensure a reasonable balance over time. This is especially useful if pricing is lopsided 
when compared to the US (i.e., countries with centrally-funded education and low or 
no tuition, and low-income countries).
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Figure 6.14.  Recent trends in international higher education students studying in the US by leading 





































An international branch campus (IBC) is partly or fully owned by the providing 
university, which awards a degree in its name based on an academic program run 
substantively on-site in the host country. The most recent comprehensive study shows 
that IBCs have been opening at a rate of about 11 new campuses per year, worldwide, 
since 2006 (The OBHE and C-BERT at SUNY Albany 2016). Of the 249 in operation 
serving about 180,000 students, almost one third have home institutions in the US (78) 
followed by IBCs based in the UK (39), France (28), Russia (21) and Australia (15), 
per Garrett et al. (2016). The host countries with the most IBCs are China (32), United 
Arab Emirates (31), Singapore (12), Malaysia (12), and Qatar (11), with the growth 
seen in the Persian Gulf countries during the 1990s and 2000s now halted and China 
growing markedly instead (Garrett et al. 2016). Part ownership of IBCs is common, 
often in partnership with the host government, other educational institutions or private 
entities, with the rationales for the commitment including revenue, internationalization 
and status, and with concerns including financial sustainability, mission creep, 
reputational risk, and academic freedom issues (Garrett et al. 2016). The large initial 
capital investment in IBCs can sometimes be offset by the local government partner, but 
IBCs have operational costs and activities that rival a regular campus, including a set 
of support services (a part of their appeal in recreating the home campus experience 
abroad) as well as complying with financial, labor and other laws and regulations not 
only of the home country but also of the host country (Crist 2017). About 13% of all 
IBCs have closed over time, based on the most recent data (Cross-Border Education 
Research Team 2017). This is a high failure rate by higher education standards but a 
low failure rate in comparison to other sectors involving entrepreneurial startups; for 
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example, 90% over three years in technology (Kinser and Lane 2016). Finally, blended 
models have emerged, such as a “microcampus” network that merges elements of 
in-person delivery with online education on a host campus (Redden 2017).
6.13 What are the trends in library expenditures?
University libraries are iconic institutions, often centrally located on campus, that 
represent both the repository and accessibility of knowledge at the heart of the academy. 
So much so that some are architectural treasures: the George Peabody Library at Johns 
Hopkins University, the Linderman Library at Lehigh University, the Suzzallo Library 
at the University of Washington, and the Geisel Library at the University of California 
in San Diego (yes, it is named for Dr. Seuss), to mention just a few.
Knowledge in the contemporary era is increasingly stored electronically and virtually, 
rather than physically on paper, and academic libraries are changing accordingly. The 
thousands of linear feet of shelf space (“the stacks”) that were devoted to local copies 
of broadly available periodicals and books are giving way to information commons, 
study rooms and even classrooms as the library provides support and access to 
specialized digital information sources from all over the world. Instead of the pre-
digital model of purchasing resources once and keeping them forever, libraries now 
enter into licensing agreements with vendors to purchase access to virtual volumes. To 
be sure, established libraries will continue to maintain physical collections of special 
and unique items and even make them available to others digitally. Yet, the workaday 
set of scholarly journals and other frequently accessed items has been predominantly 
electronic for years. At smaller schools, 90% or more of serials collections are now 
electronic; R1 and R2 university libraries house collections of specialized non-digital 
subscriptions, so the electronic share is 60–80% (IPEDS 2020).
The mix of costs in library budgets is remarkably consistent across types of 
institutions, with 59% (plus/minus 5–10%) of expenditures going to personnel and 
operations and the other approximately 40% going to acquiring resource materials 
(Figure 6.15). Three quarters of the materials budget goes to ongoing subscriptions, 
the bulk of which are scholarly journals, while the other quarter is spent on one-time 
acquisitions, such as new books. The challenge for libraries is as follows: total library 
budgets have roughly kept pace with inflation (more so at bigger institutions and less 
so at smaller schools, within about 0.5%) but subscription costs have seen rampant 
increases for decades, well before the digital era.
The trend in subscription expenditures is clear in Figure 6.16, where ongoing 
subscription costs for research libraries have been increasing by 3.4% over inflation 
since the 1980s. This contrasts with expenditures for one-time acquisitions, which have 
remained flat in real terms. Comparable data for R1 libraries are overlaid in Figure 6.16 
and, while the amounts are higher for private versus public institutions, the trends 
are the same. This state of affairs has come about due to monopolistic tendencies in 
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Figure 6.15.  FY2017 share of library expenditures for personnel and other operations and for resource 
materials, including ongoing subscriptions (e.g., journals), one-time acquisitions (e.g., 





the for-profit journal market, in which journals are not interchangeable and are only 
available from one vendor. For highly-accessed journals, libraries have had limited 
negotiating room as continued subscriptions to those journals are vital to the success of 
the university’s researchers.
Figure 6.16.  Trends in library expenditures for ongoing subscriptions (e.g., journals) and one-time 
acquisitions (e.g., books) for the median of Association of Research Libraries (ARL) 
and the average of R1 public and R1 private institutions respectively, by fiscal year 
in 2016 dollars. ARL data from FY2012 onward are adjusted to account for a survey 
methodology change. Note that R1 data are available only in even years before FY2014. 
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To make matters worse, the large commercial publishers market their journals in 
bundles, much like cable television providers bundle channels, in which many minor 
titles are packaged with those in highest demand. This practice became known as 
the “Big Deal” in which the price per title in a discounted bundle is significantly 
lower than the sum of the individual list prices, although Big Deal pricing has risen 
nonetheless.6 A recent study evaluated the cost-effectiveness of bundled subscription 
prices by comparing cost per citation from 19 nonprofit and 6 for-profit publishers 
(Bergstrom et al. 2014). As shown in Figure 6.17, the cost per citation from for-profit 
publishers is substantially higher than from the nonprofits, with big differences by 
institution type that reflect the differential willingness (necessity) of major research 
institutions to pay (Bergstrom et al. 2014). For R1 institutions, the bundle cost per 
citation averages roughly $1 from nonprofit publishers but about $6 across the major 
for-profit publishers. The range by publisher is large: about $2 for Elsevier, $3 for 
Springer, $5 for Wiley, and up to about $11 per citation for Taylor & Francis. At R2 
institutions, the average for-profit rate is still more than double the nonprofits, and at 
master’s institutions it is about 50% more (Figure 6.17).
Figure 6.17. Average cost per citation for journal subscription bundles from 19 nonprofit and 6 for-
profit publishers. Source: Bergstrom et al. (2014).
University libraries have not stood by idly, and through systems and consortia they 
have had some success in bargaining. The University of California system has taken 
a notably hard stance, keeping their increases from Elsevier to an average annual rate 
6  The Scholarly Publishing and Academic Resources Coalition (SPARC) makes available a database of 
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of about 1.5% versus the initial 5% for the decade ending in 2013 (Bergstrom et al. 
2014); nonetheless, negotiations reached a breaking point in 2019 when the UC system 
dropped its Big Deal with that publisher, garnering statements of support from other 
libraries that have done or are contemplating doing the same (McKenzie 2019b). Part 
of the desire in that negotiation was for a “read-and-publish” deal, which would 
combine the cost for accessing content behind a paywall with another cost structure 
known as open access. The UC System recently announced just such an open-access 
agreement in a landmark deal with Springer Nature (McKenzie 2020a).
Open access is a broad movement, supported by many but not all librarians and 
scholars, to make published research freely available to read. Under open access, 
there are two main models: in the “gold” model the author or funding agency pays an 
upfront processing and publication fee (which can amount to thousands of dollars), 
while in the “green” model a version of the article is made available for free after 
a delay period (e.g., six months or a year) but subscription remains for immediate 
access (Ellis 2019). Many US funding agencies now require the green model, and the 
major European funding agencies now require the gold model (Ellis 2019).
It is not clear what this will mean for library budgets in the long run. The indignation 
of scholars at having to pay unreasonable rates to either publish or read research that 
they produce (and that they peer-review for free as part of the publication process) 
will only diminish if they move away from for-profit publishers. Yet, many of their most 
prized journals are from those very publishers; Springer Nature recently announced 
optional open access processing charges of more than $11,000 per article (Else 2020). It 
remains to be seen whether the open access movement will succeed in keeping down 
the costs of accessing the latest knowledge (see Section 9.4 for more on open access).
6.14 How much do we spend on information technology?
Institutions spend about $1,000 per person on campus for information technology 
(IT). Figure 6.18 illustrates expenditures on central IT per institutional FTE (full-time 
equivalent students, faculty and staff), with average totals ranging from about $800 to 
$1,500 per year. Research institutions spend more than master’s institutions per FTE, 
and baccalaureate colleges (most of which are private) also spend relatively more. Over 
half of these amounts go towards personnel costs, about one third go to infrastructure 
and services on campus, and 2–6% goes to external providers (e.g., “cloud” services 
such as email or web servers hosted offsite). The total institutional investment in central 
IT can therefore total millions to tens of millions of dollars annually depending on the 
size of the institution, comparable to a mid-sized academic college. From FY2010 to 
FY 2016, inflation-adjusted central IT spending per FTE has grown at annualized rates 
of 0.3% at master’s institutions and 1–2% at research universities and baccalaureate 
colleges (Lang 2017).
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Figure 6.18.  FY2016 central IT expenditures per institutional FTE (full-time equivalent students, 
faculty and staff) divided into primary spending categories of personnel compensation 
and fringe benefits, infrastructure and services provided in-house (e.g., hardware 
software, network cabling), and those provided through external entities (e.g., third 
party email and web services), by classification (research, master’s, or baccalaureate) 
and control. Source: EDUCAUSE (Lang 2017).
The two main pressures on IT budgets are personnel and the technology itself. Stiff 
competition from the private sector in the salary market means that pay rates are higher 
and can rise faster for IT compensation versus other parts of the university, which can 
also lead to high turnover—it’s not unusual for individuals to spend just a few years 
in a position before moving to another. The endless treadmill of technology refresh 
and upgrades means that the IT enterprise has continuous short-term capital outlays. 
If the Chief Information Officer (CIO) is not provided with the resources to invest in 
updated networks and systems, as with all deferred maintenance, the institution will 
fall behind in its capabilities, leading to higher costs later when the inevitable upgrade 
turns into a crisis. Some system replacement costs are large enough that they need to be 
amortized over the life of the technology, such as the core enterprise resource planning 
(ERP) systems like the student information system or the finance and accounting 
system. An entire ERP replacement project is a massive undertaking in technical and 
implementation terms, and at a large university the cost can amount to many tens of 
millions of dollars, similar in financial scale to (and as critically important as) a new 
campus building.
Central IT expenditures account for about 4.75% of the total institutional budget 
at master’s universities and baccalaureate colleges, but at public and private research 
institutions that share is lower at about 3% and 3.75% respectively (Lang 2017). From 
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at large research institutions occur because distributed (i.e., non-centralized) IT is 
more commonplace at those schools, partly reflecting the historical emergence of IT 
in multiple specialized units; 69% and 45% of public and private research universities 
respectively spend less than 75% of total IT expenditures centrally, while that share 
is only 9–30% at other types of institutions (Lang 2017). Institutions have difficulty 
tracking distributed IT expenses consistently, and therefore it is hard to establish 
reliable trends in centralized versus distributed IT expenditures (Brummund et al. 
2015). Recent technological trends have been towards centralization (and outsourcing) 
of commodity IT services such as email and website hosting. One regular survey shows 
consistently increasing trends in the percentage of centralized versus distributed 
campus IT spending for over a decade across all types of institutions: for example, the 
share of central IT spending increased from around 40% to over 60% at larger public 
universities, and from about 60% to nearly 90% at smaller private four-year colleges 
(Green 2007–18).
You may be wondering why I’ve included IT in this chapter on academic affairs, 
rather than in the facilities section along with utilities like lights and water. Information 
technologies, in contrast to regular utilities, play a direct and strategic role in furthering 
the academic mission of the university. Some domains of IT are utility-like, such as 
basic internet service and, literally, dial tone for telephones. Other domains support 
the broader administration of the university (accounting, human resources, etc.). Still, 
IT software and services are critical to not only supporting but also advancing teaching 
and learning, student success, and research, which is why smart institutions view IT 
as integral to knowledge transfer and discovery. Figure 6.19 illustrates relative levels 
of central IT spending across the major IT functional domains including personnel, 
averaged across institution types because they are similar. While all the domains are 
essential, some are more visible than others:
• Administration of the IT enterprise includes activities related to the Office 
of the CIO such as management, planning, vendor contracts, and policy 
development, and it accounts for one quarter of expenditures;
• Information systems include the core enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
systems (student information, payroll and financial, procurement, human 
resources, grants and contract management, etc.);
• Enterprise infrastructure and services include data centers, servers, backup 
power supplies, web services, databases and more;
• IT support services serve all users such as desktop support, reference staff, 
departmental support, IT training, and multimedia production;
• The communications infrastructure includes all the physical elements of the 
network such as cable, wireless network, telephone and voicemail, video 
surveillance, and emergency notification systems along with communication 
services such as email, calendaring, and collaboration technologies;
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• Educational technology services cover the range of instructional software 
and support including learning management systems, e-portfolio, degree 
audit, classroom technology, online education platforms, and library systems 
and together they account for about 10% of central IT spending;
• Information security covers increasingly critical items such as identity 
management, access provisioning, authentication, intrusion detection 
and prevention, breach response, and information security training, with 
spending on IT security increasing one and a half times over the previous 
year (to 3% of the total);
• Finally, research computing services are not reflected in Figure 6.19 
because they are only significant at the relatively small number of major 
research institutions, and they include high-performance computing 
(“supercomputers”), specialized networks (e.g., Internet2), and advanced 
visualization (EDUCAUSE 2020).
Figure 6.19.  FY2016 functional domain area spending as a percentage of central IT spending, 
averaged across all types of four-year institutions. Source: EDUCAUSE (Lang 2017).
The various software systems and services vary widely in cost and, as might be expected 
in the dynamic IT environment, the relative spending on each also changes from year to 
year (Figure 6.20). Student, financial and human resources ERP systems are large and 
growing, and the vendors in this area include Oracle (Peoplesoft), Ellucian (Banner), 
Jenzabar and Workday (MarketWatch 2018). The biggest institutional investment in 
instructional technology is learning management systems (LMS). The LMS landscape 
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and over 90% of market share is now held by the big four: Canvas, Blackboard Learn, 
D2L Brightspace, and Moodle (Hill 2019). An LMS has become an essential tool in face-
to-face and online education, although the related technology of adaptive (self-paced 
and personalized) learning tools has not yet gained wide adoption (Dimeo 2017). The 
other systems lower down the list in Figure 6.20 have seen flat or decreasing shares 
of expenditures, and they are generally low to medium in relative expense (the drop 
for analytics may be related to a definition change in the survey, as it was increasing 
steeply in prior years). Finally, plagiarism-detection software (e.g., Turnitin) was not 
listed on the survey, but it is another educational technology tool that is widely used 
(McMurtrie 2019).
Figure 6.20.  FY2016 and FY2018 shares of annual expenditures for ERP, administrative and 
instructional software and services, averaged across all public and private four-year 
colleges and universities, sorted by growing (upper portion) or shrinking share (lower 
portion). Source: Campus Computing Survey (Green 2007–2018).




















7.1 What are the numbers for recruiting and admissions?
As we’ve seen, most universities are tuition-dependent, especially the smaller non-
elite institutions, and enrollment is their financial life-blood. Effective enrollment 
management is therefore critical to the survival and success of a campus. Enrollment 
management begins with recruiting and admissions, although nowadays it goes well 
beyond those activities. Done strategically, enrollment management is most effective 
when it (i) optimizes student success in the context of the institution (diversity, location, 
selectivity, size, etc.) and (ii) works in close collaboration with academic programs, all 
of which lead to improved retention and graduation rates, greater overall enrollment 
numbers, and consistent and predictable tuition revenues. That said, we’ll focus on 
recruitment and admissions in this section, and then progress to other aspects of the 
incoming class in subsequent sections.
Every university needs to shape its incoming class and doing so requires a set 
of marketing and recruitment activities that cost money. A recent survey provides 
some insights into these expenditure details (Ruffalo Noel Levitz 2018), although it 
is unfortunately quite narrow (N=126) and limited to small privates and a range of 
publics. The median cost to recruit a new undergraduate enrollee in 2017, including 
personnel costs, was $2,357 at small privates (middle tercile of total enrollment 
from 1,673 to 2,992 students) and $536 at public institutions (middle tercile of total 
enrollment from 8,683 to 17,144). Omitting personnel costs, those medians are $1,102 
and $175 respectively (Ruffalo Noel Levitz 2018) with the primary scaling being the 
efficiency of larger incoming class size. Backing out those numbers, the typical size 
of a recruiting and admissions staff is 10 to 30 FTE at small privates and 30 to 50 
FTE at midsize publics, with expenditures of $2M to $3M in either case on the mix 
of activities shown in Figure 7.1. Marketing is the largest expenditure in this area, 
followed by travel and events such as admissions fairs. These latter two reflect the 
key role of reaching college-bound students in high school, and the special influence 
of guidance counselors who rank visits from university representatives as their most 
useful source for helping students with college planning (Ruffalo Noel Levitz 2017b). 
Universities also purchase lists of prospective students from vendors such as the 
College Board and ACT, which, at 10% of the recruiting budget, cost well into the six-
figure range. Unsurprisingly, digital marketing budgets are growing faster than any 
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other part of the recruiting budget, with traditional marketing budgets mostly staying 
flat or decreasing (Ruffalo Noel Levitz 2018).
Figure 7.1.  Share of FY2018 recruiting budget allocated to specific marketing and recruitment 
activities from a survey of 126 four-year institutions, including public institutions of 
all sizes and predominantly smaller private institutions. Source: RNL (Ruffalo Noel 
Levitz 2018).











Figure 7.2.  Percentage of admitted applicants and subset of those who enrolled for FY2018, averaged 
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The number of applicants ranges from thousands at the small colleges to tens of 
thousands at large universities. At most types of institutions, 50–70% of applicants 
are admitted on average (Figure 7.2). R1 institutions admit a lower percentage of 
applicants than R2 and smaller institutions across publics and privates, with the 
most notable being the R1 privates where the admissions rate averages only 18% of 
applicants. Naturally, the applicant populations differ across types of institution, so 
that selectivity is more stratified than it looks from these basic numbers (that’s coming 
up next). The subset of applicants who subsequently enroll is 16–20% (of the 50–70%) 
at the publics, likewise 10–13% of applicants at R2 and smaller privates, and just 6% of 
the 18% of admitted applicants at the R1 privates.
If we take these enrollment figures as a percentage of those admitted, we get a 
(widely over-used) metric known as the yield, the percentage of admissions that 
became enrollments (Figure 7.3). Purveyors of college rankings frequently use yield 
as a measure of selectivity, with a higher yield supposedly indicating a more selective 
institution. However, yield rates are so inconsistent as to render this approach utter 
nonsense. Indulge me, if you would: take a look at Figure 7.3, where we see that the 
R1 private universities average 34% yield, followed by all the publics in decreasing 
size order (30–26% yield), and then the other three types of private institution around 
19–22% yield. If that wasn’t enough to demonstrate that yield is a poor index of 
selectivity, allow me to cite a handful of yield rates for individual institutions as a further 
indulgence: Harvard leads the R1 private schools at 83% yield, followed by Stanford, 
MIT, Chicago, Yale, etc., much as expected; things unravel from there, though, with the 
R1 public universities led by the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (51%), UC Berkeley 
and UW-Milwaukee tied for 7th place (44%), but with UW-Madison in 31st place (35%); 
institutions of different types also at 44% yield like UC Berkeley include the University 
of North Dakota, Northwestern State University of Louisiana, and Liberty University, 
to name just a few. With all due respect to my colleagues at these schools, I imagine 
they’d be among the first to agree that they are not as selective as Berkeley. So, yield 
is a terrible measure of selectivity, more inconsistent than not because it is a complex 
contextual combination of applicant pool, financial aid, reputation, competition, and 
more.1 OK, that was fun, but let’s get back to our regular programming.
1  By the way, cynical college applicants invented the concept of yield protection (a.k.a. Tufts syndrome), 
which alleges that, to bolster its rankings, a university will manipulate yield by rejecting or wait-
listing highly qualified applicants who will surely be accepted to higher-prestige schools. Admissions 
officers deny its existence, but like any good conspiracy theory, it is conveniently appealing to those 
rejected by their safety schools in the admissions process (Pak 2015).
Recruiting and admissions staff build a class somewhat like an investment 
portfolio, balancing applicants across a range of academic preparation, in-state and 
out-of-state share at the publics, enrollment targets related to size and revenue, 
student demographics, and the mix of need-based and merit aid from the institution 
to hopefully increase academic readiness, diversity and revenue. While much of this 
activity is aimed at high school graduates, transfer students from other universities 
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Figure 7.3. Yield, or percentage of admitted applicants that subsequently enrolled, for FY2018, 


















and colleges are becoming an important component of the incoming class at many 
institutions too.
As potential future students are identified and move along the path from prospect 
to applicant to being admitted and matriculating, admissions staff members use 
several indicators to monitor and manage that path.2 At the start, these indicators 
include information requests, email open rates, and such, along with campus visits. 
A paid application fee is an early indicator of intent, and after the admission decision 
other similar indicators include housing deposits, orientation signup, and ultimately 
enrolling in courses. These are all going on simultaneously in the year or more before 
the student arrives, and the indicators are checked closely and regularly, with the 
incoming class being shaped continuously via tuning of admission and aid offers, in 
some cases right up until classes begin.
7.2 What are the academic and financial profiles  
of the incoming class?
Fortunately, we have a useful index of academic preparation in IPEDS, which collects 
information on standardized test scores. These tests, such as the SAT and ACT, which 
2  A phenomenon known as summer melt is seen in this process, and it comes in two varieties: one is 
related to competition, in which students drop out of the process at one university in favor of another; 
the other relates to college-intending students, more typically from low-income backgrounds, who for 
various reasons including perceived financial issues or other unexpected obstacles, fail to make the 
transition to actually enrolling.
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assess what might be informally described as the “three Rs” (reading, writing, and 
arithmetic), offer a useful common benchmarking comparison across most applicants 
to undergraduate programs (as does the GRE for graduate school). These tests are 
validated to predict first-year college grades (ACT, Inc. 2017; The College Board 
2018), not college success overall or future earnings and so on; validity here is used 
in the narrow, technical, psychometric sense of robust statistical association. They are 
not perfect and display differences across demographic subgroups, largely (but not 
completely) attributable to differential academic preparation (ACT, Inc. 2017). First-
year grades and class-rank can be similar predictors of grades in entry-level courses, 
but they are not standardized. It’s the latter feature that makes standardized tests 
useful for benchmarking (comparison), which is how we’ll employ them here. Using 
scores expressed as score percentiles so we can compare across tests as well, Figure 
7.4 illustrates the interquartile range (from the 25th to 75th percentile) of admitted 
applicants. The admitted applicants to R1 private institutions are remarkably well-
prepared and the middle 50% of them occupy a narrow band between the 93rd and 99th 
score percentiles. The 25th percentile individuals in that group score similarly to the 75th 
percentile individuals at the R1 publics and R2 privates. A similar step jump occurs 
from the latter to R3-M3 privates, with private baccalaureate colleges overlapping 
these last two categories. There is relatively more overlap among the different types of 
public institution as compared to the privates, although the same step pattern across 
types is still clear. This test score/academic preparation distribution pattern is a critical 
part of the college rankings discussion, which we’ll cover in Section 14.2.
Figure 7.4.  Range of 25th to 75th percentile values of standardized test scores of admitted applicants 
for FY2018, expressed as score percentiles for comparison, on the SAT Evidence-Based 
Reading and Writing (EBRW), SAT Mathematics, ACT Composite, ACT English and 
ACT Mathematics tests, averaged by Carnegie classification and control. Sources: IPEDS 
(2020), The College Board (2018) and ACT (2019).
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The consistency of score percentiles within each type of institution across the various 
kinds of test is worth noting too. It’s encouraging to hypothesize that the greater 
overlap across public versus private institutions reflects the public university mission 
of greater accessibility and inclusion. Again, we are fortunate that IPEDS collects the 
necessary data to test that hypothesis, in this case income levels of first-time, full-time 
undergraduates, illustrated in Figure 7.5, where I’ve expressed them relative to the 
US average household income distribution. These data are just as illuminating as the 
standardized test data. Public universities are indeed much more representative of 
the national income distribution than the privates, and starkly so in some cases. In a 
result that you might not expect, the R1 public universities and public baccalaureate 
colleges are within just a few percent of the US population across all income bands. 
Lower- and upper-income bands are relatively over- and under-represented at R2 and 
R3-M3 publics by roughly 10% and 30% respectively. At R1 and R2 private institutions, 
incoming undergraduates in the income band of $110,000 or more are over-represented 
by 60–80%, those in the $30,000 to $75,000 band by 20–30%, and those in the lowest 
income band under $30,000 are 30–46% under-represented on average. The patterns 
are similar, but not as extreme, for the smaller private institutions. There is so much 
that can be said about these two sets of data in conjunction, but I’ll keep it brief. Of 
course, the privates by their nature are more expensive and will therefore have more 
students from wealthy backgrounds, especially the smaller tuition-dependent privates 
that are struggling for revenue. Still, the extent of the imbalance is nonetheless glaring, 
Figure 7.5.  FY2017 representation of first-time, full-time undergraduate degree-seeking students 
(including those awarded and not awarded aid) by family income level, expressed as 
percentage difference from the corresponding distributional share of the US average 
household income, averaged by Carnegie classification and control. Sources: IPEDS 
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particularly at relatively well-endowed R1 privates that often profess inclusion. A 
recent study found that students from families in the top 1% of the income distribution 
are 77 times more likely to attend an Ivy League college than those from families in the 
bottom income quintile (Chetty et al. 2017). Still, the fact that R1 publics can achieve a 
balanced mix of income bands while attracting well-prepared students demonstrates 
that it can be done.
7.3 How much aid are incoming students  
awarded by income level?
We looked at financial aid broadly in Chapters 3 and 4, and here we focus on aid awards 
stratified by student family income. Overall, we would expect relatively more students 
from less wealthy backgrounds to receive aid and to receive larger aid awards, ceteris 
paribus.3 The data show that these statements are indeed true. Figure 7.6 shows that 
over 90% of students with family income levels less than $75,000 receive financial aid 
at all types of university. At public institutions, the share is 70–80% in the $75,000 to 
$110,000 income band, while only 50–60% of students in the band greater than $110,000 
receive aid. In contrast, at private institutions, virtually all students receive financial 
aid, over 90% in all income bands except for the uppermost band at R1 privates at 
3  This Latin term is one of the few things I remember from my first-year economics course, and it means 
“all else being equal” or “other things remaining constant.” It is typically used in a context such as this 
where one is positing a fundamental relationship isolated from the influence of other variables.
Figure 7.6.  FY2017 share of first-time, full-time undergraduate degree-seeking students awarded 
grant and scholarship aid by family income level, averaged by Carnegie classification 
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82% (Figure 7.6). The main reason for the public-private difference is the much higher 
tuition and associated institutional aid at the privates.
We can see this in the amounts of financial aid versus price paid towards the total 
cost of attendance (Figure 7.7). Cost of attendance is the full cost upon which financial 
aid is awarded, and it includes tuition as well as accommodation, food, books, supplies, 
transportation, etc. Cost of attendance (largely tuition) is much higher at the privates, 
with aid levels in all income bands set correspondingly higher to reduce the net price 
paid closer to that at the publics. Students in the lowest income band pay $10,000 
to $11,000 per year at all types of public institution and, notably, also at R1 privates; 
however, these students pay roughly double at the smaller privates. Students in the 
highest income band pay most of the cost of attendance at the publics, about 90% on 
average, ranging from $17,500 to $23,000. At the privates, students in the higher income 
band pay 60–70% of the cost of attendance, but the amounts are roughly double in 
dollar terms, ranging from about $27,000 to $43,000 annually. Despite the high aid 
amounts at the privates, the net price paid is generally higher and therefore, as you 
will recall from the previous section, private institutions have relatively fewer students 
in the low- and middle-income bands. Of course, $10,000 per year at the publics (or R1 
privates) is still a lot of money for a low-income family, with serious implications for 
equity of access (Mugglestone et al. 2019). Financial aid for low- and middle-income 
students has generally tracked the institutional charges, but not living expenses (St. 
Amour 2020).
Figure 7.7.  FY2017 amount of grant and scholarship aid and net price by family income level for 
first-time, full-time undergraduate degree-seeking students awarded Title IV aid, 
averaged by Carnegie classification and control. Amounts for public institutions are at 
in-state rates. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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A related policy question surfaces from time to time: do state subsidies at public 
universities favor the wealthy? We have now seen all the evidence demonstrating 
that this is patently not the case, as a thorough study has clearly found (Delisle and 
Dancy 2016). The argument is that state funding for public universities provides 
an indirect subsidy, and because that subsidy is relatively higher per student at the 
larger prestigious state institutions that also spend more per student than smaller, 
less prestigious schools, and because students attending the bigger schools are more 
affluent, students from high-income families must be receiving a greater public subsidy 
than their low-income counterparts. That logic draws over-simplified conclusions 
from generic per-student funding rates and doesn’t consider who receives financial 
aid and thus the tuition paid by family income level (Delisle and Dancy 2016). We’ve 
seen in Section 7.2 that the R1 (or any other size) publics do not enroll predominantly 
high-income students. Plus, we’ve just seen that low-income students receive grant 
and scholarship aid that reduces their tuition paid at all types of public university, 
before accounting for federal and other aid. Additionally, affluent students are more 
likely to attend out-of-state schools where tuition is well above the cost of education 
and carries no subsidy (see Section 3.6). For these reasons, the indirect state subsidy 
for public universities does not favor the wealthy.
Returning our attention to all types of institution, once the financial aid dust settles, 
the typical student pays almost double to attend a private school. The income-scaling 
range from lowest to highest student family income level is consistent across public 
institutions, with students from the wealthiest backgrounds paying roughly twice 
what those from the poorest backgrounds pay; that factor diverges at the privates that 
include both broader (R1) and narrower (R3-M3) income-scaling ranges. Naturally, 
because these figures are all averages, individual students each receive aid and pay a net 
price that is more or less unique, based on their combination of academic preparedness, 
family income, and fit to the university’s overall portfolio for its incoming class. Up to 
this point we’ve ignored the type of aid awarded, so we’ll look at the split between 
need-based and merit aid next.
7.4 How much aid goes to need versus merit?
Institutional financial aid, as distinct from federal, state, and other forms of aid, is 
divided into need-based and merit (non-need based) components and, as the name 
implies, is controlled by the institution. As we saw in Section 2.8, institutional aid is 
a typically hidden portion of a university budget because, as a discounting device, 
it is subtracted from gross tuition revenue to obtain the commonly used net tuition 
revenue. Institutional aid of both types is vital at all universities, but especially at 
private institutions where it is the dominant form of aid (Figure 7.8). At the publics, 
total aid per student averages $10,000-$15,000 and institutional aid is 10–20% of that 
amount while at the privates, in contrast, institutional aid makes up 40–60% of the 
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$20,000 to $30,000 total aid amount. The R3-M3 institutions award the lowest average 
proportion of institutional aid relative to other types within the public and private 
groups.
Figure 7.8.  FY2016 undergraduate total aid amount partitioned into institutional and other aid, 
averaged by Carnegie classification and control. Source: NPSAS:16 (National Center for 
Education Statistics 2018a).
Let’s take a brief detour to mention so-called need-blind admissions, where the notion 
is that the admission decision is made before, and independently of, the financial aid 
decision— “If you’re good enough to get in, you get in regardless of your financial 
situation, and we’ll figure out the money later.” The intent of the concept is to signal 
to prospective students of high ability that cost should not scare them away. Only a 
small number of the most elite schools can cover all need; most institutions do not 
have enough resources to meet the full financial need of all accepted students without 
including impractical loans in a need-blind offer. Therefore, most institutions are 
instead need-aware, and they do consider need in the admission decision. Importantly, 
this enables them to meet the financial need for all those who are accepted— “If you 
get in, we’ll make sure you can afford to attend.” Both terms are easy slogans but, 
outside of the most elite institutions, each has trade-offs and neither one is inherently 
better.
So, how do institutions split their investments in need-based versus merit aid? 
Figure 7.9 illustrates undergraduate institutional aid partitioned into need-based, 
merit and athletic scholarships (the latter are a non-academic subset of merit aid). At 
the R1 privates, over 75% of institutional aid goes toward financial need. Recall from 
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merit is less of a differentiator than at other types of universities. The split is near half 
and half at private baccalaureate colleges and R1 publics, and around 30% need-based 
at the other types of institution.
Figure 7.9.  FY2016 share of undergraduate institutional aid partitioned into need-based, merit, and 
athletic scholarships, averaged by Carnegie classification and control. Source: NPSAS:16 
(National Center for Education Statistics 2018a).
It’s tempting to think that many institutions are, if you’ll pardon my bluntness, 
effectively “buying” meritorious students. While that isn’t entirely untrue, there is an 
additional psychology at work. For the same dollars, a school can make an offer seem 
more prestigious by framing all or part of the overall award as a merit scholarship. 
Most financial aid is “stackable” and that is certainly true of the institutional aid 
portion. Doesn’t it sound more appealing to be offered a presidential scholarship or 
an our-mascot-name-here award for your high-school achievements? Then, that merit 
award is topped up with a need-based award as necessary. Of course, this is all done in 
a competitive environment and schools, especially those that wish to project prestige, 
must be careful not to undermine perceptions of brand quality.
I’ve included the athletic scholarships here largely for comparison and as a teaser 
for Chapter 12, which deals with athletics. It’s interesting to see that at the publics, 
except for the baccalaureate colleges, 10–15% of institutional aid goes towards athletics 
scholarships; it’s about half that share at the privates, but their institutional aid budgets 
are about ten times bigger, thus netting out athletic scholarship spending at about five 
times the amount of the publics, which is considerably more than what it takes to 
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7.5 How is tuition discounting used?
The tuition discount rate, usually referred to as simply the “discount rate,” is derived by 
calculating the total amount of institutional grant aid (need plus merit) as a percentage 
of gross tuition and fee revenue. Essentially, it’s what the institution awards (in cash 
and waivers) as a share of what it would have collected had it charged full tuition and 
fees (a.k.a. “sticker price”) to every student, like this:
It’s literally the percentage discount off the sticker price, reflecting not only what the 
average student pays after institutional aid (not counting federal aid, loans, etc.) but 
also the complement to (and a key lever of) net tuition revenue. Note that this doesn’t 
include room and board, textbooks, etc., just tuition and fees. The version above is for 
the incoming undergraduate class, which tends to run a few percentage points higher 
than the discount rate that can be calculated similarly for undergraduates overall.
Enrollment managers have an extremely tough job to build a class of the desired 
quality, size, and diversity. On top of that, they have the weighty responsibility of 
controlling the discount rate elements that supply the institution’s net tuition revenue. 
It’s their version of optimizing the “iron triangle” (see Section 14.3): obtain the desired 
quantity at maximum quality and minimum cost. The unfortunate psychology of the 
college recruiting marketplace is that (i) higher sticker price is perceived to signal 
high quality and (ii) everyone expects a discount. Pricing and discount strategies 
have therefore evolved with the market, which has shifted from low-tuition/low-aid a 
generation ago to high-tuition/high-aid in recent decades.
That shift means higher discount rates, which are exactly what we see in the data 
(Figure 7.10). Two patterns are immediately clear: one, the trends are all upward, 
about 7 to 15 percentage points higher over the almost two decades of data depending 
on the type of institution; and two, the privates discount at almost double the rate 
of the publics. The current average discount at the publics is 23–34%, whereas it is 
41–53% at the privates. Of course, the privates have much higher tuition, but the 
higher discount rates bring the average tuition paid comparatively closer to that 
at the publics, as we saw when looking at net price by income level in Figure 7.7 
(although those numbers include all aid, not just institutional aid, but the general 
patterns are the same).4
4  The dependence of the discount rate on (the semi-arbitrary) sticker price is the subject of a recent 
critique, which notes that it is a flawed metric for following university finances (Levine 2019).
This is a good juncture for us to return briefly to “skyrocketing” tuition increases of 
3–4% annually. We saw earlier that, after accounting for rising enrollment and inflation, 
net revenues and expenditures have been rising at 1% or less (see Sections 2.10 and 
3.4). We also saw that the explanation for those latter increases over general inflation 
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Figure 7.10.  Trends in tuition discount rates for full-time first-time undergraduates, averaged by 
Carnegie classification and control. Values for public institutions are weighted to 
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were fundamental economic forces related to being in a labor-intensive industry and 
the continual pursuit of quality in a competitive marketplace (see Section 3.7). Still, 
after accounting for all of those (roughly 2% inflation and 1% labor and quality), 
where has the remaining approximately 0.5–1% of the annual sticker-price tuition 
increase gone? The answer is in the apparently irresistible shift to a high-tuition/
high-aid model with the associated prestige and discounting that the marketplace has 
encouraged and supported.
7.6 Why do students drop out and what proportion are retained?
A retained student, and better yet a graduate (see the next section), is not only a 
successful outcome for the individual but is also more financially efficient and effective 
for the university. A retention costs three to five times less than a fresh recruit (Cuseo 
2010), and improved retention rates lead directly to the success of the institution in 
graduating a greater proportion of its students. Attrition, the opposite of retention, 
arises when students drop out of higher education. If this occurs, state appropriations 
yield lower returns, students diminish their lifetime incomes, and universities lose 
revenue (Johnson 2012).
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Box 7.1. College Dropouts Get Mostly A’s and B’s
Contrary to popular misconception, inadequate academic preparation or performance 
are minor causes of students dropping out of four-year universities and colleges (Bound 
et al. 2010; Johnson 2012). Overwhelmingly, students drop out because of other life issues, 
and not because they are having academic problems (Figure B7). A major longitudinal 
study found that for students with unfinished degrees, 80% left in good standing, most 
of those with A and B grades, and with the majority departing in the first two years 
(Johnson 2012). Effective student-success support systems are expressly designed to 
address not only academic support, such as early warning and tutoring services, but 
also to assist to the degree possible with the many other reasons that students drop out, 
e.g.: by providing counseling services; by supplying financial advice and supplementary 
aid; and, if a student must leave, such as when a personal crisis hits, assisting with how 
to withdraw formally (rather than the student just leaving with default failing grades), 
which makes it easier to resume studies at a later date.
Figure B7.  Reasons cited for leaving higher education by students in the 2003–04 cohort of the 
Beginning Postsecondary Students Longitudinal Study who had left without a degree 
by 2008–09. Note the relatively low frequency of academic problems. Source: Delta Cost 
Project (Johnson 2012).
Ensuring the success of students involves a multidimensional set of activities across 
many aspects of administration and student life, many of them embedded within a 
student affairs division: recruiting, marketing, application, admissions, transfer, financial 
aid, orientation, registrar, residence halls, dining, tutoring, advising, student analytics, 
success interventions, student organizations, mental and physical health, career services, 
and graduation. The contemporary student affairs portfolio, and by extension the 
strategic enrollment management portfolio, embody the transition from the pre-1980s 
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“weeding out” mentality to the “student success” approach over the last few decades. 
Naturally, to provide this support, student affairs expenditures and personnel have 
grown accordingly (see Section 7.8). The results of the change have been small but steady 
gains in retention and graduation rates despite counteracting forces such as increasing 
enrollments, rising student financial need, and lower state investment with attendant 
increases in student-faculty ratios at smaller public institutions (Bound et al. 2010).
First-year to second-year retention rates are highest at R1 institutions and decrease 
by Carnegie classification, with the highest rates in the mid-90% range at R1 privates, 
followed by R1 publics and R2 privates in the mid to high 80s, and the smaller publics 
and R3-M3 privates just over 70% (Figure 7.11). We look at retention/attrition from 
first to second year because it is typically the largest jump—subsequent years tend 
to have progressively smaller attrition rates. The primary reason for students leaving 
is not academic performance (see Box 7.1) but having to deal with other life issues. 
At the institutions with higher attrition, an important contributing factor is the lower 
income profile of students that reduces their resilience when inevitable challenges 
occur, such as having to care for a family member or work longer hours at a job because 
another family member lost income. The relative lack of financial security means that 
the other pressures of life place greater demands on a student’s time. As we’ll see in 
the next section, students who are not retained do not always drop out permanently; a 
sizable number of them transfer and graduate from a different institution, while others 
“stop out” instead and return to complete their studies later. We’ll also see that these 
behaviors are more prevalent at lower-retention institutions.
Figure 7.11.  Full-time retention rate, defined as the percentage of the fall full-time first-time 
cohort from the prior year that re-enrolled at the same institution in the current 
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7.7 What are the patterns and trends in graduation rates?
The official federal graduation rate is, unfortunately, the source of much confusion and 
myth because non-specialists who quote it don’t realize how narrowly it is defined. 
The graduation rate required to be reported by law5 is the share of students completing 
their programs within 150% of the standard time (i.e., six years for a four-year 
bachelor’s degree) at, and here’s the kicker, the same institution where they started as 
full-time, first-time students. So, if you go out of state for college, decide you’d rather 
transfer closer to home and then complete your degree locally, you don’t count. If you 
take a year off for medical reasons and then finish your degree, you don’t count. If you 
struggle in your first year, go to community college for a semester to improve your 
grades, and then return and complete your degree, you don’t count. Consequently, 
it isn’t the percentage of students who graduated in six years as many people might 
imagine that number, it’s a considerably more conservative version thereof that 
assumes a standard single-institution continuous conveyor-belt model.
While the choice of such a model is understandable, it is most applicable at the 
kind of institutions for which it is typical: selective schools with primarily eighteen- 
to twenty-two-year-old students who are financially well-supported. It should be 
no surprise, then, that non-selective institutions catering to older and/or working 
students do not fare as well on this metric. Such institutions tend also to have higher 
proportions of students who are part-time, as well as those who are taking individual 
courses without the intention of completing a full credential (most notably at 
community colleges). Thus, the conventional graduation rate has a built-in bias that 
under-represents student success for types of schools and students with these latter 
types of completions.
Also, the regular graduation rate is “institution following” rather than “student 
following,” meaning that, strictly speaking, it can provide only the aggregate numbers 
of students attending, graduating or otherwise departing an institution. The regular 
graduation rate does not provide the graduation outcomes of students independently 
of institutions attended, including those that transferred, suspended and resumed 
their studies, or never completed a degree. Because of these concerns, calls for national 
student unit-record data are made from time to time, although they are often opposed 
due to privacy concerns (Kreighbaum 2017). Alternative non-government systems 
5  There were no publicly available national data on graduation rates until the Student Right-to-Know 
and Campus Security Act of 1990 was passed. It was originally intended to inform student athletes 
about graduation rates at their prospective programs, which at the time were known to be lower than 
for all students (Cook and Pullaro 2010). One of the sponsors was US Senator Bill Bradley, a former 
college and professional basketball player (and Rhodes scholar). In addition to requiring graduation 
data to be published, the security part of the act similarly required disclosure of campus safety 
policies and statistics. That section was amended in 1998 and renamed the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of 
Campus Security Policy and Campus Statistics Act, known as the Clery Act, named for a student who 
was sexually assaulted and murdered in 1986 at Lehigh University. Her parents argued that, had they 
known of the many violent crimes on campus in previous years that had not been made public, she 
never would have attended (Nelson 2008).
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have developed in the higher education community instead, notably the National 
Student Clearinghouse (2019) and associated initiatives such as the VSA and SAM 
(Voluntary System of Accountability 2019; Student Achievement Measure 2019). 
One last bit of throat-clearing before we get to the numbers: graduation rates are not 
the same as attainment rates, which measure the percentage of the population with 
postsecondary degrees.6
Graduation rates are based on entering cohorts from six (or more) years earlier, with 
a standard method to define who is included or not, and from which completion rates 
for different times can be computed. In recent years, IPEDS has included additional 
numbers beyond just the cohort size and count of graduates, such as transfers, 
students still enrolled, and those not enrolled; these values for FY2018, which tracks 
the entering cohort from Fall 2011 (i.e., FY2012), are illustrated in Figure 7.12. Most 
students graduate in four years, a further share in five years, and a small share in six 
years, although these proportions vary by type of institution. Graduation rates are 
lower at the publics and higher at the privates. Average four-year graduation rates 
at private R1, R2 and baccalaureate schools exceed those at all public institutions, 
including the R1 publics that have a graduation rate close to the R3-M3-privates. 
The relative proportions of students completing in five or six years are lowest at all 
types of private institution; for example, students graduating on the “five-year plan” 
range from an additional 8–26% beyond the number who finish in four at the privates, 
6  The US educational attainment rate reflecting the share of the population aged twenty-five and over 
with a bachelor’s degree or higher was 35% in 2018 and 4.6% in 1940 (US Census Bureau 2019a).
Figure 7.12.  FY2018 rates (Fall 2011 entering cohort) for completion of bachelor’s or equivalent 
degrees in four years or less, five years, and six years, students still enrolled, known 
transfers out to another institution, and individuals no longer enrolled, averaged by 
Carnegie classification and control. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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while the corresponding range at the publics is 36–70%. Six-year full-time first-time 
graduation rates average 90% at R1 privates, in the 70s at private R2 and baccalaureate 
schools, and 61% at the R3-M3 privates. The R1 publics average a 74% full-time first-
time graduation rate, with the subsequent types down the scale at 56%, 50% and 49% 
respectively.
But, as I discussed above, this is an undercount of the percentage of students who 
ultimately finish with a degree. While the portion of students still enrolled at the same 
institution where they started after six years is just a few percent of the original cohort, 
the share that were known to have transferred to another institution is sizable at 
most institutions, 13–18% overall at the medium and small publics and 13% at R3-M3 
privates. What fraction of those go on to graduate? About two thirds to three quarters, 
it turns out, if we look at the Clearinghouse data (See Figure 7.13). An additional 
8–10% of students transfer and graduate at a different four-year institution, and a 
further 2–3% graduate from a two-year institution. If we went beyond six years, several 
more percent would be added from those still enrolled. The Clearinghouse six-year 
graduation rates are in the mid-60% zone for students who started at publics and the 
mid-70s for those who started at privates. Lest we start slipping back into thinking that 
the smaller schools are somehow “worse” at graduating students than bigger or more 
selective institutions, or that their students are somehow “weaker” at their studies, this 
is a good time to repeat the information from the retention section on the reasons why 
students don’t finish their degrees: most students leave with As and Bs, and they leave 
to deal with other personal, financial and family issues that are more challenging to 
resolve for students with lower incomes. The proportion of students in these situations 
Figure 7.13.  Six-year outcomes by starting institution type for the Fall 2012 cohort based on National 
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is the leading reason for the differences in both retention and graduation rates across 
types of institution. Effective initiatives to improve graduation rates therefore must 
grapple with and address these underlying challenges.
Challenges notwithstanding, graduation rates have been on an improving trend 
for several decades. The reportable rate is available in IPEDS only from FY2005 to the 
present, so to extend the general trends further back in time, I’ve calculated a simple 
proxy metric using data that are available for a longer period, degrees awarded per 
(current) enrollment, and shown them both relative to starting values (See Figure 
7.14). While they differ in their annual variability, the long-term trends are roughly 
linear, showing that graduation rates are about 15% higher today than three decades 
ago averaged across private institutions, and over 35% higher across public institutions. 
Similar trends are seen in attainment rates (the percentage of the population with 
a degree, as mentioned above), with a rise from 33.6% of people aged twenty-five 
to thirty-four years old in 1987 to 52.4% of that age cohort in 2017, a 56% increase 
(Garrett 2019). By either measure, these are dramatic improvements, even more so 
given that many of the challenges for students are non-academic in nature, and these 
trends constitute valuable evidence that parallel activities to increase student success 
(and access) have indeed paid off.
Figure 7.14.  Trends in two bachelor’s degree graduation metrics, the six-year graduation rate for 
the total cohort (available since FY2005) and degrees awarded per enrolled student 
(available since FY1987), both expressed relative to their starting values to enable 
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7.8 What are the trends in student services spending?
What are the investment trends in student services (and possibly in student success) 
that have coincided with improving retention and graduation rates? As discussed 
in Section 7.6, these activities include transactional student services activities (e.g., 
admissions, registrar, records) as well as success-oriented activities such as tutoring, 
developmental courses, counseling services, student organizations, special advising, 
as well as student performance monitoring, data analytics and intervention. In FY2017, 
institutions of all types spent about 40% of their student services budget on personnel 
(around 50% if fringe benefits are included) versus other operational costs such as 
recruiting, marketing, consultants, analytics services, etc. The trends in overall student 
services budgets have been strongly upward for several decades and are visible in 
a variety of metrics. Figure 7.15 illustrates these student services investment trends 
using expenditures per student FTE and share of the overall E&R budget. Over the last 
three decades, inflation-adjusted student services spending per FTE has doubled at the 
publics and tripled at the privates. In Chapter 3 we saw that overall E&R spending per 
FTE has been increasing over time, and if we calculate student services spending as a 
share of those amounts, we see that student services spending still increased relative to 
other E&R spending, from 9.3% to an 11.6% share at the publics (a 25% increase) and 
from 10.5% to a 14.9% share at the privates (a 42% increase). For comparison, trends 
in academic support spending (libraries, media services, academic administration 
and IT, as well as course and curriculum development) were about one half (public) 
Figure 7.15.  Trends in student services expenditures per student FTE (in 2016 dollars) and in 
the student services share of E&R expenditures averaged across public and private 
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to one quarter (private) of these increases and for the last two of the three decades, 
essentially flat or decreasing shares of E&R spending.
Unfortunately, there are no easily available national figures on recruitment versus 
retention budgets and, based on relative costs of these activities (Cuseo 2010), we 
must assume that recruitment expenditures comprise a substantially larger portion. 
That means that much (but not all) of the growth in student services budgets has 
likely been in recruiting-related activities, which makes sense in a tuition-dependent 
environment. Still, while retention budget trends cannot be easily determined, there is 
little doubt that retention initiatives and activities are now widely practiced (Ruffalo 
Noel Levitz 2017a) and have seen an increase over time.
7.9 What is the total cost of attendance with room,  
board, and books?
The full cost, by which we strictly mean price, of attending university extends beyond 
tuition and fees (after subtracting aid) to include books and supplies, room and board, 
and other expenses. One can reasonably argue that individuals will incur room and 
board costs whether they are attending university or not—they would still be paying 
for rent and food if they were working a job instead—but, as a practical matter, students 
and parents want to know how much the entire experience will cost them.
The formalized way that institutions provide estimates of the total cost of attendance is 
stratified by a student’s lodging arrangement: on campus, off campus staying with family, 
Figure 7.16.  FY2017 share of first-time full-time students living on campus, off campus (not with 
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and off campus living independently (not with family). First-time full-time students stay 
predominantly on campus at all types of institutions and we see this proportion vary with 
the different missions and student bodies they serve (see Figure 7.16), averaging from 
98% living on campus at R1 privates to 64% at R3-M3 publics. At many, but not all, schools 
the share of students living on campus (in residence halls) is highest in the first year and 
diminishes in the second and subsequent years as students seek to live off campus. In the 
first year, only 5–10% of students live off campus independently, whereas a notably higher 
share of first-year students live with family (2–26% depending on the type of institution).
Figure 7.17 shows that the average costs for living on campus or independently 
off campus do not differ much; naturally, students living with family typically will 
not incur any additional costs for lodging at home although their marginal food costs 
will still be a factor. The room/board split for on-campus students is roughly 60/40 
(about $6,500 and $4,800 on average). Room and board costs are based on a student 
sharing a room with one other student and a specified number of meals per week 
(about 20), using institutional room and board charges for on-campus students and 
area market estimates for off-campus students. Other expenses averaging $3,000 to 
$4,000 include items such as laundry, transportation, entertainment, and furnishings; 
the average amount is slightly larger for off-campus students largely because of 
higher transportation costs. Books and supply costs can vary widely by program, and 
the average for students in programs without specialized requirements is currently 
estimated by institutions for financial aid purposes at about $1,200 per year. The 
institutional estimate definition is an important caveat as we’ll see in Section 7.11 about 
textbooks; spoiler alert, the book portion is only about half this total.
Figure 7.17.  FY2017 non-tuition costs of attendance for the full academic year by lodging arrangement 
for first-time full-time students, averaged across all types of institution. Room and 
board charges are shown separately for on-campus students and are not provided for 
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Adding all these components to sticker-price tuition results in the total cost of 
attendance, illustrated in Figure 7.18 as amounts weighted by the mix of students 
living on campus, off campus and with family at each school. This is the gross 
(rather than net) amount and, because tuition is the largest component, we see the 
stratification across institution types familiar to us from earlier sections on tuition. 
The average net price paid after accounting for all grant and scholarship aid (federal, 
state, local, institutional), but not loans, is also illustrated in Figure 7.18. We examined 
net price by income level in Section 7.3 and here we see it split into in-state and out-
of-state versions for the public institutions, which reveals an interesting pattern: the 
net price paid by out-of-state students at the publics is remarkably comparable to that 
for students at the privates, $25,000 to $35,000 annually, while it is significantly less 
($13,000 to $16,000, about half as much) for in-state students at the publics. These are 
the actual average costs to students and families, and while they are not small and have 
grown over time, they are also not the headline-grabbing extreme amounts sometimes 
cited in the media. We’ll look at affordability of these costs in the next section.
Figure 7.18.  FY2017 total cost of attendance and component costs of published tuition and required 
fees (left and right columns are in-state and out-of-state for public institutions), books 
and supplies, and weighted averages for room and board and other expenses (weighted 
by the mix of students staying on campus, off campus and with family), as well as net 
price (total cost after deducting total federal, state, local and institutional grant aid), 
for first-time full-time undergraduates for the full academic year. Total aid is the upper 
portion of each column not covered by net price. Source: IPEDS (2020).
Talking of cost increases over time, though, let’s finish up this section with exactly 
that, the trends in inflation-adjusted component costs of attendance (Figure 7.19). 
Room charges have risen just a little slower relative to sticker-price tuition, both having 
grown more than 1.5 times over almost two decades. This is interesting because room 
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charges are part of the local housing market, with the implication that they cannot 
differ greatly from local market rental rates (to avoid over- or under-subscription). 
It turns out that inflation-adjusted median rents grew 1.4 times over this period (US 
Census Bureau 2019b), a similar amount to tuition and room rates (noting that these 
are broad national census data not tied to university-area markets). Meal charges grew 
less rapidly, about 1.3 times, although this increase is above the inflation-adjusted 
national average for food away from home of 1.1 times since FY2000 (US Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2019a). In contrast, the inflation-adjusted costs of books and supplies 
as well as other expenses has remained essentially flat, increasing slightly before the 
recession and decreasing in recent years.
Figure 7.19.  Trends in component costs of attendance expressed relative to their FY2000 amounts 
in inflation-adjusted dollars, averaged across all types of institutions (using in-state 
amounts for publics). Source: IPEDS (2020).
The cost of food can become a budget trade-off for low income students, leading to 
a much greater prevalence of food insecurity in recent years. National data on food 
insecurity are not available, but a recent comprehensive government review estimates 
that more than 30% of all students are food insecure (Harris 2019), although other 
studies present much larger numbers and another recent study challenges these 
high figures (Smith 2019). Campuses have begun to address this issue by opening 
food pantries and making sure that students are aware of their eligibility for the 
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7.10 How has affordability changed?
Affordability in our context is the net price relative to the ability to pay, which we 
can index to median family income for trend purposes. This makes sense because 
substantial portions of financial aid are tied to income-based need. Inflation-adjusted 
median family income was flat in the decade leading up to the Great Recession, dipped 
by almost 10% for several years thereafter, and only since FY2016 has it recovered 
to pre-recession levels near $70,000 per year (Figure 7.20). The median value doesn’t 
convey the underlying (and widely-documented) further separation in inflation-
adjusted income inequality between the lower percentiles (flat trend) and upper 
percentiles (over 10% growth) of the income distribution since FY2000 (US Census 
Bureau 2018a). As it happens, median family income increased by about $5,000 over 
this period, and the net price for public and private institutions increased by roughly 
the same amount (Figure 7.20) with the familiar pre-recession rise, then fall, and rise 
again pattern.
Figure 7.20.  Trends in median family income and in net price for four-year public and private 
institutions, by fiscal year (median family income is for the previous calendar year), in 
2016 dollars. Sources: US Census Bureau (2018b) and College Board (Ma et al. 2018).
Looking at net price trends as a share of median family income accounts for shifts in 
timing and relative amounts (Figure 7.21), showing that the privates have held steady 
near 35% since rising in the early 2000s, while net price at the publics rose from 12% 
to about 20% of median family income through FY2013 and it has since remained at 
that level. Therefore, and this is a big deal because it is contrary to popular perception, 
university affordability relative to income has remained flat for at least the last seven 
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Figure 7.21.  Trends in net price as a share of median family income for four-year public and private 
institutions, by fiscal year (median family income is for the previous calendar year), in 
2016 dollars. Sources: US Census Bureau (2018b) and College Board (Ma et al. 2018).
Box 7.2. How Free is Free College?
The lexicon surrounding college affordability has become complicated in recent 
years, especially around what is meant by “free college” during elections. 
Here’s a handy guide (Kreighbaum 2019b; Mangan 2019):
• First Dollar: program funds applied before grant aid that can then be used for 
living costs (rare);
• Last Dollar: program funds applied after grant aid (most common);
• Last Dollar Plus: like Last Dollar, with extra program funds for living costs (rare);
• Tuition-Free: program funds cover only tuition;
• Debt Free: Tuition-Free with extra funds for living costs, thereby avoiding loans;
• Debt Cancellation: program funds applied to reduce or zero-out existing loans for 
all or for lower-income subgroups with loans.
Some of these options can be expensive, e.g., First Dollar. Yet others can be controversial 
too, such as Debt Cancellation, which is criticized as unfair by those who’ve just paid off 
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You might be wondering if students, especially those from low-income families, can 
offset the net price and cost to families by working part-time during college. Decades 
ago, when net price was much lower relative to median family income, a part-time 
job was often an effective solution. Unfortunately, that is no longer the case. A recent 
study (Anthony et al. 2019) shows that at four-year institutions, a student working ten 
hours per week at the minimum wage would still be $6,550 short of the net price or, 
alternatively that the student would need to work twenty-six hours per week to offset 
the net price (with large differences in both of those figures across states). Unlike a 
generation or two ago, students and families must now bridge this affordability gap 
with savings or by incurring debt through loans.
7.11 How much debt do students have at graduation?
“As you walk across campus and see students moving between classes, remember that 
they and their families took out loans to pay our salaries.” I’ve made this point many 
times in campus meetings to underscore, even in the large public research university 
where I work, that we are a tuition-dependent institution and the extent to which we 
rely on and must serve our students. The reality of paying the net price (i.e., after aid) 
for attending university, while considerably lower than the sticker price, means that 
students must foot that remaining bill by working, by using their parents’ savings, 
and/or by borrowing the money. We looked at student loans for first-time full-time 
(FTFT) students in Section 4.5, and here’s a quick recap:
• Not all FTFT students have debt and the share who do ranges widely from 
about one quarter at R1 privates to almost three-quarters at R3-M3 privates, 
while the share is roughly half at other types of institutions;
• The average loan is just over $7,000 (plus/minus about $1,000 depending on 
type of school, in FY2016 dollars) for those FTFT students with loans;
• Most student loans are federal loans, but there is a small portion of students, 
4–10%, with much larger other loans averaging $10,000 to $20,000 (by type 
of school);
• Four years at the average loan amount is about $30,000 of cumulative debt 
for students who have borrowed. I underline again that this kind of number 
is frequently misquoted and misperceived as the average debt of all students, 
but because only half of all students borrow, it follows that (if someone truly 
wants that figure) the average cumulative debt per graduating student is 
also half, about $15,000;
• The trend in the share of FTFT students borrowing has been relatively flat, 
increasing slightly after the recession and then decreasing in recent years;
• The amount borrowed has remained flat since the recession for federal and 
student loans, except strong increases for that small percentage with other 
types of loans.
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Now, instead of FTFT students, we’ll move to the completion of their studies and 
examine cumulative debt for students that earned undergraduate and graduate 
degrees. The share of degree recipients with debt and the amount of debt per 
individual are illustrated in Figure 7.22 (note that these data are from student NPSAS 
Figure 7.22.  FY2016 share of graduates with debt (upper) and average debt of those with debt 
(lower) by degree level, averaged by Carnegie classification and control. Professional 
practice degrees include the doctor degree in chiropractic, dentistry, law, medicine, 
optometry, pharmacy, podiatry, and veterinary medicine. Blanks indicate that minimum 
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surveys and are not directly comparable to the institutional IPEDS data in Section 4.5). 
Starting with bachelor’s recipients, at most types of institution about 60–70% graduate 
with debt, although that share is 75% at R3-M3 privates and much lower, 43%, at R1 
privates. The average debt amount for graduates with debt is quite similar across 
institution types, $26,000 to $29,000 at the publics and a few thousand more, $28,000 
to $34,000, at the privates.
For master’s recipients, the share with debt is centered around 50% depending on 
type of school, but with a large public-private difference in the average debt amount, 
$32,000 to $45,000 at the publics and $44,000 to $68,000 at the privates. Bear in mind 
(i) that students may be awarded assistantships for master’s degrees in the arts and 
sciences, but financial aid is less common for professionally-oriented master’s degrees 
that can also be priced higher, and (ii) these debt amounts are accumulated in the two 
years or less that it takes to complete a master’s degree.
Students graduating with a Ph.D. or other research doctoral degree will take four 
to eight years (some requiring a master’s, some not, depending on field) and they are 
the most likely graduate degree level to be awarded assistantships and other aid. Thus, 
although the degree takes two to four times longer than a master’s, the share of Ph.D. 
graduates with debt is the lowest for all levels of degree (although it is concerning 
that this share at R3-M3 institutions is double that at R1 schools). Debt amounts for 
the generally smaller share of Ph.D. graduates with debt are more than for master’s 
graduates, but not as much as time-to-degree would imply.
Professional practice doctor’s degrees include the MD, JD, PharmD, DVM, etc.; 70% 
or more of these degree recipients have debt on average, and those individuals have 
the highest average debt amounts of all graduates, approaching $120,000 at the publics 
and $180,000 at the privates. This level of average debt is breathtaking for those who 
haven’t seen the numbers before. It also highlights the issue of repayment: the starting 
salary and future earnings of an MD graduate will likely make repayment feasible 
but starting salaries for veterinarians and several others in this category are under six 
figures—those individuals will struggle with their debt for many years. We’ll cover 
repayment in the next section.
7.12 What are the rates of student loan repayment?
Repayment rates have slowed in recent years, and they differ by who is paying. The 
repayment rate is the share of borrowers who are making progress paying down their 
loans (at least one dollar of the initial balance), measured within a given window 
(e.g., three, five or seven years) since they entered repayment. Borrowers may enter 
repayment in a different year than when they left the institution because of a six-month 
grace period, being granted a deferment for hardship, or for attending graduate school; 
repayment rates are reported for undergraduate debt (US Department of Education 
2019a). Five-year repayment rates by institution type are shown in Figure 7.23 and, 
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logically enough, they track the corresponding student/family income profiles (see 
Section 7.3). Repayment rates are lower for those who left the publics (60–75%) 
than the privates (68–88%), while they are highest for R1 school leavers and lowest 
for R3-M3 school leavers. For leavers from all types of institution, repayment rates 
have declined by 5–10% in recent years, especially for those borrowers who left the 
institution since the recession.
Figure 7.23.  Five-year repayment rates on federal student loans by ending fiscal year for two-
year averages (i.e., borrowers entering repayment in FY2006 and FY2007 comprise 
the FY2012 amount, and likewise those entering in FY2011 and FY2012 comprise 
the FY2017 amount), averaged by Carnegie classification and control. Repayment is 
defined as paying down at least one dollar of loan principal after five years. Source: 
College Scorecard (US Department of Education 2019a).
Students who graduate are, as expected, better able to repay their student loans than 
those who do not complete their degrees (Figure 7.24), with non-completers repaying 
at rates that are 15–20% lower than completers at the same type of school. Similarly, 
students who are financially dependent on their families have a better repayment 
record than those who are financially independent without family resources (Figure 
7.24), with a parallel difference of 10–20% between the two groups. Note that these 
data reflect whether a borrower has paid down at least $1 of the loan within five years; 
they do not reflect if the loan has been completely repaid or those individuals who 
































































































































While we are not including for-profit institutions in our analyses, a lot of media 
attention has been devoted to their repayment rates, which are only about half of those 
at public and private four-year schools; two-year colleges are in-between (Baum et al. 
2018a). Most national reports on student indebtedness and repayment include these 
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Figure 7.24.  Five-year repayment rates on federal student loans for the two-year averages of 
borrowers entering repayment in FY2011 and FY2012 (i.e., five years ending FY2017), 
by degree completion status and dependency status, averaged by Carnegie classification 
and control. Repayment is defined as paying down at least one dollar of loan principal 
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other types of institutions where the statistics are quite dismaying. Loans to student’s 
parents through the Parent PLUS program have been a particular focus of attention, 
because those loans do not have the same protections as federal undergraduate loans 
like loan forgiveness and income-based repayment (Kreighbaum 2018; Looney and 
Lee 2018). As with undergraduates, the data show that large-balance graduate student 
borrowers attended for-profit schools that tend to have worse repayment outcomes 
(Lee and Looney 2018). Overall, the growth in borrowers acquiring high debt with 
low earnings prospects leads to unsustainable levels of indebtedness, that in turn lead 
to higher costs for the federal loan programs and for students.
7.13 What is going on with textbook prices and spending?
Like rising tuition, “skyrocketing” textbook prices generate considerable consternation 
that is further confounded by conflated questions and confusing data sources. 
Textbook prices (and consequent antipathy toward publishers) rather than other 
course materials have fueled the concerns and drawn most of the attention, so we’ll 
begin with them.
Two core questions: how much have textbook prices risen, and how much are 
students spending on them? Curiously, the answers are (i) a lot, and (ii) less and 
less. The best data on prices are literally part of the CPI (consumer price index): the 
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educational books and supplies component goes back decades, while college textbooks 
as a subset thereof were broken out in FY2002. It turns out that they track closely, 
providing a fascinating trend pattern (Figure 7.25). After adjusting for inflation with 
the overall CPI exactly as we’ve done for other dollar trends, we see that new textbook 
prices were flat from the 1960s through the mid-1980s, then doubled in price over 
the next thirty years, and that trend has abated only in the last few years. The other 
data source for textbook prices is the National Association of College Stores (NACS); 
its surveys show comparable but slightly lower increases in inflation-adjusted new 
textbook prices and flat prices for used textbooks (Figure 7.25).
Figure 7.25.  Inflation-adjusted price changes for educational books and supplies (relative to 
FY1967) and for college textbooks (relative to FY2002, starting at the matching value) 
from the consumer price index, and the price of new and used textbooks from college 
bookstore surveys (relative to FY2008, also starting at the matching value). Source: BLS 
(US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2019b) and NACS (2019a).
While new textbook prices have climbed, students have been spending progressively 
less on their overall basket of textbooks and course materials. Three independent 
surveys all converge on approximately the same number, which after adjusting for 
inflation is currently about $500 per year, down from about $850 in FY2002 (Figure 
7.26). Data for the last five years show that the mix of materials purchased has shifted 
too. Of the four types, the shares of new and rented textbooks have remained roughly 
flat, the used textbook share has shrunk, and the digital text share has grown to make 
up the difference (Figure 7.27). These are noisy survey responses and not national 
summary data, but this latter switch is nonetheless consistent with an important trend 
in textbook publishing: unlike paper books, digital textbooks cannot be resold, and 
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texts is expected nowadays, this shift also happens to be a way for publishers to reclaim 
a portion of the used textbook market that otherwise does not accrue to them.
Figure 7.26.  Student-reported spending on textbooks from three surveys, each averaged across 
all types of institution, by fiscal year in FY2016 dollars. Sources: Student Monitor/SM 
(Kestenbaum 2014; Business Wire 2018), NACS (2019b), and NPSAS 2016 (National 
Center for Education Statistics 2018a).
Figure 7.27.  Share of student-reported spending on types of textbooks by fiscal year. Source: Student 
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The curious part of all this is that despite the decades-long increase in textbook prices, 
students are spending about 60% less on textbooks than they did just over a decade 
ago. Are they getting the same books for less using other means, or are they just opting 
out of buying them altogether? It appears to be a bit of both. We saw above that used 
textbook purchase amounts are down. The same survey shows that while renting 
expenditures are flat, the percentage of students renting has virtually doubled to about 
40% over almost a decade (Business Wire 2018). About half of students responding 
purchased at least one new textbook; 39% of those bought it significantly cheaper than 
list price from a mix of sources, 61% from the campus bookstore, 41% from Amazon, 
and 21% from other bookstores and online retailers (Business Wire 2018). When it 
comes to all course materials of any type, not only new, 77% of students purchase 
from the campus bookstore, 42% from Amazon, and 25% from other sellers (NACS 
2019b). Only 12% of students (Business Wire 2018) reported that one or more of their 
classes used an open educational resource (OER). OERs are public domain or freely 
usable materials, typically online, that include textbooks as well as course modules, 
videos, tests, etc. While almost half of all faculty members are now aware of OERs, 
only 13% of those teaching all courses and 22% of those teaching introductory courses 
require OERs (Seaman and Seaman 2018). About 30% of students do not buy or rent at 
least one of their required materials, and on average these students skip buying three 
required texts in one semester; price was cited by 30% as a reason for not acquiring the 
text, the other responses being that either the individual, the professor or others said 
it was not necessary (Hill 2015). What do students do without a text? Apparently, 57% 
just use class notes, 47% borrow from friends or the library, and 19% obtain material 
illegally (Hill 2015). Consistent with all the above, the number of books bought per 
student was down from 13 in 2001 to 8.5 in 2013 (Kestenbaum 2014).
In addition to required texts and course materials, students also need to purchase 
non-required (but practically necessary) technology such as a computer and other 
school supplies; the FY2019 average spending on these items was $527 (NACS 2019b), 
which is $496 in 2016 dollars for comparison to the textbook amounts. So, together, 
student-reported annual spending on books and other supplies total about $1,000 
on average. That’s not too different from the roughly $1,200 amount for books and 
supplies listed in IPEDS that is subsequently republished by the College Board (Ma 
et al. 2018) and widely-cited by the media and interest groups. However, it’s worth 
repeating the easy-to-miss distinction between the source of these amounts that 
I flagged in Section 7.9: the underlying IPEDS amount does not come directly from 
student-reported amounts and instead is a broad estimate for financial aid purposes 
made by the institutions.
The vicious cycle of increasing textbook prices and purchase avoidance by students 
is reflected in campus bookstore sales figures. Campus stores are often owned and 
run by the institution or its student association, and they are sometimes contracted to 
a company (NACS 2019a). Although textbooks are just one part of college store sales 
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(that also include stationery, logo items and apparel, and technology), overall total 
and per-student sales have declined almost 20% during the decade since the recession 
(Figure 7.28). About 22% of a textbook’s price goes to the bookstore, of which almost 
one quarter (6%) is profit after costs, which is a modest amount; about 11–15% of the 
price goes to author royalties, and the rest goes to the publisher to cover costs and 
generate a profit (Crockett 2013).
Figure 7.28.  Recent trends in inflation-adjusted US college store sales and sales per postsecondary 
student (Fall enrollment), by fiscal year. Sources: NACS (2019a) and IPEDS (2020).
The textbook publishing industry, after the long run-up of price increases, now finds 
itself pressured by all the alternative options mentioned above as well as mergers, 
acquisitions and associated debt necessitated by a rapidly changing market. The 
recent merger announcement between Cengage and McGraw-Hill will rival the largest 
publisher, Pearson, with this consolidation resulting in a duopoly that will dominate 
market share (McKenzie 2019a). A new subscription-based model is emerging, 
aimed at institutions and departments, with content morphing from static textbook 
information to digital courseware that includes personalized, adaptive learning 
technology (McKenzie 2018a; Blumenstyk 2019b).
There is one other dimension to the college textbook business worth mentioning. 
Faculty-authored textbooks are sometimes assigned by those authors in their own 
courses, which can create an actual or perceived conflict of interest. Many universities 
and the AAUP have statements and policies on the necessity of avoiding such conflicts 
while enabling the material to be used. Remedies include an approval process, 
eliminating or donating (typically minor) royalties, and discounting the cost of the 


























8.1 What’s in the research budget, and how big is it?
Discovery, inquiry, the search for meaning, creative activity: all of these and more 
comprise the academic quest for original new knowledge that we include under the 
banner of research. Furthermore, like love, knowledge isn’t really knowledge until it is 
shared, and therefore research also includes communication of its outcomes through 
publication, presentation and performance. Research can be undertaken for the sake 
of knowledge and curiosity alone, as well as for broader application and problem-
solving;1 it can be carried out by lone scholars and by large groups of researchers; and, 
most relevant to our purposes here, depending on the topic, it can be done at very little 
cost beyond time and expertise or it can require significant and sustained investment.
Many kinds of science and engineering research simply cannot be accomplished 
without research funding to cover the costs of equipment, supplies, specialized labor, 
and unique facilities. Faculty members and other researchers in these areas expend a 
lot of time and effort in the pursuit and acquisition of research funds to enable their 
research, much of it through intense national competition.2 Naturally, those who 
garner such support are judged as successful by their peers. Because money (and 
publications) can be counted easily, it was probably inevitable that these two metrics 
came to be used as convenient proxies for research productivity in promotion and 
tenure as well as in university rankings.3 Of course, research funds are not an end in 
1  Vannevar Bush, who in 1945 delivered Science, the Endless Frontier (Bush 1945), the enormously 
influential report that ultimately led to the creation of the National Science Foundation and the 
unprecedented rise in research funding for US universities, made the unidimensional distinction 
between basic and applied research. Donald Stokes, in his book, Pasteur’s Quadrant (1997), transformed 
this view into two dimensions to explain use-inspired research. He contrasted the work of Niels Bohr 
(purely basic) and Thomas Edison (purely applied) with that of Louis Pasteur and the discovery of 
penicillin, an example of use-inspired research that simultaneously contributed to basic biological 
knowledge and solved a practical problem.
2  Two points on competitive research grants: (1) open competition adjudicated by rigorous peer review 
in the US research funding system is a driver of high overall quality, and (2) those faculty members 
and others who are outside the grant-active disciplines often don’t appreciate just how intense and 
time-consuming the competition can be, with funding rates under 20% in many fields.
3  I’ve often referred to this pair as “fame and fortune” when discussing research productivity with 
faculty colleagues. While they can be empty personal attributes, as Elvis Presley told us in his 1960 
song of the same name, in this case they are a droll reminder of the necessity for research support and 
for communicating research findings.
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themselves. Still, at a successful research university they are vital, and they represent 
a sizable portion of the overall institutional budget.
We celebrate grants when they are awarded, and we’ll typically quote the entire 
award amount, “Professor Famous just received a $1M grant from the NIH to study a 
promising cancer treatment.” What this doesn’t say is that it might be a five-year grant 
at, say, $200,000 per year, and it might be split among several universities collaborating 
on the work.4 Also, research grants are not the only kind of grants and contracts coming 
in to the university—they fund instruction and public service too. These complications 
make it difficult to track research revenues alone, but more importantly they are quite 
uneven from year to year: large grants can arrive all in one award year or be unevenly 
spread over the multiple grant years they are intended to cover. And, you shouldn’t be 
shocked to learn that sometimes the money arrives late.
So, to avoid these issues, the convention is to track research expenditures instead. 
Research expenditures include not only expenditures on government agency-funded 
research grants that make up the biggest category, but they also include research 
funded by private sector, state and local, and institutional sources. The latter includes 
staff and facilities costs for research centers and institutes, the central research and/
or sponsored programs office, research compliance, and so forth. Note that research 
expenditures do not account for faculty time allotted to research during the regular 
semesters (a potentially large number given that this may be as much as half of the 
faculty’s effort at an R1 school; see Section 6.10 on faculty effort), but faculty summer 
salaries paid on research grants are included in research expenditures.
To make the above distinctions plain, Figure 8.1 illustrates grant and contract 
revenues versus research expenditures by institution type. Several things are 
immediately apparent: the R1 schools are by far the dominant players in terms of sheer 
dollars of either kind; federal funds comprise the lion’s share; and, for the reasons 
cited above, research expenditure totals do not equate neatly to grant and contract 
revenue (although they are nonetheless closely related). At the beginning of Chapter 
3 we observed that, across all university types, research expenditures comprise about 
8% of the budget. At R1 institutions, those with the greatest focus on research, the 
budget share for research expenditures is about 20% and second only to instruction.
4  Professor Famous might be the lead principal investigator (PI), but she could be a co-principal 
investigator, a co-investigator, a subcontractor, etc., and her role may or may not correlate with the 
proposed budget share allocated to the work done by her individually or by her lab.
Which universities are the biggest players nationally? The go-to data source for 
research expenditures is the National Science Foundation (NSF) Higher Education 
Research and Development (HERD) survey, and the top 25 institutions are shown in 
Figure 8.2. These are, by definition, among the most prominent research institutions 
in the country (and the world). For most of them the dominant share of research 
expenditures is associated with health sciences and funding from the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH); see more on NSF and NIH funding later in this chapter. 
Note, for example, that the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center is, on 
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Figure 8.1.  FY2017 revenues from all grants and contracts (research and non-research) by source, 
and expenditures on research from all sources (external and institutional), by Carnegie 
classification and control. Source: IPEDS (2020).















































Figure 8.2.  FY2017 total research and development expenditures for the 25 highest-ranked 
institutions. Source: NSF HERD (National Science Foundation, National Center for 
Science and Engineering Statistics 2018a).
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its own, ahead of the regular UT Austin campus (which is number 35). Counter to 
the health sciences point, Johns Hopkins University, at the top if the list, includes its 
Applied Physics Laboratory (APL), a huge research center with over 6,000 employees 
that receives funds from the Department of Defense (DoD) and NASA. Much like the 
point I made in Chapter 2 about university budgets sometimes including hospitals 
and sometimes not, the same goes here for hospitals as well as the units that carry out 
DoD-funded research and development—some of the latter are part of the university, 
like APL at Hopkins, and some are independent entities such as the MIT Lincoln 
Laboratory. Over half of Hopkins’ $2.6B research expenditures ($1.4B in FY2016) are 
associated with APL (National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and 
Engineering Statistics 2018a).
In addition to clarifying that the research expenditure totals are not always an 
apples-to-apples comparison, there are a couple of other issues related to research 
expenditures in general that are worth clearing up. First, while faculty members 
bring their unique and specialized expertise to bear on a research project, and they 
do the intellectual heavy lifting of applying for grants and carrying out the research, 
some novice faculty members are surprised to learn that the grant is not “theirs.” The 
funding agency awards the grant (or contract) to the institution (or its board) and 
the faculty member (in the role of principal investigator) carries out the work as an 
employee of the institution. Technically, if the faculty member cannot complete the 
work for some reason, the institution can substitute another suitable researcher to 
do so or return the remaining funding to the agency. In practice, and in most cases, 
should a faculty member move to another institution, most universities will work 
with the funding agency to enable the grant to follow the investigator. For its role, 
the institution handles the mostly invisible but nonetheless essential administration of 
the research including accounting, contracting, compliance processes, legal issues, etc. 
that are paid for through overhead charges (see Section 8.4).
The second issue is one of terminology and public perception. Research expenditures 
as a term makes sense in the context outlined in this section, vis-à-vis incoming grant 
awards, but it is easily confused by those outside the university. Consider, for example, 
that the latest research rankings are released, and our university proudly puts out a 
press release about how its research expenditures have risen. If not explicitly stated, 
there will be some commentators or politicians who are unaware that we really mean 
separately-funded revenues (most of which are externally-funded) when we say 
expenditures; so, in fact, when we say expenditures, we really mean income, the exact 
opposite. “There goes that university again,” they might say, “wasting our precious 
tuition or tax money.” Moral of the story: whenever you mention research expenditures 
outside of a research audience, always append a comment to the effect that they mostly 
reflect outside investment that the university has brought to the community. If you are 
talking with politicians or business people, you can further underline that most of 
those dollars are spent in the community on salaries, goods, services, and taxes (see 
also Section 14.3 on economic impact).
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8.2 What are the trends in research expenditures?
University research expenditures from all sources have increased steeply for over sixty 
years. Even after adjusting for inflation, research expenditures at all universities have 
been doubling every twenty years, with about 5–6% annualized growth (Figure 8.3). 
Each of the major meanders in this unprecedented expansion of research investment 
has a story that we can unpack by funding source. Figure 8.4 shows the relative share 
of this research funding trend by source. Note that the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) are part of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and, for 
our purposes of university research funding, HHS and NIH are synonymous. The 
predominance of federal funding is clear, and we can see the increase due to the 
1960s space race, several decades with episodes of slowing and growth, the effects 
of the NIH budget-doubling in the early 2000s (naturally, expenditures lagged the 
1998–2003 appropriation increases by a couple of years), the Great Recession, and 
immediately thereafter a brief spike from the stimulus.5 The federal share trends 
slowly downward for much of the record, not because federal spending has shrunk, but 
because institutional investments by universities have grown steadily as well, thereby 
increasing in share over time (it’s not shown in the figure, but if we exclude institutional 
investments, all external funding sources have maintained relatively steady shares 
5  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) was an economic stimulus package 
enacted in response to the Great Recession. It included federal research funding increases of almost 
25% focused in FY2009 and FY2010.
Figure 8.3.  Trend in higher education research and development expenditures from all sources, 
in FY 2016 dollars by fiscal year. Source: NSF HERD (National Science Foundation, 
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over time, with the federal share between 70% and 80%). The institutional investments 
comprise the university’s infrastructure to help carry out research, and as mentioned 
in the previous section they include staff and facilities costs for research centers 
and institutes, the central research and/or sponsored programs office, and research 
compliance (the expense of which has been increasingly borne by universities; see 
Section 8.6 on research compliance costs). By comparison, research funding from state 
and local governments, from private business, and from nonprofits and other sources 
has increased only modestly over time, with their shares each staying under 10% of 
total research expenditures.
Figure 8.4.  Trends in shares of higher education research and development expenditures by source, 
in FY 2016 dollars by fiscal year. Source: NSF HERD (National Science Foundation, 
National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics 2018a).
Figure 8.5 delves deeper into the federal portion of the research funding trend, 
illustrating financial support to universities by agency. Note that these are funding 
allocations and not expenditures, and thus the inflections in the trend lead those 
in the preceding figures by a couple of years. Again, the space race, NIH doubling, 
and the stimulus are quite clear. After its initial growth in the 1960s, federal research 
funding was flat through the 1970s in real terms, and then doubled in the two decades 
from the early 1980s to the early 2000s. Except for the stimulus, the inflation-adjusted 
trend in federal research funding to universities has been downward to flat in the last 
fifteen years. Despite this recent trend, the competition among universities for those 
resources continues unabated, as seen in the growth of institutional expenditures noted 
above and in diminished funding success rates for those faculty members and other 
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Figure 8.5.  Trends in federal science and engineering research and development funding to 
universities by agency, in FY2016 dollars by fiscal year. Agency acronyms are for the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS, which includes the National 
Institutes of Health, NIH), the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department 
of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA), and the US Department of Agriculture (USDA). Source: 
NSF Federal Support (National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and 
Engineering Statistics 2018b).
Looking at the funding mix by agency in Figure 8.5, perhaps most the notable feature 
for the uninitiated is the relative size of NIH funding, about three times that of NSF 
and over half of all federal research funding to universities. Incidentally, this is why it 
is tough for a university without health sciences to rise into the top ranks of research 
university funding. DoD funding to universities is slightly less than that from NSF, 
followed by the Department of Energy, NASA, USDA, and other agencies that fund 
smaller amounts. The relative sizes of federal agency support amounts have waxed 
and waned over the decades, albeit dominated by NIH that moved from about 50% 
to about 60% of the total during its doubling phase. The DoD more than doubled its 
share of federal research funding from 7% in the 1970s to over 15% in the mid-1980s 
before declining again in the 1990s;6 NASA’s peak share was in the 1960s, as one might 
expect, but the USDA’s share has dropped from about 11% in the mid-1970s to just 3% 
of the total in FY2017.
6  Defense funding to universities is generally non-classified and non-military, and it covers the gamut 
one might expect from a large government organization, including not only technology but also health 
and biosciences, environment, economics, and game theory, to mention just a few examples. Many 
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Box 8.1. Research Grant Funding Success Rates
Success rates for competitive peer-reviewed research grants average about 20% 
nowadays, about half what they were a generation ago when today’s senior researchers 
were starting out (Figure B8). At NIH the number of proposals has quadrupled over 
a half-century while awards doubled, and at NSF applications almost doubled over a 
quarter-century while award counts stayed about the same. We know that the numbers 
of faculty and principal investigators (PIs) have increased at a far slower rate than 
proposals based on data from IPEDS (2020) and NSF (National Science Foundation, 
National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics 2018a), and thus proposals per 
person have also increased. Of course, grant budgets have increased over time to cover 
rising labor and other costs, so we have more PIs submitting more proposals per person, 
all vying for limited funding (Lauer 2018). The number of grant awards per PI has not 
changed markedly over time, they are not going disproportionately to the successful few, 
and the number of applications per PI does not correlate with the percentage of funded 
applications (Rockey 2011; 2012). Therefore, declining funding success rates are largely a 
problem of our own making, a symptom of intensified competition for research funding.
Figure B8.  Overall research grant funding success rates at NIH and NSF (left) and associated 
proposal and award counts (right). NIH data show similar patterns for research project 
grants and all R01-equivalent grants, therefore they are combined here. Sources: NIH 
(National Institutes of Health 2018) and NSF (National Science Foundation 2018).
8.3 What is the research funding mix by discipline?
Academic disciplines and fields differ enormously in their levels of extramural research 
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research (labs, equipment, etc.) but they also differ in funding level accorded them by 
funding agencies (based on topic, strategic priority, history, etc.). Figure 8.6 illustrates 
federal research funding by field and by agency, grouped into several science subfields, 
engineering, and non-science and engineering fields. 
Figure 8.6.  FY2017 federal higher education research and development expenditures as shares (left) 
and total dollars (right), by agency and field. Source: NSF HERD (National Science 
Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics 2018a).
We saw the dominance of NIH funding in the previous section, and it is clearly visible 
here in the amounts for health sciences and biosciences. Unfortunately, these NSF 
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Higher Education Research and Development (HERD) survey data do not distinguish 
between the many disciplines in these two large fields,7 which exaggerates their 
relative size. All other fields total roughly the same as the combined health sciences 
and biosciences funding levels. Among the other fields, the next largest are electrical 
engineering, computer science and physics, with most remaining fields receiving far 
smaller amounts of federal research funding.
Separately from whether disciplinary research funding levels are high or low, the 
mix of agency funding across fields varies by relevance of the topic to the agency, 
as expected (Figure 8.6). NIH funds are prominent in social work, psychology, 
bioengineering and several social sciences. The largest fields of support for the NSF are 
computer and information science, biosciences, physics, and electrical engineering. For 
the DoD, it’s not surprising that electrical and computer engineering is top, but health 
sciences is its second largest funding area, followed by computer and information 
science, mechanical and aerospace engineering, and the biosciences. The DoE’s funds 
go in large part to physics, as well as chemistry and several engineering fields. NASA 
funding is largest in astronomy, of course, but is also important in geological and 
atmospheric sciences, aerospace engineering, and physics. Unsurprisingly, USDA 
funding goes predominantly to agricultural sciences, biosciences and natural resources.
8.4 Why do universities lose money on research?
When Professor Famous brings in that $1M research grant it certainly supports more 
research but, counterintuitively, it costs the university money. For all the effort put 
into research as a major mission area of the university, and for all the grants awarded, 
most faculty members are shocked to hear that research actually loses money for the 
university. How can that be, and why do we keep doing it? The answer to the latter 
question is simple—the quest for knowledge is fundamental to the university mission 
and, especially for research universities, high levels of research are synonymous with 
quality, strong graduate programs, productivity and prestige. Like so many other 
things universities do, we cross-subsidize critical activities in research from other 
sources for the benefit of the whole institution.
To understand why the financial support of federal agencies, private foundations 
and others generally doesn’t cover the full cost of research, we need to examine what 
is known variously as overhead, facilities and administrative (F&A) costs, or indirect 
cost recovery (ICR). Let’s work through a simplified example research grant budget to 
help explain things (Table 8.1).
7  The health sciences include dentistry, clinical research, gerontology, medicine, mental health, nursing, 
optometry, pharmacy, public health, radiology, rehabilitation, veterinary medicine, and others. The 
biosciences include animal biology, biochemistry, biophysics, bioinformatics, biotechnology, plant 
biology, cellular biology, epidemiology, genetics, immunology, molecular medicine, neuroscience, 
pharmacology, toxicology, physiology, and more.
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Table 8.1. Example of a simple one-year research grant budget, showing major categories 
including direct and indirect costs. See text for explanations.
Line Item Detail Amount ($)
1. Salaries
2. Principal Investigator Dr. V. Famous, 1 month, summer 11,000
3. Graduate Research Assistant 0.5 FTE, 9 months Fall & Spring 25,000
4. Fringe Benefits
5. Faculty @ 32% 3,520
6. Graduate Assistants @ 11% 2,750
7. Other Direct Costs
8. Equipment (>$5K) Real-time rapid cycling PCR system 34,000
9. Materials & Supplies Lab glassware, tools, chemicals, etc. 8,000
10. Travel Conference registration, airfare, hotel, food 2,000
11. Tuition Remission 2 semesters, in-state amount 12,000
12. TOTAL DIRECT COSTS: 98,270
13. Indirect Costs (F&A)
14. Modified Total Direct Costs Excluding equipment & tuition: $52,270
15. Indirect Cost Negotiated rate @ 50% of MTDC: $26,135
16. TOTAL INDIRECT COSTS: 26,135
17. TOTAL COST: Direct plus Indirect costs 124,405
Starting with the salary section (line 1), we have just the PI and a grad student (lines 
2 and 3) on this proposal. In the fringe benefits section (line 4) we calculate those 
amounts at the applicable rates (lines 5 and 6). The section for other direct costs (line 7) 
includes equipment, supplies, travel, and tuition for the grad student (lines 8 through 
11). Together, the total direct costs for this grant proposal are $98,270 (line 12).
Now, here’s where it gets interesting: so far, this is a bare bones budget for just 
the actual research activity and it does not include necessary supporting activities 
such as accounting, janitorial services, lab safety, regulatory reporting, space, utilities, 
hazardous waste disposal, internet services, and more. All of those are facilities and 
administrative (F&A) costs that also should be covered by the research sponsor. 
Rather than itemizing them for each grant, F&A costs are calculated using an overall 
rate that is negotiated with the Federal Government (and which universities often 
use for external grants with other sponsors too). In our example budget, we use a 
50% F&A rate that is applied to something called MTDC or modified total direct costs 
(lines 14 and 15). MTDC includes all the allowable direct costs (according to federal 
regulations) that can be included in the base amount to which the rate is applied; 
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items such as major equipment and tuition remission are excluded from that base. 
The total indirect costs (line 16) are added to the total direct costs (line 12) to obtain 
the overall proposed total grant cost of $124,405 (line 17). Note that our institutional 
F&A rate of 50% is not the same as the effective rate, which is a little over 26% in this 
example because of the M in MTDC—the modified costs can be quite a bit less than 
the total direct costs.
The F&A rate varies from institution to institution (typically 40–60%) and from 
year to year (typically fractions of a percent), and it is calculated using audited 
amounts that detail the myriad costs associated with research. A university proposes 
a fully-accounted rate (often with the help of consultants) to its cognizant federal 
agency (either the Office of Naval Research or the Department of Health and Human 
Services, which stand in for all federal agencies); that agency’s accountants go through 
the proposal and a final reimbursement rate is set. If you were paying attention in the 
previous sentence, you will have noticed that I said reimbursement—that’s because 
the university pays these indirect costs from institutional funds until it gets the money 
back from the sponsor. There are separate F&A rates established for sponsored 
instruction, special facilities, on or off campus, and so on; we’ll stick with research 
here to keep it simple.
A common misconception is that F&A rates somehow represent a margin or 
profit on research (the colloquial use of the term “overhead rates” may fuel that 
misunderstanding). Quite the opposite: they are, as their other name states, a means 
of indirect cost recovery, and for most institutions the negotiated rate is less than the 
full set of indirect costs. The administrative portion has been capped at 26% since 1991, 
although compliance and other administrative mandates have increased over time, 
moving more of the cost burden to universities (Council on Government Relations 
2019). It is not unusual for the overall F&A differential between the proposed and 
negotiated rates to be on the order of 5%. So, in our example above, the negotiated 
rate is 50%, but the true indirect cost might be 55%, a difference of $2,600 in this case. 
Taken across all sponsored projects at an R1 university, that structural shortfall of a 
few percent can add up to millions of dollars annually.
Furthermore, many private foundations stipulate that they will only pay a greatly 
reduced F&A rate (often zero or 10%, sometimes 15% or 20%). The logic, explicit or 
implicit, is that they want to stretch their nonprofit philanthropic dollars, and/or that 
they like to see a cost-sharing contribution from the university. Certain foundations 
will allow some kinds of F&A costs to be listed as direct costs. On the other hand, some 
contracts with private companies can be fully costed so that the indirect costs are all 
included as direct costs. University sponsored project offices typically have policies and 
procedures to enable proposals that are in line with institutional and other regulations 
when the regular F&A approach is not applied.
While it is in the university’s best interests to recoup F&A costs to the full extent 
possible, historically this reimbursement logic has been poorly communicated to the 
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faculty at many institutions. From a PI perspective, if a grant agency has a fixed pot 
of dollars available to fund projects, the higher the F&A amount, the less there is to 
fund the direct research costs. Even though winning proposals are selected on quality 
rather than price, keeping the price down in a grant competition is a deeply rooted 
instinct. At many institutions there is a steady stream of requests to the vice president 
or vice chancellor for research for F&A cost waivers on grant proposals, often with 
compelling arguments as to why a waiver is worth it to win the award. Each time, 
though, the financial decision is about shifting the costs from the individual project to 
the institution (i.e., all the other projects and revenue sources).
There is a further angle to how the funds returned to cover indirect costs are handled 
on campus: F&A recovery funds (that are a type of revenue, even if reimbursed) enter 
the institutional coffers as a different “color” of money to the funds that may actually 
pay for the various items making up F&A costs. These are unrestricted funds (see 
Section 2.11) and the practice on many campuses has been to return a portion of the 
F&A recovery to the college and/or department and sometimes the lab of the PI. The 
good intentions here are to incentivize further grant-getting and to provide local funds 
in the unit to cover many of the smaller costs in support of research. But those good 
intentions also help pave the road to hell, as the saying goes, by creating an implied 
sense that the funds somehow “belong” to the PI or to the local unit doing the research, 
contributing to the myth of margin or profit from grant awards.
Many sponsored projects are grants, but some come in the form of contracts. There 
are numerous technical differences between the two for government funders and in 
the private sector, most of which are not worth detailing here. But one form of contract, 
the fixed-price contract, is worth a mention in answering the overarching question of 
this section on why research loses money. For most research grants and contracts, if 
some portion of the grant activities cannot be carried out or amended to satisfy the 
original scope, the relevant funds and any others remaining at the end of the project 
must be returned to the sponsor (“use it or lose it”). However, a fixed-price contract 
is not bound by any alteration that lowers or increases the cost to the contractor (the 
university). This kind of contract carries high risk and can obligate the institution to 
unforeseen and unrecoverable costs, but for the savvy project director who budgets 
well and knows how to save a buck, the opportunity exists to perform the work for less 
than the agreed budget and for the institution to pocket the difference. The latter is an 
enticing prospect to some on campus; needless to say, the associated risks mean that 
special permissions are typically required.
We’ve now reviewed how research grants generally cost the university money in 
a net sense, because of F&A reimbursement shortfalls. You will recall from previous 
sections that the university also invests institutional funds in research infrastructure 
such as centers and institutes. The point is to advance research, after all, and not make 
money. Still, there is yet one more way in which universities make massive investments 
in underwriting research. At R1 and R2 institutions especially, a standard faculty 
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member’s workload includes a large portion of their time for research and scholarship 
(see also Chapter 5). Thus, a truly complete description of the full costs of university 
research must include the tens of millions of dollars in salaries and fringe benefits 
necessary at research universities to support faculty research time during the academic 
year. Those funds must come from some source, and it’s not research-specific revenue 
like grants—it’s many of the other sources we reviewed in Chapter 2, including state 
appropriations or investment/endowment income at public or private institutions 
respectively.
Lest I give the impression that research is a burdensome cost to be paid, let me 
conclude this section with an acclamation of the vital importance of the research 
mission. To be sure, research is expensive, and it is important to be informed about 
what it really costs and the business model that pays for it all. That said, for the 
better part of seventy years, the US has tended a unique partnership between the 
government (as well as the private sector) and higher education that has produced 
the finest quality and quantity of research in history, by any measure. This system 
has produced more Nobel prizes, more life-saving and life-changing discoveries, more 
critical insights, than any other. Furthermore, research and graduate education are 
inextricably bound together in the quest for new knowledge, and their combination 
in the US has produced the best system of graduate education in the world. Certainly, 
there are costs to performing research, but its value far outweighs them.
8.5 Which are costlier to support, graduate assistants or postdocs?
One of the key elements of graduate education (see also Section 6.7) is the intimate 
link between it and research. Many graduate degrees, and the PhD in particular, in 
fact require the student to learn and demonstrate production of original and new 
knowledge (i.e., to do professional-level research). In practice, this educational model 
is a modern-day apprenticeship—in addition to advanced coursework, graduate 
students learn their craft by training with faculty members and other researchers for 
several years. The culture and practice of this critical element of graduate education 
varies considerably across the disciplines, and even across faculty advisors within 
individual graduate programs. In some disciplines (e.g., many in the humanities) the 
core day-to-day work is solo scholarship, while in others (especially in the sciences) the 
work necessitates working in small or large teams that are likely funded by a research 
grant. Either way, the student’s direct experience of the process of knowledge creation 
is key to advanced graduate education and, at universities, is also a critical component 
of the research enterprise.
Postdoctoral scholars are another important part of the research enterprise, 
and they are found most frequently across the sciences.8 Importantly, postdocs are 
8  The biosciences have long had postdoc positions and over the last few decades many other sciences 
have followed suit. The role and nature of postdocs has expanded into the social sciences and even the 
8. Research  215
simultaneously research staff employees (unless supported by independent fellowship 
funding) as well as being trainees (National Postdoctoral Association 2019). Ideally, 
postdocs bring their expertise to the lab that they join while they also learn additional 
fields and skills in the new setting. Thus, both postdoc positions and graduate 
assistantships have an educational component to their research role that distinguishes 
them from regular research technician and staff scientist jobs.
For a principal investigator deciding on the kinds of position on a research grant, 
questions arise as to the costs and benefits of graduate assistants versus postdocs. 
There are obviously important educational and research considerations that must 
be included in the decision, such as the need to support students in a graduate 
program, the specific expertise needed for the project, and so on. Still, this decision 
is often boiled down to hiring a less-experienced graduate assistant versus a more-
experienced postdoc. In this simplified view, the graduate assistant will need to be 
trained but then will likely remain in the lab for a longer period, while the postdoc 
can get up to speed fast and will require less oversight, but will likely depart after 
a couple of years. The question is often oversimplified even further to ask whether 
graduate assistants or postdocs are more expensive to fund. There isn’t a single 
answer, because it depends on who is paying for the various associated costs, and 
that mix varies by institution.
Table 8.2 shows a comparison of basic costs for graduate research assistants at public 
and private institutions (separated because tuition can be so different) and postdocs. 
Line A details the cost of a twelve-month appointment for each, using the typical 0.5 
FTE (half-time) rate for the graduate students and the full-time rate for postdocs. I’ve 
included fringe benefits at 20% in Line B, which is likely a higher rate than many 
institutions use but it’s a neutral term here because we’re assuming it is equivalent 
across positions for simplicity (both types of position can have lower fringe benefit 
costs than regular employees, but this can vary widely). If we stop the calculation here, 
Line C shows that graduate assistant costs are about 60–70% of postdoc costs. However, 
tuition is included with an assistantship at most institutions, so we add that amount 
in Line D. As we saw in Section 2.6, non-discounted tuition and fees are substantially 
higher at private institutions, and institutions will generally charge the grant sponsor 
for that amount. Thus, the fully-costed totals in Line E completely change the cost 
implications depending on the type of institution. Some institutions will charge tuition 
at a special rate, such as in-state only at some publics (as assumed here), or otherwise 
waived or discounted. Postdoc salaries and graduate stipends can be slightly higher at 
private institutions, but they do not make as significant a difference as tuition in this 
comparison.
humanities in recent years, with some in novel forms such as a teaching postdoc. I focus on the most 
common research-type postdoc in this section.
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Table 8.2. Example comparative annual costs of graduate research assistants (for public 
and private institutions) and postdoctoral scholars. Round-number estimates of tuition 
are from Figure 2.8 with graduate and postdoc stipends rounded from FY2018 NIH rates 
(twelve-month).
Line Item Grad Research Assistant Postdoc




B. Fringe Benefits @20% 4,800 5,800 8,800
C. Subtotal $28,800 $34,800 $52,800
D. Tuition 10,000 45,000 -
E. TOTAL $38,800 $79,800 $52,800
As an aside, one can do a very similar set of calculations for graduate teaching 
assistants versus instructors. In that case, the department will typically pay the stipend 
and the college or institution will account for the tuition, so that the discussion is also 
about cost to whom. So, for all graduate assistantships, who pays tuition and how 
much are both determinative in assessing comparative costs. Returning to research 
assistants, principal investigators have certainly noticed the increased tuition in recent 
decades—anecdotal information suggests that principal investigators have shifted to 
employing postdocs instead of graduate research assistants, although that trend is 
hard to document explicitly.
8.6 How much does research compliance cost?
Many faculty members, especially those outside the life sciences and hi-tech fields that 
are subject to a greater range of compliance activities, know the Vice President (or Vice 
Chancellor) for Research (VPR) principally as (i) the person who invests institutional 
funds in support of research, such as for faculty startup funds or centers and institutes, 
and (ii) the person responsible for F&A rates and the sponsored projects office that 
processes grant proposals. However, the VPR is also responsible for making sure the 
university is in continual compliance with complex federal and state regulations that 
govern the conduct of research by faculty, staff and students. At an R1 university, 
research compliance functions include these areas:
• Human subjects research via the Institutional Review Board (IRB), often 
with multiple IRBs for clinical or social and behavioral sciences, plus health 
data privacy for the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA);
• Animal welfare for laboratory and other animals via the Institutional Animal 
Care & Use Committee (IACUC);
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• Laboratory safety, radiation safety, and biosafety (e.g., involving recombinant 
nucleic acid molecules, stem cells, or select agents/pathogens);
• Export compliance for high technology items and information deemed to be 
of a sensitive nature for national security;
• Conflict of Interest (COI) disclosure and management, both for individual 
researchers and for the institution;
• Responsible conduct of research promotion through training and ethics 
education;
• Research integrity and allegations of misconduct involving falsification or 
fabrication of data, plagiarism, or other kinds of unethical research conduct, 
overseen by a research integrity officer;
• Research data management, retention, and repository requirements;
• Financial oversight of sponsored grants and contracts, pre-award and post-
award, including accounting, effort tracking, and subcontracting.
Regulations and policies are, of course, absolutely necessary for the appropriate and 
safe conduct of research, but over time the associated administrative burden and 
costs of unfunded mandates accumulate. While regulatory costs to universities are 
undoubtedly increasing over time as they are incurred over and above the 26% F&A 
administrative cap (see the trends in share of university research spending in Figure 
8.4), there are surprisingly few studies that systematically detail the costs of research 
compliance. Broad surveys have consistently shown that faculty members spend 
42% of their research time on meeting requirements rather than doing research 
itself (Schneider et al. 2014). The relative time commitment on each compliance 
responsibility is illustrated in Figure 8.7, and it is clear that faculty members 
working with animal or human subjects and clinical trials spend substantial time on 
compliance in those areas, while financial and personnel-related compliance is time-
consuming for most faculty (given that those roles are ubiquitous across almost all 
projects). A study across 13 institutions of varying sizes found that research-related 
compliance costs ranged from 11–25% of research expenditures, with a negative 
scale effect such that the highest relative amounts were at institutions with the 
lowest research expenditures (i.e., there are economies of scale in handling research 
compliance costs); also, consistent with the discussion above, research institutions 
doing more biomedical research experienced higher associated compliance costs 
(Vanderbilt University 2015).
Like Nobody's Business218 
Figure 8.7.  Percent of faculty respondents reporting a substantial (some to very much) workload 
for those that experience the listed research compliance responsibility. Source: FDP 
(Schneider et al. 2014).
8.7 How does the university earn money from technology transfer?
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 incentivized the development of economic benefits from 
government-funded research and subsequent patents, which had been stagnant prior 
to its enactment, by awarding universities and other recipients of federal research 
funding ownership of their intellectual property (IP or, simply, inventions) and the 
right to license it. In the decades since the act’s passage, research universities have 
grown sophisticated technology transfer and commercialization offices to develop 
and earn revenue from their inventions.9 This is an area where a relatively small 
number of blockbuster successes have led to fabulous financial rewards for a handful 
of universities. Some of these outliers have become household names (e.g., Warfarin, 
Gatorade, Google)10 while other lesser-known pharmaceuticals and engineering 
9  University technology transfer, licensing and commercialization operations are often performed by 
an associated foundation or similar entity. I’ll refer to the parent university for consistency and clarity 
in this section.
10  Warfarin is a blood-thinning drug discovered in the 1930s at the University of Wisconsin, known 
widely today by its trade name, Coumadin. The research was funded by the Wisconsin Alumni 
Research Foundation (WARF), established in 1925 as the first university office for what would 
become known as technology transfer—its name was used as the first four letters of the new drug 
(Pirmohamed 2006). Gatorade was created in the 1960s at the University of Florida and named for 
its football team, the Gators. The University initially turned down the patent rights, but in 1973 it and 
the faculty inventor were part of a settlement that awarded annual royalties (Kays and Phillips–Han 
2003). Google’s co-founders famously invented the PageRank algorithm while they were graduate 
students at Stanford. In the late 1990s they and the University patented the technology, which Google 
licensed for 1.8M shares in the company. Stanford sold its shares for $336M in 2005; if it had waited 
another week it would have received twice that amount (Krieger 2005).
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inventions have been similarly lucrative, earning their parent institutions tens to 
hundreds of millions of dollars annually (Merrill et al. 2016). However, the odds of that 
kind of windfall are like winning the lottery and cannot be relied upon to turn around 
a university’s finances—the FY2017 median gross license revenue for R1 universities 
was a comparatively modest $4.6M (AUTM 2020).
The majority of university technology transfer activity takes place at R1 institutions; 
activity at R2 schools, for the under half of those that report it, is typically 20% or less 
than at R1 schools depending on the metric and negligible at smaller schools (AUTM 
2020). Licensing income is a widely-used financial metric in technology transfer. 
A university’s gross license revenue typically includes a set of annual payments 
from companies using its inventions. Occasionally, rather than annual payments, a 
university may sell all or part of a license depending on circumstances, such as when 
Northwestern sold portions of its Lyrica license to Pfizer for over $1.1B in 2008–2010 
before the fibromyalgia pain-relief and epilepsy drug went off-patent (Tech Transfer 
Central 2011). Consequently, licensing income can be highly variable from year to year.
Figure 8.8 illustrates gross license income by quintiles across R1 institutions, averaged 
for public and private schools within each quintile for three years. Licensing revenue 
is exponentially larger in the upper quintiles, by a factor of about 100 between the top 
and bottom quintile, and it is relatively higher at private versus public universities. 
NYU, Columbia, the UC System and Northwestern are consistently among the very 
top earners (Merrill et al. 2016; DeVol et al. 2017) and they, like many of the most active 
schools, have a large presence in the health sciences and biotechnology.
Figure 8.8.  Gross license income averaged for public and private institutions by quintile of all R1 
institutions in FY2015, FY2016 and FY2017 (current dollars). Source: AUTM (2020).
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Institutions spend their licensing dollars on covering the costs of technology transfer and 
on strategic investments such as internal funds for commercialization and patenting, 
research equipment and facilities, or endowing graduate fellowships. These revenues 
don’t flow only to the overall institution, they are typically shared with the department, 
individual lab and the inventors (faculty members, postdocs, and graduate students 
who were employed by the university at the time). Institutional rules regarding the 
ownership and licensing of IP (federally-funded or not) and its proceeds are set out 
in each university’s IP policy. Not all university IP is commercialized or held by the 
institution: some work is released to the public domain (research software code is a 
common example) while other IP is almost universally assigned to the individual, 
such as lecture content or books produced by the faculty.
Among the earliest steps as an idea transitions from research into something that 
might be commercialized is the requirement for new inventions to be disclosed to the 
university, an obligation of the Bayh-Dole Act. A subset of inventions is suitable for 
perfection into patents, which are the formal means by which inventions are made 
public and protected. Patent applications are filed (in the US and often internationally 
too, both at some expense) and a further subset of those pending patents is subsequently 
issued. Figure 8.9 shows trends in these three metrics increasing steadily over time 
as commercialization activities have expanded on campuses. Invention disclosures 
have more than doubled since the early 1990s and now average 200 per year. Patent 
applications have increased from about 25 per year to over 100 per year in the same 
period, with issued patents rising from about 20 to 60 per year. If a patent is infringed 
and the university litigates then large settlements can result, such as the $750M that 
Carnegie Mellon received in 2016 regarding its technology for data transfer accuracy 
in hard drives (Stempel 2016). 
License agreements are made with established companies as well as with new 
start-up companies. A license option agreement is used when a company wants to 
evaluate the technology before licensing it. Many start-up companies are spun off from 
the university by the inventors (e.g., as with Google), usually with the assistance of the 
technology transfer office and sometimes via an associated small business incubator 
or accelerator. Figure 8.10 shows the rising trends in licenses and options, gross license 
income, and the number of start-up companies formed at R1 institutions. The increase 
in licenses and options is relatively smooth when compared to the more volatile annual 
figures for gross license income, as mentioned above. Universities saw a run-up in 
their inflation-adjusted licensing income before the Great Recession; since then these 
revenues have been comparatively flat despite the increases in underlying activity. The 
number of startups formed has also increased steeply, from about 2 per year in the 
mid-1990s to an average of 9 per year in FY2017.
In addition to licensing technology to a start-up company, a university may also 
take equity in a spinoff (i.e., a share of ownership). It’s often easier for a cash-strapped 
fledgling company to offer a share of its potential future success along with a reduced 
license payment, and this gives the university an incentive to keep initial license costs 
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Figure 8.9.  Invention disclosures, new patent applications and patents granted, averaged across R1 











































































Figure 8.10.  Total licenses and options, gross license income in FY2016 dollars and new start-up 













       
 
down and advance the success of the company while retaining a stake if the company 
becomes successful.
While universities certainly have a self-interest in advancing technology transfer, it’s 
important to note that the growth in these programs has produced broader economic 
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and health benefits from university research, just as the Bayh-Dole Act intended. 
Because university IP is protected, business and industry are prepared to make high-
risk investments to turn discoveries into products, creating wealth and jobs in the 
process. Not all applaud these and associated industry partnerships: some critics take 
a dystopian view and charge that corporate priorities have undermined the role of 
the academy (Lazerson 2010; Perry and Katz 2018). Still, technology development at 
universities has become inextricably linked to their mission of public service because 
community and public investment in higher education is predicated in part on the 
expectation of innovation and economic development. Talking of public service, that’s 
the perfect segue to the next chapter.
9. Public Service, Cooperative Extension, 
and Community Engagement
9.1 Where’s the land grant money, and how does it fund 
cooperative extension?
Public service is the third of the three core university mission areas and, relative to 
teaching and research, it is the least funded. Public service goes by a variety of names, 
including outreach, community service, community engagement, extension services, 
and even social impact. The core idea is that a university should be connecting with 
its community through knowledge in ways that go beyond for-credit instruction and 
academic scholarship. While the Cooperative Extension Service is the quintessential 
example of public service in higher education, there are many other forms including 
performing arts, museums, public lectures, K-12 outreach programs, open libraries, 
and university presses. All of these have in common that they are principally supported 
by funds other than those from tuition or research. A few in this set have interesting 
business dimensions and we’ll examine them in subsequent sections; first, let’s look at 
the one that started them all, cooperative extension.
The Cooperative Extension Service is a national outreach program that was 
formalized by the Smith-Lever Act of 1914, mounted in partnership with the land-grant 
universities that were established with the proceeds from selling designated federal 
lands (See Box 9.1). Contemporary funding for cooperative extension is complicated: 
in addition to iterations of land grant acts over a century ago, some with funding 
and some without, there is associated legislation from 1967, 1972, 1994 and 2008 that 
added, amended and reorganized which institutions are included and the basis for 
how much funding they each receive. Some funds are equally allocated to the states, 
others are based on farm population or total population, and yet others are for specific 
kinds of land grant activity.
It’s called “cooperative” because the funding was originally split three ways in a 
cooperation among federal, state and local (county) governments, some requiring a 
match to the federal funds. These same three revenue sources are still important today, 
along with grants, contracts, fees and gifts. As a result, every university cooperative 
extension service has a different amount and mix of revenue (and incidentally there 
© Andrew C. Comrie, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0240.09
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is no national database containing those data). Figure 9.1 illustrates an example 
university extension budget at a state land grant university. These are R1 or R2 
institutions, and all of them are public with just a few exceptions. For this example, we 
assume a mid-range federal amount of $8M and we assume it is a quarter of the total 
budget of $32M, also a mid-range estimate. The state appropriation is typically the 
largest component, and for our example we’ve assumed a 40% share ($12.8M). County 
shares can be zero or substantial depending on the state, and we’ve assumed a 10% 
share ($3.2M). Rounding out the remaining 25% of revenue are other types of sources 
including one-time grants and gifts as well as any fee revenue. These latter sources and 
a portion of the appropriated federal, state and county funds are restricted funds for 
targeted projects, so perhaps one half to two thirds of the total budget can be used for 
unrestricted payroll and operations expenses. For a sense of scale, this unit might have 
a payroll of several hundred employees spread across the main campus and county 
extension offices; smaller states might have an extension budget of half or less this size 
and the biggest states have extension budgets more than double this size.
Figure 9.1.  Example revenue sources budget for a typical cooperative extension service at a land 
grant university. Percentage ranges in parentheses are from APLU (Association of Public 
& Land-Grant Universities 2019).
Recent trends in federal and state funding for cooperative extension are illustrated in 
Figure 9.2. The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) administers the relevant federal 
funds to the universities through the National Institute for Food and Agriculture 
(NIFA) via what were previously known as formula funds (now capacity grants), 
earmark funds (now special needs), and competitive funds that also include substantial 












       
9. Public Service, Cooperative Extension, and Community Engagement  225
from formula/capacity mechanisms and one third from other mechanisms. While 
federal support has been roughly flat overall but highly variable (plus/minus 20% or 
more in several years), both in extension-only funding and in extension plus research 
(that has a longer record). In contrast, state support for extension underwent a major 
decline of about one third post-recession. The state to federal extension funding ratio 
has recently been about 67:33, but historically it was as low as 40:60 in the mid-1930s, 
about 60:40 in the postwar years through about 1980, and then it ascended to a high of 
80:20 in the early 2000s (Wang 2014).
Figure 9.2.  Recent trends in federal and state funding for cooperative extension, including funding 
mechanism (stacked columns) and total expenditures (extension plus research) at 
the National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA), by fiscal year. Sources: NIFA 
(National Institute of Food and Agriculture 2019a; 2019b).
Box 9.1. Land Grant Universities
It’s hard to overstate the significance of land grant universities in US higher education’s 
rise to global preeminence during the twentieth century. The seeds sown in the 1862 
Morrill Act, the Hatch Act in 1887, the second Morrill Act in 1890 and the 1914 Smith-
Lever Act created the contemporary US university with its three-part mission of 
teaching, research and service. The first Morrill Act authorized a public university in 
every state and territory by providing federal land that was sold or put in trust to start 
the new institutions, 30,000 acres for each senator and representative. For example, New 
Hampshire received 150,000 acres, Arizona 60,000, and Wisconsin 240,000, the latter 
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roughly $7M today. The act was passed during the Civil War; land prices were depressed, 
and the new colleges were underfunded from the start.
Antebellum institutions catered to the elite and taught the classical liberal arts and 
theology, with little emphasis on science and technology. The industrial revolution and 
democratic ideals stimulated education reform, and the push for higher education that 
taught practical subjects for the working classes is widely credited to an Illinois educator, 
Jonathan Baldwin Turner. Even so, Morrill’s language and the motives of Congress in 
authorizing the land-grant institutions were all about economic benefit and increasing 
wealth (Young 2000).
Initially, these “cow colleges” suffered from snobbery and quality issues as they began 
to teach “agriculture and the mechanical arts.” To provide the necessary new knowledge, 
the Hatch Act enabled the establishment of so-called experiment stations (research and 
demonstration farms) as well as funds for agricultural research based on state population 
size and the number of farms, and which required state matching funds. The second 
Morrill Act addressed two issues: it was primarily intended to correct the lack of federal 
funding for the system and it effectively created a second set of land-grant colleges 
in the Southern states. To obtain the 1890 funds those states had to avoid race-based 
admissions, which they could do by including separate colleges that served African 
Americans. Funding across institutions was not as equitable as the law intended and 
many of these schools essentially became teacher’s colleges (Young 2000). Furthermore, 
Hatch Act funds went only to 1862 institutions and not to 1890 colleges.
Extension work was already underway at both types of land-grant when the Smith-
Lever Act formalized extension at the 1862 colleges in 1914, making it a cooperative 
service by requiring a state match. In the half-century that followed there were various 
Figure B9.  Land-grant universities and colleges in the three legislation-year funding groups. 
Note that these year groups do not necessarily correspond to year of establishment or 
authorization of land-grant status. Alaska and the Pacific and Caribbean island states 
and territories are not to scale. See Appendix B for a detailed listing. Sources: IPEDS 
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additional laws passed to improve funding, further development, and provide financial 
aid (Association of Public & Land-Grant Universities 2012). In the late 1960s and 1970s, 
land-grant status was awarded (using appropriated endowments rather than land) to 
the District of Columbia and several Pacific and Caribbean island territories, with further 
Pacific island territories added in 1990 (Young 2000). A major addition to the land-grant 
system occurred in 1994, when Native American tribal colleges were added to the list 
with a $23M endowment (Young 2000). Today there are 57 1862s, 19 1890s, and 35 1994s, 
for a total of 111 land-grant universities and colleges, as illustrated in Figure B9 and listed 
in Appendix B (the three California institutions count as one because the University of 
California System is the designated land-grant institution).
As imperfect as the implementation of land-grant universities undoubtedly was, 
the seeds it planted nonetheless grew into dozens of saplings, leading to a large and 
unparalleled nationwide system of state universities that were founded on the integrated 
three-part mission. Especially after World War II, those saplings grew into large trees 
as they were fed by postwar economic growth, the GI Bill, and massive federal research 
investment, producing many of the best public universities in the world.
9.2 What is the business model for performing arts centers?
Most universities host a performing arts center that, apart from major athletics events, 
can otherwise be the most visible and visited element of the institution for community 
members. Campus performing arts venues are often major landmarks of their local 
cultural landscape, metaphorically and physically. Even in large cities, campus 
performing arts centers can be part of a vibrant, top-tier arts scene, while in smaller 
cities and towns they are frequently the leading arts presenter in the community. 
Bringing the creative and performing arts to the public is as important a public 
service role as bringing science to the community, especially because performing arts 
events engage many people who otherwise would be unconnected with the campus. 
However, public funding for the arts is low and campus performing arts centers must 
rely on other kinds of funding to carry out their public service mission.
Now, like many other parts of the public service and outreach mission, the 
performing arts are deeply connected to the teaching and research missions (research 
being creative activity in this case). If the university has academic programs in music, 
theatre or dance, those departments may have their own performance spaces, or they 
may work in a joint arrangement to use the main venue or the combined set of large and 
smaller venues. The distinction to be made is that, while student concerts, shows and 
recitals may (and should) be integrated into the programming of a campus performing 
arts center, to mount a regular season of professional artists the center needs to operate 
as a separately managed unit with goals and finances and a business model that are 
distinct from regular academic programs. Furthermore, the business of running an 
entertainment facility is unfamiliar to many in academic administration, with unique 
personnel issues, atypical procurement and bidding processes, special contracts, 
licensing, and large sums of money having to change hands fast (Henley 2016).
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It turns out that, of all the business models on a campus, the performing arts center 
arguably has the most gut-wrenching: every new season is an “if we build it, they 
will come” exercise in managed risk that puts a large portion of its budget on the 
line each year, often several years in advance. As a director or lead programmer for 
a performing arts center, here is your challenge: take half (or more) of your budget; 
spend it on contracts with a set of artists to create a season portfolio that balances 
cultural value, cost and anticipated audience; invest in marketing and fundraising; sell 
tickets; mount the shows successfully, and hope you break even. Rinse and repeat each 
year, hoping that you make a margin in more years than you incur a loss.
There’s a lot that goes into balancing cultural value, the cost of the act, and likely 
audience attendance. The acts that make money aren’t necessarily the ones that your 
(segmented) regular audience wants to see. Broadway blockbusters may fill the house 
and bring in new patrons, but they are expensive with large casts, sets and crew. There’s 
more donor support for classical music, ballet and opera but those audiences are often 
smaller. Exciting new artists emerge from contemporary genres, but it can be hard to 
sell tickets for lesser-known or avant-garde acts. A popular comedian will attract an 
audience and needs only a microphone and a spotlight. Aging rock-and-roll groups 
can bring yet another crowd. Yet, as the presenter, if you slide too far into commercial 
presenting to pay the bills you risk drifting from your core arts and culture focus and 
connection to the university, losing your audience and the financial backing of donors 
and organizations (and possibly the institution). In addition to curating and presenting 
a season yourself, you can also rent out your facility to third-party promoters of touring 
Broadway shows, comedy acts or pop groups. Less common, but in keeping with the 
university connection, you can also produce shows and/or commission new work.
A good executive director and her team will artfully blend all the above with the 
goal of creating deeper connections with different sectors of the community and the 
university, building value to drive participation and support (Webb 2016). The unit 
will do so with a limited financial support from the institution and be expected to 
generate most of its own revenue; it may report to a dean, vice president, provost or 
president, or it might be a separately incorporated entity; and, it may be required to 
provide campus units with facility usage below cost as well as block out times for 
graduations and other university events (Henley 2016; Brown 2017).
While there is a wide variety of organizational structures and programming 
arrangements across university performing arts centers, they have core business 
elements in common that are best illustrated with an example. I’ve provided a model 
of a typical performing arts center budget in Table 9.1 and in Figure 9.3 to make both 
detail and relative proportions easier to appreciate. Naturally, the overall budget will 
scale by the size of the center in each case, and the relative share of each item will 
shift with programming scope. The proportions presented in the example are based 
on results from an industry survey (Hager and Pollak 2002), and I’ve assumed dollar 
amounts that reflect a medium to large contemporary university performing arts 
center. Also, this is an annual operating budget and it doesn’t include major capital 
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and facilities activities, such as fundraising for a new performance hall or paying for 
major renovations.
Table 9.1. Example operating budget for a moderate to large university performing arts 
center. Note that major capital and facilities costs are excluded.
Line Item Amount ($)
1. Revenues
2. Ticket Sales 2,000,000
3. Hall Rentals 1,000,000
4. Gifts 1,000,000
5. Institutional Support 1,000,000
6. Grants 500,000
7. Investment 300,000
8. TOTAL Revenues 5,800,000
9. Expenditures
10. Artist salaries, fees, travel 2,400,000
11. Management & General 1,500,000
12. Stage & Production 700,000
13. Marketing 700,000
14. Fundraising 350,000
15. TOTAL Expenditures 5,650,000
16. NET Operating Margin 150,000
Figure 9.3.  Shares of example revenue and expenditure budgets for a moderate to large university 
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We start with revenue sources (line 1), where ticket sales are the single largest item 
(line 2). They may be rivaled or exceeded by rental revenues from, say, a Broadway 
promoter (line 3) or rentals may be a minor item, depending on the core business 
model. Gifts (line 4) are an essential part of the revenue stream, such as for show 
sponsorships and special programs for patrons or schools. Support from the university 
(line 5) can also vary substantially by institution, although for most it is a small but 
enabling and highly-leveraged part of the overall budget. Many centers will apply for 
grants to support young performers, special outreach, and other initiatives, but these 
are generally not large and are one-time restricted funds (line 6). Some performing 
arts centers may be fortunate to have an endowment from when they were established, 
and/or that they have diligently grown over time. Those investment returns (line 7), 
because they can be relied upon, are also enabling and leveraged. Looking at total 
revenues (line 8 and Figure 9.3), we can see that earned income is primarily from 
ticket sales and rentals and comprises roughly half of all income.
Moving to expenditures in the lower half of the budget (line 9), we see that paying 
the artists and associated costs (line 10) is the largest expense, approaching half the 
total and exceeding ticket sale revenue. Management (managers, front of house, 
accounting, security, etc.), staging and production (back of house including lighting, 
tech, stagehands, etc.), marketing and fundraising expenses all include labor and 
supplies; all these areas support the performances as well as operating the venue for 
other events (lines 11–14). The proportions of total expenditures (line 15 and Figure 
9.3) are quite different to most other university unit budgets, where in-house labor 
costs make up the bulk of expenditures; here, the main budget dynamic is around 
artist costs and the large revenues from ticket sales required to offset them. Finally, this 
example has a small net operating margin (line 16), ideally for investment in future 
activities if it isn’t needed to cover past deficits.
A successful university performing arts center will manage this budget model 
adroitly, by sharing risk with partners, combining safer and riskier bets across the 
portfolio of acts and genres discussed earlier, and developing diverse income streams 
from fundraising and other sources. More importantly, a flourishing performing arts 
center brings cultural richness to the community, connects it with the campus, and 
adds broadly to the quality of life by making the city more attractive and livable.
9.3 How are university museums paid for?
Over one quarter of the nation’s art museums are located at colleges and universities 
(Association of Art Museum Directors 2019). While museums of art constitute the 
majority of campus museums, some institutions are home to museums of natural history, 
culture, archaeology, botany, zoology, minerals and more. The functions of a university 
museum are archival (de facto, they house collections of academically significant 
objects), scholarly (curatorial staff and faculty study the objects), educational (they are 
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resources for teaching students) and engaging (they serve the broader community). 
Importantly, they are not simply venues to go and see beautiful or interesting things 
with a consumer mindset. Ideally, these museums are a vital part of campus and 
community life, infusing and inspiring young and old with an appreciation of art and 
science (Cotter 2009). For donors, university museums provide the opportunity for 
their collections to be seen rather than overshadowed as they might be in major civic 
museums, and some smaller museums have found that universities can be valuable 
stabilizing partners (Kiley 2013; Grant 2019). While those in the trade proclaim that 
“Great Universities Have Great Museums” there are critics who think that campus 
museums may have gone too far with extravagant commissions and extraordinary 
exhibits (Urist 2016; The Association of Academic Museums and Galleries 2020).
Museums are typically started and continue to grow through donations (and 
bequests) to the collection from private or scholarly enthusiasts. The gift of a private art 
collection or the need to conserve a set of scientific specimens, if of sufficient cultural 
or academic value, enables the development of a museum while also creating the need 
to support the people, programs and facilities necessary to run it. Business models for 
university museums differ widely, but virtually all of them rely on some combination 
of direct support from the parent institution, endowment proceeds, and philanthropy 
for the bulk of their support.
Figure 9.4 illustrates the revenue mix for four example university museum budgets: 
a small museum ($1.5M annual budget) at a public institution; two medium museums 
($4M budget), one at a public school and one at a private school; and, a large museum 
($20M budget) at an elite private university. Comprehensive data on university 
museum budgets are not available, but fortunately some campus museums publish 
their financials in an annual report; these simplified examples are drawn broadly from 
those reports.1 Small museums are heavily dependent on their parent institutions, 
which supply about two-thirds of the revenue; gifts and membership are the next 
largest revenue category at about 20%, while endowment income, grants and earned 
income are relatively small. Earned income includes admissions, museum store 
and merchandise proceeds, space rentals, as well as restaurant and catering income 
(typically only found in larger museums). At medium-sized museums the university 
allocation comprises about half of the revenue (a bit more at the publics and a bit less 
at the privates) while endowment income might contribute 10–20% along with several 
percent each from grants and earned income. The biggest university museums are 
supported by large endowments and their endowment earnings can be well over half 
the revenue budget, even exceeding three quarters in some cases.
1  Acknowledgements to the David Owsley Museum of Art at Ball State University, the Stanley Museum 
of Art at the University of Iowa, the McClung Museum of Natural History & Culture at the University 
of Tennessee-Knoxville, the Jordan Schnitzer Museum of Art at the University of Oregon, the Spencer 
Museum of Art at the University of Kansas, the Block Museum of Art at Northwestern University, the 
Nasher Museum of Art at Duke University, the Princeton University Art Museum, and the Museum 
of Comparative Zoology at Harvard University.
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Figure 9.4. Revenue mix for four example university museum budgets. See text for details.
Small museums may see 15,000 to 50,000 visitors per year, while that number 
can exceed 100,000 at some medium-sized museums and rise over 200,000 at large 
museums. Virtually all university museums will have thousands of students visiting 
through classes as well as providing students with part-time paid internships and 
volunteer opportunities. Such positions serve a critical staffing as well as educational 
role and may include dozens of students at small museums and over 100 at larger ones. 
At smaller museums the regular staff may number from less than 10 to more than 20, 
with 30–40 at medium-sized museums and well over 100 staff at the largest museums.
It’s no surprise that payroll is the largest item in the expense budget of university 
museums—they are labor-intensive units just like the rest of the university. Curators, 
assistants, security attendants, conservators, IT staff, financial administrators and 
managers are all on the staff in addition to the many part-time assistants, not to 
mention volunteer docents. In Figure 9.5 we can see that personnel expenses range 
from just over half the budget at large museums to about two thirds at medium-sized 
museums (a bit more at the publics and a bit less at the privates) to almost three 
quarters at small museums. Non-personnel spending on collections-related items 
(exhibitions, acquisitions, education programs, and collections care and conservation) 
is the next biggest category at 20–30% of the budget, and about 60% of that portion 
goes to exhibitions. Non-personnel investments in revenue-generating activities such 
as fundraising development, marketing and communications comprise 4–5% of the 
budget. Non-personnel expenses in administration, information technology, security, 
facilities maintenance and other operations round out expenditures, scaling with 
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utilities and building costs (an additional 10–20%) as these are often covered by the 
university.
Figure 9.5. Expenditure mix for four example university museum budgets. See text for details.
An illuminating metric used by some museum directors is direct revenue versus overall 
expenditure per visitor. Average direct revenue per visitor at university museums is 
low, no more than $2 or $3; many university museums are free to the public, although 
some special exhibitions may require a fee, and visitors may sometimes spend a little 
on merchandise. Average expenditure per visitor is many times that amount, in the 
$50 to $100 range. This is a crude way to reflect monetary value for something that is 
intrinsically non-financial, yet it underlines the level of commitment that university 
museums have towards their communities.
A section on university museum finances, particularly art museums, would be 
incomplete without mention of the ultimate taboo: selling valuable pieces of the 
collection to pay the bills. There isn’t a single museum that doesn’t endure challenging 
budgetary conditions from time to time, whether that is a budget cut from the parent 
university or a drop-off in philanthropic support. There are stories, not all apocryphal, 
of administrators, board members or politicians suggesting that the director could 
solve the museum’s financial woes by selling a prominent piece. Here’s one story:
I was invited for a dinner at the president’s house… the trustees are all kind of bantering 
around and one of them sort of grabbed me and said, “Well you could sell your Picasso 
and solve all your financial problems. That would be a good solution, wouldn’t it?” And 
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The most notable recent example was the 2009 recession-induced attempt by Brandeis 
University to close its Rose Art Museum and sell off the collection. The decision was 
later reversed following an uproar from the broader art community, alumni and 
faculty members and an accompanying lawsuit (Shea 2011). The Brandeis case also 
illustrates two important points: (i) the university broke the trust placed in it to look 
after the donated items, and (ii) many such donations build in a failsafe that stipulates 
the piece or collection cannot be sold, or that it will revert to the donor if the institution 
does not have sufficient funds to care for it and share it with the public (Glesne 2012).
9.4 How is a university press supported?
This chapter is about the university’s public service mission and you may be wondering 
why a section on the university press fits here rather than, say, with libraries in the 
academic affairs chapter. While a university press is run by the university, it serves 
the broader academy (i.e., scholars at other universities) and to an extent the general 
public. Perhaps surprisingly, university presses have little direct connection to teaching 
and research on their own campuses, and instead they succeed and serve their role by 
publishing authors from many other institutions, often in specialty areas particular 
to each press. The imperative to spread knowledge beyond the confines of campus 
was recognized from the beginning: “It is one of the noblest duties of a university 
to advance knowledge, and to diffuse it not merely among those who can attend the 
daily lectures—but far and wide.” So proclaimed Daniel Coit Gilman, who founded 
Johns Hopkins University and who, just two years later in 1878, started what is now 
the oldest continually operating university press in the country (Givler 2002). He 
and many of his peers at other universities around that time also appreciated that 
specialized scholarly research would not see the light of day if left to the commercial 
presses (Givler 2002).
There are nearly 100 US university presses that both belong to the Association of 
University Presses and appear in our dataset of four-year colleges and universities 
(Figure 9.6). Except for a small number that publish through a consortium, these 
presses bear the moniker of the principal institution (rather than branch campuses) 
and serve as its scholarly publishing arm. The substantial majority are at R1 institutions, 
about 60% of which have a press. There are a handful at R2 schools, public and private, 
plus a further handful at the smaller private campuses.
As nonprofit entities, university presses benefit from non-commercial mailing 
rates and, importantly, their inventories are not subject to tax—nonetheless, they are 
subject to the other business challenges faced by all publishers (Givler 2002). The bulk 
of university press net revenue is generated from book sales, over three quarters on 
average, as seen in Figure 9.7. While book sales include a portfolio of activity such 
as edited volumes, textbooks, reprints, and translations, the quintessential university 
press book is the monograph: one that is written by one or more scholars and that is 
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Figure 9.6.  Number of university presses and percentage of institutions with a university press, by 































































































expected to be read predominantly by other scholars (Maron et al. 2016). Institutional 
allocations (i.e., university subsidies) average about 10% of press net income, with 
successively smaller shares from endowment income, journal publishing, other 
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services, and grants and title subsidies (from authors and their institutions). Sales 
to university libraries have historically been a cornerstone of this market (although 
that is changing, as we saw in Section 6.13); while print and e-book sales dominate 
these revenues at most US university presses,2 it is worth noting that scholarly journals 
constitute nearly half or more of library sales at a few of the very largest university 
presses such as Chicago, Duke, and the University of California (Daniel et al. 2019).
2  Oxford University Press (OUP) and Cambridge University Press dominate the overall academic press 
landscape. In a recent study of US university library purchases, each of the two British presses has 
book sales that approach ten times those of the biggest US university presses. Together OUP and 
Cambridge book sales to US university libraries represent 77% of all US university press book sales 
combined and 11% of total book sales from all publishers to university libraries (Daniel et al. 2019).
It’s useful to understand university press expenditures by examining costs per 
monograph, which total nearly $30,000 in directly attributable expenses and over 
$40,000 when full costs are accounted for (Maron et al. 2016). Figure 9.8 shows a 
breakout of staff and non-staff costs per monograph for the five core press departments 
from acquisitions through editorial, production, design and marketing, as well as for 
other general and administrative costs. Acquisitions are the most expensive part of 
the process in labor and total cost terms. This is where the intellectual qualities of the 
press’s book list are shaped, and it includes author recruitment, topical expertise in 
selection, communication, and managing a thorough peer review process. Despite the 
switch to digital copy and the automation of some parts of production, the majority 
of expenditures in other parts of the process are also on labor. This is true even for 
general and administrative costs that include staff in accounting and information 
technology (Maron et al. 2016). Considering that monographs on obscure topics in 
small fields may sell only a few hundred copies and more popular titles might do 
more than a thousand (Berlatsky 2014; Barclay 2015; Straumsheim 2016), the margins 
are small overall. To ensure financial sustainability of their university presses, astute 
directors and editors are continually seeking the balance between their curatorial role 
and hoped-for prestige, the relevance and likely popularity of book topics, and the 
realities of their business model.
That business model is shifting too, with reductions in library purchases, multiple 
distribution models including print and electronic forms, and the advent of open 
access (Maron et al. 2016). In the latter, much wider readership is possible with a low 
or zero cost to the reader in electronic form and payment for print-on-demand as a 
conventional paper book; the difference is that the press must cover its costs via other 
funding sources (e.g., the author or the author’s institution, grants, crowdfunding, 
institutional support).
As we saw above, those costs amount to tens of thousands of dollars at conventional 
university presses—can they survive with such a high cost structure, and will university 
libraries and individuals continue to pay a premium for that model when lower-cost 
and alternative business models are becoming available? A quick online search reveals 
a convenient lower-end cost benchmark: the basic cost of self-publishing a book with 
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Figure 9.8.  FY2014 average staff and non-staff costs per monograph by core department, as well as 
general and administrative (G&A) costs, other overhead costs, and in-kind costs (e.g., 
contributed staff time, author-paid fees and office space) at the press level. Source: 
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a quality of editing, cover design, formatting and marketing comparable to a press-
produced book is on the order of $6,000 (Reedsy 2020). Most university press editors 
wouldn’t let me finish that last sentence without interjecting, rightly, that their presses 
offer far more than those basic services in the academic and production quality of 
their books (e.g., peer review, an established platform, the stamp of authority from 
a prestigious press, technical editing and production, targeted marketing). Still, the 
potential to expand reader access and lower cost structure by implementing business 
models that are not sales-based continues to drive the development of open access 
publishing in academia. Book production costs at presses created specifically to 
produce open access material are typically under $10,000, while they are $15,000 and 
more at existing presses that have started open access imprints and consortia (Willey 
2019; Champion 2020; Luminos 2020; Penier et al. 2020). Such entities can lower their 
costs through labor savings due to technology and leaner approaches to, for example, 
acquisitions. It’s important to appreciate that open access books are not necessarily 
cheaper to produce—the different underlying business philosophy and necessary 
associated infrastructure are what distinguish it from sales-driven publication 
(Grimme and Watkinson 2020).3
3  Full disclosure: this book is published under an open access model. In this particular case, the born-
open and born-digital approaches meant that including roughly 200 color figures did not greatly 
affect the sales or production costs. In contrast, many of the university presses that I approached 
shied away from that much color and the prohibitive cost. It seems anachronistic to be limited to the 
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Open access is still evolving, and there are multiple business models in the 
ecosystem (Speicher et al. 2018) that are often combined in practice:
• Article/book processing charges: the dominant model, in which upfront fees 
are paid by the author (or the author’s institution) to offset a portion of the 
publishing costs, that vary considerably by publisher;
• Collaboration/coalition: organizations and institutions combine assets (e.g., 
technical skills, funding sources) to support open access;
• Community: some academic-led presses use volunteers from their intellectual 
community, not only for peer review, but also for editing and other tasks;
• Endowment: endowment income can support open access as well as regular 
publishing;
• Freemium: a model adapted from the software world, whereby an online 
version of the publication is provided for free while other formats (e.g., 
e-reader, regular print) are available for a charge;
• Grants: some foundations will support projects to make publications open 
access, or support open access costs within a research project;
• Institutional: the university may include support for open access as part of 
the institutional support for its university press;
• Library funding: libraries may participate in a contribution arrangement with 
publishers to ensure open access to certain kinds of publications, such as in 
the arts, humanities and social sciences;
• Sales revenues: the press may sell print copies and other formats while also 
running an open access imprint;
• Services revenues: in addition to their regular publishing activities, some 
presses offer publishing services to other institutions.
As can be seen, libraries are active in this space, as are academic and professional 
societies, and also academic-led presses. Interestingly, open access is in many ways 
further developed in Europe and the UK than in the US, and it continues to develop 
actively at presses both small and large on both sides of the Atlantic.
Shifting back to other business model issues, another concern is the university 
allocation, the most visible recent example being that of Stanford University Press, 
where the institution proposed and subsequently delayed eliminating the press’s 
$1.7M bridging allocation, relative to its $5M in book sales (Kafka 2019). Some on 
campus expressed dismay at the full financial sustainability argument, noting it isn’t 
applied to athletics, while the wider university press community were alarmed at 
legacy of almost 600-year-old black and white printing technology as we enter the third decade of the 
twenty-first century.
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the potential domino-effect of such a decision at a well-endowed institution (Jaschik 
2019b). Yet further business model concerns for university presses include the decline 
in long-form reading, shifting scholarly modes of writing and communication, and of 
course the implications of the evolving digital revolution in print and online media.

10. Facilities & Finance
10.1 What do campus buildings cost?
It depends. Of course, there is no such thing as a typical campus building and they 
vary by size, purpose, intended lifespan, local labor and construction costs, as well 
as by the precise definition of cost. That said, numbers from $50M to $100M are not 
unusual for construction of a new medium-sized campus building with a few floors 
totaling, say, 100,000 square feet, while smaller buildings the size of large houses might 
cost just a few million dollars and massive laboratory complexes can cost hundreds of 
millions. Let’s dig in a little further.
It’s easy to focus only on direct construction costs (a.k.a. brick-and-mortar or 
hard costs paid to a contractor) and not on the total project cost, which also includes 
associated design costs, permit fees, local taxes, legal fees, cost of land, utility 
expansion/connection, roadway alterations, landscaping, interior furnishings and 
specialized equipment (some or all of which are counted as soft costs depending on 
the definition). Together, these other items add 20–50% on top of basic construction 
costs, as can be seen in Figure 10.1.
Figure 10.1.  Hard costs (construction and construction contingency) and soft costs (“everything 
else”) per gross square foot for a variety of campus building types from a 2016 study. 
Source: D’Angelo (2016).
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Figure 10.1 also illustrates the differentiation in hard and soft costs across a range 
of campus building types. New “wet labs” (and high acuity healthcare) are the 
most expensive kinds of space because of specialized needs: heating, ventilation 
and air conditioning (e.g., fume hoods, positive/negative pressure, air filtering); 
extra plumbing for purified/contaminated water; supplementary electrical and IT 
infrastructure; laboratory gas handling; additional sprinkler and fire safety equipment, 
and special rooms for delicate or large equipment. Fitting out and renovating such space 
costs somewhat less than new construction, as with most space (except for historical or 
other unique buildings). So-called “dry labs” (simple teaching laboratories, computer 
laboratories, sorting rooms, etc.) can cost substantially less. Multi-use structures 
such as student centers with a mix of catering, hospitality, meeting, retail, etc. space 
can cost almost as much as an average laboratory on a per square foot basis. Offices, 
classrooms, and residence halls are more moderate in cost, while the lowest costs are 
associated with large box-like spaces typified by libraries (and open-plan floors of 
office cubicles).
It is not uncommon for those who know commercial construction costs to balk 
at the perceived cost of new university construction. Universities tend to cite project 
costs, which as we’ve seen can be substantially higher and are easily confused with 
basic construction costs. Also, universities usually build for a facility lifespan of fifty to 
one hundred years, far longer than the typical commercial building. Figure 10.2 shows 
a comparison of cross-sector construction costs using consistent definitions and data 
collection. It is clear that, in fact, higher education construction costs are very much 
in line with commercial construction costs as well as other sectors similar to higher 
education such as healthcare and K-12 education. Laboratories and acute healthcare 
spaces are the most expensive, academic/classroom and administration spaces are on 
a par with mid-rise commercial space, while residence halls and K-12 spaces have a 
similar cost to single-story commercial space.
This is a convenient point to explain the distinctions between gross square footage 
(GSF, essentially the entire structure), net assignable square footage (NASF, all rooms 
and usable areas), and unassigned or common space such as hallways and stairwells. 
Construction cost calculations are generally made on gross square footage, while 
internal space and cost allocations (such as for a department or college) usually use 
net assignable square footage.
Total GSF on a campus ranges from under 1 million GSF at small colleges to more 
than 15 million GSF at the largest universities. Space per student varies substantially 
across type of institution with, for public and private schools combined, baccalaureate 
colleges (that are predominantly private) averaging about 650 GSF per FTE, R1 
universities averaging about 500, R2 about 350, and R3-M3 institutions about 300 
GSF per FTE (Cotter 2009). There are economies of scale from smaller to midsize 
institutions, with research space adding to overall space totals at R1 schools.
I’ve occasionally been asked about the total value of all facilities on campus, a number 
that is tough to quantify. University financial statements will list older buildings as 
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Figure 10.2.  2019 construction costs per square foot of gross floor area for selected sectors, calculated 
as the average of high and low values within the city limits of 20 US cities. Land, permits 

























































































































depreciated assets, but that kind of book value doesn’t necessarily align with value 
for practical purposes (what a university might spend on functionally similar space) 
and it certainly isn’t the same as replacement value. In any case, the total value of all 
facilities naturally scales with the overall size of the institution, and the figures are 
clearly in the hundreds of millions on smaller campuses and in the several billions of 
dollars for large R1 schools.
10.2 What are the trends in campus construction and deferred 
maintenance?
As any homeowner knows, once a building is built it still needs regular maintenance, 
which will eventually involve major outlays as essential components age and need to 
be updated or replaced (e.g., roofs, mechanical systems, windows, interiors). And, 
just like at home, it’s easy for cash-strapped institutions to put off those costs for 
just another year or two, leading to a mounting and ever more expensive backlog of 
deferred maintenance projects.
Industry benchmarks suggest that institutional investments into maintenance of 
campus facilities should be 2–3% of total asset value, a target not met by most campuses 
(EAB 2017). For a $50M building of 100,000 GSF that’s about $1M to $1.5M per year, 
or about $10 to $15 per GSF. Of course, this guideline is not per building, but for the 
entire portfolio of campus facilities, some new and many older. The average deferred 
maintenance backlog in 2015 was $88 per GSF at private institutions and $108 per GSF 
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at public institutions, both of which grew faster than the inflation rate since 2007 (EAB 
2017).
Major maintenance expenses rise around twenty to thirty years after a building is 
built. Of course, there are few campuses with an even mix of building ages and fewer 
yet that have dutifully kept up a consistent maintenance schedule amid other budget 
pressures. On many campuses the result is that major maintenance costs tend to surge. 
Figure 10.3 illustrates the century-plus age profile of campus buildings as a share of 
national higher education GSF. On top of the overall growth trend, we see two big 
surges in construction: the 1960s and 1970s, and the 2000s into the 2010s. Each of these 
had, or will have, an echo in major maintenance costs a few decades later. 
Figure 10.3. Building construction age as a share of total gross square footage (GSF) across US 
higher education. Source: Gordian (2018).
The first surge is easy to understand as a response to massive sustained enrollment 
growth during that time (as we saw in Section 4.6). The recent surge is a combination 
of pre-recession investments and response to post-recession enrollment growth, 
both taking place in an environment of intense competition for additional students. 
Paying for this recent wave of construction and the associated major maintenance 
will become extremely challenging in the next ten years, especially for institutions 
that have not managed to grow enrollments at the same time. The early signs of that 
challenge are clear in Figure 10.4, which shows the mismatched growth curves for 
space and enrollment across research, masters and baccalaureate institutions since 
2007. The two rates are comparable at research schools, masters’ institutions saw the 
largest cumulative space growth along with weak post-recession enrollment growth, 
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enrollment growth. These are troubling patterns for all but the research campuses. 
Not only will it be challenging to pay off the associated debt with modest or declining 
enrollment revenues, but also the major maintenance bills will start to hit in the coming 
decade, requiring additional debt if those schools don’t have adequate maintenance 
funding built into their budget plans.
Figure 10.4.  Recent trends in rates of space expansion and enrollment growth across US higher 
education. Source: Gordian (2018).
10.3 How much is the university’s “mortgage” and debt payment?
Universities borrow money for large capital projects, much as homeowners obtain a 
mortgage to buy or build a house, enabling large one-time costs to be spread over 
many years. Mortgages are issued in the residential loan market by lending institutions 
based on the creditworthiness of the buyer and use of the property as collateral. In 
contrast, like other corporations, universities generally issue bonds to finance large 
capital projects. Direct borrowing from banks tends to be costlier and more restrictive 
than selling debt on the bond market. While bonds do not use collateral, universities 
are rated by independent agencies as to the likely reliability of the institution to repay 
them.
Unlike most homeowners with a single mortgage for a single home, universities 
typically have multiple bonds that cover many capital projects of various ages, 
some from years ago that are about to end and others that are more recent. Thus, a 
university’s overall debt portfolio can extend its interest payments several decades 
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So, just how big is university debt at any one time and how much are the interest 
payments? Figure 10.5 shows average debt by type of institution and the matching 
interest for FY2018. Both amounts scale with institution size, much as one would 
expect, with the annual interest across institutions in a consistent range of 3.5–4.5% of 
the total debt. Average debt is about $800M at R1 public institutions and over double 
that amount at R1 privates, almost $1.8B. The smallest institutions average less than 
$100M in debt, public and private. Debt service, the interest that universities pay on 
their bonds and other loans, averages about $35M annually at R1 public universities 
and over $60M annually at R1 privates, while it is under $5M annually at smaller 
colleges and universities. Making those bond payments is a financial priority for 
the institution because not doing so would make any future borrowing much more 
expensive. Thus, bond defaults are rare and they occur only if the institution is 
undergoing significant financial distress. For example, as universities lost all or part of 
their anticipated residence hall revenue in FY2020 due to COVID-19 effects, most will 
find ways to cover the revenue shortfall gap from other sources rather than defaulting 
on the related debt.
Figure 10.5.  FY2018 institutional debt (left axis) and interest on debt (right axis, note narrower 
scale) by Carnegie classification and control. Source: IPEDS (2020).
Those annual interest payments account for 2–3.5% of the university budget 
depending on the type of institution, generally lower at public universities and 
higher at private institutions. Figure 10.6 illustrates the trend in debt service as 
a share of expenditures over three decades for public and private universities. 
While that share has remained in a narrow band for private institutions, at public 
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synchrony with increasing enrollment growth across all institutions. Worryingly, 
for the small group of BAS public colleges, their enrollment growth subsequently 
flattened and then declined in the 2010s, meaning that they will be challenged to 
meet their debt obligations in the coming years if enrollments and revenues continue 
on their current path.
Figure 10.6.  Trends in interest on institutional debt as a share of total non-hospital expenditures, 
averaged across Carnegie classifications for public and private institutions. Source: 
IPEDS (2020).
The major rating agencies (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch) rate the 
creditworthiness of higher education institutions. For example, Moody’s uses a 
scale of A (low risk), B (speculative, medium to high risk) and C (very high risk 
as well as near or in default), with nine subdivisions and three further modifiers 
for a total of 21 categories (Moody’s Investors Service 2020c). The range of ratings 
for four-year institutions is illustrated in Figure 10.7, which also shows that public 
institutions generally receive better ratings than private ones. Overall, the upper 
categories are typically dominated by elite private universities as well as major public 
universities or systems; remember also that the medium and smaller schools make 
up the majority of all institutions. To develop their ratings, the agencies examine 
multiple business-related metrics, including many covered in this book, to gain a 
comprehensive picture of each institution’s financial health. Agencies offer annual 
outlooks for the whole higher education sector, and in recent years they have varied 
between negative and stable, reflecting overall concerns about enrollment and net 
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Figure 10.7.  Moody’s credit rating distribution for 226 public and 256 private four-year institutions, 
as shares of each for December 2018. Source: Moody’s Investors Service (Shaffer 2019).
10.4 How much is the campus energy and utility bill?
The national average for the cost of utilities (natural gas, steam, electricity, water & 
sewer) in 2018 was about $2 per GSF (Gordian 2018). That translates into an annual 
utility bill of tens of millions at a large R1 university down to single-digit millions at 
smaller colleges. For example, FY2018 utility expenditures were $84M at UNC Chapel 
Hill (R1 public), $103M at Stanford (R1 private), $10M at Creighton (M1 private), 
$1.1M at Henderson State University (M2 public), as well as $3.5M at Goucher and 
$1M at Juniata which are both BAS privates (University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill 2019; Stanford University 2017; Creighton University 2018; Henderson State 
University 2018; Goucher College 2018; Juniata College 2018). Utility expenditures 
thus account for a few percent of the overall institutional budget.
Utility activity by type of utility also scales with campus size (i.e., GSF), as illustrated 
in Figure 10.8. Consumptive metrics (energy use, carbon footprint, electricity use and 
water use) are generally higher at large schools and they decrease with smaller type, 
such that BAS colleges consume at 30–50% of the rates at R1 universities. Across all 
institutions, natural gas comprises over 85% of all fossil fuel usage with emissions per 
GSF declining at about 2% per year (Sightlines 2014). Productive metrics (garbage 
and recycled waste) show the reverse pattern in Figure 10.8, with the highest rates at 
small campuses and the lowest rates at large campuses, dramatically so for recycling. 
The unusual water-use and recycling values for R2 institutions in particular may be a 
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Figure 10.8.  FY2018 utility activity per 1,000 gross square feet (GSF), with the scale for each indexed 
to 1 for comparison, by Carnegie classification of 172 institutions. The R3-M3 values 
are a weighted combination based on response count. Sources: NACUBO (2019) and 
APPA (2019).
10.5 Does the university have a rainy-day fund?
Yes. Institutions in sound financial shape keep cash on hand to cover unexpected 
revenue shortfalls or unforeseen emergency expenses (such as the financial impacts 
of COVID-19). You won’t typically find a specific fund to which money is allocated; 
rather, the institution will have cash accounts and cash equivalents (e.g., short-term 
investments) that can be liquidated almost immediately. There are many measures 
of liquidity, most of which reflect available cash relative to expenses, with variants 
depending on how those two figures are accounted for. One easy to understand 
example is “days cash on hand” that Moody’s uses in its ratings reports, and which 
is sometimes mentioned in a university’s annual financial report. It represents the 
number of days that the institution could cover operating expenses from cash. For 
example, starting with some public institutions, FY2017 days cash on hand was: 210 at 
Indiana (Moody’s Investors Service 2018a) and 68 at New Mexico (Moody’s Investors 
Service 2018d) that are both R1; 241 at Kent State, an R2 (Moody’s Investors Service 
2019); 64 at Texas Southern (Hilltop Securities 2018), an R3; and 134 at Midwestern 
State (Hilltop Securities 2018), an M2. Examples from private institutions include: 620 
at Vanderbilt (Moody’s Investors Service 2018f) and 954 at Notre Dame (Moody’s 
Investors Service 2018e) along with 187 at USC (Moody’s Investors Service 2020b), all 
R1 schools; 457 at Loyola University of Chicago (Moody’s Investors Service 2018b), an 
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College (Moody’s Investors Service 2020a) and 644 at Lafayette College (Prager & Co. 
2019), both BAS colleges.
From these examples we can see that while there are differences in liquidity across 
all schools, there is also a differentiation between public and private universities. 
Public institutions can typically cover a portion of a year while private institutions are 
Figure 10.9.  Trends in simple liquidity ratios averaged by Carnegie classification and control. Note 
that the vertical scale in the upper panel (Private) is 4X the lower panel (Public); see 
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usually able to cover hundreds of days and some even several years. The reason for 
the distinction is that private institutions typically keep a portion of their endowment 
as cash in addition to other operating cash reserves. This is not typically an option 
at public universities where an outside foundation holds the endowment and those 
funds are restricted. While endowment-related funds at a private university can fill 
a hole in the short run, if they are used, they will of course deplete the long-term 
resources of the institution. This public-private difference can be seen in Figure 10.9, 
which illustrates trends in simple liquidity ratios.
Unfortunately, while the data to calculate days cash on hand are readily found 
in individual university financial statements, sufficiently specific information to 
properly calculate days cash on hand for all schools is not publicly available, nor is it 
recorded in IPEDS. However, IPEDS does contain certain asset and liability data, from 
which simple liquidity ratios can be computed. In Section 1.4, I mentioned that we 
could generally handle technical accounting differences between public and private 
institutions in our comparisons, but this is one of the topics where those differences 
are marked. In the case of public universities, this simple IPEDS-based liquidity ratio 
is calculated as total current assets over total expenses, while for private universities 
it is calculated as total unrestricted net assets over total expenses. The numerator for 
the privates is a far broader quantity than that for the publics, which leads to two 
different scales as seen in Figure 10.9. Despite the resulting much higher ratios for 
privates versus publics, there are still some interesting differences among each group 
and some overall trends worth noting. At public universities, liquidity is similar across 
all sizes of institution except the group of small baccalaureate colleges that have lower 
cash reserves. Before the Great Recession there was variability in liquidity trends 
among the publics, but institutions made modest improvements to their liquidity 
post-recession. The privates, especially R1 universities and baccalaureate colleges, had 
distinct profiles pre-recession and they experienced dramatic reductions in liquidity as 
their endowments shrank. Interestingly, because endowments are relatively low at the 
smaller private research and master’s institutions the impact of the recession on their 
liquidity was comparatively muted. Post-recession, liquidity improved slightly across 
all types of private institution.
In fact, it was the recession that prompted far more attention to liquidity across all 
of higher education: some institutions had to borrow money to meet debt obligations 
because their investments were inaccessible, and the credit rating agencies cited 
liquidity concerns in numerous cases as they downgraded institutions (Kiley 2011). 
Of course, liquidity is just one of many indicators used to assess institutional financial 
health, and composite financial indices are made available by the US Department of 
Education and in rankings exercises published by the media (Coudriet and Schifrin 
2019; Seltzer 2019d).
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10.6 Why isn’t parking free?
A university is a series of individual faculty entrepreneurs held together by a common 
grievance over parking. This much-repeated witticism is attributed to Clark Kerr, and 
like many good jokes it contains just enough truth to be amusing. Because thousands 
and even tens of thousands of people flow on and off a typical campus every day, 
there is never enough parking for all of them and it’s only natural that the tensions 
between convenience and congestion make for regular grumbles about parking 
and transportation. Chief among those are questions about why parking fees are so 
expensive, and why parking can’t be free. Companies don’t charge their employees 
or their customers for parking, as the argument goes, so why do universities do it? 
Besides this rhetoric being partially untrue (many businesses in urban downtown 
settings don’t have onsite parking and expect their employees and customers to figure 
out their own public or private transportation and parking needs), the bigger point is 
really about who pays.
We all know the economic truth that there is no such thing as a free lunch, so either 
the costs of providing parking or alternative transportation solutions are absorbed 
centrally and paid for by all whether they use the service or not, or they are paid 
by those who use the service. Individual faculty and staff members might consider 
parking fees a tax on wages while students may complain that it should be included 
in tuition; all have an interest in externalizing the cost away from the individual to the 
institution. On the other hand, many campuses have physical space constraints that 
severely limit parking availability, and even if they don’t, the university community 
still has an interest in reducing congestion and the physical costs of providing parking. 
Therefore, universities typically charge individuals for parking permits, often using a 
portion of parking fees to offset costs of other transit options such as free shuttles, bus 
passes, and the like.
Surface lots are the cheapest to construct although they are the least efficient use of 
space, while multi-level parking garage structures enable higher density parking but 
they can cost an order of magnitude more to build; both require additional maintenance. 
Construction cost estimates range from $2,000 to $3,500 per space for surface parking, 
and between $12,000 and $25,000 per space for a parking structure (UNC Charlotte 
2019; Texas A&M University 2020). Operations and maintenance expenses include 
custodial, repairs, staffing, and security. A back-of-the-envelope calculation that spreads 
construction and financing costs out over thirty years (assuming the university issues 
a bond for the project) and includes an allowance for maintenance puts the annual 
cost at a few hundred dollars per surface space and $1,500-$3,000 per garage space, 
an amount that needs to be recovered from parking charges or other sources (such as 
tuition). Because the faculty and students are not all on campus all the time, typical 
annual parking charges can be less than these numbers if the university issues more 
permits than there are physical spaces—the hunting license analogy. As an indication 
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of the seriousness and emotion attached to campus parking issues, it is interesting to 
note that at UC Berkeley the ultimate academic recognition is being awarded a special 
reserved parking spot for winning the Nobel Prize (Figure 10.10).
Figure 10.10.  The ultimate academic accolade at UC Berkeley, winning a special reserved parking 
space along with the Nobel Prize. Source: De Comité (2017), Flickr, CC BY 2.0, https://
www.flickr.com/photos/fdecomite/34688401634.
10.7 Do public-private partnerships and outsourcing save money?
They can save money, but that should not be the sole reason that a university enters 
into a public-private partnership (P3) or similar form of privatizing or outsourcing. 
There are several important aspects of P3s that institutions should assess and manage 
to avoid non-financial (e.g., academic and reputational) as well as financial risks. We’ll 
cover those items below, but first let’s describe what we’re talking about. Outsourcing 
is a slightly older term that carries negative connotations for some. The P3 term is now 
widely used, although it is technically a misnomer for private universities that use 
these agreements as much as public institutions. Whatever we call them, the essence of 
such agreements is that the university contracts with a third party to deliver a service 
rather than the institution providing that service itself.
P3s are not new and universities have been contracting out functions such as food 
service, vending and bookstores for decades (Bushman and Dean 2005; Phipps and 
Merisotis 2005). These areas are not close to the core academic mission and can often 
be delivered more effectively by a company with specialty expertise and economies 
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of scale. Since the late 2000s, however, higher education has seen strong increases in 
P3s for facilities construction and/or operation as well as those much closer to the 
core academic mission, such as student services and online program management. 
Table 10.1 shows the extensive range of functions and services that may be provided 
by private partners. Across the country, higher education P3 deals now total in the 
billions of dollars annually (EY-Parthenon 2017), with a growing literature that 
describes them (Leeds 2019).
P3 agreements differ depending on the level of control and risk for the company 
and the university, financial elements such as whether there are fixed payments or a 
revenue-sharing agreement, and timing. Depending on the needs of the institution 
the P3 could be a short-term contract or it might be a long-term partnership over 
many decades. A seemingly straightforward example might be a contract for janitorial 
services, where the university pays a certain amount to a company instead of hiring 
and managing its own janitorial staff. Clearly the university will want the costs to be 
lower, but it also has to consider how integrated it wants the “outside” staff to be and 
how the arrangement fits with union agreements. Furthermore, will the cost savings 
come from efficiencies or will the company workers be paid less than if they were 
university employees, and will they receive fewer benefits? These can be critical issues 
for a campus community.
A facilities example might involve the construction and operation of a residence hall, 
where the institution provides a ground lease to the company, which in turn fronts the 
cost of construction and receives a significant portion of the student housing revenues. 
From the company’s point of view, it can rely on the captive audience of students for 
a relatively reliable tenant income to recoup its investment, while the university gets 
a building financed and built quickly without having to borrow. Concerns abound: 
to list just a few, can the university ensure that the construction quality meet its usual 
standards, will maintenance problems be dealt with to the satisfaction of students 
and parents, and will the university or the company be handling student behavior 
and support issues? If such issues are anticipated and managed well, then the project 
can work well for all, but poor revenue or management arrangements can severely 
undermine the hoped-for benefits. Also, for capital projects, universities can typically 
borrow money (through bonding) at lower rates than commercial developers, so the 
premium paid for that aspect of the project must be offset by other benefits such as 
speed to completion, level of service, or risk avoidance.
A third example is online program management (OPM), which has received a 
lot of press over the last decade as higher education moved into online instruction. 
I mentioned OPMs briefly in Section 6.11 when discussing online programs, and it’s 
worth emphasizing again just how poorly structured many of these OPM deals have 
been for the universities (Hall and Dudley 2019). In their rush to get help recruiting 
online students and delivering instructional content, some institutions more-or-less 
sold their academic souls (Carey 2019), ceding over half the revenue and much of the 
10. Facilities & Finance  255
academic control to the OPM partner. As universities gain more experience in the online 
space the nature of these deals will hopefully become more balanced. Nonetheless, in 
a recent survey of campus leaders the desire for OPM P3s came in second, right behind 
facilities and infrastructure P3s (Blumenstyk 2019a).











































































































11. Health Sciences, Hospitals  
& Medical Schools
11.1 How do hospital budgets compare to main campus budgets?
Some of the health sciences operate on a completely different financial basis to the rest 
of campus because of their reliance on clinical revenues. Nowhere is this truer than in 
medical schools, although it can also be a factor across nursing, pharmacy, dentistry, 
public health and veterinary medicine. We’ll get to medical school funding in the next 
section, but first, let’s get a feel for the basic numbers.
In earlier chapters I was careful to point out where hospital revenues or medical 
employees needed to be excluded from our campus comparisons. That’s because (i) 
most universities don’t have hospitals or medical schools, (ii) of those with medical 
schools, at more than half the hospital partner is an independent corporation rather 
than the hospital being incorporated within the university, and (iii) hospital budgets 
can be as big or bigger than the universities with which they are directly or indirectly 
affiliated. The Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) lists 155 accredited 
member medical schools in the United States (Association of American Medical 
Colleges 2020), 115 of which are spread across our comparison data set of nearly 
1,200 four-year higher education institutions, as illustrated in Figure 11.1 (the rest are 
largely stand-alone specialty or for-profit schools). Of those, 45 (39%) report in-budget 
hospitals on IPEDS.1
1  Technically, IPEDS lists the Penn State College of Medicine separately for academic data, while the 
finances of Penn State Health are included in main campus financials. For Rutgers, IPEDS reflects the 
medical school and hospital on the New Brunswick campus plus two small hospitals at the Camden 
and Newark campuses although they don’t have separate medical schools.
© Andrew C. Comrie, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0240.11
Unsurprisingly, R1 universities are home to most medical schools and in-budget 
hospitals, with fewer of each down the size scale. We can get a sense of hospital budget 
sizes by breaking out the hospital and non-hospital (i.e., university) revenues for those 
institutions with in-budget hospitals, as shown in Figure 11.2. Three quarters of these 
hospitals are at R1 universities and their budgets average about 40% of the total budget 
or, put differently, hospital budgets approach the size of the regular university budget. 
Financially and organizationally, it’s like adding a second university to the main 
campus. There are no publicly-accessible comprehensive statistics on the budgets of 
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Figure 11.1.  FY2018 numbers of higher education institutions with medical schools and with 
hospitals included in the reported institutional budget, by Carnegie classification and 



















other independent teaching hospitals that work with the remaining medical schools, 
although from individual examples it is clear that they have not dissimilar financial 
scopes of in-budget hospitals and sometimes more.
Figure 11.2.  FY2018 hospital and non-hospital portions of total institutional revenue for the 45 
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11.2 How are medical schools funded?
Most medical schools don’t exist in financial isolation in the way that other campus 
professional schools do. Business schools, law schools, engineering programs and 
colleges of education all connect to their domains of professional practice to ensure that 
students can learn through hands-on experience, like medical schools, but none of those 
require the level of financial integration with clinical activities necessary to support a 
contemporary US medical school. Put more pointedly, with the exception of the few that 
focus exclusively on teaching medical students, medical schools rely overwhelmingly on 
clinical revenues to support themselves with tuition playing only a minor role.
How does that work? The necessary combination of medical education, research 
and clinical practice is enabled by organizational and financial elements of what is 
called an academic medical center, which is typically comprised of the medical school, 
its affiliated hospital (historically university-owned but also independent), and the 
faculty practice plan. Practice plans originated as organizations to handle clinical 
revenue collection and compensation for the faculty as practicing physicians, much 
like a group private practice. While this is still their core function nowadays, practice 
plans have evolved into organizations that also promote patient care, manage the 
various medical specialty practices, recruit and retain quality physicians, and ensure 
an adequate number and range of patients for research and teaching. These activities 
are aligned with the mission of the academic medical center.
The practice plan looks after the interests of faculty physicians, as distinct from 
those doctors and other health professionals without academic appointments 
who work directly for the hospital. Faculty practice plans are usually separately 
incorporated, meaning that the academic medical center is a three-way partnership 
between the university, the practice plan, and the hospital. Each brings something 
to the table: the university and medical school need clinically active professors and a 
means to compensate them from the practice plan, plus the physical and organizational 
infrastructure of the hospital; the hospital desires the prestige of being a specialized 
institution with renowned experts and the latest treatments; and, the practice plan 
needs them both while providing a vehicle for the academic and clinical activities of 
faculty physician scientists.
As you will have surmised by now, successful academic medical centers therefore 
involve the exchange of large sums of money among the three parts, in particular 
to support the medical school. The practice plan contributes substantial clinical 
income while the hospital contributes payments for medical services as well as 
additional investments into the teaching, research and clinical care missions. These 
latter investments, which are typically tens of millions of dollars annually, are known 
as “mission support” and they essentially provide a cross-subsidy of teaching and 
research.2 Figure 11.3 illustrates the critical role of practice plan and hospital revenues 
2  Mission support funding has to be carefully structured to avoid kickback and ethics laws because the 
medical school’s physicians refer patients to the supporting hospital (Bulleit et al. 2017).
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for medical schools, in a roughly two thirds/one third split that together comprise 
63% of the total support. Research grants and contracts are the other large source of 
medical school revenue, with federal and other sources accounting for a combined 
22% of medical school revenue on average.
Figure 11.3.  FY2018 shares of revenue sources supporting 141 US medical schools. Source: AAMC 
(Association of American Medical Colleges 2019b).
Figure 11.3 also shows that the remaining sources of medical school income are all 
much smaller, each making up just a few percent of the total. Support from state and 
local governments and from the parent institution (i.e., the university) and revenue 
from tuition and fees each average about 4% of the total although, as we’ll see next, 
these two categories differ across public and private institutions. Gifts, endowment 
income and other miscellaneous costs round out the revenue portfolio.
The average dollar amounts for each of these sources at public and private 
medical schools are illustrated in Figure 11.4. While the general profile is similar, 
the revenues supporting private medical schools are approximately double those at 
public universities. There are two noteworthy departures from this overall pattern 
though; public medical schools naturally receive relatively more via state and local 
government support, while private medical schools generate almost three times more 









To appreciate the magnitude of total dollars required to fund a medical school, 
the level of funding is on the order of ten times the budget of a regular college at an 
R1 university. That contrast makes it instructive to return for a moment to the cross-
subsidy of teaching and research by mission support and other funds. Tuition revenues 
are insufficient to cover the substantial infrastructure, operational and labor costs of the 
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Figure 11.4.  FY2018 supporting revenue sources averaged across 85 public and 56 private US medical 

























whole enterprise associated with educating medical students.3 At most major medical 
schools, the faculty will outnumber the students and they will be among the highest 
salaried professors in the university (see the next section). Thus, even from this limited 
example, and with perception of medical school tuition as high, it is clear that tuition 
alone will not come close to covering the institutional costs of education. Regarding 
research, remember that we saw in Section 8.4 how research actually loses money 
because facilities and administration costs are not fully recovered. This is especially 
true for medical schools because biomedical research support and compliance costs 
are among the highest across campus. We’ll examine health science research funding 
in Section 11.4.
As with general university funding, the relative roles of revenue sources have 
changed over time for medical schools. Figure 11.5 illustrates the trends in relative 
shares of clinical revenues (also known as medical services), state and institutional 
funding, and tuition and fees since FY1977. Tuition and fees have stayed consistent 
around 4–5% of budget over the entire period, and other sources have stayed flat or 
decreased slightly in share over time (not illustrated; FY2018 values were 14% federal 
research, 13% other income, and 2% other federal revenue). However, clinical income 
3  Note that medical schools offer not only medical degrees but also training programs required for 
physicians to be able to practice, i.e., residencies and fellowships. Confusingly, these latter programs 
are known as Graduate Medical Education (GME). GME is funded largely by the Federal government 
through Medicare with small amounts from states and hospitals. Federal GME funding has essentially 
been capped since the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, creating a bottleneck for residency slots.
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rose from a 20–60% share of the budget over the last four decades. Because state 
funding stayed about the same over time in inflation-adjusted dollars, its relative share 
decreased from 30–5% of the total budget over the same period. Of course, the world 
of healthcare finance was completely different back then—Medicare and Medicaid 
started in the 1960s, and various successive forms of health insurance emerged over 
the decades too. Understanding the changes in the complex healthcare business would 
take a book of its own, but do recall that healthcare has many of the same underlying 
economic drivers of cost increases as higher education, as we saw in Section 3.7 and 
Box 3.1. Those costs are anticipated to grow faster than revenues in coming years, 
creating a vulnerability for medical schools that are dependent on clinical revenues 
and transfers from the other parts of the academic medical center (Guadagnolo 2018).
Figure 11.5.  Trends in the shares of three revenue sources for US medical schools, FY1977 to FY2018. 
Source: AAMC (Association of American Medical Colleges 2019c).
11.3 How much are medical school faculty salaries?
Medical school professors are the highest compensated faculty members in the 
university, earning roughly three times more on average than their colleagues elsewhere 
on campus. Figure 11.6 illustrates total compensation by rank and medical specialty. 
Across all departments and specialties, assistant professors earn about $300,000 per 
year and full professors almost $400,000, while department chairs average $632,000. 
Across the departments, salaries in the basic medical sciences (i.e., those without a 
clinical component such as immunology, microbiology, and pharmacology) are the 
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arts and sciences. Surgery is the highest-compensated set of medical specialties, where 
instructors earn $300,000 to $400,000 annually and the average chair of surgery makes 
almost $1M per year. The other specialties cover a broad range in between. Assistant 
professors earn 70–90% of full professor compensation across most specialties, whereas 
in the basic medical sciences that figure is just over 50%, reflecting the absence of 
clinical revenues and the structure seen elsewhere in the university.
Figure 11.6.  FY2018 total compensation averages for medical school faculty members (MD or 
equivalent) by rank and sorted by decreasing department/specialty average. Source: 
AAMC (Association of American Medical Colleges 2019a).
Why are medical school salaries so high? There are at least two factors at work: (i) 
as is true elsewhere in the university for fields that have a practice component with 
high market rates, such as computer science or accounting, that market drives the 
academic salaries higher; and (ii) medical professors are at the pinnacle of clinical 
care by virtue of their academic and technical expertise, thus they are the top earners 
in their profession overall (unlike computer science and accounting). If you are 
diagnosed with a hard-to-treat disease or you were in an awful accident, you will 
want to seek out the “top” medical expert in the necessary specialty—that doctor 
is in all likelihood a professor at a leading medical school. Likewise, many leading 
cancer centers, heart institutes, etc. are part of academic medical centers. Thus, 
the confluence of eminent technical expertise with elevated market rates, which in 
turn are enabled by the way the US healthcare system is set up, lead to the high 
compensation we see in US medical schools. In fact, at many of these universities, it’s 
not unusual to have a dozen or more individuals in the medical school earning more 
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Box 11.1. Relative Value Units (RVUs)
Clinical revenues are a key part of academic medicine. Medicare payments for 
medical services provided by physicians across the US are accounted for using 
a system that assigns relative value to each of more than 10,000 distinct services. 
Relative value units (RVUs) largely reflect the total time necessary to perform the service 
(before, during the service, and after) as well as skill, complexity, judgment, etc. So, 
for example, the RVU to remove a foreign body from an eye is 0.49 while it is 1.95 to 
repair a minor eye wound, meaning that the latter is four times the work of the former 
(AAPC 2020b). This is known as the work RVU and it is used with two others in the 
Medicare payment formula, practice expense (PE) RVUs and malpractice (MP) RVUs; 
the average shares of each across all payments are 51%, 45% and 4% respectively (AAPC 
2020a). There are geographic practice cost indices (GPCI) used to weight each kind of 
RVU as well as distinctions based on the place of service (e.g., a physician’s office versus 
a hospital). Medicare sets an annual per-RVU dollar conversion factor (CF), which has 
been close to $36 in recent years (AAPC 2020a), enabling the payment to be calculated as 
follows according to the US Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2020):
Payment = [(RVUwork × GPCIwork) + (RVUPE × GPCIPE) + (RVUMP × GPCIMP)] × CF
Using the minor eye wound repair example, for a physician in Arizona doing the 
procedure in her office in 2020, the numbers look like this:
Payment = [(1.95 × 1.0) + (5.86 × 0.961) + (0.13 × 0.846)] × $36.0896 = $277.58
In San Francisco, because of two higher GPCI values reflecting the higher expenses of 
the area (1.076, 1.327, and 0.44 respectively), the Medicare payment for the same service 
would be $358.43. If the procedure was done at a hospital, where the physician does not 
have to incur the overhead costs, then the physician payment amounts are $140.59 in 
Arizona and $169.26 in San Francisco because the practice expense RVU decreases from 
5.86 to 1.91.
While this sort of calculation is far from a perfect representation of the work involved, 
it certainly beats its simplistic predecessors such as number of patients seen. Of course, 
because of their key connection to revenue generation, RVUs are extensively used to 
measure physician productivity. Ask almost any doctor about this and you’ll hear plenty 
of criticism, including: it is imprecise because each case is different, no allowance is made 
for challenging cases, experienced physicians can handle complex cases more efficiently, 
the system can be manipulated, it incentivizes physicians to break procedures into parts, 
it doesn’t include patient satisfaction, and much more.
In academic settings, the pressures to deliver on RVUs are in direct tension with, 
and exclude consideration of, research and teaching. While that tension cannot be 
fully removed, it can be minimized if administrators and faculty design clear workload 
expectations and implement effective multidimensional and holistic evaluations.
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11.4 What is the mix of health science research funding?
We saw in Chapter 8 that support from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
provides more than half of all university research funding. NIH funds virtually all 
federal health sciences research and we also saw that it spends about three times more 
than NSF, which covers all the other sciences and engineering. In addition, we saw how 
NIH funding doubled in the early 2000s via a program of increased appropriations by 
Congress. But to which diseases and conditions does NIH funding go, and to which 
universities?
Figure 11.7.  Share and cumulative share of FY2019 NIH spending on specific diseases and conditions 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































As the plural in its name indicates, the NIH comprises over 20 major institutes and 
centers, organized largely around disease areas, through which most of its funding 
flows. Of the $39B total NIH budget in FY2019, more than 80% was awarded for 
extramural research. Over half the funding was awarded through just five institutes: 
the National Cancer Institute (16%); the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases (14%); the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (9%); the National 
Institute on Aging (8%); and the National Institute of General Medical Sciences (7%).
While institute-level funding provides a broad sense of the fields supported, the 
NIH produces a list of how much is spent across almost 300 diseases and conditions. It 
specifically includes multiple counting of research projects because a particular project 
could be addressing several topics (e.g., the genetics of brain disorders in the elderly, 
which covers at least three areas). The top 50 funded categories are illustrated in 
Figure 11.7 and they provide a sense of the wide range of research funded by the NIH. 
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Clearly, many studies involve clinical research, a theme that is associated with $16B 
in research funding at 6.6% of the total. Among the higher-funded diseases, cancer, 
infectious diseases and rare diseases all receive similar levels of support at around 
2.5% of the total (about $6B) annually. Half of the funding goes to the first 18 diseases, 
and three quarters to the first 45.
Figure 11.8.  FY2019 NIH funding awarded to higher education institutions, for the top 50 of 516 
listed institutions. Data for multiple units on the same campus have been combined. 
Source: NIH (National Institutes of Health 2020c).
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Looking down the list, each university will naturally have its own strengths across 
the spectrum of health research, with the highest-funded institutions being active 
across multiple areas. Those universities are ranked in Figure 11.8, which shows the top 
50 institutions nationally. The first 23 on the list win half of all higher education NIH 
funding. That group includes 10 public universities and 13 private ones, and in the top 
50 there are 29 publics and 21 privates. The amount of NIH research funding awarded 
to all higher education institutions exceeded $22B in FY2019, accounting for over half 
of the $39B total (National Institutes of Health 2020a; 2020c). It is important to note 
that more than 500 US higher education institutions receive NIH funding although 
there are only about 150 medical schools. Thus, many institutions are awarded support 
across a wider set of biomedically-related sciences and social sciences than just the 
clinically-oriented and basic medical science departments found in a medical school. Of 
higher education institutions receiving NIH funding in FY2019, the average was $43M 
and the median was just $3.6M. Thus, while NIH research support is concentrated 
at high-profile institutions with medical schools and extensive biomedical programs, 




12.1 How big is the business of college sports?
Lucrative contracts, high visibility, and college rivalries cause much to be said about 
how the money works across the variety of sports and types of schools involved in 
intercollegiate athletics.1 The total athletics budget across all schools in our dataset2 
exceeded $18B in FY2018 (Office of Postsecondary Education 2020). That’s about 
4.2% of the $435B total non-hospital revenues for all of the nearly 1,200 institutions 
(IPEDS 2020). More interesting is that 57% of all athletics revenue is accounted for 
by just 124 of those institutions, the NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) schools 
(see Box 12.1) with the highest-profile teams, celebrity coaches and rich sports media 
contracts (Office of Postsecondary Education 2020). Thus, it’s unsurprising that 
these prominent sports programs garner the lion’s share of headlines for game news 
and sports finances, especially in football and basketball. Some schools go so far as 
to privatize their athletics departments (Jarvis 2019), and some conferences may be 
looking to attract private equity investment (Bauer-Wolf 2019).
Let’s digress briefly to address a common question up front: do college sports 
provide an overall financial win to universities? No, they do not. With the exception 
of extraordinarily few schools in Division I of the NCAA that can cover virtually all 
their athletics costs, plus one or two rare rags-to-riches stories, university and college 
athletics programs are subsidized via student fees and institutional funds as part of 
a financially unsustainable “arms race” for greater standing (Cheslock and Knight 
2015). We’ll delve into further details about athletics revenue sources, including 
subsidies, in Section 12.2.
Returning to the size of the athletics budget, Figure 12.1 illustrates the difference 
in revenues by type of institution (expenses essentially equal revenues, as they do 
elsewhere in the university). Apart from the obvious budget scaling by institution size, 
perhaps the most remarkable feature of these data is the anomaly of the R1 Private 
1  The first intercollegiate sporting event was held in 1852, a four-mile rowing race known as the 
Harvard-Yale Regatta that marked the first of many US college sports rivalries and continues today.
2  IPEDS holds very little financial data on athletics programs, and several other data sets deal only 
with public institutions. Fortunately, the US Department of Education provides data from the Equity 
in Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA) that includes detailed information on the public and private 
institutions in our data set (Office of Postsecondary Education 2020).
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universities that, on average, spend far less on athletics ($47M) than their public 
counterparts ($89M). The “on average” aspect is important here, a direct consequence 
of the relatively few R1 Private universities participating in expensive top-tier football 
and basketball (see Box 12.1). If, instead of using the Carnegie classification, we 
stratify institutions by athletic subdivision (Figure 12.2), then the expected pattern 
emerges: FBS public schools have an average athletics budget of $80M while FBS 
private schools are at $92M. That 16% difference in public-private athletics budget in 
the FBS is relatively small compared to the more than 40% public-private difference 
in the rest of NCAA Division I and the Division II football schools. Remarkably, while 
the dollar amounts for public institutions are lower in NCAA Division III and still 
lower in the NAIA, private schools in the NAIA Division I spend three times more 
than their public counterparts, and twice as much in the NAIA Division II. For FBS 
institutions, the athletics department is roughly equivalent, budgetarily speaking, to a 
major academic college.
Figure 12.1.  FY2018 total athletics revenues from all sports per institution, averaged by Carnegie 


































What kind of investment in athletics are all these schools making relative to their overall 
institutional budgets? It turns out that it’s about 5% of overall non-hospital revenue 
for most Carnegie classifications, with a few exceptions: a little over 7% at public 
baccalaureate colleges and the R3-M3 Private universities, and just 1.5% for R1 Private 
universities (Office of Postsecondary Education 2020) due to a combination of a low 
numerator (smaller average budget because of lower FBS participation, mentioned 
above) and a high denominator (large institutional budgets). When stratified by 
subdivision there are some stark differences, however, as seen in Figure 12.3. In the 
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Figure 12.2.  FY2018 total athletics revenues per institution averaged by athletic association, division, 














































FBS, publics and privates aren’t too different in relative share of the institutional 
budget for athletics, but in the FCS the publics run athletics budgets at twice the share 
of the privates. That arrangement is flipped for NCAA Division I non-football schools 
and all schools in NCAA Division II, where the privates run athletics budgets that are 
Figure 12.3.  FY2018 total athletics revenue share of overall institutional non-hospital revenues 
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two to three times the relative size of those at the publics. It’s even more the case in 
both divisions of the NAIA with athletics budgets at the private schools being three to 
five times larger in a relative sense.
All the above data focus on revenues flowing to the universities, but there is a 
bit more money to account for in the overall enterprise of college sports: the funds 
going to support the associations and conferences themselves. The associations and 
the individual conferences are separately incorporated nonprofit organizations, 
which also means that they each file a Form 990 summarizing their annual revenues 
(Schwencke et al. 2020). For FY2018, the NCAA’s budget was $1B, the budgets for the 
Power Five conferences ranged from $374M at the Big 12 to $759M at the Big Ten with 
the ACC, Pac-123 and SEC in between those, while the other conferences in Division 
I ranged between $28M and $78M. Not included here in the bigger college sports 
business are the media companies, logo wear manufacturers, etc. who pay the NCAA 
and its members but who also make a profit of their own.
Box 12.1. Athletic Associations, Divisions and Conferences
Here’s a quick guide to the structure of intercollegiate athletics for readers who are not 
sports fans; to be precise, that’s 44% of US adults who are not college football fans and 
62% who are not college basketball fans (Jones 2017). Most institutions (95%) belong to 
one or more intercollegiate athletic associations (IPEDS 2020) that serve as the national 
sanctioning (i.e., quasi-regulatory) organizations. By far the largest and best-known is 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), although the National Association 
of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) serves small colleges and universities, and there are 
others that serve community colleges, religious schools and some individual sports. 
It’s worth noting the distinction between the selective nature of individuals and teams 
playing sanctioned sports versus the non-selective recreational and intramural club 
sports that any student can join; we are talking about the former here, those that are 
under a formal campus athletics department with a budget, coaches, facilities and, in the 
higher tiers, scholarships for designated student athletes.
The larger associations have hierarchical divisions and subdivisions, many of which 
are further divided into leagues known as conferences; these are the groups of ten to 
fifteen teams among which the regular-season games are played. Figure B.10 illustrates 
where the various types of schools in our data set belong by association, division and 
subdivision. We can see that the NCAA has three divisions, each including subdivisions 
for programs with football and without football (because having a football program 
skews the resources available to other sports). Division I of the NCAA, in addition to a 
non-football subdivision, has two subdivisions for football, the Football Bowl Subdivision 
(FBS) that includes the major (i.e., most well-resourced) football schools and the 
Football Championship Subdivision (FCS) that includes the other Division I schools 
3  The Pac-12 has two entities, the Pac-12 conference and the Pac-12 Networks, that had respective 
FY2018 revenues of $370M and $127M for a consolidated total of $497M.
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with football programs. The three NCAA Divisions are differentiated by regulations 
regarding number of sports fielded per school, the balance of teams for men and women, 
financial aid amounts and more. FBS schools have a higher scholarship requirement than 
FCS schools and they must average 15,000 people or more per home game.
Figure B.10.  Athletic association, division and subdivision membership in FY2018, by Carnegie 
classification and control. Source: EADA (Office of Postsecondary Education 2020).
In the NCAA the top divisions are dominated by public institutions whereas Division 
III has a preponderance of smaller private schools (Figure B.10). Most R1 publics are in 
the FBS while R1 privates are spread throughout all three divisions. The FBS is largely 
comprised of R1 and R2 schools with some R3-M3 schools as well.
Within the FBS are ten conferences, with conference membership differing slightly 
for football versus basketball, as seen in Figure B.11. The FBS conferences are the 
Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Big Ten Conference (Big Ten), Conference USA 
(CUSA), Southeastern Conference (SEC), Mid-American Conference (MAC), Pacific-12 
Conference (Pac-12), Sun Belt Conference (S-Belt), Mountain West Conference (MWC), 
American Athletic Conference (AAC), Big Twelve Conference (Big 12). The one 


























































The dominance of public schools in the FBS is especially striking (Figure B.11) with 
only 16 privates among the total of 124 in our data set (13%).* One would think that the 
available resources at R1 Private schools in particular would enable them to spend more 
on top-tier football and basketball programs, but clearly that is a path that many have 
chosen not to follow. No doubt the age-old tension between athletics and academics is a 
part of that dynamic, along with a differential need for name exposure, focusing on an 
elite academic reputation, and understanding that FBS participation requires what is 
typically a significant and sustained “loss-leader” investment.
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Figure B.11.  NCAA Division I FBS conference membership for football (FB) and basketball (BB) in 
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* The FBS additionally incorporates a half-dozen schools including teams from the three 
military academies that are not in our data set (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and some 
schools that have multiple conference memberships across different sports.
12.2 How important are subsidies and media revenues in athletics?
With the exception of the Power Five conferences, which the NCAA calls the FBS 
Autonomy conferences,4 institutional funds and student fees contribute the majority 
of support for athletics programs in all divisions. Figure 12.4 shows that together 
they supply 70% of revenue even in the FCS, and about 90% in Divisions II and III. 
Philanthropic income is generally the other sizable source of revenue, about 5–13% 
in all but the Power Five. It’s worth noting that this funding mix is not unlike many 
academic departments. As we expect, the Power Five revenue portfolio is quite 
different, dominated by NCAA and conference income from media rights and bowl 
games, followed by gifts and endowment income as well as ticket sales. Institutional 
support comprises only about 5% of income for this group, about half the amount 
from royalties, licensing and advertising.
4  The Power Five conferences are the ACC, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac-12 and SEC. The NCAA grants them 
autonomy to create their own rules to benefit athletes, which includes allocating more resources. The 
remaining (non-autonomous) FBS conferences are sometimes called the Group of Five.
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Figure 12.4.  FY2018 athletics revenue sources as a share of total athletic revenues by NCAA 
subdivision. Source NCAA (2019a).
The divergence between the Power Five and the other subdivisions is even more 
striking when we consider that these percentages apply to the dollar amounts in 
Figure 12.2. The median FY2018 revenue at a Power Five school was $123M versus 
$41M at the other FBS schools, and about $22M at FCS and non-football schools across 
the rest of Division I (NCAA 2019a). For a sense of comparison, the median FY2018 
income from media rights/NCAA alone at Power Five schools was about $42M, the 
same as the entire revenue of the other FBS schools and double the entire revenue of 
an FCS school (NCAA 2019a).
Thus, institutional subsidies are the most important source of support for athletics 
programs at most universities. In the FBS, especially the Power Five, the business 
model is entirely different and can only be sustained because of the income streams 
associated with the high profile of its football and basketball programs. Ironically, 
the institutional investments required to compete at a middling level place a higher 
relative financial burden on the university than they do for the richest and highest-
performing FBS programs. The pressures to participate in the cycle of increasing 
investments to improve performance are significant, whether from athletics boosters, 
wealthy donors, board members, politicians, or local sports media, and they lead to 
widespread aspirational athletics budgeting across US higher education.
As we’ve seen, the size of the subsidy at most schools is sufficiently large that, if it 
was cut from athletics, it could indeed be diverted to help support academics, as has 
happened occasionally (Keller 2010; Sokol 2020). However, at top-tier programs, this 
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I have heard resolute colleagues on my campus (a Power Five school) suggest that 
the entire athletics budget be diverted to academics—that’s largely folly, of course, 
because most of the generated and gift revenue would evaporate without the high-
profile teams.5
12.3 Is the number of student athletes increasing?
Before we move on to athletics spending, which is to say investments made ostensibly 
in the interests of student athletes (at least in part), it’s worth knowing how many 
athletes there are by type of school and any underlying trends. The average number of 
student athletes (who are all undergraduates by definition) at R1 and R2 institutions 
is about 500 to 700, and about 400 at smaller institutions (Office of Postsecondary 
Education 2020). From those numbers alone, we can infer that the percentage of 
students who are athletes is significantly higher at smaller schools. While absolute 
numbers of student athletes have increased steadily at all types of institution in 
recent decades (the numerator), overall student enrollments (the denominator) have 
generally increased too with the exception of baccalaureate institutions (as we saw in 
Section 2.2).
These and other dynamics have led to interesting patterns in student athletes 
as a share of all undergraduates, illustrated in Figure 12.5 and Figure 12.6. Public 
universities have lower percentages of student athletes than private universities, and 
bigger universities have lower shares of student athletes than do medium and small 
institutions. Thus, at R1 Public universities, student athletes average just a few percent 
of the student body, while at private baccalaureate colleges, nearly 30% of the student 
body are athletes (Figure 12.5). The trends diverge by size: larger universities (R1 and 
R2, public and private) have decreased their shares of student athletes on campus 
largely due to overall enrollments growing faster than athletics team slots. Many of 
these schools have fielded a large set of sports for men and women for some time, so 
they are closer to an upper bound. In contrast, medium to small institutions have all 
increased their shares of student athletes on campus (since at least the early 2000s 
when data began). This latter trend is especially noticeable when viewed by association 
and division (Figure 12.6). The NCAA Division I schools have not seen an increase in 
the percentage of student athletes on campus, while NCAA Divisions II and III as 
well as both divisions of the NAIA have seen higher percentages of student athletes. 
The growth is particularly pronounced in the NAIA where that share has virtually 
doubled in several categories. A recent study of athletics at small colleges that compete 
predominantly in lower division sports found that certain sports (e.g., women’s golf, 
women’s and men’s lacrosse) have grown rapidly, and that while women’s sports 
have grown faster than men’s, the number of men’s sports and participants have each 
5  Athletics subsidies contribute to the historic tension between academic and athletic priorities. For the 
record, despite an admission advantage (Malekoff 2005) and lower GPAs (Rampell 2010), graduation 
rates for athletes are higher than for the broader student body (NCAA 2019b).
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increased too (Hearn et al. 2018). The authors make the case that expanding into 
desirable sports and growing the percentage of student athletes can expand appeal 
to prospective students, creating a potentially astute enrollment strategy for certain 
small colleges.
Figure 12.5.  FY2003 and FY2018 student athletes as a share of all undergraduates by Carnegie 
classification and control. Source: EADA (Office of Postsecondary Education 2020).
Figure 12.6.  FY2003 and FY2018 student athletes as a share of all undergraduates by athletic 
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12.4 What are the trends in athletics spending  
and where does the money go?
Athletics expenditures at most types of schools are virtually the same as the revenues 
shown in Section 12.1, except that FBS schools average several million dollars (a few 
percent) less in annual expenditures. That margin may be used for reinvestment, 
carried forward to the next year, or (rarely) returned to the university. Whether it is 
truly a profit (in everyday terms; recall from Section 3.9 that technically it’s a margin 
in the nonprofit setting) depends on all costs being fully accounted—student financial 
aid is sometimes overlooked as a cost to the institution, as are regular facilities 
maintenance expenses. In general, though, total athletics expenditures look much like 
total revenues.
Because universities field different numbers of sports and various sized teams, 
athletics expenditures can be usefully scaled and compared as expenditures per 
athlete, much like university spending per student. Athletics expenditure levels are 
illustrated in Figure 12.7, including inflation-adjusted changes from FY2003 to FY2018 
(the trends between those years are approximately linear in most cases). The amounts 
per subdivision generally scale as expected, with FY2018 expenditures per student 
well over six figures at FBS institutions6 and over $40,000 in the rest of NCAA Division 
I. Curiously, among the latter, the FCS programs spend slightly less than the non-
football subdivision programs, perhaps because the large size of football squads 
increases the denominator relative to other sports. All lower divisions spend under 
$20,000 per athlete.
6  In FY2018, FBS schools per-athlete spending averaged almost $300,000 in basketball and almost 
$200,000 in football. The other FBS sports averaged about $50,000 per athlete and ranged between 
$10,000 (Sailing) and $120,000 (Ice Hockey) per athlete (Office of Postsecondary Education 2020).
The real story in Figure 12.7 is the growth. Almost all divisions have grown per-
athlete expenditures by half over those sixteen years, with the FBS and NAIA Division 
II closer to double. In annualized growth terms, all divisions have expanded at least 
2% above the rate of inflation with several above 3% and the same couple closer to 4%. 
These patterns highlight the expansion of athletics on a financial and a per capita basis 
at two to four times the analogous rate for university-wide expenditures (see Section 
3.4). When FY2020 data become available, they are likely to show the dramatic effects 
of COVID-19 on athletics finances, nowhere more so than in the FBS: virtually no ticket 
revenue, canceled games and seasons, layoffs and furloughs, program cuts, and even 
elimination of smaller sports at some institutions (Uhler 2020).
While the size of athletics expenditures varies across subdivisions, in a relative 
sense the money goes to a consistent set of expenses more-or-less across the board. 
Figure 12.8 shows athletics expense categories as a share of total expenditures for 
the NCAA. Athletic scholarship aid is the only category with substantial differences 
across the subdivisions: in Division I it ranges from 13% of the total at FBS autonomy 
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Figure 12.7.  FY2003 and FY2018 total institutional athletics expenditures per student athlete 



















































(Power Five) schools to a bit under 30% for the FCS and non-football subdivisions; in 
Division II, aid is about one third of the budget; and, in Division III there is virtually 
no aid by stipulation. If we omit financial aid then all NCAA subdivisions spend 
Figure 12.8.  FY2018 athletics expense categories as a share of total athletic expenses by NCAA 
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their funds in a remarkably similar pattern (much as we see in Division III), over one 
quarter on coaches (see Section 12.6 below), about 20% each on facilities costs and on 
administrative compensation and severance packages, about 15% on game and travel 
expenses, and the remainder on all other costs. Clearly, other than the student aid 
component, it takes much the same mix of activities and resources to run an athletics 
department no matter if its teams are regularly on national television or competing in 
the lower divisions.
12.5 Which sports make or lose money?
The so-called “revenue sports” are football and men’s basketball in the NCAA Division 
I FBS. Only these two sports in that subdivision (and largely only those in the Power 
Five conferences) are able to attract enough television viewers and ticket-buying fans 
to create clear net revenue margins when averaged across the division. And when we 
look closely at net revenues, as we’ll do below, we’ll see that it’s really about football—
perhaps surprisingly, basketball comes in a distant second on average. Those margins 
cross-subsidize all the other intercollegiate sports at the institution that are typically 
also competing heavily in Division I. Note that these two sports are not necessarily net 
revenue positive at all schools in the division, and likewise some other sports that are 
non-revenue positive on average across the division can be revenue sports at certain 
schools (e.g., ice hockey).
It bears repeating that, as we saw in Section 12.2, institutional subsidies and student 
fees account for half to 90% of the athletics budget from the FCS on down through the 
lower divisions. Therefore, those athletics programs all “lose” money in an overall 
sense. Of course, within their own (subsidized) budgets they generally balance total 
revenue with expenses as any other unit would. We’ll focus on the FBS in this section 
because it is where the generated net revenues are.
It is instructive to see the revenue and expenditure amounts for each sport, 
illustrated in Figure 12.9. We see that FBS football budgets are two to three times larger 
than basketball budgets, and basketball budgets are about ten times the size of any 
other sport. The effects of media revenues and ticket sales on football and basketball 
finances are thus dramatic. Furthermore, football is a men’s-only sport and over 80% 
of FBS basketball revenues are earned by the men’s team rather than the women’s 
team—about two thirds of the expenses are incurred by the men’s team (Office of 
Postsecondary Education 2020). As much as Title IX has led to greater gender parity 
in college sports, popular sports culture and fan preferences lag far behind, leading 
to the financial dominance of these two sports within FBS athletics programs. The 
net revenues make this plain: about $14M from football, $1M from basketball, and 
net losses of $0.5M or more in each of the other sports. Football clearly supplies the 
lion’s share of net revenues and it is remarkable that basketball net revenues are so 
low, especially given the sport’s high visibility and the comparative size of basketball 
budgets.
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Figure 12.9.  FY2018 revenues, expenses and net revenue/loss by sport for all sports with over 1,000 
participants in the NCAA Division I FBS. Source: EADA (Office of Postsecondary 
Education 2020).
While the absolute dollar amounts provide a clear sense of scale across the various 
sports, it is also enlightening to examine them in relative terms. Figure 12.10 shows 



































































































Figure 12.10.  FY2018 net revenue/loss as a share of expenses by sport for all sports with over 1,000 




































































































Like Nobody's Business282 
spending in that sport, thus providing a relative index of net gain or loss by sport. 
FBS football produces a margin that is 60% more than its expenses, while basketball 
margins are less than 10% beyond expenses. Looking at Figure 12.10 we can see the 
relative gain/loss profile of sports across FBS schools quite plainly: many have net 
losses that require as much as half of their expenditures to be cross-subsidized, and as 
we’ve just seen, almost all of that comes from football.
12.6 Do all head coaches earn millions?
Outside of the NCAA Division I, which is to say at the majority of institutions, head 
coach salaries across all sports are unexceptional, averaging $45,000 (NAIA Division 
II) to $69,000 (NCAA Division II with football) in FY2018 (Office of Postsecondary 
Education 2020). Headline-grabbing seven-figure head coach salaries are largely a 
feature of NCAA Division I FBS football and basketball, especially in the Power Five 
conferences. Figure 12.11 illustrates overall head coach compensation for the revenue 
sports in the Power Five. At these eye-watering levels, football head coaches average $5M 
annually in the SEC and “only” $3M in the PAC-12. Those earnings are 25–65% higher 
than the men’s basketball head coaches that average just over $2M in the PAC-12 and 
near $3M in the other conferences. Base institutional salaries generally account for over 
90% of the total pay, with 3–9% in bonuses and up to 6% from non-university athletically-
related compensation (e.g., endorsements, consulting with apparel and equipment 
manufacturers, guest speaking, sports camps). These coaches are usually the highest 
compensated individuals at their institutions, earning more than the president and the 
rock-star surgeons. For some observers these numbers are obscene and for others they 
are the reality of the market, but all can agree that they are quite extraordinary.7
7  The contrast between the sky-high coaches’ salaries, athletics revenues, and the prohibition against 
student-athlete compensation has for years created rising pressure on the NCAA to permit athletes 
to profit from their name, image and likeness, a decision that it recently approved (Anderson 
2020a). The highest-rated football recruits in the FBS generate $650,000 for their programs annually 
(Anderson 2020b). A recent study estimated that in the Power Five conferences, assuming wage 
structures from professional sports and a 50% share of revenue, that a starting quarterback should 
earn $2.4M annually, a wide receiver $1.3M, with the lowest-paid backups still earning over $100,000 
annually (Garthwaite et al. 2020).
What about trends in head coach salaries? Figure 12.12 shows inflation-adjusted 
head coach salaries averaged for all sports by division since FY2003. FBS head coach 
salaries have risen dramatically, more than doubling over this period at an annualized 
rate of 5% above the rate of inflation. No doubt the football and basketball coaches’ 
compensation affect the average—major football coach salaries rose 9% from FY2018 
to FY2019 (Lederman 2019)—but non-revenue coaches at Power Five schools have 
seen steep raises too (Berkowitz et al. 2019). FCS head coaches earn about the same in 
real terms now as they did in 2003, while head coaches in the non-football subdivision 
of NCAA Division I have grown at an annualized rate of 1.6% above inflation since 
then. Outside of NCAA Division I, head coach salaries have remained flat for over 
a decade—those coaches, who comprise the majority of head coaches nationally, are 
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Figure 12.11.  FY2019 football and men’s basketball head coach pay for the NCAA Division I 
FBS Power Five conferences, including base institutional salary, bonuses paid and 
athletically related compensation from non-university sources. Source: USA Today 
(2020a; 2020b).
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making relatively less today in real terms than they did in the early 2000s. As in other 
aspects of college athletics finances, in head coach compensation amounts and trends 
the contrasts between the top-tier and the rest are as conspicuous as ever.
Figure 12.12.  Trends in inflation-adjusted average institutional head coach salary across all sports by 
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12.7 Does athletic success benefit the university’s bottom line?
It happened on a windy and rainy Miami afternoon in 1984, the Friday after 
Thanksgiving, at the end of a nationally-televised football game between Boston 
College and defending national champions, the University of Miami. An improbable 
Hail Mary pass in the final second of the game by Doug Flutie,8 the Boston College 
quarterback, led to a classic victory and ensured that this now-legendary moment 
became enshrined in the annals of college sports. For two years following the win, 
Boston College experienced a rise in applications that many attributed to the school’s 
high-exposure success on the field. The post-game increase was alliteratively dubbed 
the Flutie Factor, or Flutie Effect. Ever since then, because most football seasons 
and virtually every basketball tournament produce compelling underdog stories,9 
anecdotes surface regularly about the Flutie Factor working for other schools (Nowicki 
2014; Wikipedia 2020).
The claimed benefits of this supposed phenomenon have broadened over the years 
to include not only the quantity of applications but also their quality, reputational 
rankings, merchandise sales, publicity value, philanthropic gifts, attendance growth, 
licensing royalties, and state appropriations as well as less tangible benefits including 
name recognition and institutional prominence. While increased game attendance, 
team merchandise sales and licensing royalties are unsurprising following high-profile 
athletic success, they benefit primarily the athletic department.
What about the more fundamental assertion embodied in the Flutie Factor, 
that athletics success benefits the wider university? It turns out that unequivocal 
answers to that question were elusive for many years, with studies of varying scope 
and sophistication producing mixed and even contradictory results. The two most 
comprehensive and econometrically advanced studies are both recent: a paper by 
Anderson (2017) and an article by Baumer and Zimbalist (2019). The latter authors 
provide an expert review of the literature covering 25 studies; those findings, the results 
of their own analyses, and two further recent papers (Eggers et al. 2019; D.R. Smith 
2019), for a total of 28 altogether, are the basis for the relationships depicted in Figure 
12.13. Nearly all of the studies focus on NCAA Division I, some more narrowly on the 
FBS, and the majority cover football although some incorporate men’s basketball; 16 of 
8  After winning the Heisman Trophy and becoming the first to break the 10,000 yards passing barrier 
in a college career, Flutie went on to play professional football. He retired from the game in 2006 and 
became a sports broadcaster. Of the many articles on what became known as the Hail Flutie game, 
one of the most evocative was written for its 30th anniversary by Mark Brown (2014); it includes the 
obligatory video clip and many others in a lively summary of the game.
9  One of the most notable Cinderella stories is the rise of Gonzaga, a previously obscure small college 
in Spokane, Washington, that was in serious enrollment and financial decline during the 1990s. After 
bursting to prominence in the Elite Eight round of the 1999 NCAA Men’s basketball tournament, 
a series of major athletics gifts and continued strong performance vaulted the school’s national 
exposure and led to documented increases in enrollments and academic quality of applicants (O’Neil 
2017).
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the studies focus on applicant quantity and quality, 11 on philanthropic giving, and 4 
on state appropriations.
Figure 12.13.  Summary of the strength of statistical relationships between athletic success and 
hypothesized benefits, based on review of 28 scholarly articles. See text for details.
None of the relationships are strong, and those with any effect favor football over 
basketball. The statistical link between athletic success and number of subsequent 
applicants is weak to moderate at best, with the size of the increase being just 0.5–1% 
in the most comprehensive studies and lasting one to three years; when studied, the 
additional applicants tended to be less academically prepared and originated in-state. 
That likely explains why the observed effect on admissions yield is extremely weak 
statistically and any effect is small (about 0.5%). The relationship between athletic 
success and a school’s SAT scores is likewise exceedingly weak, with an essentially 
meaningless impact of 0 to 8 points (a fraction of a percent). None of these applicant 
quantity or quality metrics has a direct financial benefit, and many schools have fixed 
incoming classes, but it could be argued that improvements in yield might make the 
institution slightly more selective and thus able to charge higher tuition.
Figure 12.13 also illustrates several metrics that are explicitly financial: gifts to the 
athletics program, gifts to the university excluding athletics, and state appropriations. 
Analyses of giving are plagued by incomplete data, but there may be a weak statistical 
link to athletic giving, with an impact of several hundred thousand dollars (perhaps 
5–10%). There is no robust link between athletic success and broader university giving, 
nor is there a relationship to legislative appropriations to public institutions.
Overall, under expert scrutiny, it appears that the Flutie Factor is often exaggerated, 
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at all. Interestingly, the attribution of the enrollment bump at Boston College to the 
Flutie Factor was later discounted and was instead explained by a set of campus 
investments and enrollment growth in the years before and after Flutie’s eponymous 
pass (McDonald 2003). Despite the lackluster evidence, it’s a testament to the power 
of a great story that advocates and commentators continue to mention the Flutie Factor 
when discussions turn to the benefits of college athletics for the rest of campus.
13. Fundraising
13.1 How much do universities raise in gifts?
Philanthropic giving to universities is an essential part of their business model. This 
has always been true for private universities, and for most public institutions it has 
become increasingly true over the last several decades. Of course, the relative role 
of gifts and endowment income is far greater at the privates than the publics, as we 
saw back in Sections 2.4 and 2.5; combined, they account for 5–10% of the budget at 
public institutions and 20–40% of the budget at privates. Thus, it shouldn’t surprise us 
that education is the second largest charitable cause at 14% of all giving, second only 
to religion at 29%, and ahead of giving to human services and health at 13% and 9% 
respectively (Giving USA 2020).
The levels of giving to different types of institutions are illustrated in Figure 13.1, 
split into deciles to show the huge range of giving within each type of institution. Gift 
totals clearly scale with school size and as I just noted, size-for-size, private institutions 
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attract more than public ones. The sheer dollar amounts raised are astonishing—in 
FY2018 the top 10% of R1 publics attracted over $380M in new gifts, while the top 
decile of R1 privates raised nearly $1.3B, over three times more—and these averages 
are per-institution and they raise these amounts anew every year. The stark disparity 
in gift income within each type of school is even more dramatic. The bottom 10% of 
R1 publics attracted about $10M in new gifts in FY2018, while the bottom decile of R1 
privates raised “only” $76M dollars. Across all types of institution, the lowest decile 
raises from 0.1–3% of the highest decile.
Gift amounts per student afford a more consistent comparison across institution 
types, and in Figure 13.2 we can see that FY2018 gifts per student at the publics 
amounted to no more than a few thousand dollars at most publics and under $10,000 
in the topmost decile of each institution type. At the privates, the profile of R3-M3 
privates, the lowest type, is similar to the R1 publics with all but the top decile under 
$5,000 per student in new gifts, while at the other privates the schools in the upper 
deciles raise many tens of thousands of dollars per student annually, peaking at more 
than $70,000 at the top 10% of R1 private universities. Private baccalaureate colleges 
stand out as receiving the second highest level of overall gift support per student. It’s 
worth noting that R1 universities attract sizable gifts for research and athletics beyond 
the mix at other institutions, which increases their general and per-student gift totals. 
Also, a reminder that we are looking just at new giving here and that endowment 
income is a separate but equally important source of philanthropically-derived support 
(endowments are covered in Sections 13.3 and 13.4).
Figure 13.2.  FY2018 gifts per full-time equivalent student averaged per decile by Carnegie 
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Giving has tripled over the last three decades at most types of university, the exceptions 
being the two smallest types of private school (R3-M3 universities and baccalaureate 
colleges) as shown in Figure 13.3. The latter saw some growth in gift support during 
the late 1990s but their inflation-adjusted trends have otherwise been flat. Considering 
that the R3-M3 private schools have experienced slight enrollment growth over 
this period, their per-student gift support has actually declined by almost 40% (not 
shown) since its peak in 2000. The reason that we don’t see a similar pattern in the 
smaller publics, which have seen analogous enrollment patterns, is that virtually all 
publics initiated or expanded their development programs during this time. Many 
public institutions were starting from low levels of fundraising activity relative to the 
privates that already had active giving programs, and the publics thus had plenty of 
opportunity to grow (although their received gift totals are still substantially less than 
at the privates, as we saw above). Fundraising programs are still growing throughout 
the medium and small publics and it’s not yet clear when they will encounter similar 
limitations to further growth seen at the smaller privates. Still, at some point, they 
must because there is only so much giving capacity available for institutions with 
lower numbers of alumni and limited geographical spheres of influence.
Figure 13.3.  Growth in inflation-adjusted total gifts averaged for the two smallest Carnegie 
classifications of private institution and for all other public and private institution 
types, by fiscal year. Values for 1997 and 1998 at private institutions are interpolated at 
the average rate of neighboring years; the average for other institutions is weighted by 
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13.2 Who is giving, and what are they supporting?
The mix of individuals and groups giving to higher education has shifted in recent 
decades, reflecting the changing face of philanthropy. Alumni have always been and 
will always be an important donor group, precisely because alumni have personal ties 
and emotional connections to their alma mater. As we can see in Figure 13.4, alumni 
donations are consistently among the top sources of giving to universities and colleges, 
although the preeminence of alumni giving changed after 2001 as philanthropic 
foundations took the top spot, part of the latter’s multi-decade increase in importance. 
At about the same time, and similarly to alumni giving, inflation-adjusted giving by 
non-alumni individuals and by corporations also flattened. The absolute and relative 
roles of giving by religious organizations has decreased consistently since the 1960s, 
to the point where those contributions have become sufficiently small to be included 
with other organizations since 2014. However, this is not the reason for the increase 
in giving by other organizations, which instead reflects an underlying change in the 
nature of philanthropy that is closely connected to the increase in importance of 
foundation giving.
Figure 13.4.  Seven decades of voluntary support for degree-granting postsecondary institutions 
by source of gift, in FY2016 dollars. Sources: NCES (National Center for Education 
Statistics 2018e) and CASE (Council for Advancement and Support of Education 2020).
The growth in independent foundations parallels the affluence generated in the private 
sector, such as in technology and finance (e.g., Gates Foundation and Bloomberg 
Philanthropies), and the number of independent foundations grew by 40% from 
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reflects a shift in structure of how individual wealth is given away more indirectly 
than before. Similarly, the growth in popularity of donor-advised funds is an example 
of how individual wealth is given away using a different structure, and these account 
for some of the recent rise in the other organization category seen in Figure 13.4. 
Donor-advised funds are managed by community foundations or charitable arms of 
investment companies (the latter having lately seen substantial growth). They enable 
a donor to place money in the fund and claim the charitable tax deduction right away 
while the fund subsequently gives the money to charitable causes (technically an 
independent decision by the fund, but in practice virtually always on the advice of 
the donor). Thus, the mechanisms by which individual wealth is donated have been 
changing, affecting the appearance of who is giving to higher education. Also, while 
major gifts and giving overall are on the rise, household giving rates are actually 
declining (Osili 2019).
Not all contributions from independent foundations are gifts. Many such 
foundations have extensive grant-making programs that support work in research, 
education and public outreach. For example, several of the largest foundations, 
including Mellon, Duke, Ford, Kellogg, and MacArthur, recently announced a $1.7B 
initiative in cultural inclusivity that will support nonprofit institutions in higher 
education, the arts and the humanities (Jaschik 2020). Most universities (and their 
foundations, if applicable) have established rules about what counts as a gift versus 
a grant or contract. The general rule of thumb is that the donor should not receive 
more than a thank you note for it to be a gift, versus a grant or contract where there 
are typically deliverables. Such rules are a defense against creative investigators and/
or donors who wish to avoid paying the facilities and administration cost recovery 
charges for grants (see Chapter 8).
Now that we’ve seen where donations come from, let’s move our attention to 
the intended purposes of those gifts. Gift purposes are divided into two broad 
categories, current operations and capital, as illustrated in Figure 13.5. Gifts to 
current operations are those that are available directly for current spending on a 
wide variety of purposes. In contrast, gifts to capital purposes will last for many years 
(e.g., buildings, property and major equipment) or they will last in perpetuity (i.e., 
endowments) and are managed to produce income for annual expenditures. Gifts to 
research cover the whole range of scholarly pursuits from science to the humanities, 
while donations to academic divisions include those made to departments, schools 
and colleges but without other restrictions (such as a research topic or student 
scholarship). Unrestricted gifts, those without a purpose expressed by the donor, 
are far less common than they were a generation or two ago—unlike all other 
(restricted) gifts that can only be spent on their stipulated use, unrestricted gifts can 
be used however the institution deems best. Gifts to student financial aid include 
non-endowment contributions for scholarships (merit or need-based), student 
awards, and some athletic scholarships.
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Figure 13.5.  FY2018 distribution of gifts to higher education institutions by purpose. Source: CASE 
(Council for Advancement and Support of Education 2019; 2020).
Speaking of athletics, let’s bust a persistent myth about giving to athletics versus 
academics: on average, athletics receives just 4% of gifts to the university for current 
operations. There’s a perception on many campuses that the lion’s share of giving goes 
to athletics, and while athletics gifts also go to endowments and facilities, the total 
athletic share pales in comparison to the academic share.1 There’s a related hypothesis 
that courting athletics donors somehow crowds out donors who otherwise might give 
to academics. Its flawed assumptions are that fundraising for an institution is a zero-
sum game and that donors can be redirected to other causes. The bulk of athletics 
fundraising is directly linked to obtaining premium football and basketball tickets and 
associated privileges such as stadium clubs and parking privileges. Astute presidents 
and fundraisers know that it is not an either/or proposition and that, while there are 
benefits to greater exposure and the occasional major athletics donor can be persuaded 
to support the institution more broadly, donor passion and intent drive most giving 
decisions and these are largely separate sets of donors. The research literature on this 
effect is small, but the most thorough recent study found evidence for spillover benefits 
from athletic giving to academic giving rather than crowding out such donations (Koo 
and Dittmore 2014), although recall from Section 12.7 on the related Flutie Factor that 
the magnitude of these kinds of effects is small.
Returning to the distribution of gifts by purpose, a large share of donations goes to 
restricted endowments. These are the core gift funds that support student scholarships, 
1  There are exceptions but they are rare. For example, even in the SEC, only LSU raises more gift 
funding for athletics than for academics; the other conference members typically raise twice as much 
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named chairs, centers and institutes for the long term. Making a gift to endow these 
purposes involves a challenging trade-off, as much for the donor as for the department 
chair or dean soliciting the gift: current needs are almost always pressing and a large 
contribution of cash in the short run can make a sizable impact immediately versus a 
smaller impact for the long run. For example, a $100,000 gift can benefit 20 needy students 
with scholarships of $5000 for one year, or it can provide a single $5,000 scholarship for 
just one student in perpetuity, taking twenty years to reach the same level of impact. 
Only after that time, at which point the donor may have passed on, does the lasting 
impact of an endowment manifest itself. Thus, endowments are about the long game 
and they are not necessarily the vehicle of choice when shorter-term goals are a priority.
Buildings are a particularly visible sign of large capital gifts. Depending on the 
building’s purpose, the gift might account for a substantial portion of the construction 
expenses or it might only cover a minor portion of the overall project cost. There may be 
other sources of funds for classroom or laboratory buildings that can be supplemented 
with gifts, while funds for performance halls or stadiums may not be given the same 
precedence for funding as academic buildings, meaning that a larger proportion of 
those dollars will need to be raised from private donations. Most universities have 
established policies on the gift amounts associated with naming buildings, centers, 
programs, etc. after donors (and of course buildings can be named without relation to 
a donation to honor a significant social figure such as a politician, civil rights leader, or 
former university president).2
13.3 How big are endowments and how much have they grown?
The basic concept of an endowment is simple: rather than spending a cash gift on 
current needs, invest the money for the long term and use the proceeds to provide 
funding in perpetuity. We’ll go through an illustrated example of how endowments 
work in the next section (Section 13.4), but first let’s clarify some language and get a 
sense of endowment size and growth across higher education.
We tend to talk about endowments like we talk about sheep, using the same word 
for the singular and the plural (as I just did in the previous paragraph). This can lead 
to unfortunate misperceptions both on campus and in public policy, especially the use 
of the singular to describe the entire university endowment. The resulting impression 
is that there is a single fund containing a vast hoard of cash that can be spent on 
whatever the university desires or used as a rainy-day account to avoid budget cuts in 
times of financial need. There is no single fund. University endowments are collections of 
2  Names can be removed and naming gifts returned if warranted. For example, the names of 
controversial figures such as pro-slavery alumni at Yale (Thelin 2017) and Woodrow Wilson at 
Princeton (Princeton University 2020) have been removed from campus buildings, as was the name 
of donors to Tufts who were linked to the opioid crisis (Seltzer 2019b). The issue can go further: at 
the University of Alabama a donor seeking improper influence had his name removed from the Law 
School and his gift returned (Jaschik 2019c).
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hundreds or thousands of individual funds, each from a distinct original gift and almost 
all from different donors over time. So, technically, the university has endowments, 
plural, despite our confusing verbal shorthand that incorrectly implies a single 
institutional fund. Endowments are generally not fungible either and virtually all of 
them have legal restrictions on their purpose as a condition of the gift, as we saw in the 
previous section. Therefore, the university or its foundation cannot unilaterally spend 
the principal or earnings of an endowment intended for, say, student scholarships to 
instead pay for a new stadium or to cover salaries and prevent layoffs. This issue isn’t 
helped by the conspicuous size of total endowments at the wealthiest elite private 
universities, which have become sufficiently large that recent legislation imposed a tax 
on these otherwise tax-exempt organizations.3
Figure 13.6 shows the size of total institutional endowments, split into deciles as 
we did for gifts because of the unusually large range within each institution type. At 
R1 public universities the total endowment value is typically $0.5 to $1.5B although 
schools in the top decile average north of $6B each. Endowments at the other public 
institution types barely register on the chart: at R2 publics the median endowment is 
$190M (lowest and highest deciles averaging $22M and $732M respectively), while at 
the smaller publics the median is $20-$30M with their lowest deciles in the single-digit 
millions and the highest deciles at $150-$300M.
Figure 13.6.  FY2018 endowments averaged per decile by Carnegie classification and control. Source: 
IPEDS (2020).
3  The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act imposed a 1.4% tax on private nonprofit higher education institutions 
with endowment assets greater than $500,000 per student and with at least 500 students enrolled. 
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Figure 13.6 also makes plain why the most well-endowed private institutions attract 
special attention—the handful of universities at the top of the pyramid have total 
endowment assets in the tens of billions of dollars (Harvard leads that list with about 
$40B). Endowments at the R1 privates are more typically in the single-digit billions, as 
are the wealthier R2 privates, although the latter are more typically in the hundreds 
of millions. While the richer R3-M3 privates have endowments in the hundreds of 
millions, there is a steep drop-off across these institutions and their endowments 
are more typically in the tens of millions. The private baccalaureate schools display 
a particularly wide range in endowments, as this group includes some unusually 
well-endowed elite colleges ($1.5B in the highest decile) as well as many less-wealthy 
schools (averaging just $11M in the lowest decile).
Returning to those universities with the largest endowments, the concentration of 
accumulated private giving is especially stark at the very top of the list, as shown in 
Figure 13.7. The top 2% of schools (23 of them) hold 50% of all university endowment 
wealth in the country. The first four on the list—Harvard, Yale, Stanford and Princeton—
account for over 20%. Counterintuitively, the top 25 list includes 5 public universities: 
Texas A&M and the University of Michigan are in positions 7 and 8, ahead of large 
private schools such as Columbia and also the University of Southern California, the 
latter with an endowment close to those of two more publics, Virginia and Ohio State. 
Endowment size is determined by many things, including but not limited to the size of 
the founding endowment (at private institutions), the number of financially successful 
alumni (in turn a function of time), and the compounding effects of past success and 
prestige that help to further attract non-alumni donors as well.
Figure 13.7.  Top 25 FY2018 university endowments and their cumulative share of all endowments 
in the data set. Amounts are for the main campus location and do not include branch 
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The result for high-endowment institutions is that they have extraordinary resources 
to invest in their educational and research missions, all part of staying ahead in the 
competition (some would say arms race) to be the best. Assuming a 4.5% payout, 
every billion dollars of endowment provides $45M in revenue per year—that’s as 
much as a percentage or two of overall budgets at big universities such as the ones on 
the top 25 list, and they all receive several multiples of that number.
We can level the endowment playing field somewhat by examining endowment 
per student, just as we did for gift amounts. Figure 13.8 illustrates those distributions, 
again by decile as we did above for endowments. The same key observations apply 
here too: the especially wide range within each type of institution, and the large 
differences between public and private schools. The lowest deciles at medium and 
small institutions are just a few thousand dollars of endowment per student, while the 
highest deciles average in the hundreds of thousands, with the most well-endowed 
reaching $1M or more per student.
Figure 13.8.  FY2018 endowment per full-time equivalent student averaged per decile by Carnegie 
classification and control. Source: IPEDS (2020).
The top 25 list for per-student endowments is illustrated in Figure 13.9 and, 
unsurprisingly, with only one exception (Soka University4 in the number 2 spot), 
it’s a who’s who of the most elite and long-established private schools in the nation. 
4  Soka University of America is a small liberal arts college located in Orange County, CA, and it isn’t yet 
as well-known as the other schools on this list. It provides a secular education emphasizing human 
rights and interdisciplinary approaches, and was established in 2001 by a Japan-based worldwide 
Buddhist movement that contributed to its endowment (Soka University of America 2020). In FY2018, 









































13. Fundraising  297
No public institutions make this list;5 they are all private and virtually all are either 
R1 universities or baccalaureate colleges. The wealth concentration is slightly less 
pronounced for this metric than for endowments proper, but the institutions on this 
list are still home to over one third of all per-student endowment wealth. Using the 
same payout math as above, $1M of endowment per student equates to $45,000 of 
annual endowment income per student. Note that this is not what these institutions 
necessarily spend per student, but it is a relative guide to the level of resources 
available at the wealthiest institutions. Also, a reminder that research universities have 
endowments for research institutes as well as for graduate students, and the simple 
endowment per student metric does not account for these differences.
Figure 13.9.  Top 25 FY2018 university endowments per full-time equivalent student and their 
cumulative share of all values in the data set, shaded by Carnegie classification (all are 
private institutions). Amounts are for the main campus location and do not include 
branch campuses reporting separately. Source: IPEDS (2020).
To wrap up our tour of endowment wealth it’s worthwhile to also look at trends. 
Endowment values have increased steadily over the years, with the amounts for 
each type of institution showing the same basic pattern that more-or-less tracks 
the stock market, which is where the bulk of the funds are invested. A much more 
interesting trend, and one worth showing, is the relative growth of endowments 
per student that are illustrated in Figure 13.10 (the patterns are extremely similar 
to those for straight endowments, but the per-student values provide a more 
consistent comparison over time). What’s intriguing is that, over the three decades 
5  The highest-ranked public institutions on the list are Virginia Military Institute and the University of 
















































































































































































R1 R2 BAS Cumulative Share
Like Nobody's Business298 
that included several bull and bear markets as well as the Great Recession, inflation-
adjusted endowment per student grew by a factor of 3 at private schools and by an 
astounding factor of 9 at public schools. As we’ll see in the next section (Section 13.4), 
a typical endowment keeps pace with inflation with the additional returns used 
for income, so the overall growth we see in this figure is mostly the accumulation 
of new endowment gifts. Therefore, since the late 1980s, public institutions grew 
their relative level of endowment giving at three times the rate of the privates. I 
mentioned in Section 13.1 on gifts that the medium and smaller public institutions 
are relative latecomers to fundraising and that’s the effect we’re seeing here. Within 
the average for public institutions in Figure 13.10, R1 schools grew at the same rate 
as the privates while the other types of institution all grew much faster than their 
private counterparts (not shown) because many of the medium and smaller publics 
were just starting their development programs. Of course, they still have a long way 
to go in absolute terms.
Figure 13.10.  Growth in inflation-adjusted endowment per full-time equivalent student, by fiscal 
year, with averages for public and private institutions weighted by the number of 
institutions in each Carnegie classification. Values for 1990 at both types of institution 
and for 2002 at public institutions are interpolated as the average of neighboring years, 
while the 1997–2002 gap at private institutions is interpolated proportional to the 
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Box 13.1. State Support As “Endowment Income” for Public 
Universities
Endowments at public institutions are generally far smaller than at their 
private peers, about 10–20% after adjusting for enrollment. Unlike the privates, 
however, public universities receive state support. A thought experiment: if we 
think of state appropriations as revenue from a sort of “public endowment” 
then how might the size of public and private endowments compare?
Typical state appropriations down the four types of public institution from R1 to 
BAS are something like $300M, $110M, $45M and $10M. At a 4–5% payout rate, those 
revenues represent, in round numbers, pseudo-endowment sizes of $6.7B, $2.4B, 
$1B and $0.2B respectively. Interestingly, these amounts are larger than their private 
counterparts, several times so for the medium-sized schools. However, recall that tuition 
revenue at the publics is generally much lower than at the privates, serving to offset 
some of these differences in the context of overall institutional revenue. Nonetheless, this 
exercise shows that, financially speaking, state support is at least as important to public 
institutions as endowment income is to private institutions.
13.4 How does a university endowment work?
The core idea of a modern university endowment is to invest the gifted funds to produce 
annual income, known as the endowment return, while maintaining the original 
amount, called the principal or corpus (Latin for body), such that the endowment 
can produce income in perpetuity.6 Let’s run an example to see how this works in 
practice. We’ll assume an endowment of $1M starting in 1980 and that our returns 
track the S&P 500. Of course, depending on exactly how the funds are invested, any 
given endowment will have a unique set of returns—more on that later. As it happens, 
the S&P has performed at just under 8.5% on an annualized basis over the last four 
decades. If we’d invested our funds and simply reinvested any proceeds and let those 
grow, we would have seen the value of our investment follow the index curve in the 
upper panel of Figure 13.11, starting at a smidge over $3M ($1M adjusted for inflation 
to 2016 dollars) and ending at about $23.5M. Inflation over this period was just over 
3% (it was high back in the early 1980s—see Section 3.7). Overall, the annualized 
6  Endowments are as old as universities themselves. Although some of the philosophy schools in 
ancient Athens that predate universities had endowments in the sense of having independent wealth 
(Lynch 1972), the earliest endowments in the contemporary sense of an income-producing asset were 
in Europe. For example, in England, the early universities received tithes, 10% annual taxes on the 
produce of agricultural land, from acreage that passed to them from the dissolution of monasteries 
(Russell 2006). Early university endowments in the US originated from the wealth of multi-
millionaires during the late 1800s and early 1900s, including Ezra Cornell, Benjamin Duke, Leland 
Stanford, Andrew Carnegie, and John D. Rockefeller (Kimball 2017). Since then, those endowments 
and may others have grown considerably from alumni contributions.
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inflation-adjusted rate of return is 5.24% over the four decades but with plenty of ups 
and downs on that journey.
Figure 13.11.  Performance of an example endowment started in 1980 (upper panel) shown 
as a simple investment with returns tracking the S&P 500 index and as a revenue-
generating endowment fund, and as components of the example endowment (lower 
panel) including annual return, payout, investment management fees, and a surplus 
(or deficit) for reinvestment (or withdrawal). Amounts are in FY2016 dollars; the 
inflation-adjusted initial endowment value of $3M corresponds to $1M in FY1980 
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Endowment management is all about taking advantage of the overall trend, while 
weathering short-term downturns, to simultaneously produce a dependable annual 
income stream and maintain the principal in the long run. Therefore, the question 
is what (fairly consistent) portion of the endowment can be withdrawn each year, 
allowing for investment management fees, that will leave enough returns to cover 
inflation and preserve the original investment? In practice that amount, known as 
the payout, is typically between 4% and 5%. In our example, we will take an annual 
endowment payout of 4.2%, and we will pay annual investment management fees of 
1%. Those rates result in the endowment trend illustrated in the upper panel of Figure 
13.11, which is essentially flat in the long run, just as we desire (it ends slightly up 
at $3.2M in inflation-adjusted terms). The notion of preserving the inflation-adjusted 
principal is known as intergenerational equity. This approach is debated in tough times, 
when some argue that the corpus should be invaded to prioritize institutional survival 
(Whitford 2020d), and in good times when managers keep payouts low and let the 
endowment grow, i.e., lowering future risk at current expense (Mehrling et al. 2006).
The components that constitute the endowment performance are illustrated in 
the lower panel of Figure 13.11, also in inflation-adjusted dollars. After one year, the 
$3M initial endowment returned 7.6% ($207,000) in FY 1981, allocated as $114,000 in 
payout (the 4.2%), $27,000 in management fees (at 1%), and a surplus to be reinvested 
of almost $66,000 (the remaining 2.4%). The next year, FY 1982, the market was down 
18.2% and the endowment lost value with a negative return of $468,000. Despite 
the loss, we still allocated a 4.2% payout ($108,000) and we still needed to cover 
management fees (almost $26,000), meaning that the endowment actually decreased 
by a total of $602,000. Thus, we actually invaded the corpus to provide the payout; 
many real endowments would not have done so. Fortunately, 1983 was a strong year 
and the (now reduced) endowment returned nearly 52%, although it was not enough 
to restore the endowment to its initial value—that took until 1986 (see the upper 
panel of Figure 13.11). Our example endowment did very well during the late 1990s, 
reaching a peak of more than $6M in 1999 and 2000, and it promptly lost those gains in 
2001 and 2002. It sunk to its lowest levels during the Great Recession, about $2.1M in 
2009, taking until 2017 to again fully regain its initial value.
One can see the importance of having the intestinal fortitude to take the long view, 
resisting the temptations of panicking during short-term losses or of spending windfall 
gains. That said, this was a simple example and in practice university endowment 
managers do a number of other things to increase value and ameliorate loss. We stuck 
with a constant payout percentage in our example, but endowment managers evaluate 
and reaffirm or modify the payout rate every year, trying to keep the rate smooth but 
sometimes shifting it up or down by a few tenths of 1% after a run of good or bad 
years. Also, all individual endowment funds are usually comingled for investment 
purposes while keeping track of individual accounts, much like a bank. Payouts are 
made into accounts from which the funds are spent by university units, and if those 
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accounts are well-budgeted then they provide a further small buffer against year to 
year fluctuations. I used the CPI to adjust for inflation as I’ve done throughout the 
book, but if this endowment was used to pay the salary of an endowed chair position, 
it would be more likely to rise at the HEPI which has recently run about 0.5% higher 
than the CPI (both are covered in Section 3.7). As it happens, the payout in our example 
increased at about that rate so it would be sufficient to maintain a salary commitment.
We tracked the S&P 500 in this example, but most university endowments are not 
invested in a simple consumer-oriented index fund. Instead, they are managed by a 
team that will often include investment consultants (a minority of endowments are 
wholly outsourced and managed by an investment firm). Also, depending on the 
type of investments in the portfolio there will be various associated costs and fees 
such as management fees, fund-of-fund fees, advisory fees, fund operating expenses, 
and custody fees for recordkeeping and reporting (Commonfund Institute 2017b). 
For simple investments these costs may be half or less of the 1% we assumed in our 
example, but for complex portfolios they can approach 1.5% (Skorina 2017).
University endowment managers invest the funds entrusted to them across a broad 
portfolio, as shown in Figure 13.12. Three quarters of the average institutional portfolio 
is invested in equities (i.e., stocks/shares), about 10% in fixed income investments 
such as bonds, and slightly more (about 14%) in real assets including real estate. This 
is the portfolio mix for the average institution, but the average dollars in each type of 
investment vary because large endowments (over $1B) tend to have a slightly different 
mix—about half as much in US stocks and bonds and roughly twice the share in private 
equity and venture capital, in cash, and in private real estate, energy and mining.
Figure 13.12.  FY2019 equal-weighted average asset allocations for college and university endowments 
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13.5 Are fossil fuel divestment and socially responsible  
investing financially viable?
Universities are involved in studying and teaching about environmental, social and 
governance issues, and their institutional priorities on these topics are often plainly 
reflected in their official statement of values, usually right next to their mission and 
vision statements. One important way for institutions to demonstrate that their values 
have meaning is to align their endowment investments accordingly. The trend towards 
socially-responsible investing by university endowments began in the late 1970s as 
part of the divestment movement to boycott the apartheid regime in South Africa—
the first was Hampshire College (Dayall n.d.). In 1990, Harvard and CUNY made 
front page news when they sold all their stocks in tobacco companies (Lewin 1990). 
Other disinvestment initiatives since then have included the prison industry, gun 
manufacturers, and companies employing sweatshop labor abroad (Elrod 2013; Chan 
2015; Dyer 2018). Given the small portions of endowment portfolios that any such 
investments represented, and the strong university endowment performance in recent 
decades noted in Section 13.3, it is clear that those divestments had no appreciable 
financial effect on endowments while they simultaneously signaled the institution’s 
disapproval of an activity or industry.
However, by far the most prominent contemporary university divestment 
movement is against fossil fuel companies. Fossil fuels are the principal source of 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that are causing widespread climate and 
environmental change.7,8,9 The energy sector, including coal and oil companies, has 
historically been a standard and well-performing part of most investment portfolios. 
Therefore, quite reasonably as part of their fiduciary duty, endowment trustees and 
managers have raised questions about the possible risks of divesting from fossil fuel 
assets and consequent potential losses for the endowment. A minority have asked 
about the risks and potential losses of not divesting, given the downward prospects for 
the sector (Grantham 2018; Sanzillo et al. 2018).
Analyses by leading investment advisors and independent economists show 
that both the investment risks and endowment impact of not investing in fossil fuel 
7  This statement doesn’t really need a citation nowadays. I’m a climate scientist and the evidence shows 
beyond a shadow of a doubt that climate change is happening, with alarmingly little substantive 
action to stop carbon emissions. If you’re interested, the most authoritative source on the science 
of climate change, including its consequences as well as adaptation options and mitigation, is the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (www.ipcc.ch).
8  Why target the companies when we all use energy from fossil fuels? Beyond signaling the importance 
of moving away from fossil fuel consumption, those companies are targets of divestment because they 
knew about the perils of climate change as early as the 1970s, misrepresented the harm their products 
would bring about, and funded campaigns to discredit the science, spread disinformation, and 
influence policy (the same playbook used by tobacco companies), as described by Naomi Oreskes 
and Erik Conway in their book, Merchants of Doubt (2010).
9  As someone who grew up in South Africa, became a climate scientist, and served as a senior university 
administrator, there is no more apt section of this book for me to write than this one.
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energy companies are essentially neutral and possibly even positive. The bulk of 
most endowments is invested in companies on the stock market, as we saw in the 
previous section (Figure 13.12). The market is categorized into ten sectors, such as 
energy, financials, information technology, etc. with endowments typically holding a 
diverse portfolio across those sectors. We can calculate relative market performance 
by simply omitting a sector, such as energy, and comparing the non-energy market to 
the regular market. Figure 13.13 shows these comparisons for the non-energy portfolio 
and each of the other omitted sector portfolios for two periods, since 1957 and since 
1989, as calculated by investment firm GMO (Grantham 2018). Omitting the energy 
sector makes the least difference of all sectors to overall returns, within 0.1% of the 
regular S&P 500 (10.18% return for the non-energy portfolio versus 10.25% for the 
regular S&P 500 from 1957 to 2017; likewise, 9.74% for non-energy versus 9.71% for 
the S&P 500 from 1989 to 2017). This means that if one was broadly invested across all 
other sectors, dropping energy was less risky than divesting from any other sector, and 
that the non-energy portfolio actually ended up doing slightly better than the overall 
market since 1989.
Figure 13.13.  Annualized absolute returns of market portfolios excluding each of the ten market 
sectors, relative to the S&P 500 for 1957 to 2017 (10.25% annualized return) and for 
1989 to 2017 (9.74% annualized return), with the non-energy portfolio highlighted. 
Source: Grantham (2018).
Figure 13.14 illustrates the trends for the non-energy S&P 500 portfolio and the whole 
S&P 500, showing that there is virtually no difference between the two and that, 
because energy stocks have declined more than the overall market in recent years, 
the non-energy mix actually ends up slightly ahead. Much the same conclusions 
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methods to assess the financial implications of fossil fuel divestment (Trinks et al. 
2018). Another recent study evaluated the impact of divestment in two ways, first on 
almost 700 institutions that did and did not divest, and second by modeling four actual 
college and university endowments in detail (Pitzer, Dayton, Syracuse and Stanford); 
the authors found no consistent impact or negative effects, along with some limited 
positive effects of fossil fuel divestments on mid-size and large endowments (Ryan 
and Marsicano 2020). Unsurprisingly, there are papers sponsored by the fossil fuel 
industry that claim negative impacts as a result of fossil fuel divestment (Cornell 
2015; Bessembinder 2017); sustainable-investment groups have provided detailed 
rebuttals as to why those arguments are not pertinent to the actual performance of 
fossil fuel investments (Sanzillo et al. 2018). To the question of whether fiduciary duty 
might prevent fossil fuel divestment, because that duty binds a trustee or endowment 
manager to make the best financial decisions for the funds they oversee, there is now 
plenty of evidence that the most prudent fiduciary path is to actively consider calls for 
fossil fuel divestment—those calls cannot be rejected merely because of uninformed 
worries about negative risks or losses. Fiduciary duty may even favor divestment: 
some analysts argue that while fossil fuel investments provided strong performance 
in the past, their current financial case and future prospects are far weaker (Grantham 
2018; Sanzillo et al. 2018).
Figure 13.14.  Performance of S&P 500 index with all sectors and excluding the energy sector 
since sector indices were launched by S&P in mid-1996. Source: S&P/Investing 
(Investing.com 2020).
How does an endowment divest from fossil fuels? It’s a process rather than an event. 
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complete the process within a year or two. A period of time is necessary because 
some investments have rules about when investors can get in or out, or they are 
only offered at certain times. Having that time enables the endowment managers 
to integrate the sale of direct and indirect investments in fossil fuels into the flow of 
transactions while they balance the portfolio through the purchase of other positions. 
Direct investments include, for example, shares in an oil company, while indirect 
investments include index funds and other instruments that commingle fossil fuel 
stocks with many others. Divestment initiatives sometimes include a commitment 
to shed only direct investments in fossil fuels (or even narrower, such as coal only), 
while others promise full divestment including indirect holdings. Figure 13.15 shows 
the mix of divestment at the 60 institutions that have made the commitment so far. 
About two thirds are in the process of fully divesting or are already fossil free, while 
institutions in the other third have committed to various permutations of limited 
divestment (e.g., partial divestment of direct investments only, or coal companies 
only). Together, all these schools represent about 5% of all universities and colleges; 
they include institutions of all types such as large public and private universities 
(e.g., University of California system, Johns Hopkins) as well as smaller public and 
private schools (e.g., Salem State, Middlebury). For institutions looking to evaluate 
whether or not to divest, and where to invest instead, there are several sustainable 
investment groups that offer frameworks and performance information (Cambridge 
Associates 2014; Dyer et al. 2020).
Figure 13.15.  Number of US universities and colleges (or their affiliated foundations) with full and 
limited fossil fuel divestment, as of mid-2020. University systems are counted as the 
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Divestment is not so much an investment strategy as it is a reaction and decision to 
not invest in something. A number of institutions have adopted active strategies to 
align their endowment investing with their priorities on environmental, social and 
governance issues (ESG investing). For example, not just divesting from fossil fuels 
but investing in renewable energy instead, or in companies with commitments to 
social responsibility. The irony of philanthropy is that it is needed to fix the very 
system that creates it. To that end, progressive groups in the philanthropy world are 
now advocating a rethinking of how social justice initiatives could be supported by 
what they term liberatory philanthropy, which acknowledges the inequalities that 
produced its wealth and commits to deconcentrating it, as well as making restorative 
investments in communities and programs that address environmental, social and 
governance issues aligned with their philanthropic mission (Foxworth 2019).
13.6 How does the business of university fundraising work?
For most people, the thought of asking for donations inspires a dread that rivals 
their fear of public speaking. Most professors have overcome the latter through their 
experience in teaching; the same kind of practice and familiarity is also how one 
overcomes the fear of fundraising and, in particular, making “the ask” (see Box 13.2 
for a glossary of fundraising terms). Better yet, most universities employ professional 
fundraising staff who are not only able to make the actual request but are also 
invaluable at systematizing the process of raising money. Gift officers often say that 
fundraising is friend-raising, which underlines the simple truth that relationships are 
the cornerstone of any development effort. The business of creating and cultivating 
relationships, figuring how much to ask for, and stewarding the connection after a 
donor has made a gift take time and require organization—that is the role of the gift 
officer (or development officer). Lest this sound rather clinical, the magic ingredient 
is the student, faculty member, department chair, center director, or dean who has 
the opportunity to talk about what they love with a potential donor—someone who 
would like to share in that passion for advancing the program or unit and helping it 
to do good in the world. Like teaching, it’s actually a lot of fun once the anxiety of the 
unfamiliar is out of the way. So, relationships are key, but how does the money work?
Let’s say that we need to raise a million dollars, perhaps to endow a scholarship 
program in an emerging field. This scholarship will enable us to attract excellent 
students who will gain special skills and experiences and position them well for future 
studies and/or jobs. We have some friends of the department and college who we 
already know might be willing to support the new program (and if we’re smart, we’ve 
already mentioned to them our excitement about it). Some of them could even provide 
a substantial amount, but we’ll need to greatly expand the set of people involved to 
reach our fundraising goal. Figure 13.16 illustrates a simple gift table example, also 
known as a donor pyramid, that a gift officer might draw up as a planning tool to help 
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us reach the goal. Working together, we think that we could land one principal gift of 
almost half the needed amount, we could get three major gifts in the $50,000 range, 
and a set of others down the pyramid that together will get us to our total. Notice that 
we need 184 donors across the plan and that we will need to approach three or four 
times that number of viable prospects in order to net the support we need.
Figure 13.16.  Example gift table to raise $1M, showing the donor pyramid (shaded), estimated 
prospects needed to net those donors, gift amount at each level, total gifts per level, as 
well as overall totals for each category. See text for details.
Importantly, these estimates are not arbitrary or a wish-list. They reflect what we know 
about our alumni, community members with a demonstrated interest in our other 
work, possible corporate support, and so on. The gift officer will have assessed the 
capacity of potential donors to give as a function of their connection, prior giving, 
potential interest, estimated wealth, and more, such that the amounts and timeline are 
realistic.
Box 13.2. University Fundraising Lingo—A Non-Exhaustive 
Glossary
THE PROCESS
Advancement — building broad awareness and support through development, alumni 
relations, government relations, and sometimes marketing and public relations
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Campaign, Capital Campaign — a coordinated fundraising initiative to meet a stated 
financial goal, typically institution-wide; customarily begins with a quiet phase to 
raise a substantial portion of the goal, followed by a public (marketed) phase to 
achieve and subsequently celebrate it
Capacity — the estimated giving capability of a prospective donor; a combination of the 
individual’s disposable wealth and inclination to give to the specific cause
Case Statement — a donor-oriented document that makes the case for support of a 
fundraising initiative including the need or opportunity and potential impact; often a 
glossy brochure, possibly a website and/or video
Development — fostering understanding of, and obtaining private support for, an 
institution’s activities and programs; a subset of advancement
Fundraising — acquiring voluntary financial support from individuals and organizations; 
a subset of development
Gift Officer, Development Officer/Director — a staff member with primary fundraising 
responsibilities; typically works closely with an academic unit leader (e.g., dean, 
director)
Moves Management — the practice of progressing a donor through a five-step 
fundraising cycle:
(i) Identification — finding prospective donors, or prospects
(ii) Qualification — wealth screening and estimating capacity
(iii) Cultivation — building a relationship (“fundraising is friend-raising”)
(iv) Solicitation — making “the ask”
(v) Stewardship — saying thank you and continuing cultivation
Wealth Screening — assessment of a potential donor’s assets to help estimate giving 
capacity; includes knowable and public data such as previous giving, real estate 
ownership, public stock ownership, political donations, and corporate/executive 
positions
THE GIFT
Alumni Giving — not only gifts from alumni but also the proportion of alumni who 
donate
Annual Giving — ongoing foundational fundraising program engaging a broad base of 
donors and prospects; typically generates many smaller donations from letter and 
email appeals
Bequest — gift made through a will or trust upon the donor’s decease
Charitable Contribution — a tax-deductible donation to a qualified nonprofit 
organization
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Donor Pyramid, Gift Table — planning tool that accounts for the many small donations 
and few large donations typically needed for a fundraising initiative
Legacy Gift — synonymous with bequest, sometimes announced as a gift with current 
gifts
Major/Principal Gift — large/extra-large gift at the upper end of the typical gift range 
for the institution
Philanthropy — literally “love of humanity” via the giving of money, expertise or time, 
often with a long-term or strategic connotation; a philanthropist is an individual 
giver; a philanthropy is a philanthropic organization or nonprofit foundation that 
can give and/or be given to
Planned Giving — major gift that is part of an individual’s financial and/or estate 
planning
Pledge — a promise to donate a specific sum to be fulfilled at a later date
Voluntary Support — broad and/or synonymous term for gifts, donations, bequests and 
philanthropy
Two further points on donor pyramids and gift tables. First, there’s an interesting trend 
in the shape of the donor pyramid towards a much narrower profile: the top 1% of 
donors now account for almost 80% of total giving, rising from 64% just a decade ago 
(Hasseltine 2017). This shift is likely related to rising wealth inequality and megagifts 
from the ultra-wealthy, the ultimate example of which is Michael Bloomberg’s $1.8B 
gift to Johns Hopkins (Bloomberg 2018).
The second point is about campaigns. Donor pyramids and gift tables are often 
used in institution-wide fundraising campaigns, and almost every university has had 
or will have a major fundraising campaign. Campaigns are, more or less, a large multi-
year marketing wrapper around what is essentially the whole range of institutional 
fundraising priorities. In years past when university fundraising had a lower profile, 
a campaign denoted a substantial intensification of activity and sometimes a special 
target, but nowadays campaigns can be almost continuous and they involve all the 
colleges and schools. Because the campaign has an identity of its own that is seemingly 
separate from fundraising in local units within the university, it is not unusual for 
the campus (and donors) to think that the funds raised in a campaign are likewise 
separate. I’ve heard people ask, “Where’s that X million dollars the University raised 
in the campaign? They should give some to our department.” Generally, those funds 
are not separate; they represent the university-wide total of fundraising done by all the 
units across the university as part of the overall campaign effort. Campaigns typically 
have a quiet phase and a public phase. If our school is ordinarily raising about $1M per 
year, we might plan a five-year campaign to raise $6M: the expected annual amount 
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($5M over five years) plus a further $1M from the extra campaign activity. The first 
two years might be the quiet phase where we concentrate on the top of the pyramid 
to obtain leadership-level gifts, and then we announce the public phase and say that 
we’ve already raised $2.4M and we need to reach our $6M goal in the next three years. 
Of course, we expect to get $3M of that from our regular fundraising, but we need 
to try and average an extra $0.2M (20%) more per year ($0.6M over the three years) 
using the momentum of the campaign goal. If we’ve planned well, we’ll reach the goal 
on time (or early) and celebrate (and start planning the next campaign). If we were 
over-zealous in our estimates, we might move the timing goalposts and extend the 
campaign to complete it the next year.
Let’s shift now to how the money arrives, how it’s handled, and how we pay for 
the process. Most gifts are monetary and they can be made in many forms including 
credit cards, electronic transfer and checks, but gifts also include stock/shares, real 
estate, and personal property. Non-monetary gifts are typically sold and converted to 
cash prior to the institution taking possession—the institution or its foundation will 
have a policy on how it handles such gifts. Two common exceptions are artwork or 
manuscripts donated to the university’s scholarly collections—those gifts will usually 
be handled by the museum curator or special collections librarian and, of course, they 
are not counted as fundraising.
What happens next will vary somewhat by institution—the main difference being 
whether or not the gift goes into the accounts of the institution itself or those of its 
foundation. The presence of a foundation is largely (but not exclusively) a public/
private university distinction. Public universities have separate foundations so that, 
in the memorable words of a trustee I know, “the State can’t get its hands on our 
endowment!” It’s also useful because the foundation will be a nonprofit for charitable 
contribution purposes while a public university is technically a state agency of some 
kind (nonetheless, many public universities will still accept gifts, and often they will 
be managed by the foundation). For private universities, the institution itself is a 
nonprofit (recall we are not focusing on for-profit private schools in this book) and 
only the more complex institutions might have multiple entities for handling various 
aspects of their finances.10
The role of a university foundation can also vary considerably: at a minimum it 
will almost certainly hold and invest endowed funds, it can include some or all of the 
professional fundraising staff (frontline gift officers as well as back-office data analysts 
and financial specialists), and it may provide some or all the additional functions of an 
advancement office (e.g., alumni relations; see Box 13.2). Public university foundations 
have boards of trustees/directors and, while the organization must preserve its legal 
and financial independence from the main institution, the foundation’s (typically 
10  The more complex publics can also have multiple entities connected with fundraising. Examples at 
such public and private institutions can include real estate investment, foundations for sub-parts such 
as the law and medical schools, athletics foundations, and more.
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sole) mission is to support the university. Note that those on the foundation board are 
not the same as the regents (sometimes also confusingly known as trustees) who serve 
on the public university (or system) governing board.11
Whether via a foundation or in-house, the entire fundraising operation has costs 
that need to be covered. While they are sometimes allocated all or in-part from general 
institutional funds, in many institutions/foundations those costs will be recovered 
from gifts and/or endowment proceeds via a gift or administrative fee. Such fees are 
usually in the 1–15% range depending on the base they are applied to, which may 
variously be non-endowment gifts only, just the first X million dollars of major gifts, 
only endowment income, and so on.
A discussion of fundraising costs leads, almost inevitably, to the question of return 
on investment, often phrased as, “What does it cost to raise a dollar?” It’s a fair question, 
even an important one. But take just one more step and ask, “What is the right cost per 
dollar raised?” and you will find yourself slipping all the way down the rabbit-hole 
of seemingly-useful-but-completely-misleading metrics. The notion of a right cost per 
dollar is a myth that has afflicted the fundraising world for years;12 there is no magic 
number and it is no more useful than asking, “what is the right cost per student?” The 
myth stems from the preference of donors to have 100% of every dollar go to the cause, 
and the incorrect supposition that dollars spent to actually raise the funds are being 
diverted to activities that should mysteriously be paid for by someone else (tuition 
from students and families?). This erroneous belief not only undermines the strategic 
value of investing in growing philanthropic support for education and research, but it 
also distracts from the impact and effectiveness of the program.
Consequently, while one school might spend 10 cents to raise a dollar, another 
might spend 20 cents, and either one could be performing relatively better or worse 
depending on context: a new fundraising initiative will not yet be bearing fruit, or some 
programs will need to rely more on high-cost and lower margin activities (e.g., special 
events) instead of depending on major gifts from a few reliable donors. A healthy 
fundraising program will try to balance this tension between cost and dependency. By 
all means, we should compare costs per dollar across like programs and institutions, 
but a holistic range of effectiveness metrics is far better than boiling things down to a 
single number (BoardSource 2020).
11  As you might imagine, state governing boards, foundation boards, and presidents can have diverging 
priorities. The resulting politics will occasionally rise to a level that makes the news, such as during a 
recent chancellor search at Ole Miss (Ganucheau 2019).
12  The nonprofit overhead myth became so pervasive that three leading groups that provide information 
about charities issued an open letter to donors everywhere, urging them to pay attention to other 
performance factors (Taylor et al. 2013).
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13.7 What role do alumni donors and associations fill in fundraising?
The quintessential donor is an alumna or alumnus13 but, as we discussed in Section 
13.2, that is becoming less and less the case. While the dollar amount of alumni giving 
overall has continued to rise (Council for Advancement and Support of Education 
2019), the number of alumni donors has not risen much at all, as shown in Figure 
13.17. The result is that alumni giving participation has been falling since 1990, when 
it peaked at over 18%, to less than half of that at the current level below 8%. All is 
not what it seems, however, because technology has enabled us to make dramatic 
improvements in our databases of contactable alumni, the alumni of record, by a 
factor of almost two over the same period (Council for Advancement and Support of 
Education 2019). Thus, the denominator has doubled and this alumni participation 
metric, also known as the giving rate, has halved and lost its validity as a measure of 
alumni engagement. Also, a definitional note, alumni donors include those who have 
given any amount, even just $1. Still, the role of individual alumni giving is changing 
as the wealthiest alumni give through family foundations and donor-advised funds, 
as we saw in Figure 13.4.
Figure 13.17.  Trends in alumni of record, alumni donors and alumni participation (giving rate) at 
colleges and universities. Records of contactable alumni have improved dramatically, 
driving down the participation/giving metric. Source: CASE (Council for Advancement 
and Support of Education 2019).
13  I can’t stop myself, the Latin is: alumna (female, singular), alumnae (female, plural), alumnus (male, 
singular), and alumni (male, plural; or a mixed-gender group). I’m perfectly fine with the colloquial 
“alum” or “alums” to keep things easy, although I imagine there must be some sticklers out there 
for whom those terms or the incorrect usage of the others are like fingernails scratching on a Latin 
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To which activities do alumni give, relative to all donors? Figure 13.18 illustrates that 
mix for giving to current operations (typically lower dollar amounts than capital gifts, 
and strongly connected to annual giving). We see that alumni give proportionally 
more to academics, student aid and especially athletics, relative to giving from all 
donors. Those are all areas where institutional affinity makes a difference. Alumni 
appear to give relatively less to research, but this is likely not because alumni don’t 
support research and instead because research is where non-alumni tend to find 
relatively more affinity and provide the greatest proportion of their support.
Figure 13.18.  FY2018 distributions of gifts to current operations from alumni and from all donors. 
Source: CASE (Council for Advancement and Support of Education 2019).
It’s worth stressing again that fundraising is a relationship practice—it has to be 
sincere and meaningful—and that fact applies as much to alumni donors as to 
all donors. If donors get the impression that the relationship is transactional, or if 
fundraising is managed with sales-type metrics alone (e.g., number of calls, quarterly 
targets) without those that incentivize relationship-building, then the institution’s 
fundraising success will be mediocre. Indeed, that mediocrity may be further doomed 
because the next generation of donors prioritizes the entire engagement experience 
and an investment impact mindset over the less-engaged institutional allegiance of 
previous generations. For young alumni it is particularly important to pursue multiple 
engagement paths: while their philanthropic capacity is small, they can volunteer their 
time and experience (career nights, outreach events), participate in experiences that 
celebrate achievement or create further engagement or excitement (athletics has this 
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and connect and interact via a relevant and regular set of communication tools (social 
media, even newsletters).
Alumni associations are evolving in this direction, whether they are free-standing 
or integrated within the development or advancement office. The old business model 
was based on limited membership with dues, along with sales of organized travel 
and cruises, affiliate credit cards, etc., whereas the contemporary business model is 
shifting away from exclusive membership to inclusive membership for all alumni, 
signaling the emphasis toward engagement (Fraser and LeMaster 2013; Vlahos 2016). 
Alumni associations are rarely completely self-sustaining and there is a wide range of 
institutional contribution to their budgets (The Napa Group 2010) to complement the 
specific permutation of business model (i.e., mainly dues, fee for service, alumni gifts 
or foundation support, mainly institutional funds, or some blend of these).

14. Outcomes & Futures
14.1 What are the financial benefits of a degree?
I am as eager as any professor to proclaim that the value of earning a degree is not 
primarily about earning money. Understanding our world, an educated citizenry, 
the life of the mind, solving society’s grand challenges, saving lives, and so forth, 
these are absolutely the good and right reasons to pursue higher education. The fact 
remains, however, that in today’s world a college education is the broadest, fastest, 
and straightest way to a higher-paying job and a rewarding career.1 Anecdotes about 
self-made millionaires who didn’t go to college notwithstanding, there are no rigorous 
studies that provide any evidence to the contrary—zip, zero, none. The title of a recent 
piece summed it up: “Please Stop Asking Whether College Is Worth It” (Newton 
2018a). All the reliable evidence points plainly and repeatedly to the economic 
benefits of obtaining a university degree, including a liberal arts degree, and even of 
completing just some college, versus not gaining any post-secondary education at all. 
We’ll delve into all that in a minute, but why, then, do we see respected news media 
running articles that create doubt or directly contradict what we know? Well, many 
of those articles are about the high sticker price of elite private institutions and/or the 
associated student debt (and as we’ll see below, the payoff for attending an elite school 
versus any other isn’t as clear) and the headline-writers know that we are suckers for 
stories of individual exceptionalism (Steve Jobs was a college dropout, etc.) or ones 
implying that we can buck the system. So, anecdotes aside, completing a college or 
university degree, even with reasonable debt, bestows clear financial benefits.
The core point is illustrated in Figure 14.1, which shows the progression in annual 
earnings by education level. Bachelor’s degree recipients make 56% more than 
1  Which, obviously, is why so many students choose to invest sizable sums of money and many years 
on our campuses. Despite our lofty goals, this is the essential value proposition of higher education, 
the sine qua non of the university’s existence. Consider this thought experiment: what if people with 
degrees earned no more or even less than those without, would students still be beating a path to our 
door? Of course not. Universities would be curious places outside of the mainstream, so few and far 
between that most current academics wouldn’t be working there. It’s worth mentioning again Clark 
Kerr’s observation that I noted in Chapter 1: contrary to conventional wisdom, the university did not 
descend from the Acropolis to the Agora, from the high ideals of learning to the commercial pursuits 
of the market, but rather the other way around—by serving a market we can create a place of scholarly 
learning—the university has always found itself in a tension between the two.
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individuals with only a high school diploma and they contribute 82% more in all 
forms of taxes. Advanced degree-holders can earn a lot more, especially people with 
professional degrees, while the situation is dire for those who don’t complete high 
school. The basic pattern of this chart is repeated for dozens of related metrics such 
as lifetime earnings, retirement income, charitable contributions, years of children’s 
education, volunteering, voting, and community involvement; exactly the opposite 
pattern is seen for measures such as unemployment, family income under the poverty 
line, lack of health insurance, smoking, and incarceration (Trostel 2015). Regarding 
unemployment, in 2018 the rate was 2% for people with a bachelor’s degree or higher 
and double that for those with just a high school diploma, while in 2010 at the height 
of post-recession unemployment those rates were 4.7% and 10.4% respectively (Ma 
et al. 2019). The premium of obtaining any kind of post-secondary qualification thus 
goes well beyond the purely financial benefit and is observed across a wide range of 
socio-economic variables.
Figure 14.1.  2018 median earnings and estimated tax payments of full-time year-round employees 
aged 25 and older, by education level. Estimated taxes paid at each income level include 
federal income, social security, Medicare, state and local income, sales, and property. 
Source: College Board (Ma et al. 2019).
With the cost of attending a university increasing over recent decades, one might think 
that the college wage premium would show a matching decrease, but the opposite 
is true: the college wage premium has increased in real terms as the income gap has 
widened in recent decades (Figure 14.2). Wages for high-school graduates have been 
stagnant for fifty years while wages for college graduates have risen almost 20% in 
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has consequently grown from about $20,000 in 1970 to about $30,000 in 2018, with most 
of that rise occurring during the economic expansion of the 1990s (which included the 
rise of technology sector). The premium lasts for an entire career, and it is possible to 
calculate the rate of return on the investment in a bachelor’s degree. Naturally, the cash 
flow is negative for the first several years while the individual is getting the degree and 
then it rises later. Taking these and other factors into account, the return on a college 
degree was about 8% in the 1970s, rising after that until reaching and staying in the 
14–16% range since the turn of the millennium (Abel and Dietz 2019). Therefore, the 
investment in going to college is at least as good as the long-run stock market return 
and as much as double that rate in recent years—literally one of the best investments 
one can make.
Figure 14.2.  Average annual wages of graduates holding only a bachelor’s degree and those holding 
only a high school diploma, as well as the college wage premium (i.e., the difference), 
in 2018 dollars. Source: NY Fed (Abel and Dietz 2019).
So far, we’ve looked at the data overall, but the financial returns on higher education 
will of course vary with several other factors. What about the dueling propositions that 
(1) higher education is a pathway to the middle class or (2) that it merely reproduces 
inequality? As Figure 14.3 illustrates, getting a degree makes a positive difference on 
mobility at all income levels and, owing to their size, public institutions do most of the 
moving (Reber et al. 2020). Adult children from families in the lowest income quintile 
move to higher income quintiles themselves in roughly equal proportions if they 
receive college degrees, whereas they remain overwhelmingly in the lowest income 
quintiles if they do not obtain a college degree. Perhaps less expected, adult children 
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roughly equal proportions, if they do not receive college degrees, while those with 
college degrees remain overwhelmingly in the upper income quintiles. So, the positive 
and negative economic mobility induced by higher education is evident within one 
generation at all income levels—the first proposition is true. Regarding the second 
proposition, recall that college-going rates for students from low-income families are 
lower than for those from high-income families (see Section 7.2), so the income-based 
inequality of access to higher education ironically also reproduces that inequality 
(Witteveen and Attewell 2017a). Both are true simultaneously, and they underline the 
importance of increasing access to college for students from low-income families.
Figure 14.3.  Economic mobility of adult children with and without a college degree from families 
with low and high income. Source: Brookings (Haskins 2016).
Obviously, the major subject of one’s degree can also make an appreciable difference 
in earnings. Humanities and liberal arts degrees, in particular, seem to attract 
unfair attention for lower salaries and/or high unemployment rates. Few of these 
stereotypes really hold water, as shown by the wage and unemployment data in 
Figure 14.4. Education majors dominate the lowest salary bands, especially in mid-
career earnings—it’s no surprise that our K-12 school systems have such a challenge 
attracting and retaining teachers. While they are underpaid, education majors at least 
have the consolation of having the lowest unemployment rates. Other bachelor’s 
degrees with low compensation include the performing arts (with the lowest starting 
salaries), fine arts, theology and social services. Of those, the fine arts also have a high 
unemployment rate, so perhaps only the passion-of-the-starving-artist stereotype has 
any basis in the data. The upper end of the wage distribution is populated mostly 
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information systems. General business and business management majors are pretty 
much at the median, not as high as many may think. It turns out that many liberal arts 
majors are in the middle of the pack salary-wise, along with some sciences. As recent 
studies have confirmed, financially, liberal arts majors are as good a choice as many 
others and negative perceptions about liberal arts colleges and liberal arts majors are 
not well-founded (Hill and Pisacreta 2019; Rossman et al. 2020).
Figure 14.4.  FY2017 early career (ages 22–37) and mid-career (ages 35–45) median wages for full-
time workers with a bachelor’s degree only, by major, with highest ten (H) and lowest 
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A third subdimension to the financial returns of a degree is the institution from which 
one graduates (technically you can attend several institutions and transfer courses, 
but the university on your résumé that awarded the degree is typically the one that 
counts). More specifically, how much does graduating from a selective institution 
affect earnings? This is another one of those college and university issues where 
popular perception and evidence don’t always align. In certain economic classes 
the social pressure to attend the most selective institutions is intense and it can be 
a fraught process.2 There is a constant stream of media articles ranking institutions 
on their graduates’ earnings, and to make matters worse, even the US Department 
of Education’s College Scorecard website lists earnings after graduation; at least it 
provides a range rather than a single average (US Department of Education 2020a). Of 
course, those earnings summaries are strongly influenced by fields of study offered, 
family income, demographics, geography, and what is termed “signaling”—the 
premium employers will pay for a graduate from an institution that is hard to get into. 
Any of these factors and others can strongly bias simple tabulations of earnings by 
school, and not surprisingly in such lists we see an earnings premium at expensive, 
elite institutions, or state flagships over smaller regional colleges, and so on. These 
same factors also feed into the rankings game—that exasperating topic gets a section 
all of its own, coming up next (Section 14.2).
Still, beyond perceptions of prestige and supposed quality, what is the selectivity 
effect on earnings after controlling for the confounding factors? Because rigorous 
research that controls for potential biases requires specialized surveys or cohort data 
over many years, there is only a handful of such studies for the US. An influential 
study of 27 institutions, mostly elite privates and a few top public flagships, found that 
among that group the overall selectivity effect on earnings was effectively zero (Dale 
and Krueger 2014). The study did find that Blacks, Hispanics, and first-generation 
graduates earned more if they graduated from the most selective schools in the 
study. A follow-on study confirmed the overall non-effect for men, but also found 
that women graduates of selective colleges had higher earnings than those from the 
(somewhat) less selective institutions in that small set, due in part to their greater 
workforce participation (Ge et al. 2018). Moving to a much broader set of schools, a 
recent nationally representative study of the selectivity effect on earnings for two cohort 
surveys, ten years and four years after graduation, found important earnings differences 
attributable to selectivity, as illustrated in Figure 14.5. However, the authors stressed 
how uneven those earnings payoffs are, with strong gender differences at equivalent 
institutions, contrasts by major, and the effects of family background (Witteveen and 
Attewell 2017b). The upshot is that for those in the rarified air of being admitted to the 
2  The 2019 college admissions scandal, which included a number of celebrities, and in which dozens 
of wealthy families are alleged to have committed fraud and provided millions of dollars in bribes, 
shows the intensity of the social pressure and the lengths to which some people will go for entry into 
the “right” school.
14. Outcomes & Futures  323
nation’s most elite institutions, there are positive financial effects for people of color 
and women, but for affluent parents and (generally white, male) students, the anxiety 
and almost absurd hair-splitting in choosing among those schools have essentially no 
financial (or academic, for that matter) benefit—it’s all about prestige and signaling. 
However, for most students planning to attend most universities and colleges there 
is some financial advantage to attending a highly selective institution, but choice of 
major, academic preparation and other factors are just as important.
Figure 14.5.  Average effects of college selectivity on earnings after controlling for multiple pre-
college, college, and post-college factors, for bachelor’s degree recipients representing a 
broad range of institutions four years and ten years after graduation. Source: Witteveen 
and Attewell (2017b).
14.2 Do university rankings have a financial impact?
If you want to have some nerdy fun at a cocktail party with a bunch of academic types, 
simply toss college rankings into the conversation and then stand back to enjoy what 
happens next. I guarantee an opiniated exchange. As part of a professional and popular 
culture in which rankings are ubiquitous, universities have a love-hate relationship 
with college rankings aimed at potential students and their parents, as well as with 
those that purport to assess research performance. If our program or institution does 
well in some ranking, well-known or obscure, naturally we proclaim our greatness 
from the rooftops (or at least our websites and press releases); if we don’t appear as 
high as we believe we should, then we criticize the shallowness of the exercise, the 
terrible choices of metrics used, and how rankings can’t measure what really counts 
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of ranking as important context, and I promise we will return to our question about 
whether or not rankings have a financial impact.
The fundamental drawback with many kinds of ranking is that they reduce a 
multidimensional question to a one-dimensional answer. This is also why they are 
so appealing—they (appear to) make a complex decision simple and easy. What is 
the best restaurant in the nation? The best car? The best state to live in? Because it’s a 
matching problem, the soundest response is to determine best at what (attributes) and 
best for whom (needs). Unfortunately, websites and magazines that provide choice 
and complexity as the answer don’t sell nearly as well as those that impose a one-size-
fits-all answer, as the college guide industry found out when US News & World Report 
did just that in the 1980s. Many emulators and alternative rankings have sprung up 
since then; reputational surveys were the main source of information early on, but US 
News and most others now include publicly available and/or survey-response metrics 
in their weighting schemes. Research rankings, while largely playing to the industry 
instead of students and families, have followed much the same path.
Reputational rankings were (and still are) widely criticized, and justly so. Although 
it seems to make intuitive sense to ask “experts” what they think of the competition, 
most are poorly informed about current characteristics at other institutions and 
instead they provide biased opinions relying on informal and uneven knowledge: for 
example, where their friends happen to be, their own field or group, and previous 
rankings (Bastedo and Bowman 2010); inappropriate information, such as research 
prowess rather than quality of undergraduate instruction, or vice versa; and lagging, 
self-reinforcing notions of prestige. This latter attribute is the most pernicious because 
it creates stereotypical groups at the top, middle and bottom of the ranking that resist 
change and confer a halo effect independent of the data.3
Using data is a well-intentioned improvement over reputation although it isn’t 
really possible to obtain comprehensive data on precisely what students and families 
would like to know. Beyond cost and location, they place primary importance 
on academic quality, something that is hard to pin down. The rankings partially 
approximate quality via metrics such as faculty/student ratios, amount of academic 
support, retention and graduation rates, alumni giving, and student selectivity (i.e., 
acceptance rate, yield, class rank, standardized test scores). Allocate some reasonable 
but completely arbitrary weights to each metric and, presto, you have a ranking that 
boils the “best” institutions down to a single number.
3  Where do you think Princeton Law School might rank against other law schools—probably in the top 
20, like Princeton itself and many of its programs? Well, you’d be wrong, because Princeton doesn’t 
have a law school. This marvelous anecdote on the halo effect in reputational rankings was uttered 
derisively by John Sexton, then the law dean at NYU (and subsequently its president), when he 
suggested where survey recipients for law school rankings would place the fictitious program. His 
rhetorical point was later proved correct by the judge who started Cooley Law School in Michigan; 
he surveyed 100 of his colleagues to see where they might place it on a list of 10 schools that included 
some big-name schools and some lesser-known ones, including Cooley. Also on his list was Penn 
State, which they ranked roughly in the middle, even though Penn State did not have a law school at 
the time (Harper 2013).
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The single number is a core critique, and it holds for alternative rankings that 
emphasize value or mobility too. There are other critiques. Consistency and false 
precision are often raised—change your weights or update the noisy data each 
year and you’ll find institutions moving up and down the rankings, sometimes 
dramatically. And you will be shocked—shocked—to learn that universities and 
programs attempt to manipulate their statistics in order to improve their standing.4 
For example, the percentage of alumni giving can be improved by asking every 
recent graduate to donate even just $1, or class sizes can be changed to ensure 
that there is a greater proportion just under the threshold, etc. Yet other criticisms 
underline how college rankings further promote the economic inequality between 
campuses that we saw in Section 7.2 (Wermund 2017). There are so many rankings 
being published that, in a twist of (apparently unrealized) irony, there are now 
rankings of rankings.
University research rankings embraced the emergence of digital publication and 
citation data and have mostly dropped reputational components. Still, they likewise 
combine metrics using arbitrary weightings to produce their annual lists and many 
of the same critiques apply. An added complication for program and department 
rankings is that disciplines align differently at every institution, and there is no way 
to divide up the continuum of knowledge into a consistent set of discrete disciplinary 
fields, and when you try there are serious lumping/splitting issues. Are neuroscience 
and psychology one giant field or two, or should they be further subdivided? How 
does one count a research paper that falls into multiple areas? What about influential 
books in the humanities versus the rapid-fire and cutting-edge publications in 
computer science that don’t even make it into research journals anymore? Is a science-
focused university “better” at research than one that is more oriented to the arts and 
humanities? The list goes on, but the rankings generally gloss over most of these issues, 
define their own fields and weightings, and drive on.
This can lead to meaningless comparisons and occasionally preposterous results. 
Two quick examples from my own university demonstrate the point. First, we are 
frequently top-ranked in water resources by one ranking, but in other rankings that 
field is variously within hydrology, civil engineering, earth science or environmental 
science. Our main department in this field used to be called Hydrology and Water 
Resources but it has since combined with another into Hydrology and Atmospheric 
4  The film Casablanca contains dozens of delightful quotes including the one paraphrased here about 
gambling in Rick’s Café. Other notables include these six in the top 100 movie quotes (to stick with 
the ranking theme), more than any other film: “Here’s looking at you, kid.” (#5); “I think this is the 
beginning of a beautiful friendship.” (#20); “Play it, Sam. Play ‘As Time Goes By.’” (#28) that is often 
misquoted as “Play it again, Sam.”; “Round up the usual suspects.” (#32); “We’ll always have Paris.” 
(#43); and, “Of all the gin joints in all the towns in all the world, she walks into mine.” (#67). And 
now, because we cannot resist ranked lists, you want to know the same two things anyone else does—
your favorite quote’s rank and which one came out on top. You can look up the former and all the rest 
on AFI’s website (American Film Institute 2019). For your edification and apropos our discussion of 
rankings, number one is “Frankly, my dear, I don’t give a damn.” from Gone with the Wind.
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Sciences. So, are we number 1 or 20 or 50? Indeed, we have strength and distinction 
in a wide range of interdisciplinary water issues, but our ranking is completely 
dependent on how finely the fields are defined and is unconnected to a campus unit, 
which is not much use to students, researchers or administrators. Second example, 
the Shanghai subject rankings came out just a few days before this writing (Shanghai 
Ranking Consultancy 2020), and a couple of my department colleagues in Geography 
were grousing about how some other universities’ programs could possibly be ranked 
higher than us. The most egregious case was Stanford at number 5 in the US—as 
one colleague pointed out in dismay, it has no Geography department and just one 
part-time card-carrying geographer. The rankings define the field so broadly as to be 
nonsensical for any practical purpose.
We are almost done with my exposition on important rankings issues before we 
discuss their financial impact. For the coup de grâce it is time to return to student-
oriented rankings and face a straightforward fact revealed in the data. Despite the 
many variables that go into college rankings, the cold reality is that they basically 
measure just one thing: selectivity based on general academic preparation, i.e., 
standardized test scores (Wai et al. 2018a; 2018b). Figure 14.6 shows the overlapping 
distributions of 25th and 75th percentile SAT scores (combined Math plus Verbal, 
including the converted ACT equivalent where applicable) by institution rank in the 
US News ranking. The approximately 200 schools each in the National University 
ranking and Liberal Arts College ranking are plotted together. The relationship 
is simple and essentially linear, with correlations near 0.9, meaning that SAT 
selectivity explains 80% of the variance (R2) in US News rankings. The same study 
found essentially parallel results for 5 other college rankings, including some that 
don’t even use the SAT in their metrics (Wai et al. 2018a). So, important point 
number one, no matter the ranking approach, it will end up replicating the SAT 
distribution of colleges, which is to say the academic preparation of their students. 
Important point number two, which we know intuitively and also from Section 7.2, 
there is massive overlap in students’ general academic preparation up and down 
the rankings of the schools that generally end up in the top 200 lists, and therefore 
the rankings cannot provide any meaningful separation between them, at least not 
anything close to the rank order precision that they are selling. While the top 30 
or so in each list are distinct in their profiles from the bottom 30, most schools in 
between are hard to tell apart. We can go beyond the top 200 lists and look back at 
the identical interquartile ranges for all the schools in our data set by type (Figure 
7.4). We saw that the R3-M3 institutions (that generally do not appear in the top 
rankings lists) indeed have a student academic preparation profile that is distinct 
from the major research universities and private baccalaureate colleges, within an 
overall pattern that is consistent with the notion of broad differentials bracketing 
plenty of overlap.
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Figure 14.6.  Overlapping distribution of 25th and 75th percentile SAT (Math + Verbal) scores by 
institution rank in the 2014 US News & World Report rankings of National Universities 
and Liberal Arts Colleges, including percent variance explained (R2) for each. ACT 
scores were converted to SAT equivalents where applicable. Note that tied ranks have a 
corresponding number of neighboring missing ranks. Source: Wai et al. (2018a).
Now that we know that rankings are fraught with issues and that they mostly 
replicate an institution’s underlying student academic preparation, one has to wonder 
why schools participate in the rankings and pay them attention at all. They do so 
because of the circular logic of an arms race: prospective students and parents use the 
rankings, which means they factor into the intense competition to gain and maintain 
prestige by recruiting the academically best-prepared students possible. Therefore, in 
addition to the benefits of bragging rights when an institution’s ranking ticks upward, 
it’s reasonable to hypothesize that schools might see an enrollment-related financial 
benefit or loss with a shift in rank, and they may change their spending as part of the 
jostling for position.
The research literature on the financial impacts of rankings is small, and those studies 
sometimes focus only on smaller subgroups of schools. Nonetheless, their findings are 
sufficient to help us understand the basic connections, as illustrated in Figure 14.7. 
Starting at the top, we know already about the very strong link between rankings and 
SAT, and not surprisingly the same goes for acceptance rate that is closely connected to 
academic preparation and selectivity (Meredith 2004; Wai et al. 2018a). As we might 
expect given what we learned about the earnings of graduates in the previous section 
(Section 14.1), absent the controls on all the biasing factors, there is a strong link 
between ranking and earnings (Dunlop 2018). Moving on to the heart of the question, 
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while there are differences between large universities and baccalaureate colleges, 
investment in instruction is the primary area in which institutions alter their spending 
(roughly 7–9% more) when they move to a higher category or rank (Kim 2018). 
The pay of many university presidents includes performance incentives, and a few 
explicitly call out improvements in rankings. Several studies find no generalizable link 
or only partial links depending on study design and controls, such as recent work 
(Yeung et al. 2019) that identified a roughly 1% increase in pay per rank increase for 
presidents at public universities (but not private universities or liberal arts colleges). 
Regarding price and cost, one of the original studies in this area focused on small 
top-ranked schools only and found no link to sticker price (presumably because lower 
price would signal lower quality for these schools) but it did identify a moderately 
strong link to discounted tuition after aid (a 1% reduction for each drop in rank of 2 to 
3 places; this also reduced net tuition), which is a less visible way to recruit students 
from a pool that may see a quality or quantity decline with lower rankings (Monks 
and Ehrenberg 1999).
Figure 14.7.  Summary of the strength of selected statistical relationships between institutional 
rankings and hypothesized related outcomes, based on the small literature of scholarly 
articles. See text for details.
On a related note, a recent study found that random samples of alumni ratings 
were a better predictor of graduates’ income and well-being than popular college 
rankings and, interestingly, that higher total cost of attendance actually predicts lower 
satisfaction (Rothwell 2019). Additionally, if you’re wondering what kind of resources 
would be needed to make a large move in the rankings, say from 35 to the top 20, one 
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take hundreds of millions of dollars annually in highly focused investments (Gnolek 
et al. 2014). On a per-student FTE basis, this roughly aligns with the kind of money 
separating the highest-ranked schools from the rest.
After all this, you might be wondering if there are any rankings that are worth a 
look at all. There are, and they are the ones that provide categorical ratings rather 
than over-precise numerical rankings, often grouping schools into tiered bands or 
categories with transparent supporting information. Several popular college guides 
follow this model, as do the rankings for research universities that are still informally 
known as the Lombardi rankings after one of the originators (The Center for Measuring 
University Performance 2018). These all provide a good sense of where institutions 
are placed on various metrics without the headline-grabbing distractions of the latest 
questionable best-of lists.
14.3 What is the economic impact of a university?
It’s almost axiomatic that universities are understood to be economic engines, locally, 
regionally and nationally. When I worked in university tech transfer, a wise colleague 
once clarified that, technically, the university is not the engine—instead, it produces 
the fuel for the engine. The indirect nature of the link to economic vitality is a critically 
important distinction. The prime mission of a university is not to create a vibrant 
economy directly, it is to create and transmit knowledge, largely by producing educated 
graduates. Those graduates do the vast bulk of creating and adding value that enables 
the growth of companies and jobs. Yes, universities can grow their own workforces 
and they can have secondary missions to produce technologies and spinoff companies, 
but those things generally represent a drop in the proverbial bucket compared to the 
total activity of an institution’s graduates. Their knowledge and insights are the fuel 
required to run and grow the contemporary economy. In any case, the point of the 
metaphor is that universities bring intellectual, cultural, and other kinds of value to 
their community, including financial value, and many universities like to demonstrate 
what they are worth by calculating their economic impact.
We see these numbers all the time, whether it’s the travel industry or the local 
manufacturing sector that contributes X billion dollars annually to the local economy. 
Exactly the same kinds of calculations are made to estimate the local economic 
contribution of a university. Importantly, most economic impact models focus on 
measurable spending and they ignore those (difficult to measure) broader human 
capital benefits of an educated workforce. The estimation process involves enumerating 
the fate of every dollar the university spends (e.g., employees’ consumption spending, 
institutional contracts for services, contributions to state and local taxes) and using 
a multiplier to include the knock-on impacts. What’s a multiplier? Let’s say the 
university pays for some minor construction work performed by a local contractor: 
for every dollar spent on the contracting company, some of that dollar stays locally in 
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the form of wages, taxes and materials, and some leaves the region as other taxes or 
materials not locally produced; of those local expenditures, the same cycle happens in 
turn, and so on in decreasing local amounts. That is the multiplier, and it is typically 
between 1 and 2. You may see incorrectly-labeled multipliers running as high as 10 
or more, perhaps reflecting gross return to budget (“for every dollar the state spends 
at ABC State University, it sees 9 dollars in return” for an institution that gets 10% 
of its funding from the state), or the number of times the dollar cycles through the 
local economy, but those are not multipliers. Multipliers are derived from national 
studies and are adjusted for industry and location. The relevant multipliers, times 
the appropriate estimated contributions by category, will together add up to the total 
economic impact.
Ordinarily, an economic impact calculation is done by technical experts using 
complex estimation software, but the essence of the process can be shown using the 
simple worked example described in Table 14.1, which is based on a detailed example 
(Ambargis et al. 2014). In line 1, we can see that our example university has an 
operational expense budget of $750M. As we saw in Chapter 3, this set of expenses 
includes everything the institution spends on instruction, research, public service, 
academic support, student services, institutional support, financial aid, and auxiliary 
enterprises. Because we are using what is known as a Type II multiplier that accounts 
for between-sector effects and local household spending effects, we need to adjust the 
base amount to omit what local households spend at the university, thereby identifying 
just the new dollars entering the region. About 20% of the students are from the local 
region, so we multiply the base by 0.80 to reflect only the out-of-region students, 
resulting in an adjusted base of $600M. We will use a multiplier of 1.7 for university 
spending, which results in a total impact of $1,020M for this category.
Table 14.1. Simplified calculation of a university economic impact estimate. Dollar 
amounts in millions. Adapted and abridged from a BEA example (Ambargis et al. 2014).






Multiplier Total Impact 
($M)
1. Operational Expenses 750.0 0.80 600.0 1.7 1,020.0
2. Capital Investments 10.0 0.14 1.4 1.6 2.2
3. Student Spending 7.0 0.85 6.0 1.5 8.9
4. Visitor Spending 2.0 0.80 1.6 1.8 2.9
5. TOTAL 769.0 609.0 *1.7 1,034.0
*imputed overall multiplier
The next category is the university’s capital investment, which includes things like 
major equipment and building construction. For our example we’ll assume a $10M 
investment in a new computer system, shown in line 2 of Table 14.1. The purchase is 
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from a local vendor but the equipment is actually manufactured outside the region; 
based on typical wholesale margins we’ll use 14% as the local share, which represents 
$1.4M in local spending. We use a multiplier of 1.6 for this sector that results in an 
impact of $2.2M for the capital category, obviously far less than the impact from 
operational expenses because the computer hardware was produced outside of the 
region.
Line 3 captures the effect of student spending on items like books and supplies, 
restaurants, groceries, entertainment, housing, etc. This information can be gathered 
from the university’s survey of student spending, taking care to count only what is 
spent locally in the region and not at the university (i.e., excluding meal plans and 
residence halls). In practice we would use local margins, adjusted amounts and the 
relevant multipliers for each spending sub-category and add them up for an overall 
impact; for simplicity here, we’ll assume an average local adjustment of 85% retained 
locally that results in an adjusted base of $6M, with an average multiplier for the whole 
category of 1.5, giving us an estimate of $8.9M for the impact of student spending.
Visitor spending must be directly attributable to the university, such as visiting 
parents, conference attendees, or out-of-town patrons of campus sporting or arts 
events (those particular impacts are smaller and tougher to estimate because of their 
one-time nature). Visitor spending goes primarily to lodging and restaurants, the 
bulk of which are local in nature, while shopping purchases must be adjusted to the 
appropriate local retail margin. In line 4, we assume 80% on average across the category 
and apply it to base visitor spending of $2M (also estimated from survey data) for an 
adjusted amount of $1.6M. We use an average multiplier of 1.8 for the category, again 
for simplicity, which leads us to an impact of $2.9M for visitor spending.
The total amounts are on line 5, where total base spending of $769M ends up at 
$609M after adjustments to count only the funds that stay in the economy of the local 
region. The total estimated economic impact of that spending is $1,034M, which if we 
divide it by the adjusted base gives us an imputed multiplier of 1.7 overall. For our 
example university, it could claim that it contributed just over $1B to the economy of 
the local region. Naturally, that’s a relatively large proportion of economic activity if 
this campus is located in a college town versus it being located in a major city.
The impact calculation described above is the contribution-based version and it 
tends to be the most generous approach. Imagine adding up all the contribution-based 
impacts for every enterprise in a region—you would get a number larger than the 
local economy because you’d be double-counting (or triple or more) many of those 
multiplier effects across the different sectors. More sophisticated economic impact 
models can account for the input costs more conservatively, and they can calculate 
only the net new and retained dollars in the region attributable to the university—
essentially what would be lost if it didn’t exist and those services were not consumed 
or spent elsewhere (Christophersen et al. 2014). Now, in that case, why would an 
institution want to decrease the estimated size of its impact—surely a university 
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would want the biggest number possible, especially a public university that could 
use the impact number in its arguments for more resources from the state? It turns 
out, as I mentioned earlier, that decision-makers see these kinds of economic impact 
estimates from all quarters, and unrealistic numbers will simply produce disbelief. 
So, it’s important to present economic impact figures properly, noting assumptions, 
the definition of the local region, and avoiding the multiple pitfalls that can lead to 
double-counting (Siegfried et al. 2007). It’s also smart to augment the narrow economic 
impact number with additional economically-related data (e.g., patents, licenses, and 
startups) as well as information on graduates and knowledge production to address 
the fundamental point regarding development of human capital and its societal 
benefits. Unfortunately, it is hard to capture these effects in local regions (because, 
for example, graduates move away and are substituted in from other universities, and 
there is a scale mismatch in contribution to the number of people with degrees in the 
national economy), so these overall societal benefits of higher education tend to accrue 
at broader regional and national scales instead (Moretti 2004; Rothwell 2015; Florida 
2016; Valero and Van Reenen 2019).
14.4 Our business model: what is it and how do we manage it?
The term “business model” came into vogue during the late 1990s as the dot.com boom 
was underway, although the concept has been around for much longer. The question 
“What is your business model?” is often a proxy for “How do you make money?” that 
in turn depends on the answer to “For whom do you add value?” For universities the 
answers are simple, at least on the surface: we add value for students and society and 
they pay us for it (although the relative proportions have changed considerably, see 
Chapters 2 and 4). Some universities rely on people paying more for prestige, others 
rely on volume at value pricing, others on niche specialties, and so on. Prestige can 
come from selectivity and/or research prowess—in other words, not just knowledge 
delivery, but knowledge discovery (by the way, the business model for research is for 
sponsors to offset the cost of research, as we saw in Chapter 8). Looking across the US 
higher education landscape, there are many permutations on the basic business model 
that has been in place seemingly forever.
But the winds of change are always blowing: correctly anticipating, or failing to 
anticipate, changes in the environment and how a university adds value can lead to 
greater success or to failure. Current examples of the former include schools that have 
embraced online education, while some non-elite small liberal arts colleges are examples 
of the latter (we’ll cover more on this in the following sections of this chapter). These 
changes can be evolutionary as above, or more revolutionary as we’ve seen with the 
digital revolution in other sectors (nobody wants to be Kodak making film when digital 
cameras took over). Much has been written on disruptive innovation since Clayton 
Christensen coined the term (Bower and Christensen 1995), which was based on the 
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observation that “one of the most consistent patterns in business is the failure of leading 
companies to stay at the top of their industries when technologies or markets change.” 
While established players are focused on sustaining innovation and becoming better 
in their own niche for those they currently serve, new upstarts, often with an initially 
lower-quality product, focus on an underserved niche or adding a new kind of value 
(remember when Netflix started, you had to wait days for the DVD to arrive in the mail, 
and even when they started streaming video it was relatively poorer quality—as the 
value improved, people switched away from neighborhood video rentals and we know 
what happened to Blockbuster in the end). The hard part is knowing what will be a 
fad versus what represents a deeper change: a recent example in higher education was 
the debut of MOOCs that fizzled initially but that haven’t yet disappeared either (see 
Section 6.11). There are dozens of essays in the technology-will-revolutionize-higher-
ed’s-business-model genre, such as one topical piece wondering if universities will go 
the way of CDs and cable television (Smith 2020).
The most eloquent and insightful writing I know of regarding business models 
doesn’t use the term at all: Peter Drucker, the famous scholar of organizations and 
management, called it the Theory of the Business in a 1994 article (Drucker 1994). 
Paraphrasing him, at its core is the idea that what we call a business model is a set 
of assumptions upon which the university has been built, is being run, that shape its 
behavior, determine its choices about what to do and what not to do, and characterize 
what the university believes are valuable outcomes. It also includes assumptions about 
the markets in which the university operates, the students and stakeholders it serves 
versus its competitors, their values and behavior, the changing role of technology, 
the university’s own strengths and weaknesses, and assumptions about what society 
pays a university to do. Drucker’s point is that every organization has a theory of the 
business, and he cites the genesis of the modern comprehensive research university 
by Wilhelm von Humboldt in 1809 as a powerful example of what a clear, consistent, 
and focused theory can enable. He goes on to describe how checked and unchecked 
assumptions about the theory of the business explains successes and failures of well-
known organizations.
With this broader view we can see that there are almost countless ways in which 
the business model assumptions of all universities and colleges, as well as individual 
institutions, are being challenged today. Can we assume that students and families 
will continue to want a four-year residential experience? Are we pricing ourselves out 
of the market? Who is serving the students (of all ages and backgrounds) who don’t 
attend our institution? Do we focus on the one thing we do best, or do we diversify 
our offerings and delivery channels? And of course, how is technology reshaping 
almost everything in higher education, and what does it mean for the sector and our 
institution?
Answering those questions for our own institutions will give us a clearer picture 
of our current business models and where they are headed, which brings us to 
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something called the “iron triangle,” also known as the unattainable triangle or the 
triple constraint. The iron triangle is essentially a lay Theory of Production: it describes 
the principles by which a university selects the quantity and quality of outputs it 
wants (graduates, knowledge) and the quality and quantity of inputs it will employ 
(factors of production such as labor and facilities and their associated costs, as well as 
the number and academic preparedness of its students). The iron triangle of higher 
education is illustrated in Figure 14.8. It is essentially the higher education version 
of the faster-better-cheaper triangle from project management, except in our case it 
summarizes the constraints of access instead of time, along with quality, and cost.5 
These three management constraints for higher education, quality, access, and low 
cost, constitute a three-way trade-off in which it is impossible to maximize all three 
vertices simultaneously. As Arne Duncan (2009), US Secretary of Education at the time, 
put it, “I often hear that managing the multiple missions of higher education today is 
akin to being caught in the infamous ‘iron triangle.’ Every college president and every 
governing board wants to simultaneously improve quality, increase access—and yet 
constrain costs. To college executives, these three sides of the iron triangle—quality, 
access, and cost—often seem like mutually conflicting choices. Elevating quality raises 
costs. Increasing access can dilute quality. And reducing costs impairs both quality 
and access. … In the standard formulation, the only way out of the iron triangle is 
to secure unlimited resources, either in the form of bigger endowments or state and 
federal support.”
Figure 14.8.  Schematic of the iron triangle of higher education, illustrating the three-way trade-
offs between improving quality of education, increasing access to the institution, and 
constraining costs.
5  Healthcare has essentially the same iron triangle as higher education: improving quality of care, 
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In addition to external resources that can help buy an institution out of the dilemma, 
or at least ameliorate the compromise, many have touted the promise of technology 
to do the same. New instructional technologies definitely have the capacity to modify 
each corner of this triangular playing field but, more precisely, that change will depend 
on how higher education providers implement the technology in a business model. 
Revisiting my point above regarding disruption, new providers or existing institutions 
that want to shift their advantage in the iron triangle will often do so by focusing on 
an underserved market niche and/or by contributing a new kind of value. A successful 
new offering redefines the quality-access-cost proposition to students and families in 
such a way that they increasingly choose it over existing options (more on this in the 
following sections, 14.5 and 14.6).
There are also constant changes in the iron triangle as institutions adapt and 
compete in a dynamic market, so even if an institution chooses its point of compromise 
in the triangle, its relative position compared to other schools will therefore shift over 
time. Make no mistake, the compromise point is a deliberate choice, whether it is made 
actively or passively, overtly or covertly. Few institutions are upfront about the point 
or points of the triangle that they choose not to maximize: elite institutions are by 
definition highly selective/low access and expensive, but they can offset a small part of 
their access compromise and related perceptions by offering scholarships to increase 
access; a particular kind of for-profit school, many of which have since shrunk or closed, 
maximized access while they compromised on quality and used the availability of 
federal loans to offset cost. Most other types of institution are somewhere in the middle, 
such as large public universities that are able to balance moderate access with good 
quality at modest cost. As someone who works at such an institution, we would never 
say that out loud—we are proud to offer a world-class education for many qualified 
students at a very affordable rate (certainly for in-state students), but it is also true that 
we are not as accessible as a regional comprehensive campus, our students don’t get all 
the qualities of an elite private education, and our classes cost more than similar ones 
at the local community college.
Because institutions are continually evaluating and evolving their business models, 
experimenting with novel approaches and technologies while dealing with the 
realities of production in the iron triangle, and because US higher education is highly 
competitive and highly segmented across many dimensions of the market, there 
are good odds that the sector will be sufficiently innovative to survive and succeed. 
That’s the sector—individual schools are a different story as they do or don’t adapt to 
inevitable change—without doubt some new stars will emerge as others fade. But we 
should not be complacent about the sector either, because we all have blind spots: what 
if our highly regionalized sector is consumed by a national or international megabrand 
(think local mom and pop stores before and after Walmart, or local bookstores before 
and after Amazon). It’s worth closing with a caution to be vigilant about our business 
model, because as Drucker (1994) said, “Some theories of the business are so powerful 
that they last for a long time. But eventually every one becomes obsolete.”
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14.5 Which schools are most at risk for closing,  
especially with COVID-19?
Colleges and universities close for one simple reason: their revenues cannot keep up 
with expenses and eventually they run out of cash. Historically, the number of closures 
(and related mergers) is small relative to the size of the higher education sector, just a 
few per year when there is not a larger financial crisis underway (Education Dive 2020). 
While college closures make headlines, the typical annual rate represents just a fraction 
of 1%. College closures in recent years have been limited to small nonprofit private 
colleges, with the notable exceptions of several much larger for-profit institutions that 
collapsed after student loan scandals (see Sections 4.5 and 7.12). There are two broad 
reasons that small colleges have been the most affected: (i) structurally speaking, they 
are the most vulnerable size of institution because small institutions typically have a 
narrower revenue diversity than large institutions, which both limits income options 
and reduces their ability to downsize and cut expenses, and also because there are 
simply fewer functions and areas available to cut—a shrinking small college gets to 
the point where it is below a viable size before a large institution does; (ii) the market 
for non-elite small colleges has been challenging, more so for those in small towns “off 
the interstate” that have struggled to diversify into professional and other revenue-
generating programs relative to their urban counterparts. Is it only small colleges that 
need to worry, or might another economic downturn increase the closure risk for other 
kinds of schools?
As I write, it is the fall of 2020 and the COVID-19 pandemic is still in full swing. 
Lots of financial unknowns remain, even as institutions manage their way through 
the academic year, hoping to keep as much of their tuition revenue intact as they can 
despite widespread shifts to online delivery and limited in-person classes, along with 
weaker enrollment. It’s only natural that talk of more widespread college closures 
has increased, just as it did during the Great Recession. There are some important 
differences between the two economic events for higher education. During and after the 
recession that began in FY2009, college enrollment-related revenues did not plummet 
despite other budgetary stresses, and therefore the college closure numbers were not 
especially large. As often happens in economic downturns, some people turned to 
higher education to obtain a first or second degree. which helped to bolster otherwise 
weaker institutional finances. However, the enrollment and tuition situation resulting 
from the COVID-19 pandemic is quite different, because the anticipated enrollment 
decreases directly affect tuition revenue, room and board revenue, in-state/out-of-
state shifts, and discounting (Burke 2020). Any prognoses I utter here are made in the 
early days of the financial fallout for higher education, and by the time you see this in 
print as a reader you will have the considerable benefit of hindsight.
Whether caused by the pandemic or by more prosaic struggles with their financial 
situation in other years, institutions can undertake a variety of actions to shore up 
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revenue and to cut costs, many of which apply to both situations. At the moment 
these include special scholarships to keep students enrolled (Johnson and Edwards 
2020), lowering tuition and moving to online instruction (Whitford 2020c), hoping 
for stimulus funding (Seltzer 2020c), adjusting to the reality of fundraising declines 
(Whitford 2020a), undertaking furloughs and layoffs (The Chronicle of Higher 
Education 2020), making cuts to athletics programs (Rishe 2020), and dealing with 
new costs for cleaning facilities and disease testing for students and employees 
(Lederman 2020). Other actions in the mix include early retirement/voluntary 
separation programs, reducing employee benefits, endowment drawdowns, 
elimination of administrator, staff and non-tenured faculty positions, and abolishing 
underperforming academic programs (Lederman 2020). On the revenue side, 
institutions that rely on endowments experienced a major drop in the stock market as 
the pandemic emerged, and although the market had largely recovered by summer 
of 2020, the future is murky with much market uncertainty. Discounting has also 
continued apace (Whitford 2020b). Public institutions are anticipating the effects of 
lower state revenues and associated appropriations to higher education, which are 
expected to be lower for several years as the pandemic-related economic downturn 
plays out. This pattern was the case during the Great Recession, when the market 
recovery (that dictates endowment income) happened much faster than for state 
budgets (and the revenue they supply for public universities), a contrast of one or 
two years versus five to ten, with some of the latter never returning to pre-recession 
levels (see Section 4.7).
It’s a fool’s errand to predict which specific institutions in poor financial shape will 
or will not actually close in the coming few years—even with the added financial stress 
of the pandemic—although it doesn’t stop some trying (Brown 2020). No analyst has 
access to sufficiently detailed and up-to-date financial information for every institution 
to make definitive pronouncements about exactly which institutions will close, and 
the specter of imminent closure can itself help bring about heroic measures that 
sometimes lead to a reprieve at the eleventh hour. For example, Sweet Briar College 
staved off an announced closure in 2015 with a historic fundraising effort, among other 
things (Woo 2018). However, it is possible to identify institutions exhibiting signs of 
serious financial risk using indicators from the comprehensive national-level data in 
IPEDS. Although that dataset has a reporting lag of a couple of years, it nonetheless 
enables assessments of financial risk for all institutions. Such studies appear from time 
to time, including ratings from the Federal Government and private companies that 
name names and that have been heavily criticized (Seltzer 2020b). A recent book on 
the topic specifically outlined key indicators and presented a financial stress test for 
colleges (Zemsky et al. 2020), and you can look up any institution using an online tool 
(D’Amato 2020). Understandably, there is now even wider interest in the possibility of 
campus closures given the anticipated financial fallout of the pandemic in FY2021 and 
beyond (Kelchen 2020).
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We’ve covered all the essential variables mentioned in such studies earlier in this 
book, and they each attempt to capture financial health using key factors and their 
trends (Lyken-Segosebe and Shepherd 2013; Parthenon-EY 2016; Raymond 2019; 
Zemsky et al. 2020). If you’ve read through the earlier chapters, you won’t be surprised 
to learn that there is no one-size-fits-all metric, and that it takes a set of indicators to 
make a fuller assessment. So, we’ll work through an example and do exactly that: 
assemble a set of relevant variables and trends that we will then combine to create an 
index of institutional financial risk. This is not a fully comprehensive list, but it does 
include a number of the main indicators mentioned in the literature:
• First-year enrollment: the size of the incoming class is a leading indicator 
of overall enrollment, and a shrinking first-year cohort (in the absence of 
higher net tuition per student) will lead to less income in the current year 
and subsequent years as the smaller cohort moves through;
• Overall enrollment: a measure of institution size and the basis of net tuition 
revenue, with a sustained declining trend portending serious income 
challenges;
• Retention rate: a low and/or decreasing retention rate directly affects overall 
enrollment and tuition revenue, and may signal additional issues with 
instruction or student support;
• Share of students enrolled in online programs: an institution without online 
programs has one less alternative revenue source;
• Discount rate: institutions struggling with enrollment often try to help 
recruitment by making larger financial aid offers, and thus a high or 
increasing discount rate reduces net revenue and can signal trouble;
• Share of total revenue from tuition: a high or increasing dependence on tuition 
revenue indicates low or diminishing income from other sources that could 
otherwise augment the revenue portfolio;
• Share of total revenue from auxiliary enterprises: some institutions can become 
overly reliant on residence hall and dining revenues, so a larger share of 
auxiliary revenue can flag problems;
• Expenditures per student: if enrollments are shrinking and the institution 
is not simultaneously cutting back on expenditures, the resulting rise in 
expenditures per FTE will be unsustainable;
• Endowment: the size of the endowment is a proxy for endowment payout, 
with a small endowment contributing little to overall revenue and a declining 
endowment relative to others likely signaling a drawdown to cover operating 
expenses.
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For each of these indicators we can choose to use the value for the most currently 
available year (FY2018 as of this writing) as well as recent trend data—I’ve picked the 
five-year trend FY2014–FY2018. To make the data easily comparable, the basic amount 
and the slope of the trend for each indicator are converted into percentile ranks. It is then 
a simple matter of creating a composite index of financial risk, which in our example 
I’ve done by tallying the number of indicators falling into the riskiest decile (i.e., the 
worst 10% for that indicator across all institutions). So, for example, if the trend of an 
institution’s first-year enrollment placed it among the worst 10% of institutions, its 
index score would increase by 1 count. If that same institution also placed among the 
highest 10% in share of total revenue from tuition, its index score would increase by 1 
more, for a total of 2 indices in the riskiest decile. There are multiple ways to construct 
such an index, using a weighting scheme for example, or going into the next decile 
bands. Bearing in mind that each indicator is noisy and imprecise, and therefore not 
wanting to over-engineer the exercise, I prefer something that is simple to understand 
and interpret. So, we’ll go with the straightforward tally in our example.
With our approach in place, the only thing left to decide is which indicators to 
include in the index. Again, there is no single correct answer and in practice one would 
construct a set of simpler and more complex combinations. I decided to go with the 
following for our example: the five-year trends for all of the above indicators except 
for online enrollment, and the basic amount for discount rate, shares of revenue from 
tuition and from auxiliaries, and the share of online enrollments. I didn’t select the 
remaining basic amounts because they would overly emphasize institution size, and 
I didn’t include the trend in online enrollment because there are many schools with 
no online programs and the current amount of online activity seems most relevant. 
Reasonable people may differ on these choices, but give or take an indicator or two the 
overall results are not dissimilar.
The results for our index as described are illustrated in Figure 14.9, which includes 
both the percentage and actual number of institutions with risk indicator tallies by type 
of institution. It’s important to see both the relative share of institutions at some financial 
risk as well as the absolute numbers of those institutions. Both public and private 
BAS institutions have high percentage counts on our index, but there are relatively 
few public baccalaureate colleges and about ten times as many private ones, with the 
result that there are dozens of private baccalaureate colleges with 3 or more indicators 
in the riskiest deciles. The same logic applies to the R3-M3 private universities—they 
are the most numerous of all the institution types in our data set (over 400) and even 
with a somewhat lower share of institutions at risk they have similarly high absolute 
numbers of those institutions. Although none of our indicators explicitly highlighted 
institution size, it’s clear that schools with a higher composite financial risk index 
are overwhelmingly comprised of smaller institutions. The combined number of R1 
and R2 institutions on the risk radar is less than 10. Thus, as we’ve seen in many of 
the previous chapters, there are key market and business factors leading to a higher 
proportion of smaller institutions exhibiting indicators of financial stress.
Like Nobody's Business340 
Figure 14.9.  Composite index showing the share (upper panel) and number (lower panel) of 
institutions with counts of financial risk indicators in the riskiest decile, by Carnegie 
classification and control. See text for details. Source: IPEDS (2020).
The obvious next question is how many of these schools registering on the index 
might actually close? One way to get a feel for that is to look at institutions in our 
data set that have indeed closed; there are 9 that have closed since 2016 (Education 
Dive 2020). As it happens, 1 was a public baccalaureate college while all the others 
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Four of the closed schools had 4 and 5 indicators in the riskiest deciles on our 
composite index, although the other scores range from 0 to 7 (the one with 0 was 
a separately-reporting branch campus that had several indicators in the second-
riskiest decile). Scores of 4 or 5 are therefore concerning but imprecise—there are as 
many as 75 institutions with an index of 4 or more. Many of those institutions will 
be resourceful and will make the hard decisions to scope their expenditures to their 
revenues, and they will survive. Despite valiant attempts, others may not be able to 
generate enough cash to pay for minimal operations and they will have to close. That 
number is far smaller than 75, as we’ve only seen two or three closings per year for 
the period covered by the data and immediately afterwards. Thus, the imprecision 
in this sort of exercise is worth underlining again—just because dozens might be in 
the danger zone that caused others to close does not mean that those dozens will 
also close.6 That’s worth a follow-on repeat of something else already mentioned, 
that institution-specific details and behaviors make a critical difference to survival or 
closure when an institution is in an existential crisis.
Yet, if financial conditions suddenly worsen, as is currently anticipated with a 
decrease in tuition revenue due to the effects of COVID-19, then that will obviously 
ratchet up the financial stress for all institutions and it may be a “last straw that breaks 
the camel’s back” for a greater number of at-risk institutions than we would otherwise 
expect. It’s worth underlining the imprecision yet again, because a slight change in the 
construction of the index or the indicators will drive the overall assessment higher or 
lower, even if the broad patterns are similar. That said, if we see a couple of closings 
per year in “normal” years then a major revenue shortfall (say, 10%, 20% or even 30%) 
as a result of the pandemic will surely increase the number of closings.
14.6 What are the long-term financial futures for higher education?
As the quip says, it’s difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.7 It’s as 
true for the future of higher education as anything else, although that hasn’t slowed 
the production of articles and books on the topic that prognosticate on the future of the 
sector. Our time-focus here is the longer view, a decade or two, trying to understand 
the broader forces and trends at work that will affect both the academic and financial 
business of universities, intertwined as they inevitably are.
6  This mistake is a version of the ecological fallacy, which is to incorrectly infer conclusions about 
individuals based on group-level data. Here, it intersects with its cousin, the exception fallacy, which 
is to incorrectly infer conclusions about a group based on an unusual individual. Two respective 
examples to illustrate the distinction: small colleges have higher financial risk indicators overall, so 
a specific small college is at higher financial risk (ecological fallacy); this individual small college 
closed, so all small colleges are at risk of closure (exception fallacy).
7  Being trained in weather and climate where predictions are part of the trade, I heard this humorous 
saying early in my career. Although I’d always heard it attributed to Yogi Berra, the “philosopher of 
baseball,” it turns out that many people are alleged to have coined the phrase including Niels Bohr, 
Samuel Goldwyn, and Mark Twain, but it is likely a Danish proverb (O’Toole 2013).
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If we’ve seen anything in the trends that we’ve covered section by section in this 
book, it is that very few components of higher education have remained static—
virtually every aspect of how the money works in and around universities has shifted 
and is shifting in some way. Whether it was the GI Bill, massive state investments and 
enrollment growth in the 1960s and 1970s, expansion of Pell grants, federal research 
investment, state funding decreases since the 1980s, the expanding role of philanthropy, 
or the online transformation currently underway, institutions are continually having 
to adapt and compete. In the international arena, the second half of the twentieth 
century saw the ascendancy of US higher education and research relative to the UK 
and Europe’s prior dominance, and although the US is still pre-eminent it seems that 
fast-growing China is an emerging and potentially even more dominant competitor.
Opinions on the future of higher education variously cover almost a dozen subtopics 
(and I say opinions as they are usually informed insights rather than representing 
results from the formal research literature). Most of them deal with the implications 
of several fairly obvious trends, while some commentators point out relevant but 
less-commonly mentioned elements; none of them will be a surprise for readers who 
have spent time with the earlier chapters of this book. Hyperbole is a defining feature 
of many of these opinion pieces because bold claims attract readers. Thus, as we go 
through them below, I have tried to temper the exuberance where necessary and 
highlight aspects that deserve consideration:
• Smaller institutions will struggle and more will close: Clayton Christensen’s claim 
of nearly a decade ago that half of the 4,000 colleges and universities in the 
US would be bankrupt by now (Lederman 2017) forces one to paraphrase 
Mark Twain’s famous line to say that rumors of higher education’s demise 
have been greatly exaggerated. Overstatement notwithstanding, he was 
calling attention to the potential for disruptive innovation as evidenced 
by the challenged business model and poor financial health indicators for 
smaller institutions, particularly for the non-elite privates, that we’ve seen 
throughout this book and especially in the previous section. Based on those 
data, it’s easy to see why several commentators believe that well-endowed, 
highly selective liberal arts colleges will survive while the private nonprofit 
sector overall will experience a decline, and that mergers are unlikely to save 
them either (Mintz 2019a; Witt and Coyne 2019).
• Demographic enrollment decreases: Traditional higher education can see 
its entering class coming with an eighteen-year advance notice as the 
demographic baby booms and busts make their way through the K-12 
system. When demographers and enrollment managers model future class-
sizes they include not only birth cohort size but likely college-going rates, 
geographic differences, immigration and more. Nationally, we are on a high 
school graduate plateau that began in about 2010 and that will start to decline 
around 2026, and for areas like the Northeast and Midwest the numbers 
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of college-going high school graduates will dip by 10–20% (Fox 2019). To 
the previous point on small institutions, these enrollment differences will 
fall unevenly across types of institutions (Conley 2019), so competition 
for recruitment is therefore likely to increase in that way as well as across 
geographic regions.
• Online and digital instructional technologies will continue to expand: As with 
almost every other sector, the digital revolution is transforming higher 
education. While the simplistic and overhyped early prophecies about online 
providers rapidly upending higher education in a parallel to the newspaper 
business were false, there are few observers that doubt the deep and 
widespread implications of digital instructional technologies for teaching 
and institutional business models. Interestingly, the COVID-19 pandemic 
has simultaneously accelerated adoption of hybrid online education and 
where it adds value, while also highlighting exactly what students dislike 
about online and what they value about the in-person experience. There 
will be shifting demand for both in the future and institutions will be 
jockeying for position accordingly—it’s all about which institutions adopt 
these technologies and approaches, how far the transformation goes, and 
how fast it occurs. Section 6.11 describes the changes underway in online 
education and how it is being incorporated complexly depending on each 
kind of institution’s market niche. We shouldn’t forget that it’s not just online 
delivery but other related technologies such as adaptive learning, interactive 
textbooks, virtual environments and more that are part of this transformation, 
even for in-person classes. One major unknown in the online space is the role 
of consolidation. Higher education is relatively unconsolidated compared 
to many other sectors because of its intrinsic structure (at least for public 
institutions), with several state systems representing the largest consolidated 
entities. There are no dominant national brands or chains, and it is unclear 
if higher education will continue in that mode (e.g., online news outlets 
although there is some consolidation) or if in the longer run the nature of 
online technology will produce a set of dominant players (e.g., retail with 
Amazon and Walmart).
• Credentialing and unbundling are not yet a major force: An in-person campus 
experience is the ultimate bundled service, with classes, a learning 
community, room and board, teaching, research, arts and culture events, 
athletics, and social life all in one package for four years (Roth 2020). At 
about the same time MOOCs burst on the scene, educational technology 
pundits were heralding the great unbundling of college (Selingo 2013) and 
promoting (digital) credentials for courses and even micro-credentials for 
the equivalent of course subtopics. This view seems to emanate most strongly 
from the technology sector and employers; for example, Apple’s Tim Cook 
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has mentioned that coding is a skill that is easily credentialed and that only 
half of the company’s employees have a four-year degree (Eadicicco 2019). 
Universities are definitely offering one-off courses (and have for decades) 
and MOOCs are still evolving their niche now that the hype has died down 
(Impey 2020). While unbundling, like online more broadly, undoubtedly 
expands access to those who are wanting or able to undertake less than 
an entire degree, there are no strong signs yet of a great unbundling that 
realigns higher education and changes the core demand for degrees.
• Stratification and differentiation will continue: We’ve made distinctions between 
types of institutions throughout this book, and for good reason, because as 
we’ve seen, those differences have been intensifying over time. Universities 
that do well in their niches are likely to continue doing well, such as the 
top public and private research campuses, elite liberal arts colleges, and 
specialized institutes of technology: they have diverse revenue streams, more 
tenured faculty, impressive facilities, and an ability to recruit academically 
well-prepared students (Mintz 2019b). In contrast, the types of institutions 
with serious resource challenges are struggling, such as small private 
colleges and public regional campuses. The amplification of differences is 
seen in enrollments, student preparedness and selectivity, part-time and 
non-tenured versus tenured faculty ratios, private endowments versus 
public funding, and more. This situation has been termed higher education’s 
“gilded age” in which wealth and prestige are increasingly concentrated at 
elite campuses while the disparity grows between those institutions and the 
rest—essentially the middle class of US higher education will increasingly 
be divided between the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer 
(Rosenberg 2019). Some think that institutions that succeed despite these 
pressures will be innovative and entrepreneurial in their approach to 
developing new niches in the higher education ecosystem, whether that 
be specialized training programs for industry, opening up national and 
international markets (physical or virtual), focusing on career-oriented 
majors and job skills, and changing delivery modes away from the fixed 
semester (Mintz 2019c).
• Research will need to be appropriately prioritized: Research is a net expense 
to universities and colleges, whether it is funded research or scholarship 
without external grants, as we saw in Chapter 8. Federal grants do not fully 
reimburse the complete overhead costs of research, and faculty workload 
allocation to research is subsidized from other revenue sources such as 
tuition, state, or investment income. While higher education’s research 
productivity and prowess has never been higher, the majority of institutions 
play a relatively minor role and they incur subsidy costs to do so. While 
it is in their academic interest to foreground research and scholarship, 
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the association of research with academic prestige is such that not many 
universities and colleges are willing to state outright that research is not their 
priority, even if that is the reality of their business model, niche, and financial 
situation. As a recent paper projected, smaller institutions in particular will 
need to restrict research activities in order to focus on the core educational 
mission (Rouse and Lombardi 2018).
• New models and brands will emerge: In the early days of online higher education, 
its low-cost and implied (but incorrect) low-quality image kept many top 
public and private universities out of the game. If MOOCs did anything, 
they associated the top university brands with low-cost online instruction in 
a way that arguably expanded rather than diluted their brands, preserving 
important aspects of their exclusivity (the elite in-person experience). There 
is some debate that this trend may be the equivalent of a luxury brand 
being sold at an outlet store, the very act of which undermines the high-
price to high-quality equivalency that the market assumes (Newton 2018b). 
That narrow issue aside, a number of major universities have developed 
and are continuing to develop big names and market share in the domestic 
and international online space (e.g., Southern New Hampshire University, 
Maryland, and Purdue; more about international coming next), a trend 
that seems set to continue, especially in online professional master’s and 
continuing education (Mintz 2019a). A small number of new models are 
being tried as well, like Minerva and Foundry, both for-profit and out of 
Silicon Valley, the former in an elite mold and the latter aimed at basic 
management skills training (Blumenstyk 2018). Other possible models are 
pure speculation, such as dreamy elitist cyborg mashups between major tech 
companies and top institutions—think Apple-MIT, or Facebook-Harvard 
(Walsh 2020).
• Global education is still a growth market: While we may be reaching peak US 
higher education, there’s a long way to go until we reach peak global higher 
education, as it has been cleverly phrased (Kim 2019). Higher education 
enrollments are expected to double, triple and even quadruple in some 
parts of the world (Calderon 2018). Despite the ups and downs of domestic 
politics, international relations, pandemic travel restrictions, and economic 
conditions more broadly, some US universities have made the international 
market a significant part of their business strategy. The same is true of 
universities in many other high-income countries, with Australia being the 
most visible. While recruitment of international students to in-person (and 
online) programs in the US will continue, the international growth market 
is largely in-country rather than having students move to a university 
in the US or elsewhere. Based on experiences of the last decade or two, 
significant participation in satisfying international demand will probably 
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not be satisfied via expensive physical campuses abroad that duplicate their 
home institutions (see Section 6.12). Instead, it appears that major scaling 
will more likely involve collaborations with local institutions and a blend of 
online and in-person delivery, such as the microcampus approach (Redden 
2017; Calderon 2018).
• Climate change risks will need to be addressed: Climate change arrives not with 
the slow-moving averages but with extreme events. Campuses need to plan 
for the financial (and of course other) impacts of elevated climate risks, such 
as sea-level rise, floods, severe weather, record heat, wildfires, and disease, 
as well as less obvious impacts such as insurance changes, shifting utility 
costs, more frequent brownouts and blackouts, local water quality impacts 
for those with their own water supplies, and travel disruptions. Many of 
these risks involve physical infrastructure and thus they cannot be addressed 
overnight and they may require significant capital (Gardner 2019). In 
addition to fossil fuel divestment (see Section 13.5), many institutions have 
implemented recycling programs, added solar panels, and built or retrofitted 
energy-efficient buildings to mitigate future climate change. Of course, many 
universities are already involved in preparing their students and society for 
climate disruptions. Still, climate impacts to the institutional bottom line have 
not received as much attention. There is a strong business case for climate 
resilience planning (Holland 2015) and campuses will increasingly need to 
prioritize lowering climate risk as part of facilities and financial planning. 
For many, this will need to include collaboration with their neighboring 
communities (Woodside 2018).
• Universities will need to face athletics costs and football injuries: We covered 
athletics extensively in Chapter 12, and it’s plain that many institutions 
with challenging budgets will not be able to continue subsidizing athletics 
programs at current levels. This is as true for many Division I institutions as it 
is in lower divisions. For high-profile conferences, athlete compensation is on 
the horizon too (Anderson 2020a). Furthermore, it appears that the mounting 
evidence of health issues in football from concussion and subsequent brain 
disease is leading to mounting legal spending and the anticipation of greater 
risk of lawsuits and associated damages (Seltzer 2019c). Taken together, it 
appears that institutions will be facing tough decisions about athletics in the 
coming decades.
• Higher education’s trend towards a private good will be challenged: Although 
many people in US public higher education (and not a few outside it too) 
see it as a public good, one where all of society benefits from educating many 
individuals, the evident reality of decades of decreases in state funding per 
student underlines its increasing treatment as a private good, one where the 
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benefits of the education accrue primarily to the individual. Federal support 
for students and for research (at public and private institutions) has been 
much stronger, although not always keeping pace with need either. These 
trends were covered in Chapters 4 and 8. While the overall slide towards 
even less state support does not yet seem over, the related increases in costs 
to students, along with increased prices at private institutions, eventually 
brought calls for free or low-cost college education to the forefront of the 
national policy debate during the 2020 election cycle. There are a myriad 
policy details and plans, such as first-dollar, last-dollar, and debt-free, two-
year versus four-year institutions, and more (Mangan 2019; see also Box 7.2). 
Unsurprisingly, the public-good/private-good view of who should pay for 
college has partisan dimensions (Kreighbaum 2019a), with candidates and 
think-tanks arraying their proposals and arguments on both sides (Anderson 
2019; Whistle 2020). Whatever the immediate outcomes, it is clear that the 
policy battleground is established and won’t be going away in the foreseeable 
future.
Higher education is a large and complex sector with many examples of schools already 
inventing new approaches that both create and respond to the various trends I’ve 
mentioned. Some authors have even taken to blue-sky speculation about what kinds of 
new university might emerge (Jaschik 2019a). I am hopeful that institutions will face 
these futures as an ensemble of challenges and opportunities, adapting and innovating 
as they have always done.

Epilogue
I opened this book by saying that universities are fascinating institutions; I also posited 
that there is plenty of common knowledge on campuses about how their academic 
wheels turn, and that there is much written about managing people, but that an 
appreciation and understanding about how the money works in and around colleges 
and universities is not widespread and sometimes borders on the mythical. I hope I 
have shown you, gentle reader, that the business of universities and their financing can 
be as fascinating as almost any other question that these institutions address. Certainly, 
if you’ve made it from the introduction to this point, your understanding of how the 
money works is miles ahead of most people in and around a campus.
I want to stress that, although this book is all about money and the business of 
the university, I am most certainly not a proponent of a “corporate” university run as 
if it were a conventional business. Despite the absolute necessity for the academy to 
be focused on asking and answering the big questions and the teaching thereof, I am 
also, as you’ve seen, under no illusions that a contemporary US campus can exist as 
an intellectual collective that ignores financial realities. It is precisely this tension, in 
which we simultaneously seek Truth and underwrite that quest by providing access to 
the American dream through education, that makes our many colleges and universities 
so fascinating.
In closing, I trust I have provided you with valuable and practical insights into the 
multiplicity of funding flows and financial relationships that sustain our marvelous 
institutions of learning, showing you along the way how the money really works in 
and around them—how they function and grow, in all connotations of the saying, like 
nobody’s business.
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Appendix A: Institutions in the Data Set
The 1174 institutions and their institution-type characteristics used for analysis 
throughout this book. The Carnegie Classification is the 2015 Basic Carnegie 
Classification (Indiana University Center for Postsecondary Research 2015), as 
follows: R1, R2, R3—Doctoral Universities with Highest, Higher & Moderate research 
activity; M1, M2, M3—Master’s Colleges & Universities with Large, Medium & Smaller 
programs; BAS—Baccalaureate Colleges with an Arts & Sciences Focus.
Institution Name Location Control Carnegie
Abilene Christian University Abilene, TX Private M1
Adams State University Alamosa, CO Public M1
Adelphi University Garden City, NY Private R3
Agnes Scott College Decatur, GA Private BAS
Alabama A&M University Normal, AL Public M1
Alabama State University Montgomery, AL Public M2
Alaska Pacific University Anchorage, AK Private M3
Albany State University Albany, GA Public M2
Albertus Magnus College New Haven, CT Private M2
Albion College Albion, MI Private BAS
Albright College Reading, PA Private BAS
Alcorn State University Alcorn State, MS Public M2
Alfred University Alfred, NY Private M2
Allegheny College Meadville, PA Private BAS
Allen University Columbia, SC Private BAS
Alma College Alma, MI Private BAS
Alvernia University Reading, PA Private M2
Alverno College Milwaukee, WI Private M2
American International College Springfield, MA Private R3
American Jewish University Los Angeles, CA Private BAS
American University Washington, DC Private R2
Amherst College Amherst, MA Private BAS
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Amridge University Montgomery, AL Private M3
Anderson University Anderson, SC Private M2
Anderson University Anderson, IN Private M2
Andrews University Berrien Springs, MI Private R3
Angelo State University San Angelo, TX Public M1
Anna Maria College Paxton, MA Private M2
Appalachian State University Boone, NC Public M1
Aquinas College Grand Rapids, MI Private M3
Arcadia University Glenside, PA Private M1
Arizona State University-Tempe Tempe, AZ Public R1
Arkansas State University-Main Campus Jonesboro, AR Public M1
Arkansas Tech University Russellville, AR Public M1
Armstrong State University Savannah, GA Public M1
Asbury University Wilmore, KY Private M3
Ashland University Ashland, OH Private R3
Assumption College Worcester, MA Private M2
Auburn University Auburn, AL Public R2
Auburn University at Montgomery Montgomery, AL Public M1
Augsburg University Minneapolis, MN Private M1
Augusta University Augusta, GA Public R2
Augustana College Rock Island, IL Private BAS
Aurora University Aurora, IL Private M1
Austin College Sherman, TX Private BAS
Austin Peay State University Clarksville, TN Public M1
Ave Maria University Ave Maria, FL Private BAS
Avila University Kansas City, MO Private M2
Azusa Pacific University Azusa, CA Private R3
Baker University Baldwin City, KS Private M1
Baldwin Wallace University Berea, OH Private M1
Ball State University Muncie, IN Public R2
Bard College Annandale-On-Hudson, NY Private BAS
Bard College at Simon’s Rock Great Barrington, MA Private BAS
Barnard College New York, NY Private BAS
Barry University Miami, FL Private R3
Bates College Lewiston, ME Private BAS
Bay Path University Longmeadow, MA Private M1
Baylor University Waco, TX Private R2
Belhaven University Jackson, MS Private M1
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Bellarmine University Louisville, KY Private M1
Bellevue University Bellevue, NE Private M1
Belmont University Nashville, TN Private M1
Beloit College Beloit, WI Private BAS
Bemidji State University Bemidji, MN Public M3
Benedictine University Lisle, IL Private R3
Bennington College Bennington, VT Private BAS
Bentley University Waltham, MA Private M1
Berea College Berea, KY Private BAS
Berry College Mount Berry, GA Private M3
Bethany College Bethany, WV Private BAS
Bethany Lutheran College Mankato, MN Private BAS
Bethel College-Indiana Mishawaka, IN Private M3
Bethel College-North Newton North Newton, KS Private BAS
Bethel University McKenzie, TN Private M1
Bethel University Saint Paul, MN Private M1
Bethune-Cookman University Daytona Beach, FL Private BAS
Binghamton University Vestal, NY Public R2
Biola University La Mirada, CA Private R3
Birmingham Southern College Birmingham, AL Private BAS
Black Hills State University Spearfish, SD Public M3
Bloomfield College Bloomfield, NJ Private BAS
Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania Bloomsburg, PA Public M1
Boise State University Boise, ID Public R3
Boston College Chestnut Hill, MA Private R1
Boston University Boston, MA Private R1
Bowdoin College Brunswick, ME Private BAS
Bowie State University Bowie, MD Public M1
Bowling Green State University-Main Campus Bowling Green, OH Public R2
Bradley University Peoria, IL Private M2
Brandeis University Waltham, MA Private R1
Brandman University Irvine, CA Private M1
Brenau University Gainesville, GA Private M1
Bridgewater College Bridgewater, VA Private BAS
Bridgewater State University Bridgewater, MA Public M1
Brigham Young University-Provo Provo, UT Private R2
Brown University Providence, RI Private R1
Bryan College-Dayton Dayton, TN Private M3
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Bryant University Smithfield, RI Private M2
Bryn Athyn College of the New Church Bryn Athyn, PA Private BAS
Bryn Mawr College Bryn Mawr, PA Private BAS
Bucknell University Lewisburg, PA Private BAS
Butler University Indianapolis, IN Private M1
Cabrini University Radnor, PA Private M1
Cairn University-Langhorne Langhorne, PA Private M3
Caldwell University Caldwell, NJ Private M2
California Baptist University Riverside, CA Private M1
California Institute of Technology Pasadena, CA Private R1
California Lutheran University Thousand Oaks, CA Private M1
California Polytechnic State University-San Luis 
Obispo
San Luis Obispo, CA Public M1
California State Polytechnic University-Pomona Pomona, CA Public M1
California State University-Bakersfield Bakersfield, CA Public M1
California State University-Channel Islands Camarillo, CA Public M3
California State University-Chico Chico, CA Public M1
California State University-Dominguez Hills Carson, CA Public M1
California State University-East Bay Hayward, CA Public M1
California State University-Fresno Fresno, CA Public R3
California State University-Fullerton Fullerton, CA Public R3
California State University-Long Beach Long Beach, CA Public M1
California State University-Los Angeles Los Angeles, CA Public M1
California State University-Monterey Bay Seaside, CA Public M2
California State University-Northridge Northridge, CA Public M1
California State University-Sacramento Sacramento, CA Public M1
California State University-San Bernardino San Bernardino, CA Public M1
California State University-San Marcos San Marcos, CA Public M2
California State University-Stanislaus Turlock, CA Public M1
California University of Management and Sciences Anaheim, CA Private M2
California University of Pennsylvania California, PA Public M1
Calumet College of Saint Joseph Whiting, IN Private M3
Cambridge College Cambridge, MA Private M1
Cameron University Lawton, OK Public M2
Campbell University Buies Creek, NC Private M1
Campbellsville University Campbellsville, KY Private M1
Canisius College Buffalo, NY Private M1
Capital University Columbus, OH Private M2
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Cardinal Stritch University Milwaukee, WI Private R3
Carleton College Northfield, MN Private BAS
Carlow University Pittsburgh, PA Private M1
Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA Private R1
Carroll University Waukesha, WI Private M3
Carson-Newman University Jefferson City, TN Private M2
Carthage College Kenosha, WI Private BAS
Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH Private R1
Catholic University of America Washington, DC Private R2
Centenary College of Louisiana Shreveport, LA Private BAS
Centenary University Hackettstown, NJ Private M2
Central College Pella, IA Private BAS
Central Connecticut State University New Britain, CT Public M1
Central Michigan University Mount Pleasant, MI Public R2
Central Washington University Ellensburg, WA Public M1
Centre College Danville, KY Private BAS
Chadron State College Chadron, NE Public M2
Chaminade University of Honolulu Honolulu, HI Private M1
Champlain College Burlington, VT Private M2
Chapman University Orange, CA Private M1
Charleston Southern University Charleston, SC Private M2
Charter Oak State College New Britain, CT Public BAS
Chatham University Pittsburgh, PA Private M1
Chestnut Hill College Philadelphia, PA Private M1
Cheyney University of Pennsylvania Cheyney, PA Public BAS
Chicago State University Chicago, IL Public M2
Christian Brothers University Memphis, TN Private M2
Christopher Newport University Newport News, VA Public M3
Citadel Military College of South Carolina Charleston, SC Public M1
City University of Seattle Seattle, WA Private M1
Claflin University Orangeburg, SC Private BAS
Claremont McKenna College Claremont, CA Private BAS
Clarion University of Pennsylvania Clarion, PA Public M1
Clark Atlanta University Atlanta, GA Private R2
Clark University Worcester, MA Private R3
Clarkson University Potsdam, NY Private R3
Clayton State University Morrow, GA Public M2
Clemson University Clemson, SC Public R1
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Cleveland State University Cleveland, OH Public R2
Coastal Carolina University Conway, SC Public M1
Coe College Cedar Rapids, IA Private BAS
Colby College Waterville, ME Private BAS
Colgate University Hamilton, NY Private BAS
College of Charleston Charleston, SC Public M1
College of Mount Saint Vincent Bronx, NY Private M3
College of Our Lady of the Elms Chicopee, MA Private M3
College of Saint Benedict Saint Joseph, MN Private BAS
College of Saint Elizabeth Morristown, NJ Private M2
College of Saint Mary Omaha, NE Private M3
College of Staten Island CUNY Staten Island, NY Public M1
College of the Atlantic Bar Harbor, ME Private BAS
College of the Holy Cross Worcester, MA Private BAS
College of William and Mary Williamsburg, VA Public R2
Colorado Christian University Lakewood, CO Private M2
Colorado College Colorado Springs, CO Private BAS
Colorado School of Mines Golden, CO Public R2
Colorado State University-Fort Collins Fort Collins, CO Public R1
Colorado State University-Pueblo Pueblo, CO Public M2
Columbia College Columbia, SC Private M2
Columbia College Columbia, MO Private M1
Columbia College Chicago Chicago, IL Private M2
Columbia International University Columbia, SC Private M2
Columbia University in the City of New York New York, NY Private R1
Columbus State University Columbus, GA Public M1
Concord University Athens, WV Public M3
Concordia College at Moorhead Moorhead, MN Private BAS
Concordia University-Chicago River Forest, IL Private M1
Concordia University-Irvine Irvine, CA Private M1
Concordia University-Nebraska Seward, NE Private M1
Concordia University-Saint Paul Saint Paul, MN Private M1
Concordia University-Texas Austin, TX Private M1
Concordia University-Wisconsin Mequon, WI Private M1
Connecticut College New London, CT Private BAS
Converse College Spartanburg, SC Private M2
Coppin State University Baltimore, MD Public M3
Corban University Salem, OR Private M3
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Cornell College Mount Vernon, IA Private BAS
Cornell University Ithaca, NY Private R1
Cornerstone University Grand Rapids, MI Private M1
Covenant College Lookout Mountain, GA Private BAS
Creighton University Omaha, NE Private M1
Cumberland University Lebanon, TN Private M2
CUNY Bernard M Baruch College New York, NY Public M1
CUNY Brooklyn College Brooklyn, NY Public M1
CUNY City College New York, NY Public M1
CUNY Hunter College New York, NY Public M1
CUNY John Jay College of Criminal Justice New York, NY Public M1
CUNY Lehman College Bronx, NY Public M1
CUNY Queens College Queens, NY Public M1
Curry College Milton, MA Private M2
D’Youville College Buffalo, NY Private M1
Daemen College Amherst, NY Private M1
Dakota State University Madison, SD Public M3
Dallas Baptist University Dallas, TX Private R3
Dartmouth College Hanover, NH Private R2
Davenport University Grand Rapids, MI Private M1
Davidson College Davidson, NC Private BAS
Davis & Elkins College Elkins, WV Private BAS
Delaware State University Dover, DE Public M2
Delaware Valley University Doylestown, PA Private M3
Delta State University Cleveland, MS Public M1
Denison University Granville, OH Private BAS
DePaul University Chicago, IL Private R3
DePauw University Greencastle, IN Private BAS
DeSales University Center Valley, PA Private M1
Dickinson College Carlisle, PA Private BAS
Dillard University New Orleans, LA Private BAS
Doane University-Arts & Sciences Crete, NE Private BAS
Doane University-Graduate and Professional 
Studies
Lincoln, NE Private M1
Dominican College of Blauvelt Orangeburg, NY Private M3
Dominican University River Forest, IL Private M1
Dominican University of California San Rafael, CA Private M2
Drake University Des Moines, IA Private M1
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Drew University Madison, NJ Private BAS
Drexel University Philadelphia, PA Private R2
Drury University Springfield, MO Private M2
Duke University Durham, NC Private R1
Duquesne University Pittsburgh, PA Private R2
Earlham College Richmond, IN Private BAS
East Carolina University Greenville, NC Public R2
East Central University Ada, OK Public M1
East Stroudsburg University of Pennsylvania East Stroudsburg, PA Public M2
East Tennessee State University Johnson City, TN Public R3
East-West University Chicago, IL Private BAS
Eastern Connecticut State University Willimantic, CT Public M3
Eastern Illinois University Charleston, IL Public M1
Eastern Kentucky University Richmond, KY Public M1
Eastern Mennonite University Harrisonburg, VA Private M3
Eastern Michigan University Ypsilanti, MI Public R3
Eastern Nazarene College Quincy, MA Private M3
Eastern New Mexico University-Main Campus Portales, NM Public M2
Eastern Oregon University La Grande, OR Public M3
Eastern University Saint Davids, PA Private M1
Eastern Washington University Cheney, WA Public M1
Eckerd College Saint Petersburg, FL Private BAS
Edgewood College Madison, WI Private R3
Edinboro University of Pennsylvania Edinboro, PA Public M1
Elizabeth City State University Elizabeth City, NC Public M3
Elizabethtown College Elizabethtown, PA Private BAS
Elmhurst College Elmhurst, IL Private M2
Elmira College Elmira, NY Private BAS
Elon University Elon, NC Private M2
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-Daytona 
Beach
Daytona Beach, FL Private M1
Emerson College Boston, MA Private M1
Emmanuel College Boston, MA Private BAS
Emory & Henry College Emory, VA Private BAS
Emory University Atlanta, GA Private R1
Emporia State University Emporia, KS Public M1
Endicott College Beverly, MA Private M1
Erskine College Due West, SC Private BAS
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Evangel University Springfield, MO Private M3
Fairfield University Fairfield, CT Private M1
Fairleigh Dickinson University-Metropolitan 
Campus
Teaneck, NJ Private M1
Fairmont State University Fairmont, WV Public M3
Fashion Institute of Technology New York, NY Public M3
Faulkner University Montgomery, AL Private M3
Fayetteville State University Fayetteville, NC Public M2
Felician University Lodi, NJ Private M3
Ferris State University Big Rapids, MI Public M2
Fisk University Nashville, TN Private BAS
Fitchburg State University Fitchburg, MA Public M1
Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University Tallahassee, FL Public R2
Florida Atlantic University Boca Raton, FL Public R2
Florida Gulf Coast University Fort Myers, FL Public M1
Florida Institute of Technology Melbourne, FL Private R2
Florida International University Miami, FL Public R1
Florida Southern College Lakeland, FL Private M3
Florida State University Tallahassee, FL Public R1
Fontbonne University Saint Louis, MO Private M1
Fordham University Bronx, NY Private R2
Fort Hays State University Hays, KS Public M1
Fort Lewis College Durango, CO Public BAS
Fort Valley State University Fort Valley, GA Public M3
Framingham State University Framingham, MA Public M1
Francis Marion University Florence, SC Public M3
Franciscan University of Steubenville Steubenville, OH Private M2
Franklin and Marshall College Lancaster, PA Private BAS
Franklin College Franklin, IN Private BAS
Franklin Pierce University Rindge, NH Private M2
Freed-Hardeman University Henderson, TN Private M3
Fresno Pacific University Fresno, CA Private M1
Friends University Wichita, KS Private M1
Frostburg State University Frostburg, MD Public M1
Furman Greenville, SC Private BAS
Gallaudet University Washington, DC Private M2
Gannon University Erie, PA Private M1
Gardner-Webb University Boiling Springs, NC Private R3
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Geneva College Beaver Falls, PA Private M2
George Fox University Newberg, OR Private M1
George Mason University Fairfax, VA Public R1
George Washington University Washington, DC Private R1
Georgetown College Georgetown, KY Private BAS
Georgetown University Washington, DC Private R1
Georgia College & State University Milledgeville, GA Public M1
Georgia Institute of Technology-Main Campus Atlanta, GA Public R1
Georgia Southern University Statesboro, GA Public R3
Georgia Southwestern State University Americus, GA Public M2
Georgia State University Atlanta, GA Public R1
Georgian Court University Lakewood, NJ Private M2
Gettysburg College Gettysburg, PA Private BAS
Goddard College Plainfield, VT Private M2
Golden Gate University-San Francisco San Francisco, CA Private M1
Gonzaga University Spokane, WA Private M1
Gordon College Wenham, MA Private BAS
Goucher College Baltimore, MD Private BAS
Governors State University University Park, IL Public M1
Grace College and Theological Seminary Winona Lake, IN Private M3
Graceland University-Lamoni Lamoni, IA Private M2
Grambling State University Grambling, LA Public M1
Grand Valley State University Allendale, MI Public M1
Green Mountain College Poultney, VT Private M3
Greenville University Greenville, IL Private M3
Grinnell College Grinnell, IA Private BAS
Guilford College Greensboro, NC Private BAS
Gustavus Adolphus College Saint Peter, MN Private BAS
Gwynedd Mercy University Gwynedd Valley, PA Private M2
Hamilton College Clinton, NY Private BAS
Hamline University Saint Paul, MN Private M1
Hampden-Sydney College Hampden-Sydney, VA Private BAS
Hampshire College Amherst, MA Private BAS
Hampton University Hampton, VA Private M2
Hanover College Hanover, IN Private BAS
Hardin-Simmons University Abilene, TX Private M2
Harding University Searcy, AR Private M1
Harrisburg University of Science and Technology Harrisburg, PA Private M3
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Hartwick College Oneonta, NY Private BAS
Harvard University Cambridge, MA Private R1
Harvey Mudd College Claremont, CA Private BAS
Haverford College Haverford, PA Private BAS
Hawaii Pacific University Honolulu, HI Private M1
Heidelberg University Tiffin, OH Private M3
Henderson State University Arkadelphia, AR Public M2
Hendrix College Conway, AR Private BAS
Heritage University Toppenish, WA Private M3
Hiram College Hiram, OH Private BAS
Hobart William Smith Colleges Geneva, NY Private BAS
Hodges University Naples, FL Private M3
Hofstra University Hempstead, NY Private R3
Hollins University Roanoke, VA Private BAS
Holy Cross College Notre Dame, IN Private BAS
Holy Family University Philadelphia, PA Private M1
Holy Names University Oakland, CA Private M2
Hood College Frederick, MD Private M1
Hope College Holland, MI Private BAS
Hope International University Fullerton, CA Private M2
Houghton College Houghton, NY Private BAS
Houston Baptist University Houston, TX Private M2
Howard University Washington, DC Private R2
Humboldt State University Arcata, CA Public M2
Idaho State University Pocatello, ID Public R3
Illinois College Jacksonville, IL Private BAS
Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago, IL Private R2
Illinois State University Normal, IL Public R2
Illinois Wesleyan University Bloomington, IL Private BAS
Immaculata University Immaculata, PA Private R3
Indiana State University Terre Haute, IN Public R3
Indiana University of Pennsylvania-Main Campus Indiana, PA Public R3
Indiana University-Bloomington Bloomington, IN Public R1
Indiana University-East Richmond, IN Public M3
Indiana University-Northwest Gary, IN Public M2
Indiana University-Purdue University-Fort 
Wayne
Fort Wayne, IN Public M1
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Indiana University-Purdue 
University-Indianapolis
Indianapolis, IN Public R2
Indiana University-South Bend South Bend, IN Public M2
Indiana University-Southeast New Albany, IN Public M1
Indiana Wesleyan University-Marion Marion, IN Private M1
Iona College New Rochelle, NY Private M1
Iowa State University Ames, IA Public R1
Ithaca College Ithaca, NY Private M1
Jackson State University Jackson, MS Public R2
Jacksonville State University Jacksonville, AL Public M1
Jacksonville University Jacksonville, FL Private M1
James Madison University Harrisonburg, VA Public M1
Jefferson (Philadelphia University + Thomas 
Jefferson University)
Philadelphia, PA Private M1
John Brown University Siloam Springs, AR Private M2
John Carroll University University Heights, OH Private M1
Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD Private R1
Johnson & Wales University-Providence Providence, RI Private M1
Johnson C Smith University Charlotte, NC Private BAS
Johnson State College Johnson, VT Public M3
Judson College Marion, AL Private BAS
Judson University Elgin, IL Private M3
Juniata College Huntingdon, PA Private BAS
Kalamazoo College Kalamazoo, MI Private BAS
Kansas State University Manhattan, KS Public R1
Kean University Union, NJ Public M1
Keene State College Keene, NH Public M3
Keiser University-Ft Lauderdale Fort Lauderdale, FL Private M1
Kent State University at Kent Kent, OH Public R2
Kenyon College Gambier, OH Private BAS
Kettering University Flint, MI Private M2
Keuka College Keuka Park, NY Private M2
King University Bristol, TN Private M1
King’s College Wilkes-Barre, PA Private M3
Knox College Galesburg, IL Private BAS
Kutztown University of Pennsylvania Kutztown, PA Public M1
La Salle University Philadelphia, PA Private M1
La Sierra University Riverside, CA Private M3
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Lafayette College Easton, PA Private BAS
LaGrange College Lagrange, GA Private BAS
Lake Erie College Painesville, OH Private M3
Lake Forest College Lake Forest, IL Private BAS
Lakeland University Plymouth, WI Private M1
Lamar University Beaumont, TX Public R3
Langston University Langston, OK Public M2
Lasell College Newton, MA Private M2
Lawrence Technological University Southfield, MI Private M1
Lawrence University Appleton, WI Private BAS
Le Moyne College Syracuse, NY Private M1
Lebanon Valley College Annville, PA Private M3
Lee University Cleveland, TN Private M2
Lehigh University Bethlehem, PA Private R2
Lenoir-Rhyne University Hickory, NC Private M3
Lesley University Cambridge, MA Private R3
LeTourneau University Longview, TX Private M2
Lewis & Clark College Portland, OR Private BAS
Lewis University Romeoville, IL Private M1
Liberty University Lynchburg, VA Private R3
Lincoln Memorial University Harrogate, TN Private M1
Lincoln University Jefferson City, MO Public M3
Lincoln University Lincoln University, PA Public M2
Lindenwood University Saint Charles, MO Private R3
Lindsey Wilson College Columbia, KY Private M1
Linfield College-McMinnville Campus McMinnville, OR Private BAS
Lipscomb University Nashville, TN Private R3
LIU Brooklyn Brooklyn, NY Private M1
LIU Post Brookville, NY Private M1
Lock Haven University Lock Haven, PA Public M2
Longwood University Farmville, VA Public M2
Louisiana College Pineville, LA Private M2
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & 
Mechanical College
Baton Rouge, LA Public R1
Louisiana State University-Alexandria Alexandria, LA Public BAS
Louisiana State University-Shreveport Shreveport, LA Public M2
Louisiana Tech University Ruston, LA Public R3
Lourdes University Sylvania, OH Private M2
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Loyola Marymount University Los Angeles, CA Private M1
Loyola University Chicago Chicago, IL Private R2
Loyola University Maryland Baltimore, MD Private M1
Loyola University New Orleans New Orleans, LA Private M1
Lubbock Christian University Lubbock, TX Private M2
Luther College Decorah, IA Private BAS
Lycoming College Williamsport, PA Private BAS
Lynchburg College Lynchburg, VA Private M2
Lynn University Boca Raton, FL Private M1
Lyon College Batesville, AR Private BAS
Macalester College Saint Paul, MN Private BAS
Madonna University Livonia, MI Private M1
Maharishi University of Management Fairfield, IA Private M1
Malone University Canton, OH Private M2
Manhattan College Riverdale, NY Private M2
Manhattanville College Purchase, NY Private M1
Mansfield University of Pennsylvania Mansfield, PA Public M3
Marian University Fond Du Lac, WI Private M2
Marian University Indianapolis, IN Private M2
Marist College Poughkeepsie, NY Private M1
Marlboro College Marlboro, VT Private BAS
Marquette University Milwaukee, WI Private R2
Marshall University Huntington, WV Public M1
Martin University Indianapolis, IN Private BAS
Mary Baldwin University Staunton, VA Private M2
Marygrove College Detroit, MI Private M1
Marymount Manhattan College New York, NY Private BAS
Marymount University Arlington, VA Private M1
Maryville College Maryville, TN Private BAS
Maryville University of Saint Louis Saint Louis, MO Private R3
Marywood University Scranton, PA Private M1
Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts North Adams, MA Public BAS
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA Private R1
Massachusetts Maritime Academy Buzzards Bay, MA Public M3
McDaniel College Westminster, MD Private BAS
McKendree University Lebanon, IL Private M1
McNeese State University Lake Charles, LA Public M1
Medaille College Buffalo, NY Private M1
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Mercer University Macon, GA Private R3
Mercy College Dobbs Ferry, NY Private M1
Mercyhurst University Erie, PA Private M2
Meredith College Raleigh, NC Private BAS
Merrimack College North Andover, MA Private M2
Methodist University Fayetteville, NC Private M3
Metropolitan College of New York New York, NY Private M1
Metropolitan State University Saint Paul, MN Public M1
Metropolitan State University of Denver Denver, CO Public M2
Miami University-Oxford Oxford, OH Public R2
Michigan State University East Lansing, MI Public R1
Michigan Technological University Houghton, MI Public R2
Mid-America Christian University Oklahoma City, OK Private M2
MidAmerica Nazarene University Olathe, KS Private M2
Middle Tennessee State University Murfreesboro, TN Public R3
Middlebury College Middlebury, VT Private BAS
Midway University Midway, KY Private M3
Midwestern State University Wichita Falls, TX Public M2
Millersville University of Pennsylvania Millersville, PA Public M1
Mills College Oakland, CA Private M1
Millsaps College Jackson, MS Private BAS
Milwaukee School of Engineering Milwaukee, WI Private M3
Minnesota State University Moorhead Moorhead, MN Public M2
Minnesota State University-Mankato Mankato, MN Public M1
Minot State University Minot, ND Public M2
Misericordia University Dallas, PA Private M2
Mississippi College Clinton, MS Private M1
Mississippi State University Mississippi State, MS Public R2
Mississippi University for Women Columbus, MS Public M3
Mississippi Valley State University Itta Bena, MS Public M3
Missouri Baptist University Saint Louis, MO Private M1
Missouri State University-Springfield Springfield, MO Public M1
Missouri University of Science and Technology Rolla, MO Public R2
Molloy College Rockville Centre, NY Private M1
Monmouth College Monmouth, IL Private BAS
Monmouth University West Long Branch, NJ Private M1
Montana State University Bozeman, MT Public R2
Montana State University-Billings Billings, MT Public M2
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Montclair State University Montclair, NJ Public R3
Montreat College Montreat, NC Private M3
Moravian College Bethlehem, PA Private BAS
Morehead State University Morehead, KY Public M1
Morehouse College Atlanta, GA Private BAS
Morgan State University Baltimore, MD Public R3
Morningside College Sioux City, IA Private M2
Mount Holyoke College South Hadley, MA Private BAS
Mount Marty College Yankton, SD Private M3
Mount Mary University Milwaukee, WI Private M2
Mount Mercy University Cedar Rapids, IA Private M2
Mount Saint Joseph University Cincinnati, OH Private M2
Mount Saint Mary College Newburgh, NY Private M2
Mount Saint Mary’s University Los Angeles, CA Private M2
Mount St. Mary’s University Emmitsburg, MD Private M2
Mount Vernon Nazarene University Mount Vernon, OH Private M1
Muhlenberg College Allentown, PA Private BAS
Murray State University Murray, KY Public M1
Muskingum University New Concord, OH Private M2
Naropa University Boulder, CO Private M1
National Louis University Chicago, IL Private R3
National University La Jolla, CA Private M1
Nazareth College Rochester, NY Private M1
Nebraska Wesleyan University Lincoln, NE Private M2
Neumann University Aston, PA Private M2
New College of Florida Sarasota, FL Public BAS
New England College Henniker, NH Private M1
New Jersey City University Jersey City, NJ Public M1
New Jersey Institute of Technology Newark, NJ Public R2
New Mexico Highlands University Las Vegas, NM Public M1
New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology Socorro, NM Public M3
New Mexico State University-Main Campus Las Cruces, NM Public R2
New York Institute of Technology Old Westbury, NY Private M1
New York University New York, NY Private R1
Newman University Wichita, KS Private M2
Niagara University Niagara University, NY Private M1
Nicholls State University Thibodaux, LA Public M2
Norfolk State University Norfolk, VA Public M2
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North Carolina A & T State University Greensboro, NC Public R2
North Carolina Central University Durham, NC Public M1
North Carolina State University at Raleigh Raleigh, NC Public R1
North Central College Naperville, IL Private M2
North Dakota State University-Main Campus Fargo, ND Public R2
North Greenville University Tigerville, SC Private M3
North Park University Chicago, IL Private M1
Northeastern Illinois University Chicago, IL Public M1
Northeastern State University Tahlequah, OK Public M1
Northeastern University Boston, MA Private R1
Northern Arizona University Flagstaff, AZ Public R2
Northern Illinois University Dekalb, IL Public R2
Northern Kentucky University Highland Heights, KY Public M1
Northern Michigan University Marquette, MI Public M2
Northern State University Aberdeen, SD Public M3
Northland College Ashland, WI Private BAS
Northwest Christian University Eugene, OR Private M3
Northwest Missouri State University Maryville, MO Public M1
Northwest Nazarene University Nampa, ID Private M1
Northwest University Kirkland, WA Private M2
Northwestern Oklahoma State University Alva, OK Public M3
Northwestern State University of Louisiana Natchitoches, LA Public M1
Northwestern University Evanston, IL Private R1
Norwich University Northfield, VT Private M1
Notre Dame College Cleveland, OH Private M3
Notre Dame de Namur University Belmont, CA Private M1
Notre Dame of Maryland University Baltimore, MD Private M1
Nova Southeastern University Fort Lauderdale, FL Private R2
Nyack College Nyack, NY Private M1
Oakland University Rochester Hills, MI Public R3
Oberlin College Oberlin, OH Private BAS
Occidental College Los Angeles, CA Private BAS
Oglethorpe University Atlanta, GA Private BAS
Ohio Dominican University Columbus, OH Private M2
Ohio State University-Main Campus Columbus, OH Public R1
Ohio University-Main Campus Athens, OH Public R2
Ohio Wesleyan University Delaware, OH Private BAS
Oklahoma Christian University Edmond, OK Private M1
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Oklahoma City University Oklahoma City, OK Private M1
Oklahoma State University-Main Campus Stillwater, OK Public R2
Oklahoma Wesleyan University Bartlesville, OK Private M3
Old Dominion University Norfolk, VA Public R2
Olivet Nazarene University Bourbonnais, IL Private M1
Oral Roberts University Tulsa, OK Private M2
Oregon State University Corvallis, OR Public R1
Otterbein University Westerville, OH Private M2
Ouachita Baptist University Arkadelphia, AR Private BAS
Our Lady of the Lake University San Antonio, TX Private M1
Pace University-New York New York, NY Private R3
Pacific Lutheran University Tacoma, WA Private M2
Pacific Union College Angwin, CA Private BAS
Pacific University Forest Grove, OR Private M1
Paine College Augusta, GA Private BAS
Palm Beach Atlantic University West Palm Beach, FL Private M1
Park University Parkville, MO Private M2
Pennsylvania State University-Main Campus University Park, PA Public R1
Pepperdine University Malibu, CA Private R3
Peru State College Peru, NE Public M3
Pfeiffer University Misenheimer, NC Private M1
Philander Smith College Little Rock, AR Private BAS
Piedmont College Demorest, GA Private M1
Pine Manor College Chestnut Hill, MA Private BAS
Pittsburg State University Pittsburg, KS Public M1
Pitzer College Claremont, CA Private BAS
Plymouth State University Plymouth, NH Public M1
Point Loma Nazarene University San Diego, CA Private M1
Point Park University Pittsburgh, PA Private M1
Pomona College Claremont, CA Private BAS
Portland State University Portland, OR Public R2
Prairie View A&M University Prairie View, TX Public R3
Presbyterian College Clinton, SC Private BAS
Prescott College Prescott, AZ Private M3
Princeton University Princeton, NJ Private R1
Providence Christian College Pasadena, CA Private BAS
Providence College Providence, RI Private M1
Purdue University-Main Campus West Lafayette, IN Public R1
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Queens University of Charlotte Charlotte, NC Private M2
Quincy University Quincy, IL Private M2
Quinnipiac University Hamden, CT Private M1
Radford University Radford, VA Public M1
Ramapo College of New Jersey Mahwah, NJ Public M2
Randolph College Lynchburg, VA Private BAS
Randolph-Macon College Ashland, VA Private BAS
Reed College Portland, OR Private BAS
Regent University Virginia Beach, VA Private R3
Regis University Denver, CO Private M1
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Troy, NY Private R2
Rhode Island College Providence, RI Public M1
Rhodes College Memphis, TN Private BAS
Rice University Houston, TX Private R1
Rider University Lawrenceville, NJ Private M1
Ripon College Ripon, WI Private BAS
Rivier University Nashua, NH Private M1
Roanoke College Salem, VA Private BAS
Robert Morris University Moon Township, PA Private R3
Robert Morris University Illinois Chicago, IL Private M1
Roberts Wesleyan College Rochester, NY Private M1
Rochester Institute of Technology Rochester, NY Private R3
Rockford University Rockford, IL Private M3
Rockhurst University Kansas City, MO Private M1
Roger Williams University Bristol, RI Private M2
Rollins College Winter Park, FL Private M1
Roosevelt University Chicago, IL Private M1
Rosemont College Rosemont, PA Private M2
Rowan University Glassboro, NJ Public R3
Rutgers University-Camden Camden, NJ Public M1
Rutgers University-New Brunswick New Brunswick, NJ Public R1
Rutgers University-Newark Newark, NJ Public R2
Sacred Heart University Fairfield, CT Private M1
Saginaw Valley State University University Center, MI Public M1
Saint Ambrose University Davenport, IA Private M1
Saint Anselm College Manchester, NH Private BAS
Saint Cloud State University Saint Cloud, MN Public M1
Saint Edward’s University Austin, TX Private M1
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Saint Francis University Loretto, PA Private M1
Saint John Fisher College Rochester, NY Private R3
Saint John’s University Collegeville, MN Private BAS
Saint Joseph’s College of Maine Standish, ME Private M1
Saint Joseph’s University Philadelphia, PA Private M1
Saint Leo University Saint Leo, FL Private M1
Saint Louis University Saint Louis, MO Private R2
Saint Martin’s University Lacey, WA Private M2
Saint Mary’s College Notre Dame, IN Private BAS
Saint Mary’s College of California Moraga, CA Private M1
Saint Mary’s University of Minnesota Winona, MN Private M1
Saint Michael’s College Colchester, VT Private BAS
Saint Norbert College De Pere, WI Private BAS
Saint Peter’s University Jersey City, NJ Private M1
Saint Vincent College Latrobe, PA Private BAS
Saint Xavier University Chicago, IL Private M1
Salem College Winston-Salem, NC Private BAS
Salem State University Salem, MA Public M1
Salisbury University Salisbury, MD Public M1
Salve Regina University Newport, RI Private M2
Sam Houston State University Huntsville, TX Public R3
Samford University Birmingham, AL Private M1
San Diego State University San Diego, CA Public R2
San Francisco State University San Francisco, CA Public R3
San Jose State University San Jose, CA Public M1
Santa Clara University Santa Clara, CA Private M1
Sarah Lawrence College Bronxville, NY Private BAS
Savannah State University Savannah, GA Public M3
Schreiner University Kerrville, TX Private BAS
Scripps College Claremont, CA Private BAS
Seattle Pacific University Seattle, WA Private R3
Seattle University Seattle, WA Private M1
Seton Hall University South Orange, NJ Private R3
Seton Hill University Greensburg, PA Private M2
Sewanee-The University of the South Sewanee, TN Private BAS
Shenandoah University Winchester, VA Private R3
Shepherd University Shepherdstown, WV Public BAS
Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania Shippensburg, PA Public M1
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Shorter University-College of Adult & 
Professional Programs
Marietta, GA Private M2
Siena College Loudonville, NY Private BAS
Siena Heights University Adrian, MI Private M2
Sierra Nevada College Incline Village, NV Private M2
Silver Lake College of the Holy Family Manitowoc, WI Private M3
Simmons College Boston, MA Private M1
Simpson College Indianola, IA Private BAS
Simpson University Redding, CA Private M3
Skidmore College Saratoga Springs, NY Private BAS
Slippery Rock University of Pennsylvania Slippery Rock, PA Public M1
Smith College Northampton, MA Private BAS
Soka University of America Aliso Viejo, CA Private BAS
Sonoma State University Rohnert Park, CA Public M1
South Carolina State University Orangeburg, SC Public M2
South Dakota State University Brookings, SD Public R2
Southeast Missouri State University Cape Girardeau, MO Public M1
Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary Wake Forest, NC Private M1
Southeastern Louisiana University Hammond, LA Public M1
Southeastern Oklahoma State University Durant, OK Public M2
Southeastern University Lakeland, FL Private M2
Southern Adventist University Collegedale, TN Private M2
Southern Arkansas University Main Campus Magnolia, AR Public M2
Southern Connecticut State University New Haven, CT Public M1
Southern Illinois University-Carbondale Carbondale, IL Public R2
Southern Illinois University-Edwardsville Edwardsville, IL Public M1
Southern Methodist University Dallas, TX Private R2
Southern Nazarene University Bethany, OK Private M1
Southern New Hampshire University Manchester, NH Private M1
Southern Oregon University Ashland, OR Public M1
Southern University and A&M College Baton Rouge, LA Public M1
Southern University at New Orleans New Orleans, LA Public M2
Southern Utah University Cedar City, UT Public M1
Southern Virginia University Buena Vista, VA Private BAS
Southern Wesleyan University Central, SC Private M1
Southwest Baptist University Bolivar, MO Private M2
Southwest Minnesota State University Marshall, MN Public M2
Southwestern Assemblies of God University Waxahachie, TX Private M3
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Southwestern College Winfield, KS Private M2
Southwestern Oklahoma State University Weatherford, OK Public M1
Southwestern University Georgetown, TX Private BAS
Spalding University Louisville, KY Private R3
Spelman College Atlanta, GA Private BAS
Spring Arbor University Spring Arbor, MI Private M1
Spring Hill College Mobile, AL Private BAS
Springfield College Springfield, MA Private M1
St Bonaventure University Saint Bonaventure, NY Private M2
St Catherine University Saint Paul, MN Private M1
St John’s University-New York Queens, NY Private R3
St Lawrence University Canton, NY Private BAS
St Mary’s College of Maryland St. Mary’s City, MD Public BAS
St Olaf College Northfield, MN Private BAS
St Thomas University Miami Gardens, FL Private M1
St. John’s College Annapolis, MD Private BAS
St. John’s College Santa Fe, NM Private BAS
St. Joseph’s College-New York Brooklyn, NY Private M1
St. Mary’s University San Antonio, TX Private M1
St. Thomas Aquinas College Sparkill, NY Private M3
Stanford University Stanford, CA Private R1
State University of New York at New Paltz New Paltz, NY Public M1
Stephen F Austin State University Nacogdoches, TX Public M1
Stephens College Columbia, MO Private M3
Sterling College Craftsbury Common, VT Private BAS
Stetson University DeLand, FL Private M2
Stevens Institute of Technology Hoboken, NJ Private R2
Stevens-Henager College Murray, UT Private M2
Stevenson University Stevenson, MD Private M2
Stillman College Tuscaloosa, AL Private BAS
Stockton University Galloway, NJ Public M1
Stonehill College Easton, MA Private BAS
Stony Brook University Stony Brook, NY Public R1
Suffolk University Boston, MA Private R3
Sul Ross State University Alpine, TX Public M1
SUNY at Albany Albany, NY Public R1
SUNY at Fredonia Fredonia, NY Public M2
SUNY at Purchase College Purchase, NY Public BAS
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SUNY Buffalo State Buffalo, NY Public M1
SUNY College at Brockport Brockport, NY Public M1
SUNY College at Geneseo Geneseo, NY Public M3
SUNY College at Old Westbury Old Westbury, NY Public M3
SUNY College at Oswego Oswego, NY Public M1
SUNY College at Plattsburgh Plattsburgh, NY Public M1
SUNY College at Potsdam Potsdam, NY Public M2
SUNY College of Environmental Science and 
Forestry
Syracuse, NY Public R3
SUNY Cortland Cortland, NY Public M1
SUNY Empire State College Saratoga Springs, NY Public M2
SUNY Maritime College Throggs Neck, NY Public M3
SUNY Oneonta Oneonta, NY Public M3
SUNY Polytechnic Institute Utica, NY Public M2
Susquehanna University Selinsgrove, PA Private BAS
Swarthmore College Swarthmore, PA Private BAS
Sweet Briar College Sweet Briar, VA Private BAS
Syracuse University Syracuse, NY Private R1
Tarleton State University Stephenville, TX Public M1
Temple University Philadelphia, PA Public R1
Tennessee State University Nashville, TN Public R3
Tennessee Technological University Cookeville, TN Public R3
Texas A&M International University Laredo, TX Public M1
Texas A&M University-College Station College Station, TX Public R1
Texas A&M University-Commerce Commerce, TX Public R2
Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi Corpus Christi, TX Public R3
Texas A&M University-Kingsville Kingsville, TX Public R3
Texas A&M University-Texarkana Texarkana, TX Public M2
Texas Christian University Fort Worth, TX Private R2
Texas Southern University Houston, TX Public R3
Texas State University San Marcos, TX Public R2
Texas Tech University Lubbock, TX Public R1
Texas Wesleyan University Fort Worth, TX Private M1
Texas Woman’s University Denton, TX Public R3
The College of Idaho Caldwell, ID Private BAS
The College of New Jersey Ewing, NJ Public M1
The College of New Rochelle New Rochelle, NY Private M1
The College of Saint Rose Albany, NY Private M1
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The College of Saint Scholastica Duluth, MN Private M1
The College of Wooster Wooster, OH Private BAS
The Evergreen State College Olympia, WA Public M2
The King’s College New York, NY Private BAS
The Master’s University and Seminary Santa Clarita, CA Private M3
The New School New York, NY Private R2
The Sage Colleges Troy, NY Private M1
The University of Alabama Tuscaloosa, AL Public R2
The University of Findlay Findlay, OH Private M1
The University of Montana Missoula, MT Public R2
The University of Tampa Tampa, FL Private M1
The University of Tennessee-Chattanooga Chattanooga, TN Public M1
The University of Tennessee-Knoxville Knoxville, TN Public R1
The University of Tennessee-Martin Martin, TN Public M2
The University of Texas at Arlington Arlington, TX Public R1
The University of Texas at Austin Austin, TX Public R1
The University of Texas at Dallas Richardson, TX Public R1
The University of Texas at El Paso El Paso, TX Public R2
The University of Texas at San Antonio San Antonio, TX Public R2
The University of Texas at Tyler Tyler, TX Public M1
The University of Texas of the Permian Basin Odessa, TX Public M2
The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley Edinburg, TX Public R3
The University of Virginia’s College at Wise Wise, VA Public BAS
The University of West Florida Pensacola, FL Public R3
Thiel College Greenville, PA Private BAS
Thomas Aquinas College Santa Paula, CA Private BAS
Thomas College Waterville, ME Private M3
Thomas Edison State University Trenton, NJ Public M2
Thomas More College Crestview Hills, KY Private M3
Thomas More College of Liberal Arts Merrimack, NH Private BAS
Thomas University Thomasville, GA Private M3
Tiffin University Tiffin, OH Private M1
Tougaloo College Tougaloo, MS Private BAS
Touro College New York, NY Private M1
Touro University Worldwide Los Alamitos, CA Private M3
Towson University Towson, MD Public M1
Transylvania University Lexington, KY Private BAS
Trevecca Nazarene University Nashville, TN Private R3
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Trinity College Hartford, CT Private BAS
Trinity International University-Illinois Deerfield, IL Private R3
Trinity University San Antonio, TX Private M3
Trinity Washington University Washington, DC Private M1
Troy University Troy, AL Public M1
Truman State University Kirksville, MO Public M2
Tufts University Medford, MA Private R1
Tulane University of Louisiana New Orleans, LA Private R1
Tusculum College Greeneville, TN Private M2
Tuskegee University Tuskegee, AL Private M3
Union College Barbourville, KY Private M2
Union College Schenectady, NY Private BAS
Union Institute & University Cincinnati, OH Private R3
Union University Jackson, TN Private R3
University at Buffalo Buffalo, NY Public R1
University of Akron Main Campus Akron, OH Public R2
University of Alabama at Birmingham Birmingham, AL Public R1
University of Alabama in Huntsville Huntsville, AL Public R2
University of Alaska Anchorage Anchorage, AK Public M1
University of Alaska Fairbanks Fairbanks, AK Public R2
University of Alaska Southeast Juneau, AK Public M2
University of Arizona Tucson, AZ Public R1
University of Arkansas Fayetteville, AR Public R1
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Little Rock, AR Public R3
University of Arkansas at Monticello Monticello, AR Public M3
University of Baltimore Baltimore, MD Public M1
University of Bridgeport Bridgeport, CT Private M1
University of California-Berkeley Berkeley, CA Public R1
University of California-Davis Davis, CA Public R1
University of California-Irvine Irvine, CA Public R1
University of California-Los Angeles Los Angeles, CA Public R1
University of California-Merced Merced, CA Public R2
University of California-Riverside Riverside, CA Public R1
University of California-San Diego La Jolla, CA Public R1
University of California-Santa Barbara Santa Barbara, CA Public R1
University of California-Santa Cruz Santa Cruz, CA Public R1
University of Central Arkansas Conway, AR Public M1
University of Central Florida Orlando, FL Public R1
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University of Central Missouri Warrensburg, MO Public M1
University of Central Oklahoma Edmond, OK Public M1
University of Charleston Charleston, WV Private M3
University of Chicago Chicago, IL Private R1
University of Cincinnati-Main Campus Cincinnati, OH Public R1
University of Colorado-Boulder Boulder, CO Public R1
University of Colorado-Colorado Springs Colorado Springs, CO Public M1
University of Colorado-Denver/Anschutz 
Medical Campus
Denver, CO Public R2
University of Connecticut Storrs, CT Public R1
University of Dallas Irving, TX Private M1
University of Dayton Dayton, OH Private R2
University of Delaware Newark, DE Public R1
University of Denver Denver, CO Private R2
University of Detroit Mercy Detroit, MI Private M1
University of Dubuque Dubuque, IA Private M3
University of Evansville Evansville, IN Private M3
University of Florida Gainesville, FL Public R1
University of Georgia Athens, GA Public R1
University of Hartford West Hartford, CT Private R3
University of Hawaii at Hilo Hilo, HI Public M3
University of Hawaii at Manoa Honolulu, HI Public R1
University of Houston Houston, TX Public R1
University of Houston-Clear Lake Houston, TX Public M1
University of Houston-Downtown Houston, TX Public M3
University of Houston-Victoria Victoria, TX Public M1
University of Idaho Moscow, ID Public R2
University of Illinois at Chicago Chicago, IL Public R1
University of Illinois at Springfield Springfield, IL Public M1
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Champaign, IL Public R1
University of Indianapolis Indianapolis, IN Private M1
University of Iowa Iowa City, IA Public R1
University of Kansas Lawrence, KS Public R1
University of Kentucky Lexington, KY Public R1
University of La Verne La Verne, CA Private R3
University of Louisiana at Lafayette Lafayette, LA Public R2
University of Louisiana at Monroe Monroe, LA Public R3
University of Louisville Louisville, KY Public R1
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University of Maine Orono, ME Public R2
University of Maine at Machias Machias, ME Public BAS
University of Mary Bismarck, ND Private M1
University of Mary Hardin-Baylor Belton, TX Private M2
University of Mary Washington Fredericksburg, VA Public M1
University of Maryland Eastern Shore Princess Anne, MD Public R3
University of Maryland-Baltimore County Baltimore, MD Public R2
University of Maryland-College Park College Park, MD Public R1
University of Maryland-University College Adelphi, MD Public M1
University of Massachusetts-Amherst Amherst, MA Public R1
University of Massachusetts-Boston Boston, MA Public R2
University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth North Dartmouth, MA Public R2
University of Massachusetts-Lowell Lowell, MA Public R2
University of Memphis Memphis, TN Public R2
University of Miami Coral Gables, FL Private R1
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor Ann Arbor, MI Public R1
University of Michigan-Dearborn Dearborn, MI Public M1
University of Michigan-Flint Flint, MI Public M1
University of Minnesota-Duluth Duluth, MN Public M1
University of Minnesota-Morris Morris, MN Public BAS
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities Minneapolis, MN Public R1
University of Mississippi University, MS Public R1
University of Missouri-Columbia Columbia, MO Public R1
University of Missouri-Kansas City Kansas City, MO Public R2
University of Missouri-St Louis Saint Louis, MO Public R2
University of Montevallo Montevallo, AL Public M2
University of Nebraska at Kearney Kearney, NE Public M1
University of Nebraska at Omaha Omaha, NE Public R3
University of Nebraska-Lincoln Lincoln, NE Public R1
University of Nevada-Las Vegas Las Vegas, NV Public R2
University of Nevada-Reno Reno, NV Public R2
University of New England Biddeford, ME Private M1
University of New Hampshire at Manchester Manchester, NH Public BAS
University of New Hampshire-Main Campus Durham, NH Public R2
University of New Haven West Haven, CT Private M1
University of New Mexico-Main Campus Albuquerque, NM Public R1
University of New Orleans New Orleans, LA Public R2
University of North Alabama Florence, AL Public M1
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University of North Carolina at Asheville Asheville, NC Public BAS
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Chapel Hill, NC Public R1
University of North Carolina at Charlotte Charlotte, NC Public R2
University of North Carolina at Greensboro Greensboro, NC Public R2
University of North Carolina at Pembroke Pembroke, NC Public M1
University of North Carolina Wilmington Wilmington, NC Public M1
University of North Dakota Grand Forks, ND Public R2
University of North Florida Jacksonville, FL Public M1
University of North Georgia Dahlonega, GA Public M2
University of North Texas Denton, TX Public R1
University of North Texas at Dallas Dallas, TX Public M3
University of Northern Colorado Greeley, CO Public R2
University of Northern Iowa Cedar Falls, IA Public M1
University of Northwestern-St Paul Saint Paul, MN Private M3
University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, IN Private R1
University of Oklahoma-Norman Campus Norman, OK Public R1
University of Oregon Eugene, OR Public R1
University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, PA Private R1
University of Pikeville Pikeville, KY Private BAS
University of Pittsburgh-Greensburg Greensburg, PA Public BAS
University of Pittsburgh-Johnstown Johnstown, PA Public BAS
University of Pittsburgh-Pittsburgh Campus Pittsburgh, PA Public R1
University of Portland Portland, OR Private M2
University of Puget Sound Tacoma, WA Private BAS
University of Redlands Redlands, CA Private M1
University of Rhode Island Kingston, RI Public R2
University of Richmond Richmond, VA Private BAS
University of Rochester Rochester, NY Private R1
University of Saint Francis-Fort Wayne Fort Wayne, IN Private M2
University of Saint Joseph West Hartford, CT Private M1
University of Saint Mary Leavenworth, KS Private M2
University of San Diego San Diego, CA Private R3
University of San Francisco San Francisco, CA Private R3
University of Science and Arts of Oklahoma Chickasha, OK Public BAS
University of Scranton Scranton, PA Private M1
University of Sioux Falls Sioux Falls, SD Private M2
University of South Alabama Mobile, AL Public R2
University of South Carolina-Columbia Columbia, SC Public R1
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University of South Dakota Vermillion, SD Public R2
University of South Florida-Main Campus Tampa, FL Public R1
University of South Florida-Sarasota-Manatee Sarasota, FL Public M3
University of South Florida-St Petersburg St. Petersburg, FL Public M2
University of Southern California Los Angeles, CA Private R1
University of Southern Indiana Evansville, IN Public M1
University of Southern Maine Portland, ME Public M1
University of Southern Mississippi Hattiesburg, MS Public R2
University of St Francis Joliet, IL Private M1
University of St Thomas Houston, TX Private M1
University of St Thomas Saint Paul, MN Private R3
University of the Cumberlands Williamsburg, KY Private R3
University of the District of Columbia Washington, DC Public M3
University of the Incarnate Word San Antonio, TX Private M1
University of the Pacific Stockton, CA Private R3
University of the Southwest Hobbs, NM Private M2
University of Toledo Toledo, OH Public R2
University of Tulsa Tulsa, OK Private R2
University of Utah Salt Lake City, UT Public R1
University of Vermont Burlington, VT Public R2
University of Virginia-Main Campus Charlottesville, VA Public R1
University of Washington-Seattle Campus Seattle, WA Public R1
University of West Alabama Livingston, AL Public M1
University of West Georgia Carrollton, GA Public R3
University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire Eau Claire, WI Public M2
University of Wisconsin-Green Bay Green Bay, WI Public M3
University of Wisconsin-La Crosse La Crosse, WI Public M1
University of Wisconsin-Madison Madison, WI Public R1
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Milwaukee, WI Public R1
University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh Oshkosh, WI Public M1
University of Wisconsin-Parkside Kenosha, WI Public BAS
University of Wisconsin-Platteville Platteville, WI Public M1
University of Wisconsin-River Falls River Falls, WI Public M2
University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point Stevens Point, WI Public M3
University of Wisconsin-Stout Menomonie, WI Public M1
University of Wisconsin-Whitewater Whitewater, WI Public M1
University of Wyoming Laramie, WY Public R2
Upper Iowa University Fayette, IA Private M2
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Ursinus College Collegeville, PA Private BAS
Ursuline College Pepper Pike, OH Private M1
Utah State University Logan, UT Public R2
Utah Valley University Orem, UT Public M3
Utica College Utica, NY Private M1
Valdosta State University Valdosta, GA Public R3
Valparaiso University Valparaiso, IN Private M1
Vanderbilt University Nashville, TN Private R1
Vanguard University of Southern California Costa Mesa, CA Private M3
Vassar College Poughkeepsie, NY Private BAS
Villanova University Villanova, PA Private R3
Virginia Commonwealth University Richmond, VA Public R1
Virginia Military Institute Lexington, VA Public BAS
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Blacksburg, VA Public R1
Virginia State University Petersburg, VA Public M2
Virginia Union University Richmond, VA Private BAS
Virginia Wesleyan University Norfolk, VA Private BAS
Viterbo University La Crosse, WI Private M1
Wabash College Crawfordsville, IN Private BAS
Wagner College Staten Island, NY Private M2
Wake Forest University Winston-Salem, NC Private R2
Walla Walla University College Place, WA Private M2
Walsh University North Canton, OH Private M3
Warren Wilson College Swannanoa, NC Private BAS
Wartburg College Waverly, IA Private BAS
Washburn University Topeka, KS Public M2
Washington & Jefferson College Washington, PA Private BAS
Washington Adventist University Takoma Park, MD Private M2
Washington and Lee University Lexington, VA Private BAS
Washington College Chestertown, MD Private BAS
Washington State University Pullman, WA Public R1
Washington University in St Louis Saint Louis, MO Private R1
Wayland Baptist University Plainview, TX Private M1
Wayne State College Wayne, NE Public M2
Wayne State University Detroit, MI Public R1
Waynesburg University Waynesburg, PA Private M1
Weber State University Ogden, UT Public M1
Webster University Saint Louis, MO Private M1
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Wellesley College Wellesley, MA Private BAS
Wells College Aurora, NY Private BAS
Wentworth Institute of Technology Boston, MA Private M2
Wesleyan College Macon, GA Private BAS
Wesleyan University Middletown, CT Private BAS
West Chester University of Pennsylvania West Chester, PA Public M1
West Texas A&M University Canyon, TX Public M1
West Virginia State University Institute, WV Public BAS
West Virginia University Morgantown, WV Public R1
West Virginia Wesleyan College Buckhannon, WV Private M3
Western Carolina University Cullowhee, NC Public M1
Western Connecticut State University Danbury, CT Public M2
Western Governors University Salt Lake City, UT Private M1
Western Illinois University Macomb, IL Public M1
Western Kentucky University Bowling Green, KY Public M1
Western Michigan University Kalamazoo, MI Public R2
Western New England University Springfield, MA Private M2
Western New Mexico University Silver City, NM Public M2
Western Oregon University Monmouth, OR Public M2
Western State Colorado University Gunnison, CO Public M3
Western Washington University Bellingham, WA Public M1
Westfield State University Westfield, MA Public M2
Westminster College Salt Lake City, UT Private M1
Westminster College Fulton, MO Private BAS
Westminster College New Wilmington, PA Private BAS
Westmont College Santa Barbara, CA Private BAS
Wheaton College Norton, MA Private BAS
Wheaton College Wheaton, IL Private BAS
Wheeling Jesuit University Wheeling, WV Private M2
Wheelock College Boston, MA Private M2
Whitman College Walla Walla, WA Private BAS
Whittier College Whittier, CA Private BAS
Whitworth University Spokane, WA Private M3
Wichita State University Wichita, KS Public R2
Widener University Chester, PA Private R3
Wilkes University Wilkes-Barre, PA Private M1
Willamette University Salem, OR Private BAS
William Carey University Hattiesburg, MS Private M1
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William Jewell College Liberty, MO Private BAS
William Paterson University of New Jersey Wayne, NJ Public M1
William Peace University Raleigh, NC Private BAS
William Penn University Oskaloosa, IA Private M3
William Woods University Fulton, MO Private M1
Williams College Williamstown, MA Private BAS
Wilmington University New Castle, DE Private R3
Wingate University Wingate, NC Private M2
Winona State University Winona, MN Public M2
Winston-Salem State University Winston-Salem, NC Public M2
Winthrop University Rock Hill, SC Public M1
Wittenberg University Springfield, OH Private BAS
Wofford College Spartanburg, SC Private BAS
Woodbury University Burbank, CA Private M2
Worcester Polytechnic Institute Worcester, MA Private R2
Worcester State University Worcester, MA Public M1
Wright State University-Main Campus Dayton, OH Public R3
Xavier University Cincinnati, OH Private M1
Xavier University of Louisiana New Orleans, LA Private M3
Yale University New Haven, CT Private R1
Yeshiva University New York, NY Private R2
York College of Pennsylvania York, PA Private M3
Young Harris College Young Harris, GA Private BAS
Youngstown State University Youngstown, OH Public M1
Appendix B: Land Grant Institutions
Land-grant universities and colleges listed alphabetically for the three assigned 
legislative-year funding groups, state or territory, and institution (National Institute of 
Food and Agriculture 2019c; IPEDS 2020). There is currently a total of 113 institutions. 
Note that the year-groups do not necessarily correspond to year of establishment or 
authorization of land-grant status; for each group, some institutions were in the initial 
authorized set at the time of the legislation and others were added later. See Figure B9 
for a map.
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1 1862 Alabama Auburn University
2 1862 Alaska University of Alaska Fairbanks
3 1862 American Samoa (AS) American Samoa Community College
4 1862 Arizona University of Arizona
5 1862 Arkansas University of Arkansas
6a 1862 California* University of California-Berkeley*
6b 1862 California* University of California-Davis*
6c 1862 California* University of California-Riverside*
7 1862 Colorado Colorado State University-Fort Collins
8 1862 Connecticut University of Connecticut
9 1862 Delaware University of Delaware
10 1862 District of Columbia (DC) University of the District of Columbia
11 1862 Federated States of Micronesia (FM) College of Micronesia-FSM
12 1862 Florida University of Florida
13 1862 Georgia University of Georgia
14 1862 Guam (GU) University of Guam
15 1862 Hawaii University of Hawaii at Manoa
16 1862 Idaho University of Idaho
17 1862 Illinois University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
18 1862 Indiana Purdue University-Main Campus
19 1862 Iowa Iowa State University
20 1862 Kansas Kansas State University
21 1862 Kentucky University of Kentucky
22 1862 Louisiana Louisiana State University and A&M College
23 1862 Maine University of Maine
24 1862 Maryland University of Maryland-College Park
25 1862 Massachusetts University of Massachusetts-Amherst
26 1862 Michigan Michigan State University
27 1862 Minnesota University of Minnesota-Twin Cities
28 1862 Mississippi Mississippi State University
29 1862 Missouri University of Missouri-Columbia
30 1862 Montana Montana State University
31 1862 Nebraska University of Nebraska-Lincoln
32 1862 Nevada University of Nevada-Reno
33 1862 New Hampshire University of New Hampshire-Main Campus
34 1862 New Jersey Rutgers University-New Brunswick
35 1862 New Mexico New Mexico State University-Main Campus
36 1862 New York Cornell University
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37 1862 North Carolina North Carolina State University at Raleigh
38 1862 North Dakota North Dakota State University-Main Campus
39 1862 Northern Mariana Islands (NP) Northern Marianas College
40 1862 Ohio The Ohio State University-Main Campus
41 1862 Oklahoma Oklahoma State University-Main Campus
42 1862 Oregon Oregon State University
43 1862 Pennsylvania Pennsylvania State University-Main Campus
44 1862 Puerto Rico (PR) University of Puerto Rico-Mayaguez
45 1862 Rhode Island University of Rhode Island
46 1862 South Carolina Clemson University
47 1862 South Dakota South Dakota State University
48 1862 Tennessee The University of Tennessee-Knoxville
49 1862 Texas Texas A&M University-College Station
50 1862 Utah Utah State University
51 1862 Vermont University of Vermont
52 1862 Virgin Islands (VI) University of the Virgin Islands
53 1862 Virginia Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University
54 1862 Washington Washington State University
55 1862 West Virginia West Virginia University
56 1862 Wisconsin University of Wisconsin-Madison
57 1862 Wyoming University of Wyoming
1 1890 Alabama Alabama A&M University
2 1890 Alabama Tuskegee University
3 1890 Arkansas University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff
4 1890 Delaware Delaware State University
5 1890 Florida Florida Agricultural and Mechanical 
University
6 1890 Georgia Fort Valley State University
7 1890 Kentucky Kentucky State University
8 1890 Louisiana Southern University and A&M College
9 1890 Maryland University of Maryland-Eastern Shore
10 1890 Mississippi Alcorn State University
11 1890 Missouri Lincoln University
12 1890 North Carolina North Carolina A & T State University
13 1890 Ohio Central State University
14 1890 Oklahoma Langston University
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15 1890 South Carolina South Carolina State University
16 1890 Tennessee Tennessee State University
17 1890 Texas Prairie View A&M University
18 1890 Virginia Virginia State University
19 1890 West Virginia West Virginia State University
1 1994 Alaska Ilisagvik College
2 1994 Arizona Diné College
3 1994 Arizona Tohono O’odham Community College
4 1994 Kansas Haskell Indian Nations University
5 1994 Michigan Bay Mills Community College
6 1994 Michigan Keweenaw Bay Ojibwa Community College
7 1994 Michigan Saginaw Chippewa Tribal College
8 1994 Minnesota Fond du Lac Tribal and Community College
9 1994 Minnesota Leech Lake Tribal College
10 1994 Minnesota Red Lake Nation College
11 1994 Minnesota White Earth Tribal and Community College
12 1994 Montana Aaniiih Nakoda College
13 1994 Montana Blackfeet Community College
14 1994 Montana Chief Dull Knife College
15 1994 Montana Fort Peck Community College
16 1994 Montana Little Big Horn College
17 1994 Montana Salish Kootenai College
18 1994 Montana Stone Child College
19 1994 Nebraska Little Priest Tribal College
20 1994 Nebraska Nebraska Indian Community College
21 1994 New Mexico Institute of American Indian Arts
22 1994 New Mexico Navajo Technical University
23 1994 New Mexico Southwestern Indian Polytechnic Institute
24 1994 North Dakota Cankdeska Cikana Community College
25 1994 North Dakota Nueta Hidatsa Sahnish College
26 1994 North Dakota Sitting Bull College
27 1994 North Dakota Turtle Mountain Community College
28 1994 North Dakota United Tribes Technical College
29 1994 Oklahoma College of the Muscogee Nation
30 1994 South Dakota Oglala Lakota College
31 1994 South Dakota Sinte Gleska University
32 1994 South Dakota Sisseton Wahpeton College
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33 1994 Washington Northwest Indian College
34 1994 Wisconsin College of the Menominee Nation
35 1994 Wisconsin Lac Courte Oreilles Ojibwa Community 
College
*The University of California System is the designated land-grant institution for California; in practice, land-
grant activities are associated with UC-Berkeley, UC-Davis and UC-Riverside.
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1.1 Schematic of the six major functional elements of the university. 8
1.2 Number of public and private institutions in each Carnegie category of the data 
set used for analysis. See text for details. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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1.3 All 1174 universities and colleges in the data set, showing location, Carnegie 




2.1 Average total institutional budget (FY2017 non-hospital revenues) for the 
universities and colleges in the data set, by Carnegie classification and control. 
Source: IPEDS (2020).
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2.2 FY2017 total non-hospital revenues compared to total FTE employees (upper) 
and twelve-month FTE student enrollment (lower) by Carnegie classification 
and control. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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2.3 FY1987 and FY2017 total Fall enrollment (i.e., headcount, including part-time 
and full-time) of undergraduate students and graduate and first professional 
(e.g., JD, MD) students, averaged by Carnegie classification and control. 
Source: IPEDS (2020).
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2.4 Growth in total enrollment (all undergraduate, graduate and first professional 
students) relative to FY1987, averaged by Carnegie classification and control. 
The vertical bar indicates the onset of the Great Recession. Source: IPEDS 
(2020).
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2.5 Trends in revenues and expenses (current dollars not adjusted for inflation or 
enrollment) by fiscal year averaged across the four public and private institution 
types. The vertical bar indicates the onset of the Great Recession. Source: IPEDS 
(2020).
20
2.6 Share of FY2017 non-hospital revenues averaged across types of public and 
private institutions. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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2.7 Share of FY2017 non-hospital revenues averaged by Carnegie classification and 
control. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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2.8 Published FY2018 annual undergraduate tuition and required fees by control 
and Carnegie classification, showing in-state tuition as well as combined 
additional tuition and fees for out-of-state students for the public institutions. 
Source: IPEDS (2020).
25
2.9 Inflation-adjusted trends in published annual undergraduate tuition and 
required fees at public (in-state and out-of-state amounts) and private 
institutions, FY1964–2018, in 2016 dollars. Prior to FY1988, private institution 
data include for-profit institutions. The vertical bar indicates the onset of the 
Great Recession. Source: NCES Digest (National Center for Education Statistics 
2016) for pre-FY1988 data and IPEDS (2020).
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2.10 Percentages of FY2016 gross tuition and fee budget (all degree levels) comprised 
of net tuition and fee revenue and associated financial aid expenditures, 
averaged across types of institutions. Source: IPEDS (2020).
27
2.11 Average FY2016 aid discounts (for all degree levels) averaged by Carnegie 
classification and control. Unrestricted and restricted institutional aid comprise 
the total institutional aid; Pell grants and other federal, state and local grants 
comprise government aid. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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2.12 FY2017 core revenues per full-time equivalent (FTE) student enrollment 
averaged by control and Carnegie classification. Source: IPEDS (2020).
29
2.13 Trends in core revenues per FTE of student enrollment (2016 dollars) by fiscal 
year, averaged across public institutions (upper panel) and private institutions 
(lower panel). The vertical bar indicates the onset of the Great Recession. Gifts 
and investment return at public institutions were combined with other core 
revenue prior to FY2010; dashed lines indicate estimated amounts based on 
their FY2010 proportions. Investment return amounts below zero (losses) in 
FY2009 and FY2016 at private institutions are indicated in italics within the 
chart. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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2.14 Trends in total core revenues per FTE of student enrollment (2016 dollars) by 
fiscal year, averaged across public institutions and private institutions. The 
vertical bar indicates the onset of the Great Recession. Source: IPEDS (2020).
31
2.15 Types of university revenue funds. Restricted funds are limited to externally 
stipulated uses. Unrestricted funds can be used for the general running of the 
institution. Some unrestricted funds may be designated by the university for 
special purposes.
33
2.16 Revenues broadly associated with primary activity (the educational mission) 
provide necessary leverage to enable other activities and their associated 
revenues. Revenue segments are for R1 public institutions illustrated in 2.7
35
2.17 Fall 2016 first-time undergraduate enrollment percentage mix of in-state, out-
of-state and international students at institutions, averaged by control and 




3.1 Percentages of FY2017 non-hospital expenditures averaged across institution 
types, by nature of expense. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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3.2 Percentages of FY2017 non-hospital expenditures averaged across institution 
types, by function of expense. Source: IPEDS (2020).
40
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4. Public Funding: Grant Aid, Loans and Appropriations
4.1 Public higher education funding flows with arrow thickness scaled to FY2012. 
State funding includes appropriations as well as grants and contracts for 
research. Federal and state flows represent aid to undergraduates. Federal 
grants to states include only higher education programs related to affordability. 
Land-grant appropriations and federally funded research projects are included 
as part of the funding from the Federal Government. Benefits from tax credits 
and deductions for higher education are not included. Source: redrafted from 
GAO (US Government Accountability Office 2014), Public domain, https://
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-151.
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College Board (Baum et al. 2017).
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4.4 State grant aid per FTE (in-state and out-of-state) undergraduate in 2015 
dollars by academic year. The wider shaded bar indicates the onset of the Great 
Recession. Source: College Board (Baum et al. 2017).
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from federal (upper panel) and state and local sources (lower panel), averaged 
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size and color for easier comparison. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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and by average amount per student receiving an award (lower panel) from 
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4.9 FY2016 loan aid to first-time full-time (FTFT) undergraduates by average 
amount per student awarded and by percentage of students awarded from 
federal (upper panel) and all sources (lower panel), averaged by Carnegie 
classification and control. Categories are differentiated by circle size and color 
for easier comparison. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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4.10 FY2016 other non-federal student loan aid to first-time full-time (FTFT) 
undergraduates by average amount per student awarded and by percentage of 
students awarded, averaged by Carnegie classification and control. Categories 
are differentiated by circle size and color for easier comparison. As a reference 
to highlight the different scales of these other loan data, the federal loan data 
from Figure 4.9 are plotted in the gray rectangle corresponding to the axis 
ranges used in that figure. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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4.11 Trends in student loan aid (by fiscal years in 2016 dollars) awarded to first-time 
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panel) and by average amount per student receiving an award (lower panel) 
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Loan data broken out by category are only available from FY2008 onwards. 
Source: IPEDS (2020).
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State University, Center for the Study of Education Policy 2018); SHEEO-SHEF 
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for the Study of Education Policy 2018); SHEEO-SHEF (2017) for FY2000–2017.
77
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for appropriations: Snyder (1993) for FY1930–1959, odd years interpolated 
from even years; Grapevine for FY1960–1999 (Illinois State University, Center 
for the Study of Education Policy 2018); SHEEO-SHEF (2017) for FY2000–2017. 
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2018b).
77
Like Nobody's Business434 
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part-time) by using the average 2004–2006 ratio of the two for each Carnegie 
group. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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ratio of the two for each Carnegie group. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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8.6 FY2017 federal higher education research and development expenditures as 
shares (left) and total dollars (right), by agency and field. Source: NSF HERD 
(National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering 
Statistics 2018a).
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8.7 Percent of faculty respondents reporting a substantial (some to very much) 
workload for those that experience the listed research compliance responsibility. 
Source: FDP (Schneider et al. 2014).
218
8.8 Gross license income averaged for public and private institutions by quintile 
of all R1 institutions in FY2015, FY2016 and FY2017 (current dollars). Source: 
AUTM (2020).
219
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at a land grant university. Percentage ranges in parentheses are from APLU 
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are excluded.
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(“everything else”) per gross square foot for a variety of campus building types 
from a 2016 study. Source: D’Angelo (2016).
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calculated as the average of high and low values within the city limits of 20 
US cities. Land, permits and other soft costs are excluded. Source: Cumming 
Corporation (2019).
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higher education. Source: Gordian (2018).
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10.5 FY2018 institutional debt (left axis) and interest on debt (right axis, note 
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Service (Shaffer 2019).
248
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10.9 Trends in simple liquidity ratios averaged by Carnegie classification and 
control. Note that the vertical scale in the upper panel (Private) is 4X the lower 
panel (Public); see text for details. Source: IPEDS (2020).
250
10.10 The ultimate academic accolade at UC Berkeley, winning a special reserved 
parking space along with the Nobel Prize. Source: De Comité (2017), Flickr, CC 
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11. Health Sciences, Hospitals & Medical Schools
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classification and control. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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control. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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11.5 Trends in the shares of three revenue sources for US medical schools, FY1977 
to FY2018. Source: AAMC (Association of American Medical Colleges 2019c).
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11.6 FY2018 total compensation averages for medical school faculty members (MD 
or equivalent) by rank and sorted by decreasing department/specialty average. 
Source: AAMC (Association of American Medical Colleges 2019a).
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conditions for the top 50 of 292 categories. Source: NIH (National Institutes of 
Health 2020b).
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combined. Source: NIH (National Institutes of Health 2020c).
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Postsecondary Education 2020).
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12.7 FY2003 and FY2018 total institutional athletics expenditures per student athlete 
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Postsecondary Education 2020).
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12.11 FY2019 football and men’s basketball head coach pay for the NCAA Division I 
FBS Power Five conferences, including base institutional salary, bonuses paid 
and athletically related compensation from non-university sources. Source: 
USA Today (2020a; 2020b).
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12.12 Trends in inflation-adjusted average institutional head coach salary across all 
sports by athletic association, division, and subdivision. Source: EADA (Office 
of Postsecondary Education 2020).
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13.1 FY2018 gifts averaged per decile by Carnegie classification and control. Source: 
IPEDS (2020).
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13.2 FY2018 gifts per full-time equivalent student averaged per decile by Carnegie 
classification and control. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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13.3 Growth in inflation-adjusted total gifts averaged for the two smallest Carnegie 
classifications of private institution and for all other public and private 
institution types, by fiscal year. Values for 1997 and 1998 at private institutions 
are interpolated at the average rate of neighboring years; the average for other 
institutions is weighted by the number in each type. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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13.4 Seven decades of voluntary support for degree-granting postsecondary 
institutions by source of gift, in FY2016 dollars. Sources: NCES (National 
Center for Education Statistics 2018e) and CASE (Council for Advancement 
and Support of Education 2020).
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13.5 FY2018 distribution of gifts to higher education institutions by purpose. Source: 
CASE (Council for Advancement and Support of Education 2019; 2020).
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13.6 FY2018 endowments averaged per decile by Carnegie classification and control. 
Source: IPEDS (2020).
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13.7 Top 25 FY2018 university endowments and their cumulative share of all 
endowments in the data set. Amounts are for the main campus location and 
do not include branch campuses reporting separately. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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13.8 FY2018 endowment per full-time equivalent student averaged per decile by 
Carnegie classification and control. Source: IPEDS (2020).
296
13.9 Top 25 FY2018 university endowments per full-time equivalent student and their 
cumulative share of all values in the data set, shaded by Carnegie classification 
(all are private institutions). Amounts are for the main campus location and do 
not include branch campuses reporting separately. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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13.10 Growth in inflation-adjusted endowment per full-time equivalent student, by 
fiscal year, with averages for public and private institutions weighted by the 
number of institutions in each Carnegie classification. Values for 1990 at both 
types of institution and for 2002 at public institutions are interpolated as the 
average of neighboring years, while the 1997–2002 gap at private institutions 
is interpolated proportional to the public institutions. Source: IPEDS (2020).
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13.11 Performance of an example endowment started in 1980 (upper panel) shown as 
a simple investment with returns tracking the S&P 500 index and as a revenue-
generating endowment fund, and as components of the example endowment 
(lower panel) including annual return, payout, investment management 
fees, and a surplus (or deficit) for reinvestment (or withdrawal). Amounts 
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portfolio highlighted. Source: Grantham (2018).
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(Investing.com 2020).
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(Council for Advancement and Support of Education 2019).
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donors. Source: CASE (Council for Advancement and Support of Education 
2019).
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14.1 2018 median earnings and estimated tax payments of full-time year-round 
employees aged 25 and older, by education level. Estimated taxes paid at each 
income level include federal income, social security, Medicare, state and local 
income, sales, and property. Source: College Board (Ma et al. 2019).
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Bank of New York 2019).
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pre-college, college, and post-college factors, for bachelor’s degree recipients 
representing a broad range of institutions four years and ten years after 
graduation. Source: Witteveen and Attewell (2017b).
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14.6 Overlapping distribution of 25th and 75th percentile SAT (Math + Verbal) scores 
by institution rank in the 2014 US News & World Report rankings of National 
Universities and Liberal Arts Colleges, including percent variance explained 
(R2) for each. ACT scores were converted to SAT equivalents where applicable. 
Note that tied ranks have a corresponding number of neighboring missing 
ranks. Source: Wai et al. (2018a).
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14.7 Summary of the strength of selected statistical relationships between 
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literature of scholarly articles. See text for details.
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B1 Seals of the universities of Bologna (left) and Padua (right) including the year 
that each was established. Sources: University of Bologna, Image by Malinion 
(2016), Wikimedia, Public Domain, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/
commons/d/d0/Seal_of_the_University_of_Bologna.svg, and University of 




B2 The eight US universities with the highest revenues in FY2016 that exceeded the 
Fortune 500 threshold of $5.4B. Source: IPEDS (2020).
16
3. Institutional Expenditures
B3 Decade averages of annual percentage change in the Higher Education Price 
Index (HEPI) and inflation-adjusted National Healthcare Expenditures (NHE) 
per capita. Sources: Commonfund Institute (2017a) and CMS (US Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services 2018).
54
B4 Degrees conferred (bachelor’s, master’s and doctor’s) by postsecondary 
institutions per academic year and citable documents published in all subject 
areas in the SCOPUS database per calendar year, both for the United States. 
Sources: IPEDS (2020) and SCImago (2018).
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5. Human Resources
B5 Simplified typology of faculty titles at US universities. 99
6. Academic Affairs
B6 This photograph from July 1, 2006 shows the County Theater in Doylestown, 
Pennsylvania, a glorious art deco building from 1938 that is still showing 




B7 Reasons cited for leaving higher education by students in the 2003–04 cohort 
of the Beginning Postsecondary Students Longitudinal Study who had left 
without a degree by 2008–09. Note the relatively low frequency of academic 
problems. Source: Delta Cost Project (Johnson 2012).
178
8. Research
B8 Overall research grant funding success rates at NIH and NSF (left) and 
associated proposal and award counts (right). NIH data show similar patterns 
for research project grants and all R01-equivalent grants, therefore they are 
combined here. Sources: NIH (National Institutes of Health 2018) and NSF 
(National Science Foundation 2018).
208
9. Public Service, Cooperative Extension,  
and Community Engagement
B9 Land-grant universities and colleges in the three legislation-year funding 
groups. Note that these year groups do not necessarily correspond to year 
of establishment or authorization of land-grant status. Alaska and the Pacific 
and Caribbean island states and territories are not to scale. See Appendix B for 
a detailed listing. Sources: IPEDS (2020) and National Institute of Food and 
Agriculture (2019c).
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12. Athletics
B.10 Athletic association, division and subdivision membership in FY2018, by 
Carnegie classification and control. Source: EADA (Office of Postsecondary 
Education 2020).
273
B.11 NCAA Division I FBS conference membership for football (FB) and basketball 





2.1 An illustrative estimate of the net tuition and fee revenue impact of in-state 
versus out-of-state students. See text for explanation.
37
5. Human Resources
5.1 Non-instructional support staff categories and selected examples of occupations 
and fields. Sources: IPEDS (2020) and US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010).
108
6. Academic Affairs
6.1 Example annual college budget, showing major categories of revenues and 
expenditures, including shares of revenue and institutional costs. See text for 
explanations.
120
6.2 Example of the layers of cross-subsidization across disciplines. Amounts are in 
dollars per student credit hour (SCH).
129




8.1 Example of a simple one-year research grant budget, showing major categories 
including direct and indirect costs. See text for explanations.
211
8.2 Example comparative annual costs of graduate research assistants (for public 
and private institutions) and postdoctoral scholars. Round-number estimates 
of tuition are from Figure 2.8 with graduate and postdoc stipends rounded 
from FY2018 NIH rates (twelve-month).
216
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9. Public Service, Cooperative Extension,  
and Community Engagement
9.1 Example operating budget for a moderate to large university performing arts 
center. Note that major capital and facilities costs are excluded.
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10. Facilities & Finance
10.1 Examples of institutional functions and services that may be provided through 
public-private partnerships.
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14. Outcomes & Futures
14.1 Simplified calculation of a university economic impact estimate. Dollar amounts 
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